Subsequently, it was held in the Nashashibi case that the test for the purpose of imposing personal liability on an organ of a company, including an officer thereof:
"It is the same ordinary test that exists in tort law, i.e., the existence of the elements of the tort (see: The Tzuk Or case, supra, at p. 697; Civil Appeal Authority 7875/06 Saltz v. Hachsharat HaYishuv Insurance Company in a Tax Appeal (published in Nevo, November 29, 2009) at paragraph 12) However, the applicant must impose personal liability on an organ or officer of the company, there is a duty to point out a specific cause of action against the organ or officer and to lay an evidentiary foundation from which it emerges that the organ or officer has fulfilled its foundations. Otherwise, it may be possible to be repaid from the company, but not from the organ or the officer (see: Civil Appeal 2273/02 Statue Company in a Tax Appeal v. The General Cooperative Workers' Company in Eretz Yisrael Ltd., IsrSC 58(2) 36, 43 (2003); the Zeltz case, supra, at paragraph 12)" (paragraph 48 of the judgment of the Honorable Justice Danziger).
Similarly, other municipal applications 2792/03 Eliezer Yitzhari v. Tal Import [Nevo] (14 December 2006) held that:
"The judgment of the District Court indicates that the appellant served as a manager or director of the printing companies that did not repay their debts to the respondent. The printing companies constitute a separate legal entity. However, in accordance with the personal liability model, an organ in a company cannot hide behind the separate legal personality of the company, where he himself committed an act of tort against a creditor of the company (Civil Appeal 725/78 British Canadian Builders in Tax Appeal v. Oren, IsrSC 35(4) 253, 266). The Honorable Justice (as he was then called) Barak discussed in the Roundknife case: "The basic principle of tort law is that whoever upholds the foundations of the tort is responsible for his own actions. The status of the wrongdoer in the administrative or executive hierarchy does not absolve the wrongdoer of his responsibility. Therefore, the mere fact that a person commits a tort not for himself, but as an employee or agent of another, does not absolve the perpetrator of liability in torts. Similarly, the mere fact that a person commits a tort as an organ of a corporation does not absolve him of liability" (Civil Appeal 507/79 Morris Roundknife (Koren) v. Ilana Hakim, IsrSC 36(2) 757, 794)."