It was further argued that defendant 1 did not act in accordance with the accepted norm, by determining that the bill of lading would not be prepared for the order of the opening bank, but for the order of the importer – which, according to the prosecution, is a straw company. In this way, it was possible to obtain original documents from the supplier, which eliminates the need to honor the financial obligation that appears in the letter of credit. This conduct of defendant 1 indicates his intention, according to the prosecution, that the letter of credit will not be honored and that he will fraudulently receive the goods without paying for them.
On the other hand, the defense's argument is that the thesis presented by the prosecution has no basis in reality. The only considerations that guided the defendant in drafting the letter of credit were "professional, pertinent, commercial and financial considerations". According to the defense's approach, it has not been proven that any of the clauses of the letter of credit is illegal, unacceptable or unrecognized in the world of international trade. The letter of credit itself was drafted by Calderon's opening bank, Bank Leumi, and the bank should not be suspected of deliberately impeding any of the clauses.
It was further claimed that the letter of credit was received by the supplier and his bank, and no claim was raised that these were clauses or conditions that could not be met, and they did not raise any request to change the wording of the letter. The defense is of the opinion that in these circumstances, there is no basis for the claim that defendant 1 drafted the letter of credit in such a way that there would be no need to honor the obligations contained therein, and in this way receive the goods fraudulently without paying for them.
After examining the evidence relating to this matter, I am not convinced that the very wording of the letter of credit constitutes the commission of the offense of fraudulent receipt. It was not made clear to me as to what was the "thing" that defendant 1 received, or was supposed to receive, at the time of drafting the letter of credit, and it is not possible to rule out the possibility that at the stage of drafting he did not yet have the intention to remove the goods fraudulently. In this context, it should be mentioned that the supplier of the goods decided, for its own reasons, to send the goods to Israel in four separate shipments, and even sent the bill of lading relating to the first shipment, even before the letter of credit became operational and before the consideration for the supply of the goods, in whole or even in part, was paid to him. In summary, despite the suspicion hovering over the head of defendant 1 that he devised a complex plan that was supposed to lead to the receipt of the goods without paying the consideration for them, I am unable to determine that this issue was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore I do not see room to convict the defendant in this context.