"I say in my broken English what I mean. And there is clause 3.13 in the agreement that anyone can read." I will question this – a review of the notice does not conform to the language of section 3.1.3, insofar as Peleg only sought to reflect what was stated in it, he could have simply copied and pasted it. However, Peleg found a way to interpret the rewriting of the section, and thus revealed his intention with regard to its content.
To all of this it should be added – as detailed above at length – that the interpretation given by Peleg in real time to the clause (inter alia in the meeting on September 24, 2019) is that this is a conversion clause and not a clause that grants the plaintiff the right to additional options. Moreover, as detailed above, the plaintiff's failure to raise a demand for such options by February 2020 also shows support for the determination, and accordingly the plaintiff did not view this clause as a clause that grants her a right to options, but rather as a clause that allows her to convert the financial commission into shares.
- The summary of the aforesaid teaches that even the interpretation of the clause in light of its language and in light of the circumstances external to the agreement, is sufficient to support the conclusion and accordingly the plaintiff is not granted the right to receive options to purchase the company's shares, and therefore it can lead to the rejection of the plaintiff's claim for this remedy.
entitlement to commission for the second offering;
- From here I will turn to the examination of the second remedy that the plaintiff petitioned, which is a fee in respect of the second offering. As to this remedy, I will begin by noting that in the framework of the lawsuit, the plaintiff also petitioned with respect to the second offering for a double commission – a monetary commission and in addition a fee in the form of options to purchase shares. With regard to the second part of the commission – i.e., with regard to eligibility for options in addition to the monetary fee – my determinations with regard to the very entitlement to options, as determined above, are also true with respect to the second offering, and therefore, they are sufficient to lead to the rejection of this component relating to the second offering.
In addition, and as will be detailed below, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff's demand for a monetary commission in respect of the second offering is also denied.