More importantly, counsel for defendants 2 and 3 themselves noted that the second informant did not produce evidence from Muhammad linking the defendants to the indictment attributed to them, and there is no dispute about this, so that in practice there is no substantive significance (relating to the dubbing itself) to the allegations against the conduct of the investigating unit in the case of the second informant.
Moreover, since we are dealing with a single additional informant and not a series of informants, we should also not accept the argument of the defense attorneys that the conduct of the investigative unit with the second informant presents a recurring pattern of behavior, which can teach us about the conduct of the investigative unit with the first informant.
It should be emphasized that as detailed in detail above, the dubbing products conducted by the first informant were numerous and of high quality, and it can be said that even if the state chose to try to employ an additional informant against Muhammad, this will not in any way attest to the difficulty found in the products of the first informant.
In light of this, I did not find any significant defects in the operation of the second informant, and even if such defects were found, this would not have affected in any way the manner in which the dubbing products conducted by the first informant were evaluated.
Defendant 1
According to counsel for defendant 1, in their summaries there was not a shred of evidence that there was a connection between Muhammad and defendant 1 in the commission of the murder, and in this regard it was further argued that even if it is determined that Muhammad is the murderer, and even if it is determined that defendant 1 lied, it will not be possible, on the basis of the existing evidence base, to convict defendant 1 of the offense of murder as an accomplice.
According to them, given the lack of evidence on the evidentiary basis, it is possible to accuse defendant 1 of committing an offense of lesser severity, on an existing evidentiary basis. It was noted that in cases where there is no direct evidence, as in our case, but circumstantial evidence, according to the Supreme Court's ruling, the circumstances must present at most one and only conclusion that arises, which is that the defendant was an accomplice in the commission of the murder and there is no other reasonable possibility. It was further argued that it would not be possible to conclude from the defendant's silence or from the contradictions in his version that complicity in the murder is the only option (Criminal Appeal 7234/13 Imam v. State of Israel).