Agreement File (Rishon LeZion) 13518-03-23 A.C. V. K.C.

1. I have before me a claim "for a declaratory judgment on the nullity of an agreement", in which the plaintiff petitions for the cancellation of a "marital peace agreement and alternatively divorce" that was signed between her and the defendant, and which was approved by the court in 2009, on grounds of a defect in its conclusion, such as mistake, deception, oppression, and more.

Background, arguments and sequence of proceedings

2. The plaintiff and the defendant (hereinafter: "the woman" and "the man", as the case may be) are former spouses, who married each other on 00.00.1997, and have three children together, all of whom are now adults.
3. In 2008, the parties' relationship deteriorated and they conducted legal proceedings; The man filed a divorce claim with the rabbinical court, and the woman filed claims with this court regarding alimony, property and time of stay.
4. On December 30, 2008, the rabbinical court rejected the man's claim for divorce and ordered him to return to a life of peace with the woman (Appendix 1 to the statement of claim).
5. In the hearing held on January 6, 2009, they initially agreed to seek mediation, and later agreed to set the case for evidence as well as mutual disclosure of documents.
6. On April 23, 2009, while conducting the legal proceedings in court, the parties signed a marital peace agreement and alternatively a divorce (hereinafter: the "Agreement"). On the same day, the parties and their counsel appeared before the Honorable Judge Hani Shira, to approve the agreement.  After the parties declared that they had signed the agreement willingly and with free consent and understood its contents, essence and results, it was given the force of a judgment.
7. There is no dispute that both parties were represented: the woman by Dr. xxx, an attorney, who was replaced by her attorney representing her today, and the man by his representative in this lawsuit today as well.
8. In the framework of clause 5 of the agreement, in the chapter entitled: "Money and Property", the parties regulated the division of joint property, inter alia as follows:

"A.  Upon the expiration of the marriage due to a divorce between the parties, the husband will pay the wife a sum equal to $100,000 upon the actual arrangement of the get, as a division of property and the balance of resources between the parties and as payment for her ketuba and the addition of her ketuba (deleted in handwriting - M.R.P.).  In the event that the wife demands a get, and the husband refuses to give her the geta within 3 months from the date of her claim, the husband will undertake to pay the wife the aforementioned sum, as a division of property and the balance of resources, as her ketuba and as an addition to her ketuba (deleted in handwritten - M.R.P.).  For the avoidance of doubt, this amount is final and binding on the parties and neither party will have any claim and/or claim arising from the termination of the marriage."

9. After the agreement was signed, the parties returned to living together for another 14 years, until in January 2023, the man submitted a "joint request for divorce" to the Rabbinical Court, requesting that the 2009 agreement be applied. The Rabbinical Court found that the "joint" application was not agreed upon and not joint, and cancelled the scheduled hearing (Appendix 5 to the statement of claim).
10. On March 7, 2023, the woman filed the lawsuit for a declaratory judgment ordering the nullity of the 2009 agreement, claiming that its drafting did not meet the principles of transparency, good faith and fairness, which are required in family matters, as well as grounds for oppression, mistake and deception.
11. According to the woman, in essence, the agreement was concluded in circumstances in which she was financially dependent on the man absolutely, did not work and fulfilled her role as a housewife. Due to the outbreak of the crisis between the parties, and the subsequent legal proceedings, including an eviction order from the apartment in which she lived, the woman found herself in severe mental distress, and even fell ill with fibromyalgia.  According to her, her difficult mental state establishes the existence of oppression at the time of signing the agreement.
12. In this situation, and out of a desire to restore the situation to its previous state and return to peace of mind, she believed the man and agreed to sign the agreement, but this was based on a misrepresentation and deception on the part of the man, who concealed material information about the status of his assets at the time the agreement was signed. As a result, the woman waived the rights to which she is entitled by law.
13. According to the woman, in practice, the agreement was abandoned by both parties, and in any event, it was an extremely discriminatory agreement that was signed not of her own free will, but under pressure, deception, deception, oppression, coercion, misrepresentation, and exploitation of her mental distress, in violation of the duty of good faith.
14. The woman further claims that the man misled not only her, but also her lawyer, which impaired her ability to understand the meaning of the waivers included in the agreement. The woman referres, among other things, to the testimony of Attorney Dr.  XXX, who represented her at the time, that he was not aware of all the details due to deliberate concealment on the part of the man.  Therefore, the woman petitions for a declaratory judgment on the nullity of the agreement (in the summaries she also petitioned for a balance of resources).
15. According to the man, in essence, the agreement was valid and valid, signed by the parties of their own free will and with clear knowledge of its economic consequences, when the woman was represented and received legal advice, and after the court explained the results of the agreement, and the parties even acted in accordance with it. Now, according to him, due to economic unfeasibility, the woman is seeking to cancel it in bad faith, even though it has received the validity of a judgment that has become final.
16. The man denies any concealment of information and claims that all of his assets, income and business were known to the woman at the time of the signing. According to him, the agreement was drawn up at the request of the woman and her counsel.  Therefore, he wishes to dismiss the claim in limine, to leave the agreement in place and to order that its provisions be fulfilled in accordance with the judgment.
17. In the pre-trial that took place on July 20, 2023, the court tried to bring the parties to an agreement, but each side entrenched itself in its position, and therefore instructions were given to present evidence. On November 19, 2023, a preliminary hearing was held, during which attempts were again made to bring the parties to an agreement, but the attempts were unsuccessful.  Therefore, a hearing was scheduled for the hearing of evidence, which took place on 17 June 2024.  Subsequently, written summaries were submitted.
18. The witnesses summoned to testify on behalf of the woman: Dr. xxx, who represented the woman in the proceedings that took place between the parties, including the drafting of the agreement; Mr. xxx - an arbitrator to whom the parties approached in order to bring them to an agreement at the time; Mrs. xxx - the woman's sister; Mrs. xxx - the man's mother; Mr. xxx - the man's brother.  No witness was summoned on behalf of the man.

Discussion

19. A family agreement, including an agreement for reconciliation and divorce, is a contract for all intents and purposes, and as such it is subject to the principles of contract law, including the principle of good faith.
20. Family relations are based on mutual trust and a particularly broad duty of disclosure, even beyond what is required in commercial relations. In such relationships, each party is obligated to share the other party with all relevant information.
21. Family agreements require full transparency, especially when it comes to economic, property, or personal rights that affect the future of the parties and their joint children.
22. When a party to an agreement proves that the agreement was entered into on the basis of error, misrepresentation, misrepresentation or concealment of material information, it has the right to cancel the agreement.
23. The case law discussed extensively the cancellation of a prenuptial and divorce agreement that was approved and validated by the court, when it was determined that the petitioner to cancel the agreement has a heavy burden of proof and persuasion, since the divorce agreement "is usually a comprehensive arrangement of many points in dispute and must be examined as a single whole; Efforts must be made to provide him with stability and credibility in order to nurture agreed-upon arrangements between spouses who have a dispute that cannot be resolved, otherwise a divorce agreement will have no value and any agreement will only be an interim stage until it goes back to court.”)Civil Appeal 4515/92 Sylvia Martha Stein Komarov v. Ladislau Stein (Nevo, June 13, 1994) (Agreement Case (Petah Tikva Family) 56267-06-18 Anonymous v.  Anonymous (Nevo, October 31, 2021).
24. A prenuptial and divorce agreement is approved by the court after the court is convinced that it is an agreement made out of the free will of the parties, and when each party understands the implications of the agreement (High Court of Justice 7947/06 Kahalani v. The Great Rabbinical Court [published in Nevo] (December 24, 2006)).
25. However, the approval of the agreement in court does not prevent one of the parties from claiming a defect in its conclusion in accordance with the grounds enumerated in the Contracts Law (General Part), 5733-1973 (hereinafter: "the Contracts Law"), to the extent that there was indeed a material defect at the time it was entered into (Tax Appeal 1277/07 Anonymous v. Anonymous [published in Nevo] (August 18, 2009)).

From the general to the individual

26. I will preface by saying that from the evidence that was placed before me, I got the impression that at the time of signing the agreement, the woman was in a difficult mental state and in severe distress. This distress was the result of a mask of pressure and threats exerted on her by the man, including through his family members.
27. When the man persuaded the woman to return to him, she assured him that he wanted to live with her in peace and that signing the agreement was a condition for the peace of the home, thereby restoring the situation to the way it was, preventing her from being removed from the house, the children taken from her by the man, and leaving her destitute.
28. This severe distress has created a reality in the woman whereby she has no choice but to sign an agreement, which is based on the man's representation that he has almost no property, and the practical result is that the parties have no property.  Moreover, the lawyer who represented her also relied on the information presented to him by the man's counsel and the man himself.  Based on this information, the woman's counsel recommended that the woman sign the agreement she signed.  My conclusion is based on all of the following considerations.

Grounds for oppression

29. Section 18 of the Contracts Law states: "A person who entered into a contract as a result of exploitation by the other party or another on his behalf of the contractor's distress, mental or physical weakness or lack of experience, and the terms of the contract are unreasonably worse than customary, may cancel the contract."
30. A central element of the cause of oppression is the poor condition of the oppressed. Additional elements are: the behavior of the oppressor, which takes advantage of the situation of the oppressed person, as well as the fact that the terms of the contract are unreasonably worse than is customary.  These are cumulative elements and it is necessary to prove a causal connection.

The first element - distress, mental or physical weakness or lack of experience:

31. At the time of signing the agreement, it was proven that the woman was in an inferior emotional and financial situation in relation to the man, who took advantage of her distress in order to obtain an agreement that benefits him in a way that deprives the woman of her rights.
32. There is no dispute that during the life together the wife did not work, she and the children were financially dependent on the man. The man confirmed in his interrogation that the woman did not work, but rather raised the children and took care of the management of the house, but he claimed that she should have gone to work and therefore acted in contravention of the agreement (28 July 2024, pp.  40, 11, 18-35).
33. As part of the legal proceedings conducted by the parties in 2008, an eviction order was issued against the woman from the apartment in which they lived (in the name of the man's sister xxx), the man stopped providing for the house and paying payments to the authorities. The woman was weakened, and was later diagnosed as "a patient who is known to suffer from fibromyalgia and problems of restlessness, anxiety and depression," and is being treated with cannabis (see medical documents from 2020 - Appendix 16 to the appeal against the decision of the Registrar of Women).
34. It should be noted that these documents in themselves do not prove the woman's mental state at the time of signing the agreement. However, the attachment of these documents to the fabric of the evidence and testimonies in the case shows the woman's emotional distress as a result of the financial pressures exerted on her by the man.
35. The woman's severe distress can also be learned from the woman's testimony and the testimonies of witnesses on her behalf. In this context, it should be noted that the man did not bring any additional testimony beyond his own, and this was attributed to his obligation.
36. Attorney xxx testified about the woman's concerns and the pressure she was under following the legal proceedings and the eviction order she received from the apartment. According to him, the woman was anxious for the future of the children, due to the fact that she did not work, had no property and was unable to support her children (17 June 2024, pp.  3, 10-15).
37. The woman's sister, Mrs. XXX, testified that the woman was in financial distress for months, when the man who was responsible for paying all the expenses of the house and the children, stopped paying them, thus causing the electricity and telephone to be cut off, exerted financial pressure on her, threatened her to take the children, and more. When the man asked to return to her, she saw only Shalom Bayit (June 17, 2024, pp.  53, 30-41; p.  54; p.  55, s.  1-3; p.  57; p.  58, s.  15-17, s.  25-38; p.  63, s.  38 to p.  64, ;).
38. The woman's mental state and distress can also be learned from the testimony of the arbitrator to whom the parties reached the mediation at the time, Mr. XXX, who testified that the woman at that time was in a state of disarray, "like half dead," told him that she agreed to peace with the man and that she was afraid of losing the home and the children (June 17, 2024, pp. 21-25).
39. The woman attached a letter that she claimed she sent to Adv. xxx at the time (Appendix 12 to the appeal against the decision of the Registrar of Women), which raises great frustration, and claims, among other things, that she is giving up, that she has no strength, that the man wants to take the children, and that she wants to believe the man that this time it will succeed. The content of the letter testifies to the woman's difficult mental state that led to the signing of the agreement.  Attorney xxx confirmed in his testimony that the woman sent the letter to him (June 17, 2024, pp.  5, 37 to 6, 7).
40. This evidence joins the woman's testimony and strengthens her that in the mental state in which she was subjected, she would have signed anything, every agreement (pp. 20, 29-31).

The Second Element - Exploitation of Distress:

41. The man testified when questioned during his interrogation about a letter he sent to the woman on September 17, 2008 with a demand to vacate the house with the children (Appendix 14 to the appeal against the decision of the Registrar of Women). He admitted that the letter he sent was a tool to exert pressure in his "game", and in his words: "True, it's a kind of lawyers' show, it's true, the very fact that I've been paying rent for two years is a kind of show.  It's a kind of game of a lawyer like you, it's a kind of game [...] it's true it's a game [...] they wouldn't leave this house" (pp.  39, 17-18, 30, 38; p.  40, 1).
42. Thus, the "game" that the man played, according to him, succeeded, and led to the woman signing the agreement, in order to remove the threat of her eviction from the house.
43. The circumstances of drafting the agreement indicate unreasonable circumstances for drafting a divorce agreement, after the application of economic pressures, threats that it will be left homeless, and the deliberate and manipulative use of the parties' children by the man. All of this serves as further support for the woman's claim that she took advantage of her difficult mental state and that she was unable to resist the man at the time of signing the agreement.

The third element - the terms of the contract are unreasonably worse than is customary:

44. In this case, the result of the agreement is that the wife receives nothing from the property accumulated during the married life of the parties, except for the sum of $100,000, which according to the man constitutes the value of half of the apartment in XXX at the time, in which they lived at the time.
45. As will be detailed below, it turned out that the man did not share with the woman the extent of his real property, the man did not share with the court during the period of drafting the agreement regarding his real assets, and his attorney also provided the woman's attorney with incomplete information, not to mention erroneous information regarding the extent of his real property.
46. The woman, as stated, hardly worked during the years in which she was married to a man, did not accumulate social rights, and does not have any profession, so in the absence of income, rights or other assets for the woman, the actual meaning is that the woman leaves the marriage without a roof under her head and without financial resources, except for the aforementioned small sum.
47. All of the above strengthens the above conclusion that this is a discriminatory and one-sided agreement that did not take into account the woman's legal rights at all, and was even intended to infringe on her rights, while taking advantage of her difficult situation when she is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the man.
48. After examining all the data, testimonies and evidence that were placed before me, I was convinced that the elements of the cause of oppression had been fulfilled and that the woman was in a very difficult mental state and in great distress when she signed the agreement, and that in this state of affairs she was unable to rationally consider the legal implications of the agreement. It was proven that the man deliberately tried to cause the wife's severe distress and took advantage of this to his advantage in order to get her to sign a discriminatory and unreasonable agreement, which would grant him extreme rights at the expense of his wife's rights.
49. The woman lifted the burden of proving her mental state at the time of signing the agreement. The woman was exhausted by the economic pressures that hovered over her and believed that the parties were looking for peace at home.  The man took advantage of the woman's distress, persuaded her to save the house, and caused her to sign the discriminatory and unilateral agreement, in a manner that establishes the cause of oppression as a reason for canceling the agreement, according to section 18 of the Contracts Law.
50. Therefore, I determine that the foundations of the cause of action were fulfilled and therefore the agreement should be annulled. Moreover, as will be detailed below, I found that in the case at hand there were grounds for error, deception and lack of good faith, and therefore the agreement should be cancelled on these grounds as well.

Mistake and deception

51. The cause of error is anchored in section 14(a) of the Contracts Law, which states: "A person who entered into a contract due to a mistake and it can be assumed that if it were not for the mistake he would not have entered into the contract and the other party knew or should have known about it, is entitled to cancel the contract."
52. The ground for deception is enshrined in section 15 of the Contracts Law, which states: "A person who entered into a contract due to a mistake that is the result of deception by the other party or another on his behalf, may cancel the contract; In this regard, 'deception' - including the failure to disclose facts which, according to law, custom or circumstance, the other party should have disclosed."
53. In the present case, and as will be detailed below, I am convinced that the woman would not have signed the agreement that is the subject of the proceeding, had she not been misled into thinking that the essence of the agreement was for domestic peace and not an agreement in which she unilaterally waived all her rights to which she was entitled by law, most of which she did not know at all. The man convinced her that signing the agreement was the only way to cancel the legal proceedings, the economic pressures and the threats hovering over her head to be left without a home and without her children.

Concealing the man's financial situation

54. As may be recalled, during the legal proceedings in 2008, temporary foreclosures were imposed on the man's accounts, instructions were given for the disclosure of documents about the parties' financial situation, as well as instructions for hearing evidence. However, at the end of the day, the documents were not disclosed, the evidence was not heard, and the foreclosures were canceled, after the parties announced that they had signed the agreement that is the subject of the proceeding, and returned to Shalom Bayit for another 14 years.
55. The timing of the signing of the agreement and its approval shows that the agreement was drafted and approved in a hurry, after a "twist in the plot" according to which the man began to ask the woman to return to peace. After all, before that, the parties had conducted lengthy negotiations and were unable to reach a comprehensive agreement.  The timing of the signing of the agreement and its approval after foreclosures were imposed on the man's accounts, an order for the disclosure of documents and instructions for hearing evidence - strengthens the woman's claim that the man's entire purpose was to remove the threat of the foreclosures and to expose the extent of his property.
56. From the testimonies that were heard, it emerged that the man had expressed his concerns to many people due to the foreclosures imposed on his accounts, and that he was required to disclose financial documents about his financial situation (see at length Appendix 1 to the woman's summaries and the relevant references to the testimonies of the man himself, of the witnesses: Attorney Dr. XXX, Mr. XXX, Mr. XXX , Mr. XXX, and Mrs. XXX.
57. The testimonies also indicate that due to the man's many fears about the foreclosures imposed and the disclosure of his financial situation, he began to threaten to commit suicide in front of the woman and that he would harm himself if she left him, until she agreed to his request to return to peace with him (see references in Pesach 1 above).
58. The testimony of Attorney Dr. XXX, who represented the woman in 2008, revealed that prior to the signing of the agreement, attempts were made to locate properties registered in the man's name.    xxx testified that the man claimed at the time that he had no property and that the assets that were located belonged to his family members and did not belong to him (June 17, 2024, pp.  2, paras.  6-27).  However, it later became clear that the man owned many assets, most of which were transferred to his name after the agreement was signed, as "mushrooms after the rain."
59. Thus, for example, it turned out in retrospect that in 2008 the man had purchased land rights in XXX (Appendix 6 to the statement of claim), which the woman did not know about at the time of signing the agreement, neither her lawyer nor the court. The agreement did not mention the existence of the aforementioned property, not even in the discussion of 06.01.2009, where there was a lot of talk about property matters, when the man even declared for the record: "What is not, how can you give it?" (p.  4, s.  20).
60. The arbitrator, Mr. XXX, testified that the man told him that he had no property, except for the apartment in XXX, and that to his question the man replied that he had no additional assets (June 17, 2024, pp. 22, 6-7; pp.  25, 25-26).
61. The man's mother, Mrs. XXX, confirmed in her testimony that she does not work, that she lives on a pension from the National Insurance Institute, and that in 2007 she was transferred to her ownership of land in XXX, for which she did not pay with her own money. She claimed that the money was from Peres, and when confronted with the claim that the man paid from his own money, she did not deny it.  In any event, her testimony on this matter was confused and full of question marks (June 17, 2024, pp.  37-39).
62. The man's claim that the woman knew about the property in xxx and his profits from the family business was not proven. When the court asked the court at the hearing what was the logic of the woman settling for $100,000, when she allegedly knew that he had so many assets and income, the man replied: "That's what they asked for" (July 28, 2024, p.  47, para.  16).
63. The man's testimony was found to be unreliable, and it is clear that deliberate actions were taken to conceal the information from the woman and her lawyer. This deception constitutes grounds for canceling the agreement, as it prevented the woman from making an informed decision based on all the relevant information.
64. As part of the legal proceedings conducted by the parties in 2008, no assets registered in the man's name were found. The parties did not have time to reach the stage of discovering the documents and hearing the evidence, when they decided to draw up the agreement.  However, the evidence shows that after the date of the signing of the agreement, assets began to be transferred to the ownership of the man as aforesaid, in a way that may indicate a sense of "protection" on the part of the man through the agreement:

In 2011, the man's sister, Mrs. xxx, transferred to him the full rights in the apartment in xxx (in which the parties lived), in a free transfer (Appendix 19 to the appeal against the woman's registrar's decision); in the same year, 2013, the man's brother Mr. xxx transferred the rights to the property in xxx- A lot on which a banquet hall was built, with a free transfer (Appendix 21 to the appeal against the decision of the Registrar of Women); In 2014, rights in the property were transferred to a man inXXX, in a transfer without consideration.

65. These moves, which took place after the agreement was drafted, testify to the fact that the man, who is rich in money and assets, tried to prevent the woman from exposing the true extent of his assets during the legal proceedings, thereby depriving her of her rights under the law. The woman's testimonies and evidence in this matter were not contradicted by the man, who was unable to present a satisfactory explanation for the failure to disclose the information.
66. The testimony of Adv. xxx strengthens the woman's claims regarding the man's misrepresentation, and the violation of her right to receive full and reliable information about his real financial situation, in order to make an informed decision before signing the agreement.
67. Attorney Dr. xxx testified in a reliable, coherent and convincing manner, that the man at that time repeatedly claimed to him that he had no property and had nothing.  He also testified that he was not aware of all the information about the man's assets, and if he had known about the additional assets, he would have advised the woman not to sign the agreement under the conditions that had been set.  However, he said the agreement was based on false data, and therefore it could not have any validity.  The testimony of Attorney XXX made it clear that the woman was undoubtedly not presented with the overall information regarding the man's financial situation.
68. The testimonies of the man himself and of the witnesses who were heard reinforce the conclusion that the man's concerns about the foreclosures and the disclosure of the documents were a major motive in drafting the agreement, in an attempt to prevent the disclosure of relevant information that could have affected the course of the proceedings and even the content of the agreement that was signed. This raises doubts as to the man's good faith, and in fact supports the woman's claim that she acted under a misrepresentation and lack of proper disclosure on his part.
69. When it was found that the control of the data relating to the man's assets was entirely in the hands of the man, and that the woman had given faith in the man and the representation he presented to her, I found that the man had taken advantage of this trust, and chose to negotiate in bad faith with the woman, while hiding the true extent of his assets from her. The woman signed the agreement based on an incorrect database, which stemmed from deception on the part of the man.

Breach of the duty of good faith

70. The duty of good faith in negotiations is enshrined in section 12 of the Contracts Law, which states: "In negotiations leading up to the conclusion of a contract, a person must act in an acceptable manner and in good faith."
71. Spousal relationships require a particularly high level of good faith and cooperation, especially when it comes to making agreements regarding their financial future. The duty of good faith in negotiations requires full disclosure of all material information, in particular information relating to assets and financial rights.
72. In our case, there is much more hidden than what is revealed with regard to the scope of the man's assets. It is not clear and no reasonable explanation is given as to how after the signing of the agreement, the man began to receive rights in many real estate assets as a gift and without consideration, and this matter raises questions and wonders.
73. It was proven that the man breached the duty of good faith by concealing material information and acting contrary to the principles of good faith and full disclosure. The man had full control over the extent of his property, and the woman trusted him to show her the picture in its entirety, but he did not do so.
74. If the court had been under the impression that the woman was aware of the extent of the man's assets, and still made an informed decision to relinquish her property rights, there would have been no room to intervene with the consent of the parties. However, the woman proved that she was not aware of all the relevant data at the time the agreement was signed, and that the actual situation was different from that presented to her by the man.  It is doubtful whether the woman would have given her consent to such an agreement if she had all the information about the man's assets.
75. Admittedly, the trend of case law is to limit intervention in divorce agreements approved by the court to those cases in which it has been proven that there was a defect in the will (CA 4504/90 Anonymous v. Anonymous [published in Nevo] (March 29, 1993)).  However, in our case, the woman lifted the heavy burden that was placed at her doorstep, and proved that the agreement was signed out of error, deception and bad faith in the conduct of the negotiations for the conclusion of the agreement on the part of the man.

A few words about abandoning the agreement

76. The peace agreement was signed about 14 years before the final separation of the parties. The terms of the agreement have become irrelevant with regard to alimony and the time spent with the children who have become adults.  In fact, we are dealing with an agreement in which neither party has fulfilled its obligations.  Now the man asks to apply only the property part, which deprives the woman of all her rights, except for the payment of $100,000.
77. The passage of time since the signing of the agreement, without the parties taking any action to implement it, indicates that it has been abandoned. The parties did not take any operative action to implement the agreement, and in practice their life together continued as it had been before, for another 14 years, during which none of the parties claimed the existence of the agreement or its breach.
78. The parties not only did not implement the agreement, but also did not express any protest or claim regarding its non-existence. The prolonged silence of the parties, together with their inaction to implement the agreement, is a clear indication that they have abandoned it.
79. Even if I were to accept the man's argument that these are independent obligations in the agreement, in the unique circumstances of the present case, the agreement was abandoned by both parties even regardless of the nature of the obligations set forth in it. Even in these circumstances, I found that the agreement was abandoned and no longer valid.
80. As the man himself confirmed in his testimony, after the parties returned to a life together for full domestic peace, the agreement did not exist in their world (July 28, 2024, pp. 30-33).

Conclusion

81. From all of the above, I find that the elements of the cause of action were fulfilled and therefore the agreement should be annulled.  In addition, there were grounds for error and deception by the man to mislead the woman and her representative, following negotiations conducted in bad faith, and in violation of the man's duty of disclosure towards the woman.  Therefore, the agreement must be cancelled on these grounds as well.
82. The claim is accepted - the agreement dated April 23, 2009 is canceled.
83. Property matters between the parties must be regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Property Relations between Spouses Law, 5733-1973, while examining the joint assets accumulated during the marital life.
84. The man will bear the woman's expenses and attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 55,000.
85. The judgment may be published in the absence of identifying details.
86. After the proceeding, the case will be closed.

Granted today, February 05, 2025, in the absence of the parties.