High Court of Justice 23426-04-26 Uri Elmakis v. Prime Minister - part 21

The said document appears in several versions of the material before us, with slight changes, some of which the 210th Division is explicitly mentioned.  In any event, the message that emerges from them is the same: after a thorough examination, no evidence of Almakais being operated was found.

14. On May 24, 2022, Almakais was arrested and interrogated by the ISA and the police, and was later indicted for security offenses related to the provision of confidential information. After several weeks in detention behind bars, Almakais was transferred to detention under electronic supervision, and later to house arrest under restrictive conditions.  To complete the picture, it should be noted that criminal proceedings were also taken against military elements that are not part of the 210th Division.
15. During the month of August 2022, a procedure was conducted by the ICBM that was defined as a "security investigation" into the Almakais affair, with the involvement of its head. This additional investigation was not conducted on the criminal level, but on the military level, and focused on military officials against whom no indictment has been filed.  In this context, on August 10, 2022, Major Tzur was interrogated regarding his relationship with Almkayes, as well as the materials he transferred.  Later that day, Maj.    Goffman contacted the head of the CIBM's investigations department, in which he stated that he had approved the said operation, but qualified it, noting that his approval was given only in relation to the transfer of open materials.  This is ostensibly the first time that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman noted that Almakais was operated with his knowledge and approval.  At the end of this proceeding, Maj.  Gen.  Goffman was reprimanded by the commander of the Northern Command at the time, who was his direct commander, and received a command note.  This is because the operation of al-Maqays was carried out in violation of military administrators (regardless of the type of materials transferred).  To complete the picture, and without going into detail here, it should be noted that the army also made decisions in the matter of Major Tzur.
16. More than a year later, on December 14, 2023, the state announced the withdrawal of the indictment against Almakais, and on December 17, 2023, the District Court ordered the cancellation of the indictment, as well as the cancellation of all the restrictive conditions imposed on Almakais. The full range of reasons underlying the state's statement was not disclosed, but it noted that "during the lengthy dialogue that took place between the parties, [al-Makays's] counsel presented a lot of data and presented information that was not in the investigation file."
17. The result that emerges from the affair is particularly difficult, even if it is detached from the concrete issue before us. In practice, a criminal proceeding was taken against a minor, in which he was even detained for a long period of time, in circumstances in which he had contact with military officials who, from his point of view, approached him as part of their duties.  The law enforcement officials' choice to conduct the investigation against al-Maqais and to indict him was based on the assumption that al-Maqais was not operated by authorized military officials.  Later, when it became clear that Almakais had been activated with the approval of Maj.    Goffman , this assumption turned out to be wrong.  Almakais claimed at the beginning of his interrogations (on May 25, 2022) that he was manipulated by Major Tzur of the 210th Division, who, according to his understanding, approached him as part of his job and as part of the division's activities.  This did not fit with the information that the researchers had at the beginning.  The material before us indicates that the possibility that, contrary to the information provided, Almakais was operated by Maj.  Gen.  Tzur under the direction of Maj.  Gen.  Goffman, was first mentioned by the investigators only after almost two weeks in which Almakais was detained.  If so, the consequences of this on him were not negligible.
18. This is the place to reiterate that the acts that were at the center of the investigation and the indictment against Almakais were not part of his operation by the 210th Division, but were carried out in the framework of his contacts with other parties.

The process of examining the appointment of Maj.  Gen.  Goffman in the Advisory Committee for Appointment to Senior Positions

19. The starting point for the discussion is, of course, that the committee is "a professional, high-level and independent committee, in which senior members serve; This committee is authorized to examine appointments to the most important positions in the public service, including the leadership of the various security organizations. It is not easy for the court to intervene in an appointment that passed its examination" (High Court of Justice 427-10-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.  Government of Israel, para.  38 of the opinion of the Vice President   Sohlberg (December 28, 2025)).  At the same time, the committee is also an administrative body whose manner of work must be examined, and all the more so when the subject it examines is also within the court's area of expertise - the determination of findings of fact.
20. The committee's work was detailed by my colleague Justice Grosskopf, including the actions it took in order to formulate its opinion. My colleague found it appropriate to emphasize that even after the existence of supplementary work following the development of the proceeding at hand, "certain gaps remain in the factual foundation" (at paragraph 65 of his opinion).  He went on to detail various deficiencies in the committee's work, and I also agree with him on this matter.  However, I am unable to accept his conclusion as to the consequences of these defects.
21. This is not the place to elaborate on the importance of making an administrative decision on the basis of an appropriate factual basis, but it should be noted that "a defect in the collection of data may be an independent reason for judicial review of the decision, even in areas where the court was careful not to interfere with the authority's discretion" (see: High Court of Justice 5309/18 Israel Hotel Association v. Ministry of Interior, paragraph 73 of my opinion (January 6, 2021)).  This is because the conclusions drawn must necessarily be derived from the data in the Authority's possession.
22. In the circumstances of the case, "a closer judicial review in relation to the decision itself", as suggested by my colleague Justice Grosskopf (in paragraph 60 of his opinion), does not provide the necessary response.
23. The main flaw in the present proceeding, as will be detailed below, is in the stage of formulating the factual basis. In particular, the clarification that was made was partial, so that the result was that questions that were at the core of the dispute were left unanswered.  A careful legal examination, which by its nature does not include the formulation of a new factual basis, will not necessarily help to reach the correct conclusion when the defect stems from the formulation of a partial factual basis.  At this stage, we have no further information beyond the materials presented to the committee itself.  Thus, and since the infrastructure before it was found to be lacking, it is clear that the infrastructure before the court is also deficient.  Moreover, in my view, there is a real difficulty in a situation in which flaws are attributed to an administrative body in the formulation of the factual infrastructure on the one hand, and in which at the same time it is allowed to "enjoy" the fruits of those defects (i.e., sufficiency with that missing infrastructure) on the other hand.
24. Therefore, I will now address aspects of the committee's work and its conclusions, which led me on a different path than those of my colleagues. Needless to say, I also reviewed, with the consent of the parties, all the materials that were placed before the committee and the transcripts of its deliberations - both at the stage preceding the legal proceeding and at the stage of the supplementary examination.

The Almakais affair - what's on the agenda?

25. As noted, the committee's role was to examine the integrity of Maj.   Goffman, with the main issue being his conduct and involvement in the Almakais affair.  In this specific context, it is possible to point to two significant question marks that the committee should have addressed.  The first question mark lies in the May 2022 timeline, and focuses on Maj.  Gen.  Goffman's reply to Brig.  Gen.  G.  that he was not aware of any connection, direct or indirect, to the Telegram channel in the field of security current affairs, and in particular his statement that he was not familiar with the specific channel operated by Almakais (my colleague Justice Grosskopf called this in his opinion the issue of lying).  The second question mark lies at a later point in time: when Major General Goffman learned of the arrest of the "blogger" under whose active command the division was operating, did he act in the manner necessary to ensure that no steps were taken against him because of the actions he took against him against the background of his ties with the division (what my colleague Justice Grosskopf defined in his opinion as the issue of abandonment).  Unfortunately, as will be explained, the committee's work did not sufficiently dispel the fog that had accumulated around these two points.
26. It is important to add that it is important to add, as my colleague Justice Grosskopf elaborated, that the Almakais affair ostensibly raises additional difficulties relating to the conduct of Maj.   Goffman - difficulties that relate to strict adherence to caution and to act according to procedures.  Thus, for example, the material shows that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman was not at all interested in the personal characteristics of the "blogger" (his age, background, etc.).  Given that this was an unusual operation, the military directors are puzzled and uncomfortable.  However, this difficulty is not the focus of the discussion at this stage.  I therefore agree with my colleague Justice Grosskopf that there is no room to attribute the issue of the minors to Maj.  Gen.  Goffman.  In addition, I am of the opinion that the question of whether classified materials on behalf of the 210th Division were in fact transferred to Al-Makis (and I do not determine that this was done) is not our business.  There is sufficient basis to determine that General Goffman clearly instructed the transfer of unclassified materials only, and in any case this can be assumed to be in his favor.
27. In this sense, the two questions that in my opinion the committee should have focused on are quite limited. It is precisely for this reason that it is possible to be surprised that most efforts were not made to complete the examination process without leaving "black holes."

The Question of Telling the Truth to Brig.  Gen.  3 - May 2022

28. This point relates to the inquiry that Brig.   G.  made with Maj.  Gen.  Goffman regarding the operation of Almakais.  The clarification was part of the preliminary examination carried out by the ICBM.  Shortly thereafter, Almakais was arrested and the investigation into his case continued.  As the procedural history of the proceeding before us shows, from the outset the question was decided by the committee in a very partial manner.  The problem is, in my opinion, even now - after the committee's supplementary work - the question has not been fully examined.
29. In the framework of the committee's original deliberations, only Maj.   Goffman himself, who did not remember exactly what was asked and what he answered, and the head of the International Intelligence Operations Unit, who did describe the findings of the investigation but did not take part in it himself (and in this sense was only a "second tool").  This was in the circumstances in which the conversation with Maj.  Gen.  Goffman was carried out by Brig.  Gen.  G.  - who was not called to testify before the committee at all in the first place.  It should be emphasized here that the decision not to summon Brigadier General G.  or to ask him to address the aforementioned inquiry was significantly deficient, given that he was the main person, with the exception of Maj.  Gen.  Goffman, who had direct knowledge of the content of the clarification conversation (along with Brig.  Gen.  G.'s assistant who listened to the conversation).
30. As may be recalled, with the consent of the parties, and in order to try to remedy the aforementioned defect, Brig.   G.'s affidavit was submitted, accompanied by an appendix that included a summary of the conversation from a real time, including a memorandum of remarks.  The document indicates that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman's negative answers, both regarding the possibility of a connection between the division's elements and the channels in the field of security current affairs in general, and with regard to the channel operated by Almakais in particular, were unequivocal.  At the same time, it should not be ignored that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman's questioning revolved mainly around an investigation that focused on the transfer of classified information.  In addition, in his answers, Maj.  Gen.  Goffman clarified that the transfer of intelligence material (as opposed to open material) was done with his knowledge and personal approval, and therefore he assessed that this did not happen in the division under his command.  It should also be noted that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman asked to check the details with his subordinates, but was refused in view of the sensitivity of the criminal investigation being conducted, and this too should be credited to him.
31. In our decision of May 19, 2026, we wrote: "It became clear that [the committee's] work was deficient, including the failure to disclose relevant documents from real time and to the direct testimonies of parties involved." As a result, we suggested that the committee summon Almakais and Brig.   G.  with reference to the affidavit he submitted, as well as any other required party at its discretion, after which Maj.  Gen.  Goffman could complete his comment.
32. This was indeed done as stated in our decision in order to try to remedy the aforementioned defect retroactively. Among other things, the committee summoned Almakais and Brig.    G., and summoned Major Tzur and Maj.  Gen.  Goffman once again.  However, I am of the opinion that even now the clarification on the matter remains of a partial nature.
33. It should be noted that Brig.   G.'s testimony before the committee did not include additional significant information in the affidavit and the summary of the hearing.  At the same time, he clarified, in response to questions from some of the committee members - which were to some extent guiding questions - that the purpose of the investigation was to examine a leak of classified intelligence information.  In his additional testimony before the Commission, Maj.  Gen.  Goffman also explained that the "general context" and "context" of the discourse between him and Brig.  Gen.  G.  dealt with the leak of intelligence information for the purposes of influence.  Maj.  Gen.  Goffman noted that he believed that the focus of the affair was on the transfer of classified materials, and against this background his answer must be understood.  Ultimately, most of the committee members accepted this explanation.  Not only that: the majority opinion in the committee went further, stating that Major General Goffman's answer "was true" and that even in retrospect it "turned out to be true." On the other hand, the committee's chairman, President (ret.) Grunis, was of the opinion in his first opinion that Goffman's answers were inaccurate, "and this is a delicate description."
34. It is important to say this: The negative answer given by Maj.   Goffman to Brig.  Gen.  G.  was certainly incorrect on the simple factual level.  My colleague Justice Grosskopf also emphasizes that "Major General Goffman should have answered the aforesaid question in the affirmative", even if with certain clarifications and reservations (paragraph 87 of his opinion).  In view of the aforesaid, there is no basis for the conclusion of the majority opinion of the Committee that the answer given is pure truth.  This is also emphasized by my colleague in his opinion (ibid.).  At most, this is an inaccurate answer that can be explained in retrospect.
35. Most of the committee members accepted the late explanation that emphasizes the context in which the remarks were made, according to which it can be understood that General Goffman denied any connection to the channel regarding the transfer of classified materials only. My colleague Justice Grosskopf also accepts this position (paragraph 90 of his opinion).  This is indeed a possible explanation for the negative answer given.  However, it does not completely remove the doubts - given that the question was of a very general nature, which is not limited to the leak of information.  As far as we know, General Goffman's answer was conclusive and unequivocal, without including all the details that should have been mentioned.  Moreover, the negative answer given had real consequences.  As a result of this investigation, the conclusion that was reported to the investigators was this: there was no connection between the authorized military officials and al-Maqays.  As we know, this was not the state of affairs.  Moreover, the materials indicate that only some time later did the investigative authorities begin to suspect that Major Tzur's activity was carried out under the direction of the division commander, contrary to the information provided by the head of the International Intelligence Investigation Unit prior to the investigation.
36. I will clarify that these words do not constitute a conclusion to the duty of Major General Goffman. According to the information before us, it is impossible to know whether General Goffman's answer was tainted by an attempt to distance himself from the matter, or by a mistake stemming from the context of the conversation or by his distraction.  It seems that the contextual explanation given to the answer may provide a certain response to the difficulty, as well as the fact that Major General Goffman wished to further examine the issue with his subordinates "with certainty" - and was not permitted to do so.  At the same time, I am of the opinion that these aspects in themselves do not establish a clear conclusion, one way or another.  The complexity that was raised actually sharpens the need to further deepen the examination in relation to the question marks that remain in the matter.  All the more so when there is an apparent gap between the documentation of the things in the document from real time and a later explanation given based on memory alone.
37. To this, it should be added that all the parties concerned in the committee - the witnesses and the members of the committee itself - relate to the difficulty of testifying in retrospect and the importance of the document that was documented in real time. This detailed document, which is the best evidence we have at this time, indicates that Maj.    Goffman was clearly asked about any involvement - direct or indirect - regarding the existence of any connection with Telegram channels in general and with Almakais channel in particular.  The hurdle is not so simple.  Even if we do not have a full and clear transcript of the conversation, the documentation that exists from real time is ostensibly unequivocal, and therefore the matter requires a more careful examination of the matter.  I cannot accept the position of my colleague Justice Grosskopf on this point, according to which "after the supplementation made following the petitions, the Advisory Committee had before it a great deal of evidentiary platform" (paragraph 93 of his opinion).  I am of the opinion that the evidentiary platform remains insufficient.
38. Thus, for example, there was room to expand the examination with Major Tzur regarding the quality of the regular updates that were given to Maj.   Goffman during the period when contact with Almakais took place.  In his testimony before the committee, Maj.  Tzur noted that not every small detail in the conversation between him and Almakais, which was of an intensive and daily nature, was reported to Maj.  Gen.  Goffman.  At the same time, Maj.  Tzur clarified that materials that were transmitted and published on the channel were mentioned to Maj.  Gen.  Goffman.  Ostensibly, the committee should have clarified this with Maj.  Gen.  Goffman himself - what he knew about the nature of Almakais' operation.  And all the more so in light of the irregularities of its operation, in contrast to the typical influence operations carried out with elements on the Syrian side.  The higher Major General Goffman's awareness of the operation of Almakais and the activity with the channel, the more it could be concluded, on the factual level, that he remembered the operation when he gave his answer to Brig.  Gen.  G.  And vice versa.  However, as noted, these aspects have not been examined in depth.
39. Another point relates to the fact that the committee did not summon - neither in the first stage nor in the supplementary process - the division's intelligence officer at that time, as well as the division's commander. These are people who were allegedly aware of the operation of Almakais (according to Major Tzur's version, as noted by the committee in paragraph 6.8 of its opinion).  They were also central elements in the chain of command between Maj.    Tzur and Maj.  Gen.  Goffman.  Their summons could have shed light on the question of what was reported to Maj.  Gen.  Goffman in real time, as they had received the same updates from Maj.  Gen.  Tzur.  The same is true of Brig.  Gen.  G.'s assistant, who was allegedly present at the clarification call.  It seems that summoning these people might have provided details that would have helped answer the open questions.  It was even possible to summon the head of the Intelligence Operations Corps once more.  It should be noted that in the decision in which we proposed to the committee to complete the examination process, it was clarified that the committee may summon any other party as it deems appropriate.  The committee again summoned Major Tzur, at its discretion.  On the other hand, it refrained from inviting other parties.  There is no explanation for this.
40. In any event, the main thing is that there remains a question mark regarding General Goffman's negative answers to Brig.   G's questions - a question mark that the committee was unable to answer.  In practice, this also applies to the additional issue that will be examined below.  In fact, I am of the opinion that the committee's partial handling of the first question mark illustrates even more strongly the duty that it had to seriously examine the second question as well.

The Question of Standing Together (upon Becoming Aware of the Arrest) - May-August 2022

41. I will now turn to what was referred to in the opinion of my colleagues as the issue of abandonment. I will preface by noting that indeed, the word "abandonment" carries with it a heavy and painful baggage, and it is possible that a different terminology could have been used.  However, even if Almakais was not held captive by the enemy, as my colleague Justice Grosskopf noted, the dramatic consequences of being in prolonged detention and interrogation, which even led to an indictment for security offenses, should not be ignored.  In any event, in order to neutralize the harsh meaning of the term abandonment, I would like to focus the discussion on another term: standing by.
42. It is also important to emphasize that with regard to this issue, my colleague Justice Grosskopf gives great weight to the opinion that Major General Goffman was not in a position to assist Almakais from a practical point of view. According to my colleague, given that the suspicions against Almakais focused on the publication of classified information that did not originate in the 210th Division, Maj.    Goffman could not have prevented the indictment or interrupted the criminal proceedings in its early stages, even if he had acted and updated the investigative authorities with the full and correct information.  I cannot accept my colleague's approach.  This is a consequential view of the course of events.  From my point of view, the focus is not on the question of whether General Goffman could have improved Almakais' situation in practice.  The focus is on the question of his personal obligation to assist, by way of clarifying the factual situation, to those who worked for the division.
43. To this, I will add that, unlike my colleague Justice Grosskopf, my impression is that a full reply on behalf of Major General Goffman, or the provision of additional information as soon as possible, could have helped Almakais, even if only partially. A hint of this can be found in the testimony of the head of the International Investigation Bureau before the committee, according to which a dialogue between the State Attorney's Office and Almakays' defense attorneys regarding his operation by the 210th Division ultimately led to the state's withdrawal of the indictment and the dismissal of the charges.  The Attorney General, in her response of May 28, 2026, also pointed to the connection between the two statements.  It can therefore be assumed that what helped Al-Makais up the road could have worked in his favor even earlier, since from the very beginning he raised the claim that he had a connection with the 210th Division.  To complete the picture, it should be noted that in his testimony before the Commission, the head of the International Operations Operations Unit noted that Almakais first claimed that he had been operated by the 210th Division about three months after his arrest, and this was noted in the Committee's opinion (see paragraph 6.5 of the Committee's decision).  However, from the full materials, a different picture emerges, according to which Almakais stated this from the beginning of his interrogation.  It should be noted that the committee initially acted under the impression of the head of the IABAM.  And now, if she had summoned Almakis to her at the first stage, she would have been able to get an impression of the difficulty in the version given by the head of the IBB.
44. In any event, for the sake of the discussion, I am prepared to assume that Maj.   Goffman could not have helped Almakais from a practical point of view.  One way or another, that's not the heart of the matter.  The main point of the matter in the current context lies in the question of whether Maj.  Gen.  Goffman stood by and refrained from fulfilling his duty to provide everything he knew about the matter, after he found out about Almakais' arrest - even if it was ostensibly a "futile" action, or as my colleague Justice Grosskopf notes: "if only for the sake of clarity" (at paragraph 98 of his opinion).  On the level of moral purity, I believe that proper action is of great importance, regardless of the question of its potential impact on actual reality (something that cannot always be foreseen).  One way or another, even with regard to this issue, there remain factual gaps that the committee did not properly address.
45. As you may recall, the initial examination with Maj.   Goffman was conducted in mid-May 2022.  A short time later, on May 24, 2022, Almakais was arrested.  An important question that remains open relates to the point in time when Maj.  Gen.  Goffman first found out about Almakais' arrest and how he conducted himself following the discovery.  At the latest, it was only in August 2022, when it was made clear to Maj.  Gen.  Goffman that Almakais had been arrested as part of the security investigation conducted by the BBC.  At the same time, the materials and testimonies indicate that it is not impossible that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman knew about this even earlier, perhaps even shortly after his arrest, but that he ceased to act on the matter for a long time.  These are points that required further clarification.
46. It should be noted that on three different occasions, Major Tzur claimed that shortly after the arrest, he updated his commanders about the events. First, as part of the summary of his interrogation at the IUC, which took place on August 10, 2022, Maj.  Tzur noted that after Almakays' arrest, he proactively reported to his commanders the relationship he had with Almakais.  Second, in his first testimony before the committee, Major Tzur noted that after Almakais stopped sending him messages and the channel's publications stopped, he saw an advertisement on the Internet about "someone who had been arrested" and reported to Maj.    Goffman that it might be Almakais.  Maj.  Tzur added that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman had reported the matter to the ICBM and informed him (Maj.  Tzur) that he would be investigated on the matter.  When Major Tzur was asked when Major Goffman mentioned this to him, he stated that it was done close to his arrest, and at most a few weeks later (see: pp.  6-7 of Major Tzur's testimony before the Commission of March 22, 2026).  Third, in Major Tzur's supplementary testimony before the committee, he essentially reiterated what was said.  These words seem to indicate that General Goffman knew about the arrest at a relatively early stage.
47. In fact, even in the testimony of Maj.   Goffman himself, he noted that "when the investigation was opened" he understood that the "blogger" had been arrested and that there was a major affair (see: p.  6 of Maj.  Gen.  Goffman's testimony before the Commission of March 22, 2026).  He reiterated this in other testimonies as well.  Maj.  Gen.  Goffman even mentioned two investigations that took place in the Kirya matter, without placing them on the exact timeline and without being asked about it in detail.
48. Despite all of the above, the exact date on which Maj.   Goffman learned of Almakais' arrest has not yet been clarified.  This, despite the fact that it has to do with two important questions regarding the issue of standing by the sidelines: first, from the moment he learned of the arrest, why did Maj.  Gen.  Goffman not try to act in the case of Almakais? Second, since this was discovered close to Almakais's arrest, why did Maj.  Gen.  Goffman not return to Brig.  Gen.  G., who spoke with him only a few days ago in order to present him with the whole picture? As can be seen, the date of the discovery of the arrest is of great importance with regard to the question of how General Goffman was expected to act, and how long his failure lasted.  The longer he stood by, the more serious it would seem to be in terms of moral purity.
49. Another aspect in which the committee's work was lacking relates to the explanations raised by Maj.   Goffman for his refusal to investigate Almakais' condition.  The main argument raised by Maj.  Gen.  Goffman, without exhausting it, was that the existence of an active investigation by the IAB and the fact that the 210th Division's role in the affair was small, dissuaded him from clarifying further details about Almakais.  These are ostensibly weighty arguments that may explain the standing on the sidelines.  However - and this is the main point - these claims should have been clarified, first and foremost, placed on the timeline.
50. These arguments are based on Major General Goffman's conversations with the head of the International Intelligence Investigation Unit and in the security investigation that took place on the matter at the International Intelligence Agency. Therefore, a critical aspect that has not yet been resolved relates to the dates on which such conversations took place.  Both the testimony of the head of the IMP and the testimony of Maj.    Goffman indicate that this was investigated as part of the affair and that a number of conversations took place between the two.  However, it is not clear when these were made.  As far as can be understood, the first CBAV investigation was conducted in August 2022.  However, it is ostensibly possible that Maj.  Gen.  Goffman knew about the arrest long earlier.  If indeed many months have passed between the date on which Major General Goffman found out about the arrest and until he was interrogated about it himself by the IOM and provided the full factual details for the first time, this is a real difficulty.
51. Against this background, the Committee's determinations on the matter should also be examined. In its original opinion, the Commission noted that according to Maj.    Goffman, the details relating to Al-Makays, including his arrest, became known to him only two years later (see paragraph 6.2 of the Committee's decision of April 12, 2026).  These words contradict the words of Major Tzur and, apparently, even the words of Maj.  Gen.  Goffman himself.  Indeed, in his repeated testimony before the commission, Maj.  Gen.  Goffman clarified that two years later he learned that Almakis was a minor, but that he knew about the arrest before (although he did not remember exactly when).  Moreover, the commission itself determined elsewhere that the head of the IOM, who investigated the incident in real time within the IDF, stated that he assumed that General Goffman knew about the matter after the matter "exploded" (see paragraph 6.5 of its aforementioned decision).  The committee's decision devoid of any reference to the aforementioned contradiction between the testimonies.
52. It should also be noted in this context that most of the Committee's preoccupation with this issue revolves around events that occurred only at a relatively late stage, beginning in August 2022. However, the important period of time is actually earlier, shortly after Almakais's arrest.  At this stage, the question of standing idly by arises in full force.  This was also the opinion of my colleague Justice Grosskopf, when he clarified that the date of Major Tzur's interrogation (in August 2022) was the watershed in the matter.  The problem is that with regard to the question of standing on the sidelines, there is no reference to the earlier period in the committee's opinion .
53. This is even more acute in light of the lack of factual clarity regarding Major General Goffman's awareness of the full operating format, as already noted above. Contrary to what is claimed before us, an examination of the correspondence between Major Tzur and Almakaiis shows that the two had an ongoing and daily relationship for several months, during which they assisted each other in receiving materials.  Major Tzur updated Almakis on various developments, gave him materials that he needed to publish, and even asked for his help in collecting various materials.  Major General Goffman's awareness of the nature of the relationship and its intensity may have a direct impact on the question of whether he acted as expected of him after learning of the arrest.
54. As I noted, the classification of the materials that were actually transferred to Almakis is not the focus of the matter before us, and the question of whether he was given secret or overt materials does not directly affect the integrity of Major General Goffman. At the same time, the operating format described above attests to its deviation from the division's own activities.  This activity was approved from the outset by Maj.    Goffman (with regard to the transfer of unclassified materials), who even clarified that he used to closely monitor such activities.  The committee did not clarify whether Maj.  Gen.  Goffman was familiar with the full format of the operation and whether he used to receive regular reports of the fruits of the operation.  More importantly, the committee refrained from examining whether Maj.  Gen.  Goffman had not been informed that the operation had ceased to yield results one fine morning, after Almakais stopped responding to Major Tzur's announcements.
55. No answers were provided to all of these questions. The committee was presented with contradictory versions regarding the question of whether Major General Goffman was informed of the arrest or at least the cessation of activity, or whether the matter was not brought to his attention during the said interim period.  None of those who addressed this issue sufficiently contradicted the opposite version, and this point is not reflected in the committee's decision.
56. This is the place to ask - could Maj.   Goffman have done something or should have done something in the circumstances in which he learned shortly after his arrest that the detainee was the one who was operated by his division? And all this, against the background of the fact that Brig.  Gen.  G.  told him not to talk to his subordinates about the affair, in order not to disrupt the investigation? The answer to this may be positive or negative, depending on the facts that have not been sufficiently clarified.  In any event, there was nothing to prevent Maj.  Gen.  Goffman from contacting the investigators directly, or through Brig.  Gen.  G.  himself, and giving full disclosure about Almkays's connections with the division.  If Maj.  Gen.  Goffman did find out about the arrest a few days after it was carried out, only about two weeks after the clarification conversation that Brig.  Gen.  G.  held with him, he would have been asked to contact him on the matter.  As noted, the facts regarding this remain vague.
57. It should be added that even the late explanation given by Maj.   Goffman for his refusal to investigate, according to which it was made clear to him that the 210th Division's role in the affair was limited - "promil" - does not necessarily help him.  From the materials, it can be understood that this was communicated to him by the head of the IUCB only in August 2022, that is, at a later stage than the period relevant to the question of standing id.  It should also be noted that as marginal as it may be, the division's involvement in the affair warranted, at the very least, a preliminary inquiry with Maj.  Gen.  Goffman prior to the arrest of Almakais, even though it was defined only as a "branch," and this is of considerable importance.  Even if Maj.  Gen.  Goffman believed that the part of the investigation relating to the 210th Division was relatively marginal, he could not assume that there was no point in presenting the full information to the investigative authorities.  I reiterate that this is not a determination against Maj.  Gen.  Goffman, but only a clarification regarding the fact that the examination process was not complete.

In practice

58. The path I am walking is therefore a middle path. I do not believe that a basis has been laid for the positive determinations of the majority opinion in the committee that all questions relating to moral integrity in the context of the Elmakais case have been removed.  At the same time, I do not share the current position of the minority opinion in the committee with regard to the need to clarify the question of the classification of the materials that were transferred between Almakais and Major Tzur.
59. I am therefore of the opinion that there is no way out of continuing to clarify the questions within a short timetable. To this end, if my opinion had been heard, we would have issued an order nisi directing that the committee repeat and complete its factual examination (taking into account the question marks on which I have pointed out), and that accordingly an interim order will also be issued to determine that Maj.    Goffman will not begin his position in the meantime.  The timetable does not allow for the proper completion of the process without doing so.
60. For the sake of comparison, it is worth mentioning that in the case law of this Court, it was emphasized the importance of the committee in charge of examining appointments to conduct a proper procedure. Admittedly, in that case the committee was dealing with a different matter than the one discussed before us.  However, this is also true here, and all the more so given that even there the discussion of the candidate's integrity was returned for further examination by the committee.  This is how it was explained:

"Hence also the importance of holding a proper discussion in the Appointments Committee, on whose opinion the government relys.  It is possible that following a proper discussion - during which the entire picture would have been unfolded before the first appointments committee - her opinion would have been different.  A different opinion of the Appointments Committee could have led to a different decision in the government.  Indeed, the discussion that took place before the first appointments committee was improper.  The whole picture was not unfolded before her.  The factual system presented to it was partial.  Its recommendation focused on the respondent's qualifications and did not take into account its part in the Bus 300 case and the Nafso affair at all.  In these circumstances, if they had insisted on the originator of this recommendation and the decision of the government that followed it, there would have been no choice but to cancel the recommendation (of the Appointments Committee) and the decision (of the government).  But, as stated, the defect was corrected.  A new appointments committee is reconsidering the matter.  Her opinion was re-examined by the government.  Now we must examine the legality of the government's own decision" High Court of Justice 6163/92 Eisenberg v.  Minister of Construction and Housing, IsrSC 47(2) 229, 244 (1993) (emphasis in original)).