Civil Claim in Rapid Hearing (K.S.) 57824-04-21 Tarya P2P Ltd. vs. Ilan Shlomo of Maran

Receiving the message                   Icom College Ltd.

I have before me a claim in the amount of ILS 7,935.46, which concerns a loan that was allegedly given to the defendant for the purpose of financing his participation in a course at ICOM College, which was not honored.  The defendant claimed in summary that he did not know the plaintiff, that he did not take and/or request a loan from the plaintiff, that his signature was forged and that there was no engagement agreement and/or binding agreement between him and ICOM.

1. B. In accordance with Regulation 82(b) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, a judgment shall be reasoned in a concise manner, but shall include a reference to all the arguments and facts required for the matter.

The Deliberative Framework

1. This case was opened as an objection to the execution of a claim for a fixed sum at the Execution Office. After an objection was filed, the case was heard in the Magistrate's Court, and after the defendant's interrogation, permission to defend was granted on November 19, 2021.
2. Subsequently, the parties submitted additional documents and a supplementary affidavit was even filed on behalf of the defendant.
3. The defendant filed a notice to a third party against ICOM College, the parties submitted affidavits of the main witness, and on April 28, 2025, an evidentiary hearing was held, during which the witnesses were questioned and the parties submitted their written summaries.

The plaintiff's arguments

4. The plaintiff claimed that there is no dispute that she fulfilled her full part in the agreement when she transferred the full amount of the loan for the defendant, to finance his studies into the bank account of a third party, ICOM College in a tax appeal (hereinafter: the "College"), all in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.
5. According to her, the defendant has no defense claim before the prosecution and has no claims against the plaintiff, all of his claims are against the college only and all of these are sufficient to obligate him to pay the full debt in the execution file number 523229-02-21.
6. The defendant confirmed in his testimony that he behaved in accordance with the loan agreement, and according to it he paid the plaintiff the exact monthly payments in the amounts specified in the loan agreement, over a period of 5 months.
7. Moreover, even if the defendant digitally signed a loan agreement that was sent to him to his private email address and mobile number, which he approved, a contractual engagement can also be oral, and this is sufficient to bind him and the plaintiff.
8. According to the plaintiff, the testimony of the plaintiff's representative, Mr. Eliran Marienstrauss, was reliable and consistent, he answered all the questions he was asked and did not hide anything. His testimony was coherent, and on the other hand, the defendant's testimony, according to her, would have been convoluted and unreliable.  All of his arguments are oral arguments against a written document.
9. The defendant signed an application form to receive a loan from the plaintiff through the college's loan interface, including approving Appendix A to the customer's approval agreement and the appendix to the loan terms, the settlement schedule and the appendix under the Fair Credit Law (Due Diligence) in which the loan amount, loan period, interest, loan terms and all other terms in connection with the loan were detailed.
10. According to the plaintiff, the defendant in his interrogation at the hearing admitted and confirmed that he had contacted the college and registered for a course with it, confirmed and admitted that he knew all the details, including the cost of the course and including the amount of the monthly reimbursement, details that exactly correspond to the provisions of the agreement with the plaintiff and the amounts specified therein (see p. 9 of the transcript, especially paras.  15-24).
11. In 2019, the plaintiff and the college entered into a cooperation agreement whereby the plaintiff gave loans to college students who wished to finance their studies at the college by receiving a loan (hereinafter and respectively: the "Agreement with the College" and the "Customers").
12. In accordance with the agreement with the College, any customer who requested to receive a loan to finance his studies would have contacted the plaintiff through the college, and would have submitted a request for a loan that included documents requested, through a representative of the college, through the plaintiff's internet platform, according to the plaintiff, in our case as well.
13. The defendant, according to the claim, borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of ILS 10,101 (the amount of the loan), which was transferred to the college's bank account (less commissions), as stated in the appendix under the Fair Credit Law to the agreement, and in accordance with the agreement with the college, the defendant should have repaid the plaintiff in installments and spread out for a period of 12 months.
14. According to the plaintiff, as part of her summaries, the accounting with the college (the recipient of the notice) is not the defendant's business, the amount of the loan consists of various components, some of which were transferred directly to the college's bank account (a sum of ILS 7,659.80). In addition, 20% of the loan amount was transferred to an escrow account (security cushion funds) in the sum of ILS 2,020.20, the balance of the loan amount in the sum of ILS 421 was paid to the plaintiff in respect of the fee for establishing the loan in the sum of ILS 118 and its subsidy in the sum of ILS 303, as detailed in the plaintiff's affidavit (see paragraphs 11-19 of the plaintiff's affidavit).
15. Clause 3.4 of the agreement with the College stipulates that the loan will be financed by the College at a rate of 20% of the loan amount, and for this purpose 20% of the loan funds (financing) that will be given to the customers will be transferred directly to the trust account that is being conducted by the plaintiff.  These trust funds serve as a "safety cushion" for all loans.
16. In other words, the funds that constitute 20% of the total balance of all the loans of the plaintiff derive (out of 165 loans belonging to the college), are deposited as a "security cushion", where the same cushion serves as collateral for all the loans taken, when the purpose of the security cushion is to protect the plaintiff's lenders, and then in the event of a delay in the payment of any loan, the funds are paid from the cushion at the expense of the arrears.
17. As detailed, the plaintiff is a company engaged in the field of social loans and provides alternative solutions for taking loans at the bank, with the financing it provides coming from various lenders (listed on its website). In practice, these lenders invest their money and receive a return every month according to the repayment of the loans that all borrowers pay - and this is their "profit".
18. When a situation arises in which a borrower does not pay the monthly loan repayment payment, the plaintiff makes use of the safety cushion - i.e., the funds that were deposited with her in trust, and as its name implies - the role of the security cushion is in fact to protect the lenders from the first day of arrears.
19. In practice, on the first arrears date, since the full repayment date of the loan has not yet arrived, in this situation the security cushion "replaces" the monthly payments that the borrower must pay in accordance with the monthly repayment set with him in the agreement, and this, of course, until the full use of the trust funds deposited.
20. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's representative was not asked in the hearing about the components of the loan amount and the amount, including the total cost that the defendant had to pay for the studies at the college, in the sum of ILS 10,101, and the plaintiff must return this sum to the plaintiff together with the contractual interest, all as stated in the disclosure of the loan and the loan settlement schedule.
21. In other words, according to the plaintiff, the defendant has contractual relationships, one vis-à-vis the college to which he enrolled and the other vis-à-vis the plaintiff, who financed and transferred the money for the course to the college for the defendant, and the defendant did not claim and certainly did not prove otherwise, and only by virtue of the aforesaid should it be determined that the plaintiff is entitled to receive the full money she gave.
22. In order to establish a loan, the plaintiff's representative had to obtain from the loan applicant (the defendant) an identification card, a valid means of payment that was checked in the credit databases and approved by the plaintiff, a credit card in this case, and a signed agreement, which were transferred to the plaintiff and after which the loan was approved. (p.  6 of the transcript.    1-4 and pp.  8 of the transcript, paras.  5-8, and see also paras.  25).
23. According to the plaintiff, the defendant confirmed and admitted in his interrogation that he had provided credit card details to create a charge for his account to repay the loan amount, and also provided a photocopy of his ID card and an account management certificate (p. 9 of the transcript, paras.  25-30).
24. Moreover, the defendant admitted and confirmed in his interrogation that all of his personal details that were given to the plaintiff were indeed his (p. 9, paras.  10-14 of the transcript).
25. According to the plaintiff, the defendant did not provide any satisfactory explanation, even scrupulously, for the fact that all his details were in the plaintiff's possession and that all the documents were sent to him to his personal email and mobile phone, and when the defendant was asked who he believed had used his details and called the plaintiff on his behalf without his knowledge, he replied evasively and claimed that he had not received the documents by email.
26. The defendant did not provide any explanation as to why he was actually asked to send a photocopy of his identity card and an account management certificate, if it was indeed a "regular" credit transaction, as he denies (see transcript, pp. 9 and 13).
27. The totality of the data shows that the defendant fulfilled the terms of the agreement for about five months, without claiming anything against the plaintiff, and then he stopped paying unilaterally, in breach of the agreement and without pointing to any justification for doing so.
28. It should be emphasized: The real reason for the termination of the payments was the defendant's desire to stop his studies at the college - and not his lack of familiarity with the credit card charge, as he tried to claim. However, this argument - insofar as it was raised - does not entitle him to fail to meet his obligations to the plaintiff.
29. Only after the plaintiff took legal action did the defendant first raise claims against the plaintiff - and not before. Until then, he had not denied the charges and did not claim to be unacquainted with her, which indicates a lack of good faith.
30. In his testimony, the defendant explicitly confirmed that five payments were deducted from his credit card corresponding to the monthly sum agreed upon with the college representative, in a total amount of ILS 4,435.60 (see transcript, p. 10, paras.  1-7).
31. When confronted with the fact that he had received the loan agreement for his personal email, he confirmed that it was a private email that only he had access to. Despite this, he replied in a twisted manner that "he did not see the page," but he was unable to contradict the presumption that the documents were given to him and that he was the one who approved the loan.
32. The testimony of the college representative strengthened this argument, when she testified that after the loan was approved, the defendant was sent an email requiring his approval in order to advance the process (see Transcript, p. 18, paras.  2-7, 21-22).
33. The defendant's testimony was also characterized by evasions regarding his contacts with the credit company: while in his affidavit he claimed that he contacted them shortly after he identified the charge, in his testimony he replied that he did not remember - despite the fact that he had approved a monthly payment for five months (compare paragraph 10 of the affidavit with the transcript at p. 11).
34. When asked exactly who he wanted to cancel the charge, he didn't know how to say and replied: "I can't tell who he was for. I don't remember the name." (p.  11, paras.  6-7), which undermines its credibility.
35. The plaintiff will argue that the defendant, who declared that he had four credit cards (p. 12, s.  13), cannot claim that he did not know to whom he was paid, when in fact he paid and knew exactly who the financing body was - suppressed testimony, which should be rejected.
36. The defendant, who claimed that he did not sign an agreement with the plaintiff, did not present even the first evidence that he contacted the credit company in real time, did not attach documentation to his inquiries and did not produce a credit statement that could have shed light on his claims - a failure that strengthens the conclusion that these are suppressed claims.
37. According to the plaintiff, there is no dispute that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was the entity that financed his studies, and that any other claim is detached from reality and is intended to evade the repayment of the loan.
38. The defendant signed Appendix A to the agreement (p. 13 of the affidavit), in which he declared that these were two separate transactions: one between him and the college, and the other between him and the plaintiff - which constitutes only a financing body.  He also explicitly stated that the plaintiff should not be considered a party to the agreement with the college.
39. These are two separate agreements - between the defendant and the college, and between the defendant and the plaintiff. The plaintiff acted in accordance with the agreement, transferred the funding funds directly to the college's account, and these claims were not concealed.
40. Therefore, there is no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the college, and any claim by the defendant against the college cannot serve as grounds for evading his duties to the plaintiff.
41. In summary, it was proven beyond any doubt that the defendant signed an agreement with the plaintiff, that the plaintiff fulfilled her part in full, and that for five months the defendant acted in accordance with the terms of the agreement. In accordance with contract law, he must fulfill the obligations he has undertaken.
42. It was proven that the agreement was sent to the defendant's email address, which he approved as his personal address. The agreement was signed by him and sent back to the plaintiff - and the defendant was unable to contradict these facts.
43. Insofar as the defendant signed the agreement without reading it, as he claims, he has nothing to blame but himself. The plaintiff has the presumption of the signatory, according to which a person who signs a document is a presumption that he has read and understood it.  This presumption was not contradicted in our case (see Civil Appeal 1319/06 Shlek v.  Tena Noga, Nevo, 2007).
44. The defendant claimed that there was no agreement between him and the plaintiff, but in fact he paid for a long period of time, and did not raise any claim on the matter - neither in real time, nor in a conversation with a representative of the college, which weakens his version.
45. In practice, the defendant paid the plaintiff for five months, without claiming anything, and even today he has no real claim against her. This is enough to reject the defense's arguments.
46. Only about a year and a half after the signing of the agreement, and only after the cessation of the payments, did the defendant raise for the first time claims - which were not directed at the plaintiff but only at the college, in an artificial attempt to disavow his debts.
47. In conclusion, the plaintiff argues that this is a clear and justified debt: the loan amount was transferred in full in accordance with the agreement, and the defendant is obligated to repay it.

The defendant's arguments:

48. According to the defendant, in November 2019 or thereabouts, the defendant, born in 1951, confined to a wheelchair and suffering from heart disease and cancer, took an interest in the "Multi-Talent" course offered by Icom College. This was a frontal course that was supposed to take place in physical classrooms on the college campus.
49. The engagement with ICOM was done by telephone, without a face-to-face meeting or a visit to the institution, after the defendant left his details. Therefore, this is a remote sale transaction as defined in section 14c(1) of the Consumer Protection Law.
50. The defendant understood that the payment of the consideration would be made by spreading out payments on a credit card he owned, and he never gave his consent to take a high-interest non-bank loan, certainly not vis-à-vis a foreign entity such as the plaintiff.
51. The defendant never signed a loan agreement, did not see such a document, and was not explained to him that the transaction involved a non-bank loan. The first notice regarding the existence of a loan was received by him only when the plaintiff opened a writ of execution case against him.
52. The document on which the plaintiff's claim is based, which was predicted to be a signed loan agreement, does not bear the defendant's authentic signature. An examination of it reveals that this is a scribble that was copied and pasted, and does not resemble his signature at the bank.
53. The defendant filed a complaint with the police for forging his signature. The plaintiff did not present any evidence that the agreement was signed lawfully, given to the defendant, or explained to him.  Adi Ikum and the plaintiff were not present at the time of the alleged signature, and could not confirm the matter with personal knowledge.
54. The plaintiff did not meet the requirements of sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Credit Law: no loan document signed by the defendant was presented, his explicit consent was not proven, the terms of the loan were not provided, and he was not given an opportunity to review them.
55. There was no direct engagement between the plaintiff and the defendant: no conversation, no meeting, no confirmation of account management, and no explanation as to the nature of the transaction or its terms. The plaintiff's testimony that "the transaction is not progressing without a signed document" is inconsistent with the fact that the existence of such a legally signed document has not been proven.
56. The plaintiff's claim that the agreement was communicated to the defendant by email or "online" was not backed up by references. It has not been proven what was sent, when, and how.  No recording of a conversation that was claimed to have taken place was attached, and no representative of Icom who allegedly spoke with the defendant was summoned to testify.
57. ICOM does not hold a license to engage in loans or credit brokerage, contrary to the provisions of the Regulated Financial Services Law. She is prohibited from binding a service offer in a payment plan while linking to a loan, without the free and informed consent of the consumer.
58. The defendant is a senior citizen and a person with a disability, and therefore the special provisions in section 14C of the Consumer Protection Law apply to him. He was entitled to cancel the deal within four months, and he did so through repeated phone calls to the college, which remained unanswered.
59. The fact that the defendant did not know that the transaction involved a loan, prevented him from considering the engagement, constitutes an unfair influence, and a breach of the duty of proper disclosure and trust.
60. The course actually took place in only one class in January 2020, and then was discontinued due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The defendant was unable to participate in future classes, both due to the lack of access to the classrooms and due to his medical condition, which placed him in a risk group.
61. Beyond that, the defendant is unable to learn online due to medical limitations. Thus, a fundamental undertaking on the part of ICOM to provide an accessible frontal course was breached, and the agreement should be considered legally null and void, even in accordance with the laws of prevention (section 18 of the Contracts Law).
62. The plaintiff did not prove the existence of the debt or even its amount. The disposal schedule that was attached does not match what is stated in the affidavit, and the plaintiff even testified that he does not know how much was actually paid.
63. According to the plaintiff's own documents, the defendant paid approximately ILS 6,118 out of ILS 7,659. At most, a debt of ILS 1,541 remained - an amount that the defendant denied existing, and in any case no entitlement to collect it was proven, in the absence of any real consideration.
64. In light of all of the above, and given that it has not been proven that the defendant agreed to bind himself to a loan agreement, that no consideration was received for the course, and that he was deceived and unfairly influenced, the court is requested to dismiss the claim, and to obligate Icom and the plaintiff with the expenses of the proceeding and attorney's fees

Claims from the recipient of the notice (hereinafter: "ICOM")

65. This action concerns a contractual engagement between the defendant and a third party - ICOM College - for the purpose of purchasing a course in digital marketing. The evidence shows that the defendant registered for the course on his own initiative and willingly, paid for the engagement for five months, received digital study content, participated in the class and joined the course's WhatsApp educational group.  These facts were explicitly confirmed by him in his cross-examination of April 28, 2025.
66. An examination of the defendant's testimony reveals that his version is replete with substantial contradictions, evasions and evasive answers such as "I don't remember". His testimony was characterized by a lack of consistency, a refusal to answer substantive questions and internal contradictions regarding the engagement itself, the very fact of registration for the course, the manner of payment, the identity of the parties involved, and his position in real time.
67. The defendant's claim that his signature was forged cannot stand in light of his explicit admission that he registered for the course, knew about its cost, provided personal and identifying details for the purpose of registration, and actually participated in the studies. The contradiction between his arguments in the objection affidavit and his clear confessions during the interrogation serves his duty.
68. The defendant claimed that he had not contracted with a third party, but retracted his testimony, where he admitted that he had enrolled in the course "of his own volition" (p. 15, s.  2), that "there was an engagement with Ikom" (p.  13, s.  25), and that he had transferred personal documents, including an identity card and credit details.  Thus, his claim regarding the lack of consent to the engagement or transfer of personal information collapsed.
69. The defendant's claims regarding lack of knowledge of the loan and unknowingly signing were refuted. The defendant confirmed that he had provided his details for the purpose of the engagement, that he knew the cost of the course (ILS 10,101), and that he had actually paid five installments.  Moreover, when asked why he did not attach a printout of credit card charges, he did not know how to answer.
70. Even his claim that he paid by credit directly and not through a loan, is inconsistent with the charges that were actually made, with the testimony of the plaintiff's representatives and a third party, and with the fact that the debit line on his card included the name of the lending company ("Altshuler Shaham").
71. The testimonies of the representatives of the third party and the loan plaintiff confirmed that it is not possible to establish a loan without the borrower providing all the required documents - including a signed agreement. In any event, the transaction could not have been completed without the defendant's consent and signature.  The defendant did not present any evidence to the contrary.
72. The evidence shows that the third party had no economic interest in taking a loan on the part of the defendant, since such a loan obligated the third party to pay interest and leave part of the amount in the hands of the lending company. If he had paid by credit, he would have received the full amount.
73. The defendant's open admission - both with regard to the registration and with regard to the sending of the documents - nullifies his claims of forgery or lack of knowledge. Moreover, the defendant did not request to cancel the course immediately after registration, but only about five months after the beginning of studies, and after he had used the educational content that was given to him.
74. The defendant's claims that he did not receive compensation are inconsistent with his admission that he participated in the class, received content, joined the WhatsApp group, and received access to the course's digital space. In addition, the defendant did not present any request in real time regarding these claims, did not send a notice of cancellation lawfully, and did not claim in real time of lack of knowledge or error.
75. His later claim that he had difficulty learning remotely also does not establish grounds for cancellation, especially since he was offered alternatives - face-to-face learning in a small group or postponing participation - but he refused every offer, declaring that he "regretted it." Remorse, in and of itself, does not constitute grounds for cancelling a contract.
76. The defendant explicitly admitted that the cost of the course corresponds to what was agreed, and that no amount was charged to him in excess of what had been determined in advance (p. 22, paras.  29-32).  Therefore, even if the engagement was made by way of a loan and not by direct payment, this does not detract from the validity of the transaction or the defendant's obligation to complete it.
77. All of the defendant's defense arguments collapsed one after the other - including the claims regarding forgery of signatures, lack of consent, lack of knowledge of the loan, lack of consideration, and non-fulfillment of obligations by a third party. The totality of the evidence points to a conscious, voluntary, engagement in exchange for the consideration that was actually provided.
78. Therefore, the defendant's claims should be rejected and he should be obligated to pay the balance of the loan as well as legal expenses for conducting an "unnecessary and exhausting" proceeding, according to the summaries of the receipt of the notice, the sole purpose of which is to evade a clear undertaking that he undertook on his own initiative and of his own volition.

Discussion and Decision

79. After reviewing the pleadings and hearing the testimonies on behalf of the parties, I am satisfied that the claim should be dismissed and that the notice to a third party should be accepted (against the plaintiff), since the plaintiff did not meet the burden of persuasion imposed on her - in the sense of "the one who extracts from his friend - the proof is on him" (Y. Kedmi on Evidence 1508-1509 (Part Three, 2003) (hereinafter: "Kedmi")).
80. We are dealing with a tripartite relationship: the defendant (hereinafter also: "Ilan"), was interested in studying with the recipient of the notice - ICOM, there is no dispute between the parties that Ilan even enrolled in studies with ICOM. To this relationship, the plaintiff, Tarya P2P Ltd., as a financier and lender entity, was added to the tripartite relationship, and according to the plaintiff's claim and even though according to Icom's claim, which is denied by the defendant, the defendant was aware that his engagement with Icom was through a loan that he took from the plaintiff and this was arranged by digital communication, by means of text messages to the phone and correspondence in the defendant's e-mail, the address of which was confirmed by the defendant in the hearings that took place in the framework of this case.
81. The loan was set at ILS 10,100, in installments, some of which were repaid.
82. According to the claim, the plaintiff transferred the actual loan money to Ikum, according to the special arrangement claimed, these were not transferred through the defendant and the monthly repayments of the loan were to be made by the defendant with the plaintiff. However, in the end, the defendant learned one lesson with the recipient of the notice, and the studies were suspended due to the Corona pandemic.  According to the defendant, due to being in a high-risk group, he could not participate in face-to-face classes and studying online was not suitable for him.
83. The defendant, for his part, claims that he did not take a loan from the plaintiff, was not aware of the fact that the distribution of the payments that was offered to him or requested by him, meant taking a loan, and at no stage was the meaning of taking the loan explained to him.

A fundamental condition for concluding the contract is the parties' intention to enter into a contract with each other (sections 2 and 5 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973 (hereinafter: the "Contracts Law").  Besides being determined, certain things are needed.  I want to say that the offer will be specific enough to allow the contract to be concluded at the acceptance of the offer (section 2 of the Contracts Law).  See in this regard Civil Appeal 620/89 Hoshenji v.  Agar, IsrSC 46(1) 588, 594 (1992); G.  Shalev Contract Law - General Part 172-177 (2005) ( Tadam (Tel Aviv) 642-01-24 Blender P2P Israel in Tax Appeal v.  Ahmad Abu Shakra [published in Nevo] (given on May 8, 2025)).

84. I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the claim that the defendant has made up his mind to enter into a loan agreement with her, as opposed to his desire to enter into an agreement with the recipient of the notice in his studies. Even if I take into account additional details that were transferred to the plaintiff, including the defendant's ID card, his credit details, or his (alleged) signature on the documents attached to the claim, they do not confirm his engagement in the loan.
85. When the witness on behalf of the plaintiff was asked by the court whether at any point anyone on behalf of the plaintiff contacted the defendant and explained to him the nature of the signing of the loan agreement, he replied: "I do not know whether anyone on behalf of the plaintiff spoke with the defendant prior to signing the loan" (p. 6, para.  35 of the transcript).
86. The witness tried to correct his answer, in his cross-examination, when he replied that the underwriting was done with the borrower and that: "The system is in Tarya, there is an underwriting department that explains whether the transaction can take place or not, we access credit databases" (pp. 8, 25-26 of the transcript).

However, no witness was brought to testify on behalf of the plaintiff who could confirm that anyone from the plaintiff's underwriting department contacted the plaintiff and explained the transaction to him.

87. Section 15 of the Contracts Law states that a party who entered into a contract due to a mistake resulting from the deception of the other party or another on its behalf is entitled to cancel the contract. In this regard, "deception" also includes omission - failure to disclose facts which, according to the law, practice or circumstances, the other party should have disclosed.

In the case of a non-bank loan agreement, as in our case, the duty of disclosure imposed on the lender is not limited to the general law, but is also regulated within the framework of the provisions of the Fair Credit Law, 5753-1993 (hereinafter: the "Fair Credit Law"), which was known as the Non-Bank Loans Regulation Law, 5753-1993.  The law gives significant weight to the question of disclosure, and even establishes mechanisms for supervision and regulation in relation to it.

88. In accordance with the provisions of the Fair Credit Law, the lender is obligated to provide the borrower with a detailed and full disclosure of all the material data relating to the loan agreement, including: the interest rate, the total cost of the credit, the arrears interest rate, the terms of repayment of the loan, etc. This disclosure must be made in writing, while providing a reasonable opportunity to review the document before signing, as well as by providing a copy of the agreement after it is signed.
89. The law also states that failure to comply with the duty of disclosure may justify canceling the agreement or changing its terms, and for this purpose, the court is also authorized to consider oral evidence, where required.
90. Hence, both in the general law and in the specific law relating to non-bank loans, the failure to disclose material information at the pre-contractual stage may be considered deception, which gives the injured party the right to cancel the agreement.
91. In the case before me, the question at hand is whether the plaintiff fulfilled the duty of disclosure imposed on her towards the defendant at the stage prior to the conclusion of the agreement, or not.
92. After reviewing all the material that was brought before me, I am of the opinion that the answer to this question is negative. I am under the impression that the plaintiff did not fulfill the concrete and substantive duty of disclosure required of her by law, and that the plaintiff's conduct or the receipt of the notice at the stage prior to the engagement amounted to deception, which had a real impact on the defendant's judgment when entering into the agreement.  It should be clarified that I find it acceptable to accept the defendant's argument that at no stage was he told that he was taking out a loan.
93. The cumulative impression is that although the plaintiff, whether directly or through a vacuum, carried out actions that were supposed to be within the scope of the fulfillment of the duty of disclosure - in practice it was a disclosure for the sake of appearance only, formal and partial, which did not provide the defendant with complete and clear information that he needed in order to make an informed decision regarding the engagement. This is presumed to be proper conduct, even on an in-depth examination I am of the opinion that the plaintiff did not meet the substantive standard of full disclosure, as required by law.
94. The factual and legal circumstances that support this conclusion - those components that make up the appearance of the duty of disclosure - will be detailed below:
95. According to the plaintiff, the defendant signed a request form to receive a loan from the plaintiff through the college's loan interface, and approved all the accompanying documents: Appendix A to the agreement - the customer's approval, the appendix to the loan terms, the payment schedule, as well as the disclosure form under the Fair Credit Law, which includes details regarding the loan amount, its period, the interest rate, and the full terms of the loan

These are prima facie sufficient to indicate the defendant's discretion and his awareness of taking the loan from the plaintiff, but the defendant disagrees with his signature on the loan agreement, and the burden of proving the authenticity of the signature is on the plaintiff (see, for example, Civil Appeal 5293/90 Bank Hapoalim in Tax Appeal v.  Rahamim, IsrSC 47(3) 240, 261 (1993); Civil Appeal 45/15 Nabulsi v.  Nebulsi, para.  13 [Nevo] (May 15, 2017); Civil Appeal 1700/16 Tzur Baher v.  Al-Atrash, para.  20 (published in the databases, [Nevo], July 31, 2017).

96. The plaintiff did not prove that the plaintiff's signature did indeed appear on the loan agreement. The defendant testified that he did not sign, filed a complaint with the police about forgery, and as clarified above, the testimony of the plaintiff's representative regarding compliance with the provisions of the Fair Credit Law was not reliable to me, nor did I find it possible to accept the testimony of Ms. Amit Farber on behalf of ICOM, who claimed that another "apparently" explained to the defendant that he was taking a loan.

Her testimony is hearsay, and even if that representative, Nuriel, does not work for the company, it was not explained why he was not summoned to testify by the recipient of the notice, and in any case no telephone conversation was played to support this claim.

97. In the margins, I will note that even when we are dealing with a digital signature and the difficulties in such a signature and its identification, the plaintiff should have submitted an expert opinion both with regard to the ratification of the defendant's signature on the documents and with regard to the difficulty in accepting the claim of forgery with a digital signature, since this is not a fact that is subject to judicial knowledge.
98. Furthermore, in this regard, I accept the defendant's argument in his summaries that the fact that the plaintiff has the defendant's email address and telephone number does not prove that the loan agreement was transferred to the defendant, signed by him. The defendant only confirmed that a photocopy of his ID card was sent to the recipient of the message via WhatsApp (p.  9, para.  28 of the transcript).

The business model chosen by the plaintiff Vaikom may be in trouble (Small Claim (Tel Aviv) 10168-03-24 Tucson v.  Blender P2P Israel in Tax Appeal et al.  (published in the Databases, [Nevo], July 21, 2024); Small Claims Appeal Authority (Tel Aviv District) 15579-08-24 Blender Pay B.  N.  P.L.  in Tax Appeal v.  Tucson et al.  (published in the databases, [Nevo], August 14, 2024).

99. In circumstances in which the plaintiff was unable to prove that the defendant was the one who signed the loan agreement, and did not testify before me as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff who spoke with the defendant at or close to the date of the alleged signature, the prima facie claim that it was explained to him is not sufficient at trial.
100. This is further strengthened, when in the framework of the alleged transaction, a right assignment was made in the funds to which the defendant is entitled in the framework of the loan agreement from the plaintiff to the third party - ICOM.

With the necessary caution, I will note that I am of the opinion that in these circumstances, in which there is a tripartite relationship and the loan money does not transfer directly to the borrower, in our case the defendant, but rather to a distant party, the lending company - in our case, the plaintiff, has an increased duty of care with regard to the borrower's awareness of the sophistication of the transaction and its execution.

101. Indeed, the defendant added additional details in the framework of his supplementary affidavit and in the framework of his testimony before me, but at the very beginning of the objection, which was filed even before he took representation, he claimed that he did not sign the loan agreement and that the credit details and his identity were used without his knowledge.
102. I also do not find it acceptable to accept the plaintiff's argument that the defendant must consider the fact that he made a number of payments for the loan before he ordered it not to be honored, I find it acceptable to accept the defendant's explanation that he did not pay attention to the identity of the party to whom the loan amounts were transferred, he was aware that he had made a transaction in installments with the recipient of the notice.
103. In summary, I find that the plaintiff failed in the burden of proof to accept her claim and that it was proven at the level required in civil law that the defendant was aware that he was taking a loan from the plaintiff's time in order to participate in a course with the recipient of the notice.
104. The plaintiff failed to prove that a representative on her behalf from the underwriting department or any other representative contacted the defendant and explained to him the nature of the loan.
105. In accordance with Section 3 of the Fair Credit Law, a lender is obligated to disclose to the borrower the full details of the loan, in writing, and to allow him to reasonably review the documents before entering in. In our case, no evidence was brought that these duties were fulfilled by Tarya or Ikum.
106. According to Section 5 of the Law, failure to fulfill the duty of disclosure establishes the borrower the right to cancel the agreement due to deception, and this means a breach of the duty of good faith on the part of the lender - with all that this entails, including the right to compensation.
107. It should be clarified that in any event, I do not believe that ICOM itself is directly authorized to explain to the defendant that it is taking out a loan, given that it does not have a license to grant or broker loans, in accordance with the Fair Credit Law.
108. As stated above, I found to reject the plaintiff's argument that it is sufficient to deliver the agreement and sign it from the presence of the defendant's email address and telephone number. This is in the absence of any evidence that the defendant actually signed the loan agreement or accepted it for his review.
109. The scribble in the loan document is not identified as the defendant's signature, and in any case no graphological opinion or other supporting evidence was presented.
110. Nor was any evidence provided that the loan documents were signed by the defendant, transferred to him or returned by him. The ICOM witness confirmed that it had a reference for the transfer of documents to Tarya only - but not to the defendant.
111. The defendant was not summoned to the meeting, did not receive an explanation, did not actually sign the agreement and did not give his consent. The ICOM witness testified that she never met the defendant, nor did she speak with him.
112. There is insufficient evidence to establish a valid, informed and consensual engagement between the defendant and Tarya.
113. These omissions are the plaintiff's duty and I find it necessary to dismiss the claim against the defendant.

Third-party liability towards the plaintiff

114. Although ICOM was not sued directly by the plaintiff, but was joined to the proceeding as a third party, once it was proven that she was the party responsible for the plaintiff's engagement and the establishment of a loan, there is no impediment to imposing a direct liability on it against the plaintiff.
115. In this context, the words of the Honorable Judge G. Gotovnik in his decision in Civil Case (Tel Aviv District) 25178-09-19 Ben Arush v.  Seshu [September 18, 2020], where it was held:

"[...] There is no reason to deny a defendant the opportunity to file a third-party notice against an injustice against the plaintiff, when the claim is that the third party is responsible for the entire damage.  The Regulations recognize the possibility of the informant to demand not only 'participation' but also 'indemnification'...  Against this background, it is doubtful whether there is room to distinguish between a third-party notice that deals with participation and that that which deals with indemnification...  A case in which a third party notice was received attributing full responsibility and damage to the third party has already been recognized in case law."

116. I would also like to refer to the judgment of the Honorable Judge Y. Amit in Other Municipality Applications 5222/17 Anonymous v.  Anonymous [April 26, 2018], in which it was held that:

"[...] A third-party notice may be filed where a defendant is entitled to indemnification or participation from a third party, without the defendant admitting liability to the plaintiff."

117. The Honorable Justice Amit also discussed the broad rationale underlying the third-party notification mechanism:

"One of the purposes of a third-party notice is to present the 'overall picture' before the court, in a way that will enable a focused decision on the company...  The reasons for adding third parties are the efficiency of the hearing and the savings in the expenses involved in filing a separate claim against a third party" (Civil Appeal Authority 7978/13 Haifa Municipality v.  American Zion Community (January 21, 2014)).