(a) The period of time in respect of which the receivership order was issued: It is appropriate that the appointment of receivers by way of 'execution of good faith' should be done for a fixed and defined period of time;
(b) The honest receiver, as opposed to a receiver under the Bankruptcy Ordinance [New Version] or the Companies Ordinance [New Version], is not a receiver of the legal body (the debtor), but of its assets. The receiver in the 'Execution of Honesty' does not deprive the debtor of his ability to carry out legal actions;
(c) The burden on the courts is certainly a relevant consideration that the court must take into account in the framework of its considerations prior to the exercise of the powers of appointment."
- At the beginning of the legal analysis, we saw - on the basis of the words of President Shamgar in the Roth - The difference between a receiver before a judgment, and a receiver after a judgment (see: paragraph 42 above). However, it should be noted that there have been developments in case law regarding the scope of the discretion to appoint a receiver Before Judgment. In my estimation, this ruling is based on interpretation Regulation 388 to the SDA regulations, even when it comes to receivership After Rendering the judgment, in the manner in which Regulation 388 Expansive interpretation, when a regulation is applied in relation to receivership After Rendering a judgment, and this, all the more so: if a receiver Before Rendering a judgment has broad powers, when it is not yet clear what the outcome of the proceeding will be, let alone that the receiver's powers should be expanded After The judgment, when the applicant holds the judgment in his hand, and not just a statement of claim.
- Shortly after the second Independence Day of the State of Israel, on May 24, 1949, Justice Dr. Menachem Dunkelblum (who, according to him, the justices - who were later appointed, each at the time, as acting President of the Supreme Court - Dr. Shneur Zalman Cheshin and Dr. Moshe Silberg) agreed to a judgment in an appeal filed even before the establishment of the State. Civil Appeal 224/47 Eng. A.D. Tahoresh and his brothers, Jerusalem v. Yaakov Shchupak, Piskei Din 2 414 (hereinafter - "Parashat Thorg"). In the same case, on July 23, 1947, the Tel Aviv District Court appointed Adv. Pinchas Rabinovich of Jerusalem as a temporary receiver of assets, at the request of the respondents, who claimed that the appellants manufactured and sold aluminum products in accordance with the respondents' patent, and did not provide them with reports and accounts on the sales, despite the agreement between them. The plaintiffs in the District Court (the respondents in the appeal) petitioned to obligate the defendants (the appellants) to provide full accounts and to pay them the amount that would be due according to the accounts. In this framework, the plaintiffs sought to appoint an asset receiver who would manage the defendants' workshop, and this "In order to prevent the distortion of accounts and smuggling of property by the defendants, and for the purpose of supervising the aluminum windows and their parts manufactured and manufactured by the defendants, according to the aforementioned patent and in accordance with the aforementioned agreement." (As quoted in Piskei Din II, at p. 415, opposite the letter Z).
Initially, the District Court did not grant the request, since the agreement and the conditions of manufacture of the windows according to the patent had not been proven, and also due to an additional reason, in which the Tel Aviv District Court noted that it was not convinced that there was a danger of property smuggling on the part of the defendants (ibid., at p. 416).