Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 48377-08-23 Atiat Shahshir v. Y.S. Elbaum Ltd. - part 2

Buying the Skoda

4. The plaintiff claimed in the statement of claim that on September 18, 2022, she arrived at a car lot belonging toElbaum in Rishon LeZion and that Elbaum sold her a Skoda car (hereinafter: "the Skoda") whose value at the time was approximately NIS 43,000, with the amount of NIS 43,000 undertaking and/or being obligated to pay a sum of approximately NIS 93,000 for it, while obtaining non-bank loans to finance it, from direct financing and a blender. The plaintiff claimed that Elbaum had deceived her at the time, in coordination with the other defendants, and had "obtained" loans for her in amounts that far exceeded the actual cost of the vehicle, and at a high interest rate, in cooperation between the defendants to misrepresent that direct financing and a blender were part of Elbaum's arms or representatives.  She also claimed that she discovered within a few days that she had been kidnapped and deceived by the defendants and found out from people that Elbaum was supposed to give her documents regarding the car and that the loans she took amounted to NIS 93,000, more than double the price of the car.
5. Elbaum claimed in the statement of defense thatthe plaintiff was not entitled to the remedies claimed, and in fact, she was the one who owedthe plaintiff compensation for the damages she caused to her and her property, including for damage to her good name.  She further claimed that the statement of claim was drafted vaguely, with selective and incomplete details of the facts alleged therein, and that it does not contain appendices of material documents, to which the plaintiff relies and that  she is in possession of documents and details that may resolve the disputes around which the present proceeding revolves, but the plaintiff deliberately refrained from disclosing these details and documents.  Regarding the first transaction, Elbaum claimed that such a transaction had not yet come into existence with her, that she did not own the car and that it had never owned it.  She also claimed that this was a car lot, where a number of car dealers operated, each of whom was completely independent, and that there was no connection between them, except for one address they shared, and that she was at  fault in the connection between the plaintiff and Maimon, who apparently assisted her in purchasing the car.  She also claimed that the plaintiff arrived at the car lot, while she was accompanied by a car dealer, who she stated that she trusted only and therefore there was no reason to file a lawsuit against her.  She reiterated in her statement of defense that she did not sell the plaintiff the Skoda car that was not hers.  She further claimed that the details of the people mentioned by the plaintiff in the lawsuit were not known to her.  She further claimed that no one on her behalf took  a loan in the plaintiff's name without her knowledge, and that any loan taken by the plaintiff in the matter and through it, for the plaintiff, was for the benefit of the purchase of the vehicles that the plaintiff sought to purchase.
6. Direct Finance claimed in the statement of defense that the plaintiff entered into a sale agreement with Elbaum for the purchase of a Skoda vehicle, and that at the same time it entered into loan agreements in the amount of NIS 63,000 in order to finance the purchase of the vehicle.  She also claimed that the loan documents were signed by the plaintiff digitally using her mobile phone.  She further claimed that prior to the signing of the loan documents, the plaintiff approved a full disclosure notice from her, which included, in summary, the main terms of the loan,  and that the notice was positively approved by the plaintiff via her mobile phone.  She further argued that the loan agreements in which she entered into with the plaintiff are completely independent and separate from the sale transaction in which the plaintiff entered into with the car dealership, and that according to the loan agreements, there is a complete disconnect between the sale transaction and the loan agreements – and therefore she is not responsible for the existence of the sale transaction, nor is she responsible for the price of the vehicle, the quality of the vehicle, or for its actual supply to the plaintiff.  She further claimed that she did not choose the car dealership and the type of vehicle, and that  it was the plaintiff who approached her in order to receive financing for the execution of the transaction, she was the one who received the car keys, and the responsibility for the quality of the transaction and the vehicle lies in the separate relationship between the car agency and the plaintiff, and does not concern her.  She further claimed that in accordance with the loan agreements and in accordance with the plaintiff's explicit instruction, she  transferred the loan money directly to the car dealership,  and at the same time, the ownership of the vehicle was transferred to the plaintiff's name, and she received the vehicle in her possession and control.
7. Blender claimed in the statement of defense that the plaintiff took a loan from her and stopped paying it, and that she retains her right to file a financial claim against the plaintiff for the balance of her debts in respect of the loan. She further claimed that it is a financing company and that it is not engaged in the trade in vehicles, and that  the fact that the plaintiff took a loan from it for the purpose of purchasing this or that vehicle does not establish any liability for the alleged sale transaction between the plaintiff and any third party.  She further argued that since the plaintiff has no claim against her regarding the terms of the loan she took, the claim should be dismissed out of hand.  She further claimed that the plaintiff confirms that she executed a transaction for the purchase of vehicles and that she financed the transaction, inter alia, by receiving a loan from her, and therefore, accordingly, any claim by the plaintiff regarding the feasibility of the transaction is vis-à-vis the vehicle dealer/dealer from which she purchased the vehicle and there can be no claim against her.  She further claimed that the plaintiff could have easily checked the value of the transaction before her, when it was sufficient to check the license/data of the vehicle against the Levi Yitzhak price list, and to the extent that she did not do so, she is silenced and/or prevented from raising claims in this matter.  Another claim that the plaintiff took a loan from her for the purpose of financing the purchase of vehicles made by Skoda and without derogating from any of her claims, including the absence of any liability for this transaction or at all that was made between the plaintiff  and the lot/car dealer, at the time of the return of the vehicle and the conclusion of a new transaction between the plaintiff and the car dealer – the causal connection was severed, and it is not connected in any way to the alternative transaction that the plaintiff made with the car lot.  She also claimed that she first learned about the plaintiff's claims against her from a review of the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff, when the plaintiff did not send her  any warning letter in which she detailed any allegations against her.  She further argued that the claim should be dismissed in limine due to the lack of rivalry, since the sale transaction was made between the plaintiff and a third party and not with her.  She further claimed that the plaintiff bears 100% contributory fault for the alleged damage in light of  her conduct, including her actions and omissions, when she cooperated with Elbaum and/or any third party and/or from the moment she did not perform the actions expected of a normative person purchasing a vehicle and did not take proper precautions, and she is not entitled to the requested relief.

Elbaum was the one who substantially sold the Skoda to the plaintiff and instructed her to take out loans in order to finance the purchase

8. As appears from Elbaum's arguments in the statement of defense, she shook her head out of the Skoda sale transaction and claimed that her entire "sin", as she put it, was that she mediated between the lenders and the plaintiff for the purpose of financing the purchase of the Skoda. In this regard, see also paragraph 6 of Yehuda's affidavit.  During his interrogation, Yehuda testified that Elbaum was one of the other car dealers who sat in the same car lot.  He also testified that Elbaum receives a letter of commitment from the financing company that as soon as the ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the customer's name and the vehicle is mortgaged in favor of the financing  company, the loan money will be transferred.  However, the hearing of the evidence revealed a different picture both with regard to Elbaum's involvement in the sale of the Skoda and with regard to the connection between Elbaum and one of the lenders, namely direct financing, as will be detailed below.
9. At the time of the sale of the Skoda, the plaintiff and her daughter, Mr. Muhammad Samir Odeh (hereinafter: "Mohammed") and Mr. Ahmad Abu Ammar (hereinafter: "Ahmed") were present at Elbaum's offices. The plaintiff claimed that Muhammad and Ahmad acted on behalf of Elbaum.  The parties disagreed about the relationship between Muhammad and Elbaum, with Elbaum claiming that the plaintiff arrived at the car lot, while she was accompanied by Mohammed, whom she called a car dealer.  Elbaum claimed in her statement of defense that the prosecutor said she only trusted him.  Conspicuous in his absence was the person who was registered as the owner of the Skoda, Mr. Ilan Yehezkel (hereinafter: "Ilan").  Yehuda's testimony revealed that Ilan is the owner of the car lot and that Elbaum is only one of a number of car dealers operating in the lot, and that she pays rent to Ilan.  Yehuda testified about a long-standing friendship between him and Ilan.  Although Yehuda testified that Mohammed, who, according to his version, did not know him, was the one who managed the transaction between the plaintiff and Ilan, it turned out that Yehuda himself managed the transaction.  Yehuda confirmed in his testimony that Ahmed, who the plaintiff testified about his extensive involvement in the transaction, was an employee of his, a fact that Elbaum had not disclosed beforehand, including in the statement of defense.  Yehuda, whether he was present at the office that day or not, testified that he was in contact with Ilan, regarding the sale of the Skoda, and not the plaintiff, or Mohammed, and he agreed separately with Ilan and separately with the plaintiff, the price of the transaction, with the plaintiff communicating through Muhammad with Ahmad, an Elbaum worker, in Arabic.  Yehuda confirmed that he does not have an agreement that anchors his status in the transaction between Ilan and the plaintiff, since he works with him on the basis of trust.  In addition to the aforesaid, in the loan agreements that the plaintiff signed on that day under Ahmad's instruction for the purpose of payment for the purchase of the vehicle, Elbaum is the beneficiary and not Ilan.  Elbaum actually received the loan money for the purchase of the Skoda from the lenders to her bank account, and she was the one who allegedly distributed the money between her and Ilan and Mohammed.
10. Yehuda had no satisfactory answer as to why he had paid Muhammad, through Muhammad's wife, 27,000 shekels for the transaction, if he did not know him. In addition, Yehuda did not have a document documenting Elbaum's right to get his hands on the sum of NIS 5,000 from the amount received from the lenders in Elbaum's bank account in respect of the transaction, or a document anchoring the transfer of the sum of NIS 27,000 from Elbaum's bank account to Muhammad. Yehuda testified that he transferred his share to Ilan in return.  However, the plaintiff claimed in her summaries, and rightly so, that Elbaum did not bring evidence regarding the transfer of part of the proceeds to Ilan.  It is possible that Elbaum actually purchased the Skoda from Ilan a long time ago, and at the time of the transaction it was entitled to be registered as the owner of the Skoda.  Ilan did not testify in this proceeding.  The court ruled that in light of Yehuda's version in his interrogation, regarding a conversation he allegedly had with Ilan in which they allegedly jointly determined the amount of the consideration, and about the transfer of money to Ilan, without written support, Elbaum had to testify with Ilan in order to prove that apart from the fact that Ilan was registered as an owner at the time of the transaction, he was still the owner of the Skoda.  Regarding the significance of refraining from submitting essential evidence, see  Civil Appeal 4697/05 Gavo Establishment v. David Dudai [published in Nevo] (August 27, 2012).  As stated above, the person who actually communicated in Arabic with the plaintiff on behalf of Elbaum was Ahmad and Elbaum preferred not to testify with him.  Hence, in this matter as well, there is a presumption that if Ahmad had testified, he would have confirmed the plaintiff's version regarding Elbaum's involvement in the transaction.  In addition,  the court credits the fact that there is no written documentation  of Elbaum's status in the transaction to Elbaum's obligation with regard to the manner in which she defines her part in the purchase of the Skoda and the manner in which the plaintiff saw Elbaum as the one who sold her the Skoda and as a representative of the lenders who financed the purchase.  In light of all this, the court ruled that Elbaum's role was not limited to mediating between the plaintiff and the lenderfor the purpose of obtaining credit, as she stated in the statement of defense, since she actually sold the Skoda to the plaintiff in the name of Ilan, and possibly even after she purchased the car from Ilan, and she was the one who determined the consideration that the plaintiff would pay and the sums she would commit to pay to the lender for the purpose of financing the transaction and also collected the money from the actual lenders and divided them at her discretion between her and Ilan.  Muhammad, and perhaps even only between her and Muhammad.
11. Even if the court had accepted Elbaum's version that dealt with mediation between the plaintiff and the credit companies only, and the court rejected this version, Elbaum does not have the right to pocket NIS 5,000 for the brokerage service of obtaining credit as supposed. Either way, Elbaum acted in the transaction in a conflict of interest that requires written documentation and maximum transparency.  On the one hand, it summed up the price of the transaction and set itself a commission for the transaction, and on the other hand, it turned out that it received and is receiving a salary from Direct Finance based on the amount of transactions it submits on behalf of its clients to Direct Financing, for the purpose of receiving credit from Direct Financing, in accordance with the transactions that Maimon approved and financed, so that she had and has a clear interest in promoting a loan transaction in the highest possible amount between the person who sold him a car and Maimon.

Did Elbaum and the lenders deceive or deceive the plaintiff when she purchased the Skoda?

12. The plaintiff claimed that she was not provided with a written contract regarding the sale of the vehicle, nor even a full disclosure form, as Elbaum is obligated to do under the Used Vehicle Sale Law (Entitlement to Information and Due Diligence) 5768-2008, and in practice she did not receive a document for the transfer of ownership of the vehicle in her name. It further argued that the failure to provide an agreement or a full disclosure form was intended, inter alia, to obscure the fact that it was a rental car and that the car had a lot of mileage, which would have reduced its value by at least a third, and to obscure the fact regarding the amounts of the loans and their connection to the purchase of the Skoda, when the actual price of the Skoda almost doubled as part of the same transaction. She also claimed that she was not given any document in connection with the loan she allegedly took from Blender, and that Elbaum's representatives (Ahmad and Mohammed) even explained to her that they would film her on video undertaking to repay the loan to Blender, and the plaintiff agreed to this.  She further claimed that she was not told at all by Elbaum and/or anyone on her behalf that this was a vehicle that was previously owned by the leasing company, "Leasing", and that it  was also not made clear to her that Direct Finance and Blender were not connected at all to the defendant and that the actions of Elbaum's employees in the actions they performed on her phone were intended to link her to Direct Finance and Blender.  She further claimed that the representation that Elboim's employees were representatives of Direct Finance and Blender and that they made use of her phone, even though it was with her knowledge and consent, was made while misleading her into thinking that Elbaum representatives were also representatives of Direct Finance and Blender.
13. The evidence showed that the plaintiff was assisted by the son of a friend of her mother's, Muhammad. The plaintiff's mother testified that her friend's husband told her that his son, Mohammed, works in a car lot in Rishon Lezion, and he referred her to Muhammad to buy a car. The plaintiff testified that Muhammad invited her to the car lot in Rishon LeZion, showed her cars in the lot, and managed the purchase with Ahmed, in Arabic.  The plaintiff's daughter, who came with her to the parking lot, testified that Muhammad did not say that he was an employee of Elbaum, but that it was clear that he was working there.  The plaintiff testified that Ahmad told her that Muhammad had asked him to arrange a good price for her.  She also testified thatMuhammad showed her  the Skoda and said that it was in good condition and that it was the cheapest, and promised that he would get it for her in the sum of 93,000 shekels, and also testified that the other cars she saw in the lot were expensive.  She also testified that Muhammad and she agreed that she would buy the Skoda for the sum of NIS 93,000, and that he and Ahmad took the mobile phone from her in order to obtain the credit, with her consent.  She also testified that after the purchase, when she was working for her employer, Joseph,  relatives who understand cars came to her and asked her how much she had purchased, and when she returned NIS 93,000, they asked her what documents she had received, and she replied that she had received one page.  The plaintiff claimed that from the conversation with Joseph's relatives, she found out that she had purchased the car at a price almost twice the price of the Levi Yitzhak price list, and that she had also purchased a car that was used for rent, according to the mileage of the Skoda, and therefore she contacted Muhammad by phone and referred him to the price in the  Levi Yitzhak price list.  She also testified that Muhammad told her that she would not believe anyone, but she insisted on returning the Skoda and he agreed, but explained that now the "holidays" are taking place, so they agreed that she would return the Skoda after the holidays and take another car, and according to her, Muhammad started buying time and postponing it.
14. The plaintiff's mother testified that the plaintiff wanted to return the Skoda because the car was "not worthy" because it made noise and they checked the Skoda and told them that it was not worth the price. She also testified that she had been to five Skoda inspections, and when asked why there was no documentation of these tests, she explained that she lives in the Shuafat refugee camp,  and that the garages there do not have receipts.  She was asked if she thought Muhammad had cheated on her daughter and answered in the negative.  She added that they were angry with him and were disappointed in him.  She also testified that Muhammad claimed that the plaintiff chose the Skoda because her granddaughter, the plaintiff's daughter, who was present at the purchase of the Skoda, loved the car.
15. The plaintiff was asked if she had read and understood what she was signing, to which she replied that Ahmad had prepared a sheet of paper and recorded it and filmed it, and it took him a while to teach her to say the Hebrew words he had written in Arabic. The court watched the video and got the impression that the plaintiff was looking down and not directly at the camera, and therefore the court accepted her version that she was reading in Hebrew in the video, which she was not familiar with, without knowing the content of what she was reading. The evidence showed that the video was transferred to a blender.
16. Yehuda's interrogation revealed that Muhammad pocketed a commission he received from Elbaum for the sale of the Skoda. As will be detailed below, Mohammed, according to the plaintiff's version, returned the commission he had received. The plaintiff claimed that she believed that Muhammad was an employee of Elbaum, but she did not sue him nor did she testify against him, despite his great involvement in the deal and as evidence, she approached him demanding that the Skoda be returned.  The plaintiff was asked why she did not sue Muhammad and replied that he had retroactively returned to her the commission he had received from Elbaum.  This fact only strengthens the importance of Muhammad's testimony in this proceeding in order to shed light on the question of whether or not he and Albaum hid the price in the Levi Yitzhak price list from the plaintiff.  The plaintiff's mother testified that on the morning of hearing the evidence, she was in contact with Muhammad's father, who told her that he would send him to the hearing.  However, Muhammad did not appear and was not summoned in the first place by court order.  The plaintiff's failure in this matter establishes a presumption that if Muhammad had testified, his testimony would have been her duty.
17. The plaintiff petitioned to cancel the transaction for the purchase of the Skoda and therefore sought to make use of the grounds for cancellation under the Contracts Law (General Part) 5733-1973 (hereinafter: "the Contracts Law, General Part") such as an error under section 14(a) that the other party knew or should have known about, deception under  section  15 or oppression under  section 18.  With regard to sections 14 and 15, the fact that the plaintiff did not testify to Muhammad on the one hand, and the fact that she did not sue him on the other, despite the fact that according to her, he collaborated with Elbaum in deceiving her and even pocketed money from the transaction for the purchase of the Skoda, creates difficulty for the plaintiff to prove claims of deception and mistake regarding the purchase of the Skoda.
18. Since the court rejected Elbaum's version that it did not sell the Skoda, it follows that Elbaum breached the duty to provide information and proper disclosure regarding the sale of the Skoda, and this may be sufficient to establish that a cause of cancellation arose.
19. With regard to oppression, since the plaintiff did not sue Mohammed, who is not an employee of Elbaum, nor did she testify against him, despite his extensive involvement in the purchase of the Skoda, a question mark remains regarding the claim that she purchased a car with a significant difference between the list price and the purchase price due to Elbaum taking advantage of her distress, or her mental or physical weakness, or lack of experience. Regarding lack of experience, the Supreme Court ruled in Civil Appeal 617/08 Eden Hotel Nahariya v. Yosef Kessel Supreme Court 2014[3] 12581, in paragraph 38 of the judgment: "The position has been expressed in the literature that in extreme cases of unfairness in the terms of the contract, the term should be interpreted...  'lack of experience' in a liberal way and include even innocence, lack of understanding or disorientation."  It seems that the significant gap between the list price and the purchase price may be considered  an extreme case of unfairness in the terms of the contract due to the fact that the transaction price was unreasonably worse than usual.  In this regard, see the case law that also interprets this condition in a limited way, and in this regard see Civil Appeal 403/86 Sassi v. Kikain, IsrSC 36(1) 763.  However, Muhammad's failure to testify, or to file a lawsuit against him, also created a difficulty in proving oppression.
20. At the end of the day, the court is not required to decide whether there were defects of error, deception or oppression at the time of the purchase of the Skoda, which justify cancelling the purchase of the Skoda, since, as will be detailed below, the transaction for the purchase of the Skoda was converted as part of another transaction in which the plaintiff sold the Skoda to Elbaum, added an additional payment and purchased the draft from it.

Buying the Toyota

21. The plaintiff claimed in the statement of claim that after the purchase of the Skoda, Elbaum's representative extended the Jewish holidays until she came toElbaum again, a month after the first purchase, and there Elbaum "supposedly"  purchased the Skoda from her for a price of approximately NIS 43,000 and allegedly sold her  a Toyota car (hereinafter: the "Toyota")  for NIS 120,000.  She further claimed that the difference in the cost of the two vehicles was paid again while Elbaum was drawing up documents according  to which she took additional non-bank loans from Direct Finance, while representing to her that Elbaum's employees  were also representatives of Direct Financing, all while the list price of the Toyota was NIS 86,000 at the time, and that the  sum of the two loans for the purchase of the Toyota was NIS 127,445.  She further claimed that she had taken upon herself loans with a nominal value of NIS 157,445, which she would have to repay about 60 payments in the sum of over NIS 202,000 when she purchased a vehicle with a value not exceeding NIS 86,000, which testifies to the degree of deception and deception taken by the defendants.
22. She further claimed that in the exchange transaction, Elbaum recorded the date of the transaction on September 18, 2022, and not on October 18, 2022, as it was in practice. She claimed that this was not done inadvertently and that the purpose of the registration was to obscure the traces behind the deceptive acts committed against her. She also claimed that Elbaum caused a situation in which she took 4 loans from direct finance, withElbaum and Direct Finance dividing the spoils, leaving her with 4 loans for direct financing in the amount of NIS 127,445 and another NIS 30,000 per blender.
23. She also claimed that from an examination that was conducted, it became clear that Direct Finance had assigned her right to two loans to Mizrahi Bank, which collects 2 of the 4 loans. She further claimed that she had given an order "in the fifth month" to the bank to cancel the order regarding her charge on loans in light of Elbaum's conduct and direct financing, and that she had tried to cancel the charge with Blender, but since the payment was initially made by standing order to Blender and later converted to payment via credit card, it could not be canceled and she continues to pay Blender until the date of filing the statement of claim under protest.
24. She further claimed that the defendants' actions, together and severally, constitute acts of oppression, deception, conducting negotiations in bad faith, concealing material facts during the drafting of the contracts, deception by presenting negligent misrepresentations, and unjust enrichment by the defendants jointly and severally. She further claimed that she requested and insisted on the cancellation of the transactions, and that she contacted Elbaum in a letter dated June 3, 2023, announcing the cancellation of the aforementioned transactions immediately, in accordance with her right.  She also claimed that she had contacted Direct Finance and Blender in letters and that Elbaum had not responded to her request at all.  She further claimed that the loan documents were also not delivered to her in real time and as required by law, and were received only following a later application, and only partially.
25. Elbaum claimed in the statement of defense that the plaintiff came to the lot and asked to carry out a "trade-in" transaction, in which she was credited with her car delivered to the lot, and in return she purchased a new car for an additional payment for that vehicle, and an additional financing transaction was also executed – that is, she testified about herself, that all her actions were found to be in order. With regard to the claims regarding the date of the trade-in transaction, Elboim replied that as a result of a clerical error, an incorrect date was recorded – and that copies of orderly documents were provided, including a copy of an agreement in which it was clearly stated that it was a former leasing vehicle.
26. Direct Finance claimed in the statement of defense that the plaintiff approached her again on October 18, 2022 with a request to receive a new loan, which would be used to repay the balance of the previous loan, and for the purpose of financing the purchase of a Toyota car from the car dealership, and that the new loan made available to the plaintiff consisted of the balance of the main track of the first loan in the amount of NIS 49,945 together with the supplement in respect of the second loan for the purchase of the new vehicle, in the amount of NIS 77,500, and in total the plaintiff received loans in the amount of NIS 127,445 from Mana .  She further claimed that the plaintiff digitally signed the loan agreement and approved a full disclosure notice detailing the main terms of the loan.  She further claimed that in the full disclosure notice and in the loan documents, which were signed by the plaintiff, it was made clear to her that the loan agreement was separate from the sale agreement, that she was not a party to the sale transaction and was not responsible for the pricing, supply of the vehicle and/or the quality of the vehicle.  Another argument that is at the  center of the claim that the plaintiff was a victim of "oppression", "deception" or negligent "misrepresentation" by the agency's representatives, does not concern her, since the loan she provided to the plaintiff constitutes a separate transaction from the plaintiff's purchase of the car from the agency (the basic transaction).  She further argued that accordingly, she has no responsibility towards the plaintiff in connection with the quality or price of the vehicle she purchased or any other matter related to the vehicle.
27. It further claimed that the car dealership and its employees are not its "representatives" or employees or agents, and that it is an independent financing company and that there is no agency relationship or other relationship between it and the car dealership. She also claimed that the plaintiff herself claimed that she voluntarily gave her mobile phone, ID card and credit card to the agency's representatives and gave them for hours to do with them as they pleased. If this happens, she argued, it is clear that the plaintiff was extremely negligent in her conduct and must bear responsibility for it.  She further argued that in accordance with the loan agreements, the plaintiff is obligated to repay the loans even in the event that a dispute arose between her and the car lot, and that there is no legal or regulatory obligation or obligation whatsoever that obligates her to cancel the loans, even in the event that the basic transaction is canceled.
28. The plaintiff testified that after she agreed on the phone with Muhammad about replacing the Skoda with another car, he stopped answering her, so she arrived with her brother and mother to the lot where she had purchased the Skoda, but there she saw only Ahmad, who claimed that Muhammad was not working that day. The plaintiff was asked why she returned to the same lot where she had made a "bad" deal, as she claimed, and she replied that she had come to return the Skoda and was told that she was not allowed to return the car only because time had passed, and therefore if she returned the car only, she would be obligated to pay the sum of NIS 50,000. She was confronted with her previous version that she had agreed with Muhammad to change cars from the outset and explained that Muhammad had stopped answering her.  The plaintiff was asked if she checked the price of the Toyota in the Levi Yitzhak price list when she was replacing the car and replied that her brother checked.  The plaintiff was asked why, after she claimed that she had been given incorrect oral information when purchasing the Skoda, she did not check the documents when she purchased the Toyota, to make sure that there was a match with the representations she received orally, and she replied that Ahmad told her that the price of the Toyota in the Levi Yitzhak price list was NIS 120,000 and said that it was leasing and that Muhammad made a mistake and that he would correct Mohammed's mistake.  She also testified that her brother was sitting with Ahmad.
29. The plaintiff's brother testified that he came with her to return the Skoda, but Ahmed did not agree that the plaintiff would return the Skoda and said thatthere was a chance to give a better car and showed them the Toyota and they saw that it was a "good" car. He confirmed that the Toyota was fine and explained that the plaintiff wanted to cancel the transaction because Ahmad had made a combine, the plaintiff pays a loan repayment of NIS 3,700 every month, the price of the Toyota is NIS 40,000 higher, and regarding the price of the Skoda there was a gap and the Skoda was a wagon and all the way out of votes.  He was asked if the Skoda had been tested in the garage and he replied in the negative, explaining that he had bought it in a qualified place.  The brother confirmed that hehad not checked the price list of the Toyota, but saw a license outside.  He confirmed that he had not checked the loan documents because Ahmad had said that the plaintiff would pay NIS 2,000 or NIS 2,200 every month  , all together.
30. The plaintiff testified that after discovering that she was obligated to pay a monthly repayment that was higher than the amount she thought had been agreed, she again contacted Muhammad and he returned her the sum of NIS 8,000. She was asked why, and she replied that she didn't know and that Muhammad had told her it was hers. She explained that Muhammad had returned the sum of 8,000 shekels in eight installments, through her neighbor.

At the time of purchasing the Toyota, Elbaum  purchased the Skoda from the plaintiff at a price significantly reduced from the price at which he had sold her the same car a short time earlier

31. The evidence showed, as the court had previously held, that Elbaum's version that she did not sell the Skoda to the plaintiff was naïve at best, and that she was the one who sold the Skoda to the plaintiff in essence, even if the Skoda was registered in the name of Ilan and it is possible that at the time of the sale of the Skoda, Elbaum was entitled to be registered as the owner of the Skoda. Therefore, it was expected that Elbaum would have a substantive answer to the question of how the price of the Skoda that Elbaum had set a month earlier for the purpose of selling it to the plaintiff shrank so significantly, when Elbaum bought the same car, which it substantially sold to the plaintiff. Yehuda had two explanations in his interrogation on this matter.  First, he reiterated that Elbaum had shaken an outsider in the statement of defense from the sale of the Skoda to the plaintiff, but the court rejected this version.  Second, in his interrogation, Yehuda tried to explain the change in the price of the Skoda by saying that he was not supposed to look into the plaintiff's considerations.  Since Elbaum was essentially the seller and afterwards, the buyer of the Skoda, within a month, should not accept Yehuda's naïve version.  The court ruled that Yehuda was aware that he was misleading the plaintiff about the nature of the transaction, and at the very least he was aware that the plaintiff was wrong.  The court also reaches this conclusion in light of the fact that when the plaintiff returned to Elbaum, there was a substantial change in circumstances.  Mohammed is not in the picture at this time.  The plaintiff arrived with her brother, whose interrogation revealed that he did not help the plaintiff stand up for her rights, and he also did not understand how in the car exchange deal, the price of the Skoda shrank miraculously.  The court ruled that the evidence showed that Elbaum had in bad faith demanded a fine of NIS 50,000 for the cancellation of the transaction, and in even more blatant bad faith, she misled the plaintiff into thinking that if she agreed to make a change, the total scope of the transaction would not change substantially.
32. Elbaum had the plaintiff sign a document according to which she was to pay her the sum of NIS 77,000, in addition to the value of the skoda, and she also signed additional loan documents that significantly increased the plaintiff's final purchase Thus, in practice, since Elbaum did not explain the situation to the plaintiff in its entirety, the plaintiff and her brother did not understand that the three loans that the plaintiff had already taken for the purpose of purchasing the Skoda remained in place, and that she was even increasing her commitment to direct financing, by taking an additional loan from direct financing for the purpose of paying the surcharge that Elbaum demanded for the purpose of selling the Toyota.
33. The court had already noted Elbaum's conflict of interest at the time of the sale of the Skoda. As stated above, in the matter of the sale of the Skoda Elbaum claimed that it was not involved in the sale, but rather in the intermediary of obtaining credit, a position that the court rejected. However, with regard to the sale of the Skoda to Albaum in exchange for the sale of the Toyota, there is no dispute that Albaum has a conflict of interest, not only with regard to the receipt of credit, but also as a buyer and buyer of vehicles and her role as a broker for receiving credit.  Yehuda also confirmed that the plaintiff is both a customer of Elbaum and the credit companies that incentivize Elbaum to maximize their profits.
34. The data for the replacement of the Skoda with Toyota was documented in an agreement made by Elbaum in which it stated the date of the first deal, in which it supposedly had no part. The court ruled that in the circumstances of the case, this was not a clerical error, as Elbaum claimed. Yehuda stated that it was the plaintiff who repeatedly asked him for brokerage services with the credit companies, a claim that the plaintiff denied in her testimony, and a claim that was presented to her that Elbaum and the credit companies were one.  Ahmed, who had the contact with the plaintiff, her mother and brother in Arabic at the time of the second agreement, did  not testify, and therefore the court prefers the plaintiff's version of the conduct when the plaintiff arrived at the car lot.
35. Therefore, the court rules that Elbaum misled the plaintiff by taking advantage of the fact that she does not speak Hebrew and her lack of knowledge in purchasing a car and taking out loans as follows: she sold her the Skoda at an exorbitant price and persuaded her to take loans in large sums accordingly and misled her in the second transaction, when she reduced the value of the Skoda by almost half, to an amount that is its value according to the Levi Yitzhak price list, and again persuaded her to take a loan. When the plaintiff does not understand that Elbaum has hidden a trash can in such a way that she is routinely obligated to pay the credit companies the  sum of NIS 157,000 nominally, for the purchase of a Toyota car whose value in the Levi Yitzhak price list is significantly lower than the value of NIS 120,000 in which Elbaum prices the vehicle for the purpose of the transaction.  All of this, as stated above, when Elbaum is also a car dealer, also determines the amount of the first transaction and may even be entitled to be registered as the owner of the skoda, the owner  of the draft in the second transaction, and also mediates between the plaintiff and the credit companies and receives salary from direct financing, so that she receives funds in all its  various caps.  This is when Elbaum does not explain to the plaintiff the different suits and does not disclose the conflict between the poorand the poor due to the  collection of funds by virtue of the various ties, and most importantly does not disclose to the plaintiff, certainly not in writing, the result of the two agreements according to which the plaintiff found herself indebted to the credit companies about one hundred and sixty thousand nominal shekels, when she purchased a Toyota that Elbaum determined was worth one hundred and twenty thousand shekels, with its price in the Levi Yitzhak price list.  Significantly lower.
36. The court ruled that the final price of the purchase of the Toyota by the plaintiff expresses, in terms of the scope of the loans that Elbaum instructed the plaintiff to take from the lenders, the excessive price of a Skoda car, even though the plaintiff sold it to Elbaum for a significantly lower price than the price at which Elbaum sold it to the plaintiff, and an additional payment. Elbaum signs the loan agreements, through Ahmed, an employee of Elbaum. The plaintiff and her brother did not understand their significance and both testified that they believed Ahmed who promised that the monthly repayment of the loans would be about half lower than the actual repayment amount.  The plaintiff reiterated that she discovered that Ahmad had misled her, only when she noticed that the amount of the monthly payment to the lender was significantly higher, contrary to the information Ahmad had given her.  Ahmed, Oved Elbaum, the central figure in this proceeding, who dealt with the sale of the Skoda, its purchase from the plaintiff and the sale of the Toyota, as well as the preparation of the applications to the credit companies, did not testify in this proceeding.
37. At the beginning of her summaries, Elbaum devoted a significant part to the fact that the plaintiff did not understand the meaning of the word "affidavit" at the beginning of her interrogation. In addition, Elbaum noted in the continuation of her summaries almost every inaccuracy in her approach in the plaintiff's answers and the rest of her witnesses, including on issues that do not relate to the core of the dispute. The court did not find that this helped Elbaum, and even on the contrary, the plaintiff's answers show how easy it was for Ahmad to manipulate her and her brother, and to take advantage of the plaintiff's dependence on him in a transaction in which the plaintiff sold Elbaum the Skoda car and purchased the Toyota car from her.  Elbaum rightly claimed in her summaries that the plaintiff's version in her first application created a difficulty for the plaintiff, but this is not enough to change the conclusion that Elbaum misled the plaintiff when she sold her the Toyota.

Discussion of the various remedies

38. The plaintiff petitioned for a number of remedies as follows:

The request to cancel the purchase and loan transactions

39. The plaintiff petitioned to cancel the purchase agreements for the two vehicles she purchased from the defendants and to order the cancellation of the loan agreements signed between her and Direct Finance and Blender , and to declare that the loan agreements were null and void. She also petitioned to determine that the two transactions dated September 11, 2022 and October 18, 2022 are null and void in view of all the defects in them, including oppression, deception and negligent misrepresentation on the part of the defendants and/or any of them towards her.
40. Regarding the request to cancel the purchase of the Skoda, the court previously ruled that in any case this transaction was exchanged for another transaction, namely the transaction to replace the Skoda with Toyota. In addition, the purchase of the Skoda should not be canceled, when the registered owner of the Skoda, Ilan, was not added as a party in this proceeding.
41. With regard to the motion to cancel the purchase of the Toyota, there is no reason today, about three years after the purchase of the Toyota, to cancel the transaction, while the plaintiff filed the claim, about a year after its purchase, enjoyed the Toyota vehicle for about three years, and she did not even submit an opinion that would assess the degree of her enjoyment in a way that would be deducted from the value of the Toyota, but rather expected in the statement of claim, as will be detailed below, that the court would estimate the amount of her enjoyment. In addition, the plaintiff should  have given general notice in accordance with section 20 of the Contracts Law of the cancellation of the contracts within a reasonable time after she became aware of the reason for the cancellation.  The evidence showed that the plaintiff contacted an attorney who complained on her behalf that there were mechanical problems with the Toyota and that the car was a rental vehicle.  The plaintiff confirmed that there were mechanical problems, but this claim was abandoned in the affidavit and her brother confirmed that the Toyota was "fine."  The plaintiff complained about the representation she received from that attorney.  However, in this matter, she has no choice but to complain about that attorney, insofar as her complaint is justified, and since that attorney did not have his day in this proceeding, no rivets should be set in this matter.  The court ruled that when it comes to canceling the purchase of a car, sending a notice more than six months from the date of purchase is not sending a notice within a reasonable time.  The plaintiff testified that she agreed with Elbaum to pay only NIS 2,000 and a maximum of NIS 2,300 per month, but she saw a charge in  her bank  account for the sum of NIS 3,700.  Hence, the plaintiff could easily have discovered the cause of action, immediately after the purchase, from perusing the transaction pages in her account.  Therefore, the court determines that in the circumstances of the case, the appropriate remedy is compensation, and this will be discussed later.
42. With regard to the cancellation of the loan agreements, since there is no reason to cancel the purchase agreements, there is also no reason to cancel the loan agreements, but rather to consider with respect to the second transaction only, the imposition of compensation that will take into account the increase in the plaintiff's commitment to the lender, due to the change in the price of the skoda, in the framework of the second transaction, when Elbaum signs documents that significantly increase her commitment to direct financing, while the plaintiff is not aware of this fact.

Request for a refund of amounts paid

43. The plaintiff petitioned to determine that a direct result of the cancellation of the vehicle purchase agreements is restitution and therefore sought to instructElbaum to return to Direct Finance or to Blender, or to her, all the monies it took from Direct Finance and Blender based on loans it received from them in accordance with the loan agreements, when the amounts of the loans were actually transferred directly  to Elbaum's account  or to any of its representatives and/or any of its employees and/or anyone who worked in its offices and a representation was presented that he was one of its employees.  She also petitioned to oblige Elbaum to return the money she paid and is paying to repay those loans and to compensate her for her damages as a result.   The court rejected the requests to cancel the purchase and loan agreements, and therefore also rejected the request for restitution.  In any event, the plaintiff did not lay an exact factual basis regarding the sums she paid and that she must pay in the future.  The court reiterates that since the core of the dispute relates to the manner in which Elbaum changed the price of the Skoda for the purpose of purchasing it, without bringing to the plaintiff's attention that the replacement of the vehicles would significantly increase the amount of her obligation to the lender, and in the absence of applicability for canceling the transactions about three years after the purchase of the draft, the appropriate remedy is compensation.

The request to return the Toyota to Elbaum and direct funding

44. The plaintiff sought to determine that the Toyota was made available to Elbaum and Direct Finance as early as June 3, 2023, when the warning letter was sent. She also petitioned to obligate Elbaum and Direct Finance to receive the Toyota vehicle back into their hands, while canceling the purchase agreement and the loan agreement and the repayment of the funds, while offsetting the plaintiff's reasonable use of the vehicle during the period of its maintenance.   The court reiterates its earlier ruling, according to which there is no reason, three years after the purchase of the Toyota, and taking into account that the claim was filed about a year after the purchase, to determine that the plaintiff made the Toyota available to Elbaum more than six months after the purchase.  Each of the time periods in and of itself creates a onerous delay, taking into account that this is a car that the plaintiff used, due to a change in Elbaum's situation for the worse, due to the passage of time from the date of purchase.  In this regard, the court reiterated its previous determination that the plaintiff did not meet the requirement to send a notice of cancellation of the contract within a reasonable time.  In addition, the plaintiff did not provide an opinion regarding the amount that the court must deduct from the restitution amount, due to the plaintiff's enjoyment of the Toyota.

The request for alternative relief, obligating Elbaum to pay the loan repayments

45. The plaintiff requested that if the court cancels the purchase agreements and leaves the loan agreements, Elbaum should be instructed to pay the plaintiff all the sums that she paid and remained owed for the loans taken and for which the proceeds were transferred in full by direct financing and blender to Elbaum.  As stated above, the court did not find that any of the agreements should be canceled and therefore also rejected the request to oblige Elbaum to pay the loan repayments, especially since the plaintiff did not find a specific amount of the requested charge.

Payment of compensation

46. The plaintiff asked To obligate the defendants and/or any of them to pay her compensation for deception and/or oppression and/or breach of agreement and/or negotiation that did not In good faith, and/or the presentation of negligent misrepresentation or unjust enrichment and/or any other legal cause of action in the sum of NIS 50,000 in respect of Mental anguish caused to the plaintiff. In contrast to the previous remedies in the”Q Deja, Beham”Q determines that the appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case is to oblige Elbaum to pay the plaintiff compensation for the plaintiff's deception at the time of the sale of the Toyota due to her increased commitment to the credit companies, contrary to the oral agreement between the plaintiff and Ahmed.  As stated above, the evidence showed that when the plaintiff sought to return the Skoda, Elbaum demanded payment of an alleged fine of NIS 50,000 for the cancellation of the agreement, without justification, and when the plaintiff was reluctant to pay the fine, Elbaum, through Ahmed, made a representation to her that she would spare herself the payment of the fine if she bought the Toyota.  However, at the end of the day, Elbaum fined the plaintiff in the sum of approximately NIS 50,000 due to the shrinking of the value of the Skoda for the purpose of calculating its value when it was replaced by Toyota, and caused the plaintiff's commitment to the credit companies to increase almost twice the amount that Ahmad committed to in a conversation with the plaintiff and her brother.  To this must be added the compensation for the mental anguish caused by Elbaum to the plaintiff.  Hence, Elbaum caused damage to the plaintiff in an amount higher than the amount of compensation that the plaintiff requested in the statement of claim, i.e., the sum of NIS 50,000.  This, too. After the court takes into account that Muhammad returned the plaintiff the sum of NIS 8,000.  However,”Q is not entitled to exceed the maximum amount requested by the plaintiff as compensation, and therefore the court”Q obligates Elbaum to pay the plaintiff the sum of NIS 50,000.

Should any of the escorts be obligated to pay compensation?

47. Regarding the compensation remedy, the court distinguishes between direct financing and blender. Regarding direct financing, the court is aware of the judgment in a civil lawsuit in a quick hearing (Tel Aviv-Yafo) 642-01-24 Blender P2P Israel in a Tax Appeal v. Ahmad Abu Shakra (published in Nevo) in which the court ruled that "when in the framework of the alleged transaction, a right assignment was made in the funds to which the defendant is entitled in the framework of the loan agreement from the plaintiff to a third party (the car lot that works with the plaintiff).  When the loan money does not transfer to the borrower but to a distant party, the lending company has an increased duty of care to ensure that the borrower is aware of the sophistication of the transaction and its execution."  In the same matter, the court referred in the judgment of Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 62736-10-13 Ammash v. Extra Leasing Ltd., paragraph 16 (published in the databases, [Nevo], February 11, 2015), as a source of law for the increased duty of care.
48. Shelly testified on behalf of Direct Finance that she did not identify a problem in the two transactions, both in the transaction in which the plaintiff requested a loan when purchasing the Skoda and later when she requested another loan in order to finance the purchase of the Toyota. Shelly testified that in the first transaction, the plaintiff requested financing in the amount of NIS 63,000 according to the Levi Yitzhak price list without deductions. She also testified that Direct Finance  saw that the plaintiff had the ability to repay the loan and did not know that the plaintiff had taken a loan from Blender in the sum of NIS 30,000 at the same time.  Shelly was asked whether Direct Finance  is supposed to check the value of the car, to which she replied that the borrower is supposed to check the value of the car.  During the hearing of the evidence, it became clear from Yehuda's investigation that Direct  Finance was incentivizing Elbaum to take care of directing Elbaum's clients  to ask Direct Finance for loans.  Shelly explained that Direct Finance  does this in order to compete, among other things, with Blender.
49. Direct Finance claimed in its summaries that the claim regarding the Elbaum incentive is an expansion of the front. However, both Elbaum and Maimon Direct concealed this fact in their pleadings. Direct Finance claimed that Elbaum's representatives are not its representatives, and that it is not the business of its customers that it financially incentivizes car dealers to maximize its profits by directing buyers to take loans from it.  However, as soon as the customer's request for a loan is submitted through Elbaum as "authorized" on behalf of Direct Finance and Albaum is in a conflict of interest, Direct Finance must disclose this to its customers and take into account that an innocent customer does not carefully review all the terms of the agreement, when he receives oral information from the person who submits the loan request for him, and he sees him as a representative of Direct Finance and at least fails to understand the difference between them.  As emerged from the plaintiff's interrogation.  Therefore, the court rejects the claim of direct funding according to which the wording of the agreements signed by the plaintiff, according to Ahmed's instruction, leads to the conclusion that Direct Finance is not responsible for Ahmed's actions.  Direct Finance claimed that the plaintiff should have asked her for an explanation in Arabic, but as far as the plaintiff was concerned, according to her testimony, Ahmad and Direct Finance were the same, and Ahmad did not testify, in order to contradict the plaintiff's version regarding oral representations he made to the plaintiff, when he submitted three requests for loans from Direct Finance on her behalf.
50. The court ruled that the evidence showed that direct financing essentially granted Elbaum the status of a representative on its behalf, which takes care of its profits, in a manner that exceeds the identity of the alleged customer only for the purpose of signing the loan agreement.  The court ruled that in view of the conflict of interest in which Elbaum existed, and the large number of loans that the plaintiff took from her through Elbaum, within a short period of time, Direct Finance was subject to an increased duty of care, which she breached.  Therefore, the court rules that Direct Finance is liable for the damage caused by Elbaum to the plaintiff in a manner that caused her to increase the plaintiff's obligation to direct funding, when the plaintiff believes Ahmad's undertaking regarding the amount of the monthly repayment.  Therefore, the court ruled that Direct Financing will be obligated jointly and severally with Elbaum in the amount of compensation of NIS 50,000.
51. With regard to the plaintiff's claims regarding Blender, the plaintiff confirmed in paragraph 11 of the affidavit that she had asked for and received a loan from Blender and reiterated this in her interrogation. The plaintiff's mother was asked if she had information about the loan from Blender, and she replied that Ahmed had said that he wanted to fill a gap with a company that would give a loan. Noa testified that Blender gave a loan in the amount of about NIS 30,000.  She explained that unlike direct financing, Blender does not have collateral, since it gave the plaintiff a supplementary loan.  She also explained that the plaintiff submitted an online application, entered her personal details, including the credit card, and performed a three-step check with the credit card company.  She also testified that the plaintiff received a code from the credit company, entered it into the system, and then proceeded with the process of approving the loan.  She also testified that if the plaintiff had not cooperated, Blender would not have been able to approve the granting of the loan.  The plaintiff made various allegations against Blender in her summaries, but it would have been better if she had taken a beam out of her eyes, in light of the fact that she confirmed that she had been photographed reading a Hebrew text that Ahmad had written for her in Arabic, in order to receive the loan from Blender.  The plaintiff wanted to buy the Skoda without paying anything out of pocket in cash, by receiving a supplementary loan from Blender and she has no choice but to complain about herself for presenting to Blender that she stands behind the request for a supplementary loan.  Hence, there was no reason for her to view her summaries that Blender would suspect when she watched the video, which the plaintiff allegedly made a false representation of her.  Unlike direct financing, which has been proven to incentivize Elbaum to make sure that its customers ask it for loans, there is no evidence that there is a similar relationship between Blender and Elboim, or any other, such as Elbaum's permission to submit the request on behalf of the client and identify him for Blender.  The plaintiff complained in her summaries that the court accepted an objection to the question regarding the connection between Blender and other car lots, but her arguments in this matter are not subtle, since the information would not have raised or lowered the matter of a business relationship between Blender and Elbaum.  It should be noted that the plaintiff did not take advantage of the preliminary proceedings to request the disclosure of Blender's agreements with Elbaum.  In addition, unlike direct financing, Blender gave a loan only to finance the purchase of the Skoda, and from the moment the plaintiff exchanged this transaction for another transaction, there is no reason to reiterate claims to Blender regarding the purchase of the Toyota.  Therefore, the court rejects the request to require Blender to pay compensation.

The court accepts the claim in part

52. The court accepts the claim against Elbaum and partially finances it directly by obligating them to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of NIS 50,000. The court dismisses the lawsuit against Blender.

Discussion of expenses

53. Since the court partially accepted the claim against Elbaum and Direct Funding, the court must charge them for the plaintiff's expenses. Elbaum caused damage to the plaintiff, which she also benefited from direct financing, due to the increase in the plaintiff's commitment to direct financing, which may even exceed the amount of compensation requested by the plaintiff, and therefore the court obligates them to pay the plaintiff the full fees she paid, as well as the plaintiff's attorney's fees in the sum of NIS 23,600 jointly and severally. As for Blender, it was not proven that she would incentivize Elbaum as the plaintiff claimed in her summaries.  The plaintiff turned directly to the blender, while letting Ahmad and Muhammad use her mobile phone.  Blender went further and demanded a video documenting the plaintiff's consent, and the plaintiff has no choice but to complain about herself for cooperating, according to her version, with Muhammad and Ahmed, when the reading was written in Hebrew, written for her in Arabic, in order to receive a loan from Blender, thus creating a representation regarding Blender according to which she approved the transaction.  Under these circumstances, the plaintiff will pay her attorney's fees in the sum of NIS 11,800 to Blender.

Conclusion

54. The court accepted the claim in part, by obligating Elbaum and Maimon Direct to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of NIS 50,000, plus NIS interest, from the date of filing the statement of claim until the date of the actual full payment.
55. In addition, the court obligates Elbaum and Direct Finance, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the full court fees paid by the plaintiff in the framework of this proceeding, and also obliges them, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees in the sum of NIS 23,600, plus NIS interest, from the date of the judgment until the date of the actual full payment.
56. The court dismisses the claim against Blender, and obligates the plaintiff to pay her attorney's fees, in the sum of NIS 11,800, plus shekel interest, from the date of the judgment until the date of the actual full payment.

Given today, on June 10, 2025, in the absence of the parties.