Note: The parties disagreed as to the nature of the relationship between Major Tzur and Mr. Almakais. Without elaborating, I will clarify that I see no difficulty in stating that Major Tzur operated Mr. Almakais and used him for the needs of the 210th Division. Actually,, Ress"N ZVer himself was asked about the matter and confirmed that the relationship with Mr. Almakais was indeed similar to the operation (See the transcript of Major Tzur's first statement to the committee dated March 22, 2026, at p. 17, Name Confirmed Ress"N Create, In response to a question from one of the committee members that "Practical"His relationship with Mr. Almakais It was similar to the relationship The Kabbalist Between operators and their agents (Below: His Announcement The first of Ress"N Tzur in the Committee). This was also the position of the head of the"m. See: Notice of the head of the debtor"In the Committee, Ltd.' 3, 10-9 and-16. For concrete examples, see: The correspondence between Major Tzur and Mr. Almakais, at pp. 285, 296, 311-322, 364, 393, 423-425, 485, 573-581 and 617).
- The question in dispute regarding the functioning of Maj. Goffman in the Almakais affair is whether, beyond the functional-command failures that occurred in his conduct, he should also be attributed a moral failure that had an impact on his appointment as head of the Mossad. In this regard, it seems that two different narratives have developed, which in many points are completely contradictory to each other. The first, which the petitioners claim, and which was joined by the Attorney General, is that Maj. Gen. Goffman consciously denied Mr. Almakays's operation, and consciously refrained from acting on his behalf after learning of his arrest. In human terms: it is alleged that he lied about his involvement in the affair, and abandoned Mr. Almakais (hereinafter: the narrative of the lie and abandonment); The second, which Goffman and the Prime Minister claim, is that Maj. Gen. Goffman did indeed deviate from the procedures in operating Mr. Almakais by the 210th Division, but there was no moral flaw in his action, neither when he was asked about the division's involvement in the affair (in May 2022), nor afterwards (in August 2022), when he clarified his role and responsibility in the framework of an investigation by the BBM on the matter (hereinafter: the moral integrity narrative).
- The decision on the question in dispute is, in fact, a decision between these two narratives: the more one accepts the narrative of lies and abandonment, the more difficult it is to dispute that this indicates a serious moral flaw in the conduct of Maj. Goffman in the Almakais affair. Such a flaw certainly casts serious doubt on the possibility of appointing him to the position of head of the Mossad, and if the prime minister had believed in his existence, he would have presumably refrained from promoting such an appointment. On the other hand, to the extent that we accept the narrative of moral correctness, the conduct of Maj. Gen. Goffman in the affair is indeed flawed, but it has implications for his assessment of his suitability for the position from a professional standpoint, not on the fact that he is unfit to serve in the position in terms of moral integrity.
- Before I continue, I will note that the chairman of the committee also discussed in his opinion the failures in the conduct of the 210th Division in connection with the Almakais affair, and attributed to Maj. Goffman moral responsibility for some of these failures due to the fact that he headed the division. In particular, in this context, the chairman of the committee attributes a defect in moral integrity with regard to the operation of Mr. Almakais even though he assumes to his credit that Maj. Gen. Goffman did not know that he was a minor: "The operation of a minor by a military body amounts to a defect in terms of ' integrity.' Although the division commander was not aware of this figure, and this is the assumption, it should be remembered that he is the party responsible for the division's operations. As the responsible party, and since the operation of a minor is a very significant and serious defect, Maj. Gen. Goffman is tainted from the point of view of ' integrity'" (paragraph 18 of the Committee's Chairman's opinion). In his supplementary opinion, the Chairman of the Committee added that it is necessary to clarify whether in the framework of the correspondence between Major Tzur and Mr. Almakais classified information was provided to the latter (in this context, it should be noted that even according to the Chairman of the Committee, not all the failures in the operation of Mr. Almakais constitute a defect in integrity, and in particular, there is no moral failure in the very fact that the operation was carried out in contravention of the procedures regarding the identity of the military units authorized to act as aforesaid). since "not every violation of a law, rule or ordinance constitutes a defect in terms of 'integrity'" (ibid., at section 17)).
There can be no doubt that Maj. Gen. Goffman's duty, as a professional matter, should be attributed to the violation of the procedures regarding the operation of civilians; the fact that the division employed a minor; And to the extent that this happened, so did the fact that classified information was passed on to Mr. Almakais without authorization. At the same time, failures in the division's conduct, attributed to Maj. Gen. Goffman as a matter of command responsibility, do not indicate Necessarily For a moral flaw in his actions. They may indicate responsibility on the legal level, but (at least in the usual case) they do not attest to guilt from the moral perspective (see: paragraph 20 of the Committee Chairman's opinion). In order to examine the integrity of General Goffman, it is necessary to focus on the actions (and omissions) that must be attributed to him personally by virtue of his state of consciousness; Not in the acts (and omissions) committed by his subordinates, even if he bears professional responsibility for them by virtue of his command responsibility. This is especially so, since there was no reason to assume that Major General Goffman closed his eyes from seeing the conduct of his subordinates.
- If so, there are three factual issues that must be decided: first, whether Maj. Goffman was aware that Mr. Almakais was a minor (hereinafter: the issue of the minors); second, whether Maj. Gen. Goffman knowingly provided false information in May 2022 regarding the operation of Mr. Almakais (hereinafter: the issue of the lie); Third, whether Major General Goffman consciously refrained from taking the actions he should have taken in order to protect Mr. Almakais (hereinafter: the issue of abandonment). I will relate to these issues in order, but first, and as a necessary background to the matter, I would like to clarify the relationship between the various investigations that were conducted in the framework of the affair. As I will clarify, not all of these investigations are one-size-fits-all. This distinction is essential for the clarification that will be brought below, because it sheds light on the behavior of the parties involved in the various investigations, including the behavior of Major General Goffman himself.
Between the Security and Criminal Investigation and the CBAV Investigation
- After reviewing all the materials submitted to the Advisory Committee and forwarded to us, including documents that are still classified, I concluded, in summary, that the essential connection between the security and criminal investigation that was conducted regarding the leak of information to Mr. Almakais from Intelligence Directorate officials, and the investigation of the Intelligence Directorate, which dealt with the operation of Mr. Almakais by the 210th Division, is weak, at best. The connection between the investigations exists, of course, on the level of factual causation (the security and criminal investigations led to the investigation of the IBB); In both cases, connections between the same central civilian element (Mr. Almakais) and various military elements were investigated, but from a substantive point of view, these are two investigations that deal with different and different issues. Thus, not only because in the end the indictment was filed solely in connection with the leak of information from Intelligence Directorate officials; But also because from the very beginning, the ISA's security investigation (and subsequent criminal investigation) focused mainly on the leak of information from Intelligence Directorate officials (see: ISA interrogation records, at pp. 5-6 and 8; paragraph 3 of the summary of Major Tzur's interrogation at the CIB). The reason for this is clear: it was the leak of information that created a substantial and serious risk in the eyes of the investigators; However, the deficiencies in the operation of Mr. Almakais by the 210th Division did not, in the view of the investigators, lead to such a significant risk (although they also raised concerns about the transfer of classified information to an unauthorized entity). This emerges from classified documents presented to the commission, and it was also explicitly stated to the committee by the head of the International Intelligence Operations Unit, in his reference to the security and criminal investigation:
Most of our attention, from the UAV, the Shin Bet, the Cyber Prosecution... This is accompanied by a focus on the very most prominent offense of [Intelligence Directorate officials] who actually maintain ongoing contact with the same Uri Almakais and pass on classified information to him almost in real time [...] The most serious substantive offense is the publication of classified information that came out of the IDF, and again in a negligible context, even chronologically, to the same connection to the 210th Division.