(Statement by the head of the International Intelligence Investigation Agency in the committee, at pp. 4 and 5-6. See also: ibid., at pp. 12 and 14-15 and in section 7 for the reference of the members of the majority opinion to the classified materials).
- As a result, although the investigators had already addressed the matter of Major Tzur in the early stages of the investigation, and it was clear that they were aware of the connection between him and Mr. Almakays, they decided not to arrest Major Tzur (even though they had arrested another soldier), and more importantly - they decided not to summon him for interrogation at all, even after Mr. Almakays's name came up in the interrogationsN. Tzur (see: ISA interrogation records, at pp. 18 and 24). To be precise, the reason for this was not, as Mr. Almakais assumes, that the ISA interrogators did not believe his version regarding the connection with the 210th Division (a matter that has no support in the interrogation records); The obvious explanation for the non-summoning of Major Tzur as part of the security and criminal investigation is that the interrogators believed that the connection between him and Mr. Almakais was not significant in connection with the leak of information that interested them (which, as it has been clarified, dealt with information that did not relate at all to the scene in which the 210th Division operated), not even at the relatively low level required for a summons for interrogation or testimony. It is presumed that the ISA and police interrogators, and the prosecutors who filed the indictment, had they believed that Major Tzur had a real role in the leak of information for which the security and criminal investigation was being conducted, they would have at least summoned him for interrogation or for the delivery of a version (regardless of the results of the preliminary examination conducted with the IDF). It should be emphasized that ISA interrogation records show that doubts arose at an early stage as to whether Major Tzur was acting with the approval of Major General Goffman, but this information was not perceived as a reason to interrogate Major Tzur, but at most as information that should be passed on to the military authorities (see: ibid., at pp. 18-19).
- The picture is even clearer from a review of the full indictment against Mr. Almakais. Both in the indictment itself, and in Appendix A, in which "details regarding the confidential information that [Mr. Almakayes] collected, prepared, recorded, and held," there is no mention of Major Tzur, or of the details of information he gave to Mr. Almakais in the correspondence that were submitted. Instead, the indictment focused on the actions of Mr. Almakays, along with Intelligence Directorate officials, who collected many secret information and shared it with Mr. Almakais.
- Shortly after the indictment was filed, the investigation therefore split into separate tracks: criminal proceedings were opened against some of those involved, while others involved were transferred to the investigation of the IABM or to other disciplinary proceedings. In an update to the commanders he distributed, the head of the International Intelligence Operations Unit described how "the stick was transferred." According to him, prior to the filing of the indictment, consultations were held with the relevant legal authorities, and it was decided that no indictment would be filed in relation to some of the parties in the affair, given the findings of the investigation and the "lesser degree of involvement" of these parties. At the beginning of August 2022, approval was received to open an investigation by the IUCN against three such parties, including Maj. Tzur (paragraph 6 of the document "Summary of the Incident for the Commanders' Update" dated January 8, 2024, which was submitted to the Committee (hereinafter and hereinafter: the Commanders' Update) and paragraphs 62-64 of the Advisor's supplementary comment). Major Tzur was interrogated by the CIB in relation to the correspondence he had with Mr. Almakais, and in the end, it was determined in the summary of the investigation that "the officer made an effort not to provide classified information during the contact that was established between the officer and Uri Almakais, but as part of the relationship between them [...] A situation arose in which the officer was forced to provide Uri with classified information" (section 8(b) of the summary of Major Tzur's interrogation at the IABM. It should be noted that Major Tzur disputed this determination before the committee. See the transcript of Major Tzur's statement to the Committee dated May 21, 2026, p. 3 (hereinafter: Major Tzur's second statement to the Committee)). During the interrogation at the CIBM, Major Tzur stated that he had received from Maj. Goffman the "blessing of the way" to contact Mr. Almakais, who emphasized to Major Tzur not to commit information security offenses (section 5(d) of the summary of Major Tzur's interrogation at the CIBM). See also Major Tzur's first statement to the committee, at p. 5). Since Major Tzur "passed on classified information [albeit not in a high classification, but the information was classified]," it was suggested that command measures be taken against him, and on the systemic level, it was recommended that Maj. Gen. Goffman be instructed to carry out the actions relating to influence through the units authorized to do so (sections 9(a) and 10(a) of the summary of Maj. Tzur's interrogation at the ICBM).
- Our eyes, therefore, see that the operation of Mr. Almakais by Major Tzur was available to the ISA interrogators, but its relevance to them was minimal, since the focus of the investigation was, from the beginning until the filing of the indictment, a different and much more serious leak of information - the leak of information from the Intelligence Directorate. From the material placed before us, it appears that this is the reason why Major Tzur was not interrogated or asked to give the security and criminal version, and was not even mentioned in the indictment filed against Mr. Almakais. Admittedly, Major Tzur's interrogation at the IUCN dealt with his relationship with Mr. Almakais, and the conclusion reached at the end was that certain classified information had been provided, but this justified only appropriate command-disciplinary measures, and certainly not the conduct of a criminal proceeding.
The three issues on which the majority and minority opinions of the committee were divided should therefore be read against the background of this distinction between the security and criminal investigations, which focused on the leak of information to Mr. Almakais from the Intelligence Directorate; and the interrogation of the Intelligence Operations Unit, which dealt extensively with the operation of Mr. Almakais by the 210th Division and the Central Command.