(b) The court may order a person to allow a receiver to enter the premises in which he is in custody for the purpose of carrying out the actions specified in the order given in accordance with sub-regulation (a) (hereinafter - an order to enter the premises).
(c) The court may authorize a receiver to perform, inter alia, all or some of the following actions:
(1) entering the premises for the purpose of searching or seizing the properties;
(2) to search for the assets;
(3) photograph or copy the assets;
(4) seize the assets;
(5) Possession of assets;
(6) to retain or insure the assets;
(7) managing the assets;
(8) To exercise the powers of the property owner, in whole or in part.
(d) If a receiver is appointed in accordance with this Regulation, the provisions of Regulations 389, 390, 391 and 392 shall apply."
- Following the normative determination of President Shamgar (see: paragraph 49 above), that Section 53 The Execution Law does not negate the court's authority to appoint a receiver, after a judgment, by virtue of Regulation 388 The question arises spontaneously, as posed by President Meir Shamgar:We must delve deeper and examine what is the scope of considerations for granting honest relief." (פרשת Roth, Name, on page 114, at the bottom of the page).
- After presenting the various trends in the theory of civil procedure, namely: the trend of stability, which limits the judge's discretion, as opposed to the trend that sees the procedure as an instrument for discovering the truth and doing justice, which expands the flexibility of the judge ( Roth, Name, at p. 115, opposite letter A), President Shamgar explains that remedies of equity (including: the remedy of appointing a receiver, in the framework of an act of good faith), "They do not add new rights to the party to the proceeding, but rather their purpose is to assist in the realization of rights that exist in the law." (Name, Name, in front of the letter D). Therefore, within the framework of the trend of expansion and flexibility of the legal procedures, President Shamgar comes to the conclusion that "It is only natural that when it appears that the substantive proceeding has not succeeded in granting the appropriate remedy to the case at hand, the courts should extend their hand to the entitled person to provide him with the just and convenient remedy in the circumstances of the case." (Name, Name, between the letters 4-5).
- However, even President Shamgar - as someone who for many years was entrusted with the management of public systems (in his duties, as Military Advocate General, Legal Advisor to the Defense Establishment, Attorney General, and for about a dozen years as President of the Supreme Court) - understands that it is not possible to allow every person, in any situation, to choose the path of appointing a receiver within the framework of the District Court, when there is an organizational system, whose sole function is to enforce judgments. That is, the execution. Therefore, President Shamgar states that "to a place where the injured person may come to his correction on the way to the king [i.e., the Execution Office]The court is not required to pave for him a way of exchange, even if this path is more convenient and just." (פרשת Roth, Name, Name, in front of the letter V).
- In order not to go into too much detail in the quotes from Parashat Roth, I saw fit to present the summary of the ruling, which includes the court's considerations regarding the appointment of a receiver, according to Regulation 388, as opposed to "regular" execution proceedings, as summarized by President Uri Goren, in his aforementioned book (Name, at p. 587):
"The scope of the receiver's actions by way of 'dishonest execution' is wide. It is appropriate that when granting this remedy, the courts should consider the following considerations: