In the Apel case, the Supreme Court held that "within the framework of the said section, the legislature outlined a rule of division of damages, relevant where the damage was caused 'in part due to the fault' of the injured party himself."
Subsequently, the court examined the question of how the court would determine the "correct and just" rate of the reduction resulting from the contributory fault and referred to the case law in the framework of the applied: "The 'degree of moral guilt' test, which was defined as follows: 'The court must morally weigh the negligent behaviors against each other when it comes to dividing the responsibility' (see: the Tenenbaum case; See: Civil Appeal 449/81 Ben Lev in Tax Appeal v. Megged, IsrSC 38(4) (1984) (hereinafter: the Megged case); Weissman, p. 67). In more detail, it was determined that the aforementioned moral guilt test will be examined against the background of the concrete conduct of the parties, and that its application is not an exact science, but is based on: "the consideration of what is right and what is just, according to the best assessment and consideration of the court, in light of the circumstances of each and every case" (see: Civil Appeal 316/75 Shor v. State of Israel, IsrSC 31(1) 299, 306 (1976); the Megged case)." (ibid., in paragraph 64 of the judgment).
In the same matter, the court was asked whether the defense of contributory fault can apply in principle even in cases where a tort that is not negligence is attributed to the tortfeasor, including fraudulent grounds. To the question of principle, the Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, and ruled (ibid., in paragraph 63 of the judgment) that:
"... The defense of contributory fault can also apply in principle in a case where the tortfeasor has wronged the injured party in the tort of fraud. However, the analysis does not come to an end with this insight, since the possibility of applying the doctrine separately, and applying it separately. In my opinion, even when it is possible to theoretically establish the existence of the contributory fault defense, this does not automatically lead to the actual transfer of responsibility to the burden (in whole or in part) - from the tortfeasor to the shoulders of the injured party. In principle, the aforementioned defense makes it possible to "reduce" the compensation that the tortfeasor must pay at any rate, including by zero percent (see: Civil Appeal 267/58 Lakritz v. Shafir, IsrSC 13 1250 (1959); Civil Appeal 49/77 Tenenbaum v. Gitter, IsrSC 32(3) 185, 188 (1978) (hereinafter: the Tenenbaum case)) - a result that is clearly in practice equivalent to the non-application of the contributory fault defense."