Second, the committee's powers, in its current incarnation, enable it to conduct an in-depth examination of the candidates on the factual level as well. In the past, there was criticism of the committee's conduct in relation to previous appointments, according to which the committee did not have all the necessary tools to clarify facts regarding the candidates (the criticism was expressed mainly in relation to the candidacy of Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav Gallant for the position of Chief of Staff. For more information, see: HCJ 3059/15 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, Paragraph 4 (10.11.2015); State Comptroller Appointment of senior civil servants 237 (2016)). As a result, it was agreed that it was necessary to expand the powers of the committee, and to give "Tools for the Committee for Investigation or Investigation [...] Referring mainly to hand hygiene and ethics" (ibid.). These conclusions were adopted in the framework of Resolution 3839, which anchored the committee's powers, including, "To summon to her hearings any person whom she thinks will be present before her in order to assist to formulate her opinion or ask him for a comment in the cultII"; Prepare a detailed questionnaire that candidates must fill; and to contact the Attorney General in order to accept his position if the need arises (ibid., in sections D(4), D(2) and D(7), respectively. For more information, see: Shapira, at pp. 4-5). Indeed, the Advisory Committee has used these broad powers more than once in the past (see: Assaf Shapira "The Advisory Committee for Appointments to Senior Positions and the Appointment of the Head of the Respondent"20 Next" 3 (Israel Democracy Institute, 2025)).
Once the committee has been entrusted with a heavy responsibility to ensure the integrity of those serving in the seven senior positions, and since it has been given the tools to realize this responsibility - It must be required to set a high standard when it comes to formulating a factual basis for the purpose of recommending the integrity of a candidate whose case is brought before it.
- In our case, and as explicitly stated in the panel's decision of May 19, 2026, we were of the opinion that the committee's work in the first stage (prior to the filing of the petitions) "was deficient, including the lack of exposure to relevant documents from real time and to the direct testimonies of parties involved in the matter." In particular, after it became clear at an early stage that the Almakais affair would be the focus of the discussions, it was appropriate to summon the subject of the affair itself - Mr. Almakais - to appear before the committee. In lieu of his invitation, the members of the committee relied on interviews given by Mr. Almakais in the media, both during the conversations with the other parties who were invited to testify before the committee, and in the framework of the first decision of the members of the majority opinion (see ibid., in paragraph 6.1). Under these circumstances, it would have been better to summon Mr. Almakais in order to hear his version directly. Similarly, after the centrality of the Operations Brigade was clarified, as he was the link between Maj. Goffman and the investigative elements prior to Mr. Almakais was arrested, we were of the opinion that it would be appropriate to instruct him to submit an affidavit, and in view of what was stated in the affidavit, we thought that he should be summoned to appear before the committee.
- Given this impression, after the hearing of the petition, we recommended that a supplementary inquiry be held before the committee, and that additional documents be submitted to all the committee members. And so it was. As described in paragraphs 36-39 above, on May 21, 2026, the Committee heard additional parties, and after reviewing many documents, the Committee submitted a supplementary decision to the Prime Minister on May 26, 2026. Unfortunately, even at this stage, the committee's work was not optimal, and it can be flawed - as the Advisor described well in her reference to the supplementary opinion. The majority opinion focused on an analysis of the correspondence between Major Tzur and Mr. Almakais, and sought to show that these notices do not attest to the transfer of classified information to Mr. Almakais at all. In the minority opinion of the Chairman of the Committee, it was noted without any real reasoning that he saw no reason to change his conclusions in the first decision, and that he disagreed with the determinations in the supplementary decision of the members of the majority opinion of the Committee. The problem is that the question of whether or not Major Tzur transferred classified information to Mr. Almakais is not at the center of the proceeding, and it is doubtful whether a decision is required (and it should be emphasized that the decision that the information that was transferred between Major Tzur and Mr. Almakais was not classified at all is far from being taken for granted). The position of the IOM was that classified information was indeed transferred, even if it was not in a high classification (paragraph 8 of the summary of Major Tzur's interrogation at the IAB), and even a review of the correspondence between Major Tzur and Mr. Almakais does not allow the committee to formulate an unequivocal determination on the matter, in view of the professional aspect of examining the level of classification of a given piece of information (see, for example: correspondence between Major Tzur and Mr. Almakais, at pp. 302, 618, 648-649; paragraphs 25-28 of Mr. Almakais's supplementary reference and pp. 23-25 of the ISA interrogation records). Instead of focusing on the question of the quality of the information provided by Major Tzur, the committee should have delved into the reference to Maj. Goffman's conduct in the affair - and especially to what was clarified in connection with the examination conversation that the Operations Brigade Commander conducted with him. For this reason, it is difficult to say that the inquiry conducted by the committee at the completion stage was satisfactory.
- There is no denying that certain gaps remain in the factual foundation, both because other parties that could have helped clarify substantive points were not summoned to appear before the committee, and also because certain points were not raised before the relevant parties who appeared before the committee, and therefore it is difficult to determine certain findings in relation to them (for example, the assistant director of the operations unit who compiled the memorandum was not summoned to testify, even though he might have been able to shed light on its contents; the head of the International Operations Operations Unit was not asked to appear before the committee again after the records of the ISA interrogations were revealed. were submitted to the committee, detailing conversations that took place between him and the interrogation officials (and on this, see: ISA interrogation records, at pp. 18-19, and p. 2 of the Advisor's request to the Committee from that date (hereinafter: the Advisor's letter)); Maj. Goffman was not asked about the discrepancies between his version and that of Maj. Tzur as to whether he was updated after Mr. Almakais was arrested regarding the arrest (see below in paragraph 96, and compare: the transcript of Maj. Gen. Goffman's second statement to the Committee dated March 22, 2026, on pp. 5 and 6 (hereinafter: Maj. Gen. Goffman's second statement to the Committee))). Notwithstanding the aforesaid, I do not believe that there is any reason to order the return of the proceeding once again to the Advisory Committee. The committee heard the main parties involved, and many documents were submitted to it, most of them "from real time" or close to it. She was also presented with various documents that were located by the counselor, after a few months. Of course, the committee could have further deepened its examination, but the marginal benefit of further factual clarification is diminishing, and I do not believe that there is room to determine, in the framework of a judicial decision, that the committee was obligated to do so. In contrast to the arguments of the petitioners and the counsel who moves to the supplementary stage, in the last references submitted on their behalf, they have not been able to point to a significant element in the factual basis that is still lacking, in my opinion, and at least one that cannot be clarified in the framework of the petitions in question, on the basis of the material submitted to us. Therefore, I am of the opinion that it is appropriate to decide the petitions on the basis of the existing factual basis, while carefully tracing the evidence underlying the committee's decision.
The Minority Position of the Committee Chair
- The position of the Counsel and the petitioners should be given special weight to the minority opinion authored by the Committee Chair (in the framework of the first stage of the Committee's work). This is because he is the chairman of the committee, because of his experience as a judge, and because he, and the outgoing acting civil servant, are the only two members of the committee who were exposed to the classified documents submitted to the committee before they wrote their first opinion (as opposed to the public representatives on the committee, Prof. Einhorn and Mr. Terry, who were exposed to them only at a late stage of formulating their first opinion).
- I do not believe that it is possible to determine, as a rule, that the position of the chairman of the committee is granted special status, beyond the additional vote in the vote, when the opinions in the committee are divided, which is granted to him under resolution 3839. However, in the case before us, giving more weight than usual to this position is justified, since this gives expression to the fact that the first opinion of the Chairman of the Committee was formulated with the assistance of all the relevant material, while the majority opinion in the Committee was not based on these materials (although one of the signatories to it, the outgoing Acting Civil Service, was exposed to them, and in the first decision of the members of the majority opinion it was stated that he did not believe that these materials impair the integrity of Maj. Goffman, without dealing with the reasoned conclusions of the committee chairman). Admittedly, all the members of the committee were subsequently exposed to the classified information as well as to the additional documents submitted at the completion stage, it is clear that there is a difference between making a first decision on the basis of a full factual basis, and examining the full information only after the first decision has been made and published. In the proceeding before us, there was an unusual situation, in which the members of the committee were asked to conduct a kind of "reconsideration" of the decision they had already made (and after this decision had already been brought to the attention of the Prime Minister, who relied on it when he ordered the appointment of Maj. Gen. Goffman). As is well known, changing a decision retroactively is more difficult than making it in advance, and therefore the rule is that the factual basis must be formulated before the committee's decision regarding its recommendation to the appointing body is made (compare, regarding a hearing held after a decision has been made: High Court of Justice 3379/03 Mustaki v. State Attorney's Office, IsrSC 58(3) 865, 891 (2004); High Court of Justice 7289/11 Crazy Wow Bowles in Tax Appeal v. Minister of Industry and Trade, para. 19 (May 9, 2013)). In light of this, the situation that has arisen whereby two of the committee members formulated a position on the basis of missing information, and only after their position was given, were they exposed to the full information, is improper, and justifies giving special weight to the position of those committee members who examined the confidential information in the first place - and first and foremost to the reasoned position of the committee chairman.
- Giving more weight than usual to the position of the chairman of the committee in this case also gives expression to the special role that was assigned to the committee in our case: deciding on factual questions. As noted above, the main role of the advisory committee is to assess the extent to which a particular fact or act constitutes a defect in the candidate's integrity - a normative examination in principle. It is rarer that the committee is required to decide factual disputes, especially those in which no real legal inquiry has been conducted. In such a case, the "comparative advantage" of the chairman of the committee, who, according to Resolution 3839, is a retired judge of the Supreme Court, and in our case is President (ret.) Grunis, who served as a judge and president for about 27 years. This is because making factual decisions, based on oral conversations and documents, is at the heart of the judicial profession. This biographical fact does not justify giving an additional vote to the chairman of the committee when there is no equality of votes, contrary to Resolution 3839; However, as a practical matter, it obligates the other parties involved - the other members of the committee, the appointing body and the court - to carefully consider the position of the committee chairman, in order to make an informed decision if they are convinced by the factual conclusions of the committee chairman, even though he was in the minority.
- If so, my conclusion with regard to the claims of procedural defects adopts some of the arguments of the petitioners and the counsel, but not the remedies sought by them. Indeed, it would have been appropriate to expand the factual clarification conducted by the committee, and even after the completion stage, the existing factual basis is incomplete. Similarly, in the special circumstances of the case, in which the first decision of the members of the majority opinion of the committee was made on the basis of partial information, and in view of the need for comprehensive factual clarifications, it was appropriate to give considerable weight to the position of the chairman of the committee. As a result of the foregoing, there is room to examine in a particularly careful and careful manner the conclusions reached by the members of the majority opinion in the committee, while giving considerable weight to the opinion of the chairman of the committee (in which he explained his position regarding the factual disputes in the case).
From the General to the Individual: The Advisory Committee's Decisions and the Factual Dispute in the Almakais Case
- Before I address the Almakais affair itself, I will remove from our path the other arguments that were raised against the appointment. In the movement's petition, claims were raised regarding the skills and experience of Maj. Goffman. These matters are left to the discretion of the appointing authority - in this case, the Prime Minister - and with the exception of extreme cases in which the candidate clearly does not possess the necessary qualifications for the performance of the position, it is not the role of the court to intervene in this matter (in such extreme cases, it may be possible to view the appointment of a manifestly unqualified person as a possible expression of consideration of extraneous considerations, and to disqualify, even for this reason, the appointment). See: Dafna Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, Vol. 2, 725-726 (2010); Shapira, at pp. 3-4). It is clear that the case before us is not of the type of case mentioned above. Maj. Gen. Goffman is a senior military officer with many rights; He has successfully held a long list of command positions in the IDF, the most recent of which is that of the military secretary, which is of a political and strategic nature; His superiors, led by the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff, expressed great appreciation for his skills and performance. No one disputes the courage and courage of Maj. Gen. Goffman, who also found expression in the way he fought and was seriously wounded during a battle in the Gaza envelope on October 7 (for details on the above, see the Prime Minister's letter to the Advisory Committee dated December 4, 2025, which was attached as Appendix 1 to the Prime Minister's preliminary response). Moreover, there is no norm in the State of Israel that requires the appointment of the head of the Mossad from within the organization. In fact, about half of the heads of the Mossad did not grow up within it, but rather were, like Maj. Gen. Goffman, generals in the IDF who were "parachuted" to head the Mossad (the first of them, the late Maj. Gen. Meir Amit, in 1963; the last of them, the late Maj. Gen. Meir Dagan, in 2002). In terms of Goffman's skills and experience, his appointment as head of the Mossad is a decision that lies deep within the realm of reasonableness, and therefore the authority - and responsibility - to make it rests with the prime minister, and it is not our business.
- In addition, as noted, a series of inquiries were submitted to the Advisory Committee raising claims of a defect in moral integrity on various issues relating to the appointment of Maj. Goffman. Nevertheless, it was accepted by all the members of the committee, and by me as well, that only the Almakais affair carries, in terms of the severity of the alleged failure of values, a potential baggage that could justify the conclusion that he adhered to Maj. Gen. Goffman a defect in moral integrity of the kind that could lead to the disqualification of his appointment (the other claims, which are not related to the Almakais affair, did not arise, for obvious reasons, in the Almakais petition, and the Movement's petition also addressed these matters only in the margins (see: Sections 16-17 and 23-29 of the Movement's Petition). I also did not find any substance in the movement's arguments that the appointment should be disqualified in light of a defect in the integrity of the appointer, the prime minister, which were also raised in a general and casual manner. Thus, in order to decide the petitions, we must focus on the issue that the advisory committee also focused on - the Almakais case.
- There is no disagreement about these two: One is that the affair of Elmakais is a serious affair that requires attention and clarification. This is the arrest and interrogation of a minor (he was about 17.5 years old at the time of his arrest) for a significant period of time and for particularly serious charges, in an affair that ended with the cancellation of the indictment against him about a year and a half after he was first arrested. The failures learned from this affair are also very relevant to the position we are dealing with, since someone who did not know how to act properly in relation to an Israeli minor whom he "recruited" for missions in a division under his command may not fulfill his duty to the servants of the Mossad organization, and to the various entities it employs. The second is that Maj. Goffman failed in his performance in the Almakais affair. He failed to operate a private citizen, let alone a minor, without obtaining the necessary permits; He failed to properly supervise the elements under his authority in the division who were in charge of Mr. Almakais's operation. On some of these aspects, Maj. Gen. Goffman received a command note from the commander of the Northern Command (see above, paragraph 16, as well as the statement of the commander of the Commander of the Commander of the Commander in the Commission, at p. 2). These functional-command failures must be taken into account by the prime minister when considering whether Maj. Gen. Goffman is a suitable candidate for the position of head of the Mossad. However, failures on the functional-command level do not amount to a failure in the field of moral integrity. They do not indicate that there is a moral flaw in General Goffman, which prevents his appointment to the position of head of the Mossad.
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