With regard to the sale of property to the defendant by Dvir Amar, it was clear that Dvir Amar should have obtained the consent of the heirs, insofar as he wished to sell the property to the defendant. This arises explicitly from the language of the power of attorney, and in this context, we are relied upon by the versions of Moshe Einhorn and Yosef Mandel, which were supported by the words of Adv. Yativ. In our opinion, the defendant understood that this was a weak point, and that the agreement might turn out to be invalid or forged in court. Therefore, there is no room to accept the defense's argument that the defendant was sure of his righteousness and therefore did not feel disturbed by the legal proceedings taken against him by the deceased.
With regard to appealing to Torah law and holding a hearing in a court of justice, here too we unquestionably prefer the versions of Moshe Einhorn and Yosef Mandel and reject the defendant's version on this matter outright as a false version. It is not impossible that the defendant understood that he would not have the upper hand in the District Court within the scope of the claim he filed, and his claim would not succeed. It is possible that he preferred not to confront the deceased at all, and therefore tried to escape in another proceeding. However, the defendant did not understand how he requested the dismissal of the lawsuit as a whole after he saw fit to sue additional defendants, whom he did not intend to summon to Torah law. It is possible that the defendant believed that if he succeeded in a court of justice, vis-à-vis Moshe Einhorn and Yosef Mandel, he would be able to derive a secondary benefit from this success against the other defendants as well. Apparently, he did not anticipate that the two would refuse to litigate in a court of justice, and he did not imagine that Moshe Einhorn would refrain from appearing even though he had been summoned. The defendant's plans did not bear fruit, and even this would certainly have aroused his wrath.