I also agree not to see this as an exhaustive definition of the purposes for which the order will be granted, and to leave an opening for a ruling in the future for the issuance of the order in other appropriate circumstances as well. But in any event - and this too my honorable colleague has already explained - the order will not be issued in a sweeping order on all the assets of the defendant or the debtor according to a judgment, nor as a search warrant for the purpose of discovering the defendant's assets, and in general it will not even be issued when the plaintiff or the winner according to a judgment can satisfy him by way of requesting other relief, such as the imposition of a temporary foreclosure or the methods of execution under the Writ of Execution Law. 1967. Sections 53 and onwards of the Execution Law now contain detailed provisions for the appointment of a receiver for the purpose of executing a judgment - also only for a specific asset.
In the matter discussed in the Tahoresh case, the plaintiff sued on the basis of a partnership agreement in the exploitation of a patent, and from what was stated at the end of the judgment (at p. 420, letters 2-c) it is implied that if proof of the danger of destruction or disappearance of the property (the aluminum windows manufactured according to the patent and the inventory in the possession of the defendants), this court might have approved the appointment of the receiver there as well."
Justice Berenson agreed with the judgment of Justice Landau (ibid., at p. 296, opposite letter E).
- In Parashat Rotem Judge Shlomo Levin discussed the issue we are dealing with now, in the framework of the sixth and seventh paragraphs of his judgment, entitled "Order for the Appointment of a Temporary Receiver - The Considerations" (פרשת RotemIsrSC 42(4), at pp. 689-691:
“)a) As is well known, the court was prima facie given broad scope to appoint a receiver within the scope of Regulation 388(a) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984 - 'if it deems it just and convenient'; the powers that can be granted to a receiver are also very broad (see the four subparagraphs of Regulation 388(a) and Regulation 388(b)). However, legal restrictions were imposed on the manner in which discretion was exercised, some for historical reasons and some for practical reasons. The basis of the remedy for the appointment of a receiver is in the laws of equity, and according to these laws it was customary to use it to protect property that is the subject of dispute during a dispute pending in court, in order to preserve property that is in danger of destruction by persons to whom the property was legally delivered or by persons who have a direct but partial right to that property, and for the purpose of dishonest execution. At the time, it was ruled in England that even after the legal union of 1873, the courts were not allowed to make use of their authority in cases where they were not permitted to do so before the union: in Harris v. Beauchamp Brothers (1894) . For these reasons, the Supreme Court in the Tahoresh case refused to uphold a temporary receivership order issued by the District Court in the following circumstances: The plaintiffs, who were patent holders, entered into a contract with the defendants, in order for them to manufacture the product that is the subject of the patent, sell it and pay the plaintiffs 7.5 percent of the sale proceeds; According to the plaintiffs, the defendants refrained from reporting to them the products sold, and therefore they filed an action against the defendants for the provision of bills and payment of the sums due to them according to the accounts. and in Gedera they were given a temporary receivership order regarding the defendants' workshop and its contents. In accepting the appeal, the Supreme Court noted that in fact the plaintiffs' claim is financial, and they do not claim any right whatsoever in the assets over which the receiver was appointed; With regard to monetary claims, the plaintiffs were entitled to petition for a foreclosure order, and the court's attention was not drawn to any precedent that justified the appointment of a receiver in the circumstances in which he was appointed and in deviation from the English rules. At the end of its judgment, the court noted that it had not been proven in the case before it that there was a danger to any property on which the receiver was appointed.