Finally, it was noted by the members of the majority opinion that two of them did not have the appropriate classification that would allow them to be exposed to all the confidential materials submitted to the Advisory Committee, but the Acting Civil Service Commissioner, who has the appropriate classification, reviewed the materials and "He did not find anything in these materials that could impair the integrity of Maj. Gen. Roman Goffman".
- The minority opinion of the chairman of the committee, on the other hand, did not see eye to eye with the majority opinion, and held that Maj. Goffman's conduct in the Almakais affair was flawed in three aspects in terms of integrity: First, the chairman of the committee noted that he doubted that Maj. Gen. Goffman did not know that the division was employing a minor (either because it is difficult to assume that he was not interested in the details about the person who was employed or because it is difficult to assume that Maj. Gen. Tzur did not provide him with details about him). However, even under the assumption that Maj. Gen. Goffman did not know that the operator was a minor, the very fact that the division operated a minor (and Major Tzur knew about it) constitutes a serious flaw from the moral aspect, which should be attributed to Maj. Gen. Goffman as the division's commander and as someone who bears responsibility for its actions and omissions. In this context, the chairman of the committee clarified that "a distinction must be made between matters that the division commander naturally must clarify and know about, and those that naturally do not reach such a level. The issue of the operation of Almakais by the Division was an exceptional and unusual case. As such, the division commander had to be interested and know details about what was being operated. For example, the division commander had to be interested in and know who the person was going to be activated, his experience, his qualities and his skills." Second, the chairman of the committee found a flaw in the fact that the division's officials, and Major General Goffman in particular, when asked by IDF officials whether Mr. Almakais was employed by the division, did not answer "an accurate answer and this is a delicate description." This conclusion was based on the statement of the head of the Operations Division before the Advisory Committee that his determination in a document he issued on May 21, 2022, that there was no connection between the affair under investigation and the 210th Division (hereinafter: the Controller's confirmation of the division's lack of involvement in the affair), was based on the examination conversation between the Operations Division and Maj. Gen. Goffman, and it turned out to be erroneous; Third, the chairman of the committee doubted that Maj. Gen. Goffman did not know about Mr. Almakais's arrest shortly after it took place (because he was the one who informed Major Tzur that he was expected to be questioned about the matter in a few weeks), but even assuming that he knew about it at a later stage, it was found that the officials of the division he commanded knew about the arrest shortly after it was carried out (according to Major Tzur's words in the committee), and despite this, nothing was done to inform the intelligence agencies." to those who were involved in the arrest of Mr. Almakais because he acted on behalf of the division. In this regard, too, the chairman of the committee was of the opinion that the flaw in the conduct of the division's officials should be attributed to Maj. Gen. Goffman, as the division's commander and as the person who bears responsibility for its actions and omissions. It was also emphasized that "the fact that other soldiers gave facts and data to Al-Maqais without any confirmation does not cancel the duty that the 210th Division, which employed him, to inform the arresting authorities that it was used by it."
In view of the aforementioned flaws, the chairman of the committee came to the conclusion that it was inappropriate to appoint Maj. Gen. Goffman as head of the Mossad. At the same time, it should be noted that the chairman of the committee did not find fault, in terms of integrity, in the fact that Maj. Gen. Goffman authorized the use of civilian elements and the transfer of materials to them for intelligence and influence purposes without having the authority to do so; Nor did it turn out that Major Tzur had given Mr. Almakais classified material, since it was not found that Major Goffman knew about it (and in this regard, it was noted that Major Tzur authorized Major Tzur to transfer only unclassified material).
- As stated, the majority opinion was prepared on March 30, 2026, before the opinion of the committee chair was submitted. Therefore, a supplementary reference to the minority opinion submitted to the Prime Minister on April 12, 2026 was attached to the majority opinion (hereinafter: the reference of the majority opinion members to the minority opinion). The members of the majority opinion rejected the Committee's Chairman's determination that Maj. Goffman should have initiated additional actions in order to assist Mr. Almakais after his arrest. The members of the majority opinion argued that from the material that was placed before the Advisory Committee and from the conversations it held, it appears that Maj. Gen. Goffman tried to clarify details about Mr. Almakais at two different stages, but in both of them he refrained from doing so: for the first time, during the conduct of the IBM investigation, he asked to clarify additional details, but was told that he was not permitted to do so due to the conduct of the investigations; The second time, after he learned of Mr. Almakays's identity and his arrest, he then asked to meet with him, but was advised not to do so. According to the majority opinion, if Maj. Gen. Goffman had acted contrary to the manner in which he acted, allegations of "problematic activity would have been raised against him." With regard to the fact that Mr. Almakais was a minor, the members of the majority opinion emphasized that no one had claimed before the committee that Maj. Gen. Goffman knew that Mr. Almakais was a minor, but that this was known to Major Tzur, the intelligence officer, and the division's information security officer. Moreover, according to the majority opinion, the fact that the Northern Command's intelligence officer ordered the cessation of contact with Mr. Almakais and later retracted it, as well as the fact that after the affair Major Tzur continued to serve in the army in regular service and later in reserve service, show that the army also saw no flaw in this matter.
- On the same day that the Advisory Committee's decision was issued, on April 12, 2026, the Prime Minister announced his decision to appoint Maj. Goffman for a period of 5 years, beginning June 2, 2026, with the possibility of an extension for another year, and accordingly signed a letter of appointment.
- A few days later, the petitions before us were filed. Alongside the petitions, requests were filed for an interim order ordering a stay of the appointment until the petitions are decided, but no reason was found to grant them at the stage when they were filed. Another application that was subsequently filed was rejected on similar grounds.
The parties' arguments
- The two petitions raise, in essence, similar arguments, and therefore they are represented in a united. The head of one argument is directed at the work of the Advisory Committee. It was argued that the decision of the Advisory Committee relied on a factual basis that was lacking in order to formulate its conclusion. In the meantime, it was noted that despite Mr. Almakais's repeated requests to appear before the committee, as well as his demand to summon the head of the Operations Brigade who conducted the examination to appear before the committee, the committee refused his requests, thus preventing it from receiving a complete picture of the events surrounding the Almakais affair, and Maj. Goffman's part in it. In this context, it was emphasized that it was unacceptable that the Advisory Committee would be satisfied with Mr. Almakais's version as it emerges from journalistic materials, instead of summoning him to appear before it and present his version in an unmediated manner. As a result, it was even argued that these deficiencies led the members of the majority opinion to make erroneous factual determinations in the case of Mr. Almakais, on which they later based their conclusion. Another flaw that the petitioners point to relates to the fact that two members of the Advisory Committee, who were part of the majority opinion, were not exposed to the full relevant material, because they lacked the required security classification. According to them, a situation in which such a significant decision is made by someone who has not been exposed to all the necessary vital information should not be appropriate, and that this difficulty cannot be overcome by means of the impression of the other members of the committee. Moreover, this means that the opinions of the members of the advisory committee who were exposed to all the material are equal (i.e., the outgoing Acting Civil Service Commissioner, in the majority opinion; and the chairman of the committee, in the minority opinion). In addition, the petitioners argued that the opinion of the Advisory Committee, and in particular that of the members of the majority opinion, lacked proper reasoning in a series of arguments that were raised before it in the matter of the Almakais case and other matters. As a result, it was argued that the Prime Minister's decision, which is based on the recommendation of the majority of the members of the Advisory Committee, is also deficient in these aspects. The second main argument relates to the unreasonableness of the prime minister's decision to appoint Maj. Gen. Goffman to the position. According to the petitioners, Major General Goffman's conduct regarding the Almakais affair indicates deep moral and ethical failures that clung to him. It was also argued in this context that due to the sensitivity of the position in question, the degree of care to ensure the integrity of the character of the person being sought to be appointed is particularly stringent. It was further argued that the Prime Minister's decision did not give sufficient weight to all the considerations relevant to the appointment, including the flaws in the work of the Advisory Committee (as noted above) and the minority opinion of the Committee Chairman, with respect to which it is doubtful whether the Prime Minister had time to review it and its attachments, due to the timing at which he signed the letter of appointment. Finally, the petitioners in the Movement's petition further argued that there were flaws in the Prime Minister's integrity as well, in light of his conduct in other incidents, which were ignored by the Advisory Committee; and that in light of their claim that Major General Goffman lacks experience in the worlds of intelligence and special operations and does not have a proper command of the English language - experience and skills required to perform the job - there is a serious concern that Major General Goffman's appointment was made due to extraneous considerations stemming from his personal relationship with the Prime Minister.
- The Attorney General (hereinafter: the Attorney General) in her preliminary response was also of the opinion that the Prime Minister's decision to appoint Maj. Goffman as head of the Mossad should be intervened and that the petitions should be accepted. The Counsel argues that there were material flaws that go to the root of the matter, both in the proceeding conducted by the Advisory Committee and in the factual basis on which the majority opinion was based, and as a result also in the conclusions on which it was formulated. With regard to the flaws in the proceedings conducted by the Advisory Committee, it was argued that the members of the majority opinion signed their opinion before the opinion of the Chairman of the Committee was written, and in any case before they had time to review it; that two of the members of the majority opinion, who lack proper classification, were not exposed to confidential material most relevant to the decision of the Advisory Committee and to the dispute that arose between its members; that the Advisory Committee refused Mr. Almakais's requests to appear before it. Although the opinions refer extensively to the affair in his case and his version of events, as it emerges from interviews in the media; and that the Operations Officer, who is a significant factor in one of the issues examined by the Advisory Committee, was also not summoned to appear before the Committee. With regard to the flaws in the factual basis on which the majority opinion was based and in the conclusions on which it was formulated, the Advisor argues that the majority opinion is deficient, either because it lacks reference to some of the determinations of the Chairman of the Committee, which are inconsistent with Maj. Gen. Goffman's version (and in particular regarding his failure to report in real time on the Division's relationship with Mr. Almakais, in response to questions asked on the subject). Either because it based its conclusions on partial materials, and while refraining from summoning relevant parties who could shed light on the various issues and exhaust the required factual clarification, or because some of its conclusions were not supported by the materials that were placed before the Advisory Committee, or because it lacked reference to the totality of what was said to it by the various parties that appeared before it and which contradict it, and at least raise questions regarding Major General Goffman's version. On the merits of the matter, and based on her analysis of the entirety of the material placed before the Advisory Committee (including confidential documents), the Advisor is of the opinion that the conduct of Maj. Gen. Goffman in the Almakais case was flawed in the integrity of morality, as determined by the Committee Chair in the minority opinion, which necessitate the cancellation of the appointment as it exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in an extreme manner. In this context, the Attorney General emphasizes that in her position, the severity and deviation of the events relating to the Almakais affair, together with the nature of the role and the unique characteristics of the institution (which operates without legislative regulation and in clandestine activity that is not subject to public scrutiny), as well as the need to maintain the public's trust in the government system, require a strict examination of moral integrity - an examination that was not upheld by the majority opinion.
- In the preliminary response of the Prime Minister and the Government, to which the Advisor was granted permission for separate representation, they argued that the petitions should be rejected (hereinafter, for the sake of convenience, and since the Government is a formal respondent in the circumstances: the Prime Minister). At the beginning of his response, the prime minister insists on the particularly limited judicial review that should be exercised over the prime minister's decision to appoint the head of the Mossad. Thus, in general, given that only the prime minister is exposed to all the security and strategic considerations on which this decision is based, only he is responsible for the security of the state and its citizens, and only he is entrusted with formulating a comprehensive strategy based on his political perceptions - which give him, if only him, the ability to choose the right candidate; and this is especially true in the security reality in which we find ourselves. On the merits of the matter, the Prime Minister is of the opinion that there was no defect in the integrity of Major General Goffman, and therefore there is no reason to cancel his appointment. In this context, the Prime Minister emphasizes that as opposed to professional or command responsibility, attribution of a defect in moral integrity requires personal awareness. Therefore, two of the flaws attributed by the chairman of the committee to Maj. Goffman due to his being the division commander (the activation of a minor and the failure to proactively contact the investigative authorities in order to update the contact with Mr. Almakais after learning of his arrest) cannot stand. With regard to the other defect (providing an inaccurate answer), it was argued that a distinction should be made between a deliberate lie or an attempt to conceal it and an answer given casually in response to a general question, as he assumes occurred in the present case. The prime minister also believes that weight should be given to the response of military officials in real time, including the direct commander of Maj. Gen. Goffman, who saw the incident as "a minor incident that did not even require documentation in his personal file." In any event, it was argued that even if it had been found that Major General Goffman had such a flaw, the Prime Minister was not bound by the conclusions of the Advisory Committee, whose role is to advise on one specific matter, but should have assessed this defect, which is only one of a set of relevant considerations, in the face of Major General Goffman's advantages, and made the best decision for Israel's security. In other words, according to the Prime Minister, in principle, it is possible to deviate from the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, and even to make a decision regarding the appointment of a candidate who the Committee believes has a defect relating to integrity. Subsequently, it was argued that the fact that there is no unanimity among the members of the advisory committee does not detract from the qualifications of the appointment, since unanimity was never required in the various advisory committees, and even appointments in the past were completed even when the opinions of the advisory committee members were divided. In any event, it was argued that such a demand would grant veto power to each member of the advisory committee, without any justification. In any event, the Prime Minister emphasized that he did not ignore the opinion of the committee chairman, but rather examined it, met with the committee chairman and reviewed all the materials before his eyes, and then made the decision he made, taking into account the relevant considerations on the matter. Finally, the Prime Minister rejects the other arguments of the petitioners, including claims relating to the lack of professional competence of Maj. Gen. Goffman, the integrity of the Prime Minister, and more.
- Gen. Goffman also rejects the petitioners' arguments for similar reasons. Maj. Gen. Goffman adds that the scope of judicial intervention in the professional appointments of senior civil servants, and in the systems responsible for national security and law enforcement, is even narrower and limited when the appointment is examined and approved by a professional, high-level and independent committee, such as the Advisory Committee (whether by a unanimous decision or by a majority decision). As to the substance of the matter, Maj. Gen. Goffman argues that the process of his appointment was carried out lawfully; For there was no fault in the purity of his character; that his version of the events that are the subject of the Almakais affair is consistent and full of truth; and that he has the professional qualifications and experience relevant to the position. Maj. Gen. Goffman emphasizes that the decisive decision is made by the members of the majority opinion, and he also rejects the conclusions of the opinion of the committee chairman. Maj. Gen. Goffman is also of the opinion that from the existence of indirect command responsibility for the actions of his subordinates, it is not possible to learn about a defect in integrity, which is a personal moral defect. Maj. Gen. Goffman also emphasizes that the Almakais affair is a specific case in which an erroneous operational decision was made, for which he assumed full command responsibility and for which he was reprimanded, but it does not indicate a defect in moral integrity or a systematic pattern of behavior. As evidence, the Chief of Staff, the direct commander of Maj. Gen. Goffman at the time, and the investigators all did not see the affair as a factor preventing the continued promotion of Maj. Gen. Goffman in the military chain of command. Maj. Gen. Goffman also clarifies that he did not know the identity of Mr. Almakais until the affair was published in the media, and that he did not lie in an investigation conducted by the IDF. In addition, Maj. Gen. Goffman argues that the petitioners' arguments directed at the Advisory Committee's work process in fact seek to interfere with the Committee's broad discretion to determine its work procedures and deliberations, including deciding who will appear before it - and this should not be granted.
- It should be noted that the Advisory Committee, with the opinion of the majority of its members, also submitted a preliminary response to the petitions, through private representation that it allegedly taken, without giving it permission to do so. The Attorney General asked us to remove this document from the court file. Given that the preliminary response on behalf of the Advisory Committee was submitted at the request of the members of the majority opinion, its position is clear, and we do not see the need, in the aforesaid circumstances, to elaborate on it.
It should also be noted that on May 11, 2026, after the preliminary responses to the petitions were submitted and on the eve of the hearing date set for their hearing, the Ayalon Forum for Social Rights and Equitable Growth submitted a petition"IV Moshe Shapira and Daniel Haklai asked to join as amicus curiae and to voice their position (hereinafter: Those who wish to join andJoin Request, respectively). This was after their request to attach to the petitions in question was also rejected, and it also referred to the appointment of Maj. Gen. Goffman as head of the Mossad (High Court of Justice 18828-05-26). After reviewing the application, on the same day, May 11, 2026, we determined that there was no reason to order the applicants to join, but we determined that the request to join would be attached to the court file and placed before us. On May 18, 2026, the applicants filed a motion to reconsider our decision of May 11, 2026 for the purpose of joining them in the proceeding, and they also reiterated this in their request of May 28, 2026. In essence, according to the petitioners who wish to join, they have substantial and weighty arguments that are not mentioned in the Almakais petition and in the Movement's petition, and which are of great importance to clarify. After reviewing the application to join and the requests for reconsideration, we did not think that there was room to change our decision. Thus, in summary, because a significant part of the arguments of those who wish to join, as will be explained below, have been addressed and addressed; while the other part of the arguments are baseless, and at least lack a supporting basis (and this, even without addressing the question of exhausting the proceedings of some of the claims, which was not an impediment to the beginning of their investigation, before the advisory committee made its decision, such as the claim of a conflict of interest by any of the committee members or a defect in the appointment due to the political timing).