SecondAs a result, and although the relationship between Mr. Almakais and Major Tzur was known to the investigators in the early stages of the investigation, it was not of central importance to the security and criminal investigation, since it had nothing to do with the leak of the information described, which was the focus of the investigation. Accordingly, the investigators did not see fit to summon Major Tzur for interrogation, but rather left the investigation of the full relationship between him and Mr. Almakais to the investigation of the IABAM, which took place after the indictment against Mr. Almakais was filed, and was intended to complete the investigation regarding Mr. Almakays' contacts with various military officials, whose actions were perceived by the investigative authorities to be less severe than the standard required for the security and criminal proceedings.
ThirdAs a result, the hypothesis raised by Mr. Almakais that the conduct of the elements of the 210th Division in general, and Brigadier General Goffman in particular, influenced the manner in which the security and criminal investigation was conducted, and hence on his case, has nothing to rely on, neither in terms of the evidence before us, nor in terms of common sense. As stated, the matter of the security and criminal investigation was not the leak of information that stemmed from Division 210 or was suspected of stemming from it, and in any event, information about confirmed ties with Division 210 did not lead to the cessation of this investigation.
Fourth, the connection between the 210th Division and Mr. Almakais was examined in depth for the first time by IDF officials, as part of the investigation by the Intelligence Operations Unit. The IOMB report, which in my impression is a thorough report, found flaws in the operation of Mr. Almakais by the 210th Division, which had nothing to do with the leak of information from the Intelligence Directorate, and as a result, with the main products of the security and criminal investigation, as reflected in the indictments filed in its wake. Since Brigadier General Goffman assumed responsibility for the operation of Mr. Almakais by the 210th Division as part of the investigation of the Combat Operations Unit, thus providing immediate backing to his subordinate (Major Tzur), disciplinary measures were taken against him in the IDF. These measures related to failures in the operation (failure to obtain the necessary permits), and they ended in a low-level disciplinary sanction (a command note that was not recorded in his personal file).
- Thus far, the description of the Almakais affair, while sharpening Brig. Goffman's (marginal) part in its framework. Now for a review of the activity of the Advisory Committee for Appointments to Senior Positions, whose opinion in the matter of Maj. Gen. Goffman is the focus of the petitions before us.
The work of the Advisory Committee for Appointments to Senior Positions and its Opinion on the Appointment of Maj. Gen. Goffman
- The advisory committee - whose members include the committee's chairman, the president of the Supreme Court (ret.) Asher Grunis (hereinafter: the committee's chairman), the outgoing acting civil service commissioner, Prof. Daniel Hershkovitz, and public representatives, Prof. Talia Einhorn and Mr. Moshe Terry - convened four times, and various parties appeared before it, including the prime minister, the outgoing head of the Mossad, the chief of staff, the director general of the Ministry of Defense, and the former commander of the Northern Command (who was the commander of Maj. Goffman at the time of the Almakais affair). Maj. Gen. Goffman, the outgoing head of the IBU (who was in charge of the MIBM investigation) and Major Tzur. In addition, the advisory committee received many materials, some of which are classified materials, much of which relate to the Almakais affair. However, despite requests made by Mr. Almakais to the Committee, she did not see fit to summon him to appear before it.
- On March 26, 2026, the Advisory Committee convened to discuss the positions of its members, and at this meeting, the Committee's decision was made, by a majority of opinions (against the dissenting opinion of the Committee Chairman), to approve the appointment of Maj. Goffman to the position of Head of the Mossad in terms of integrity. Subsequently, the written opinion of the majority opinion was completed on March 30, 2026, and the minority opinion of the Committee Chair was submitted on April 12, 2026 in two documents - a full opinion in a copy defined as "confidential" and a summary of the opinion in a public copy.
Preliminary NoteA significant part of the materials submitted to the Advisory Committee were classified, with varying degrees of classification, and the transcripts of the Advisory Committee's conversations with the various parties that appeared before it were confidential, in accordance with the decision made by the majority of the Committee members (against the dissenting opinion of Prof. Talia Einhorn). The same is true of the full opinion of the chairman of the committee, which was defined as a confidential document. Most of these materials were eventually published, most of them with permission and some, unfortunately (and severely), without permission. Therefore, the following description will include, where necessary, reference to materials that were originally defined as confidential, but were published for all. It should be clarified, however, that with regard to documents that were not published, and which remained classified, I have made do with only general paraphrases, to the extent necessary to clarify my position. Similarly, I also used quotes from the statements of various parties before the committee that were presented, in whole or in the vast majority, in the documents that were published, and in other cases I presented paraphrases of the same things.
- Ultimately, on April 12, 2026, the decision of the advisory committee was published. The members of the committee unanimously rejected all the objections raised regarding the appointment of Maj. Goffman, which related to matters that deviated from the Almakais affair. Regarding this affair, and what emerges from it in relation to Maj. Gen. Goffman, the opinions of the committee members were divided. The chairman of the committee found that Maj. Gen. Goffman's conduct in the Almakais affair revealed faults with his integrity, and in light of this, he believed that it was inappropriate to appoint him to the position of head of the Mossad; The three remaining members of the committee, i.e., the majority, reached the opposite conclusion, according to which there was no defect in the integrity of Maj. Gen. Goffman in the Almakais case as well, and therefore they found nothing wrong with his appointment to the position of head of the Mossad (these decisions will be called, respectively: the opinion of the chairman of the committee or the opinion of the minority, and the opinion of the majority). I will elaborate a little on the description of the various opinions.
- The Advisory Committee clarified, with the opinion of all its members, that claims raised regarding Maj. Goffman's qualifications for the position (such as his experience in the intelligence field, his command of foreign languages, and the fact that he was a candidate from outside the ranks of the organization) were not within its authority, and therefore it did not address them at all. As for the claims that dealt with the issue of moral integrity, the Advisory Committee was required to make two types of claims: the integrity of the appointing body (the Prime Minister) and the integrity of the appointing body (Maj. Gen. Goffman). In essence, all the members of the Advisory Committee agreed that the allegations directed against the Prime Minister, as well as most of the allegations directed against Maj. Gen. Goffman, should be rejected. The issue on which the members of the advisory committee disagreed is, as noted, General Goffman's role in the Almakais affair, when he served as commander of the 210th Division.
- The majority opinion (from the outgoing Acting Civil Service Commissioner, Prof. Daniel Hershkovitz, and public representatives, Prof. Talia Einhorn and Mr. Moshe Terry. hereinafter: members of the majority opinion) reviewed the summary of the materials that were placed before the committee, as well as the attitudes of the parties that appeared before it, and on the basis of which it reached the conclusion that there was no defect in the aspect of moral integrity in the conduct of Maj. Goffman in the Almakis case. The members of the majority opinion were impressed, in light of the material that was placed before them (including two extensive interviews by Mr. Almakais in the media), that the role of the 210th Division in the Almakais affair was minor, and that Mr. Almakayes's relationship with the 210th Division was limited to contact with Major Tzur only, for a very short period of time out of the entire period in which Mr. Almakais operated vis-à-vis the various IDF elements. It was also found that although the Almakais affair endangered national security, the part of the 210th Division, which was minimal, did not involve such harm. Support for this, according to the majority opinion, is the fact that Major Tzur continued to serve in the IDF after the investigation (including reserve duty), and no steps were taken against him (no indictment was filed against him, he was not given a command note, his security classification was not changed, etc.).
With regard to Maj. Gen. Goffman's role in the Almakais affair, the members of the majority opinion reached the following conclusions: Maj. Gen. Goffman was not the main initiator of the connection with Mr. Almakais; At no point did he have any direct contact with him; He did not lie or deny his actions during the interrogation and did not abandon Mr. Almakais, and his version on this matter was consistent; The identity of Mr. Almakais and that he was a minor were not known to Maj. Gen. Goffman, and even when he asked to clarify details, after Mr. Almakais's arrest, he was prevented from doing so for fear of disrupting the investigations. The members of the majority opinion also noted that Maj. Gen. Goffman took responsibility for the mistake he made, when he did not ask for approval for the actions carried out by Major Tzur (although it seems that there was no difficulty in approving them, if necessary), and for this he also received a command note that was not recorded in his personal file. Subsequently, members of the majority opinion were of the opinion that the fact that the command comment was not recorded in Maj. Gen. Goffman's personal file, along with the fact that he continued to advance in the army and even rise in rank, as well as the positive evaluations that Maj. Gen. Goffman received from his commander during the Almakais affair (then commander of the Northern Command) and from his current commander (the Chief of Staff), who even foresaw a bright future for Maj. Gen. Goffman in the IDF, show that the Almakais affair does not prevent Maj. Gen. Goffman from being appointed head of the Mossad.