At the same time, even when I come to the conclusion that there is room, as stated, to expand the Tahoresh rule, I am of the opinion that there is no doubt that most of the cases in which a receiver should be appointed are the cases that fall within the three categories set out in the Tahoresh case. The essence of the appointment is the preservation of known assets, whether in order to ensure the enjoyment thereof or in order to prevent their disposal or destruction, when the methods of execution or other remedies are not useful. In any event, there is no room for a sweeping order to appoint a receiver over all of the debtor's property and all of his actions, an order that borders, as aforesaid, to a declaration of bankruptcy, and this in our case at a stage where the debts, for which the order is sought and in respect of which it was given, have not yet been even prima facie proven."
- Following this, and after analyzing the facts in that judgment (a matter that deviates from this decision), Justice Etzioni summarizes his opinion in that judgment, with the following words (the Bosmat , Name, at p. 295, between the letters 4-5):
"My final conclusion is therefore that the precedent in the Tahoresh case should not be regarded as an exhaustive definition of the purposes of appointing a receiver, and although I am of the opinion that there may be other cases in which it is possible to appoint a receiver, cases that do not fall within the scope of the three cases listed in the Tahoresh ruling, the appointment of the receiver in the case before us is not included in them. My opinion is therefore that the appeal should be accepted and the order appointing the receiver should be cancelled."
- Justice (later the President) Moshe Landau also refers to the expansion of the authority to appoint a temporary receiver, and says the following ( Bosmat ,Name, at pp. 295-296):
"As my esteemed colleague, Justice Etzioni, has explained, a receiver order will usually be issued in accordance with Regulation 264 [today: Regulation 388] for the purpose of safeguarding certain property or assets in order to ensure the enjoyment or income from them to the plaintiff or the creditor pursuant to a judgment, or to prevent the disappearance or destruction of assets over which a dispute has been made. There may also be circumstances in which it is appropriate to appoint a receiver for the purpose of 'dishonest execution', that is, when the usual means of execution are not sufficient to guarantee the rights of a winner according to a judgment. My colleague gave an example of this in a foreclosure on shares. Another example was in the matter discussed in the Cohen-Reich case.