Even in the completion of the investigation prior to the filing of the indictment and during the trial, I do not see any prosecution or investigative failure, in light of various developments that occurred during the legal process. The main question is whether the defendants were given a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves against the evidence presented by the prosecution, and whether their defense was severely impaired, to the point that they found it difficult to deal with the evidence against them or to prove their version. I was not convinced that this was the state of affairs with regard to the evidence that was added during the trial.
Even in the argument that there is some failure in my claim in the prosecution's refusal to summon certain witnesses to testify in court, I have not found any substance. Even if these or other witnesses were available – and this was not the case with some of the witnesses – the prosecution still has the right to waive certain witnesses, and it goes without saying that the defendants were entitled to summon them, as part of the defense case, and to interrogate them by way of cross-examination. From here to the point of harming the defense of the defendants and causing a miscarriage of justice that justifies their acquittals, the distance is very great.
As to the order in which the evidence was presented, I will admit that I did not come to the conclusion of the opinion of counsel for defendant 1, who raised the argument. In a multi-defendant trial, the correct order is for each defendant to testify in turn and present his evidence, so that the first defendant, who has already given his testimony, cannot relate to and respond to the testimonies presented on behalf of subsequent defendants in the order of the indictment. This was also the case in this trial, and I do not believe that there was a flaw in the conduct of the proceeding, and it is certainly not a violation of the defendant's procedural rights.
A final argument relates to the manner in which the indictment was drafted, by way of the artificial multiplication of the indictments and the artificial splitting of the offenses concerning fraudulent receipt. I have already addressed this matter at the beginning of the proceeding, when I rejected a preliminary argument that was raised in connection with the wording of the indictment. Although it can be argued that it would have been desirable to reduce the number of offenses and focus on the main one, I do not believe that there was a flaw in the indictment, and certainly it is not "conduct that contradicts the principles of justice and legal fairness." In the decision of March 14, 2005, I addressed the arguments relating to the multiplicity of charges and offenses, as well as the argument relating to the use of general norms alongside specific norms. In the same decision, I noted that the Attorney General is authorized to "... to attribute to the defendant various offenses that rely on the same factual system", and further determined that "I have not found any reason or reason to prevent the prosecution, which is permitted to it in section 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, from attributing to the defendant offenses under the tax laws and the Penal Law, which are based on an identical or similar factual system". In addition, I noted in my decision that "I am not convinced that the multiplicity of legislations was done without a practical reason." Therefore, I have reached the conclusion that there is no reason to accept the preliminary arguments raised in this context, subject to the introduction of amendments to the indictment to which the prosecution agreed.