We will briefly address the additional evidence.
The first evidence (Appendix 1 to the application) is a document entitled "Strategic Position Paper" from the beginning of 2013 that Peretz sent to Shechem and the correspondence that followed. The document was written after the open investigation into our case was opened, and Peretz even refers to it in his writings. What is stated in the document and in the correspondence that follows is consistent with the picture that emerged from Peretz's testimony. The correspondence once again reveals Peretz's clear preference for entering into a framework agreement with IBM and his assessment that when it comes to IBM products, the pricing capability is "extremely limited" and ineffective. In the position paper and in the correspondence that followed, Peretz describes the competition between the suppliers – IBM marketers – as a competition that he believes is "for the protocol only" in view of the possibility of IBM giving preference to any of the suppliers; As an "addicted game" when the correct way to approach his position is to draw up a framework agreement and not a "mock competition" between suppliers, and he reiterates his position that it is not possible to conduct "real competition" between suppliers. These are expressions and descriptions similar to those expressed by Peretz in his testimony. They express his position and his assessment that in many cases the pricing will not be effective and will not lead to the receipt of optimal price quotes. This is not to say that where Peretz – or another party in a civil appeal – priced and approached suppliers for price quotes, it was not real pricing intended to receive real bids. On the contrary, Peretz himself refers in the position paper to the fact that there are situations, even if rarely, in which one of the suppliers has an ad hoc interest in competing with another marketer, such as in order to reach a sales quota at the end of the year (position paper, in the margin of p. 3). This is consistent with Peretz's testimony that once you go out on a privatization, "there can always be surprises" (in paragraph 615 above). In other words, the additional evidence also shows that despite Peretz's assessment of the limited effectiveness of pricing between IBM suppliers, he himself notes that the result of the pricing is uncertain. There is always uncertainty and there can be surprises. This uncertainty is the foundation of competition and it is what incentivizes each of the competitors – including the supplier who believes that he is the one who is expected to win – to offer the best price or lower the price. Hence, the evidence in question does not change the conclusion that arose from the evidence and from Peretz's testimony as a whole, including with regard to the fact that the proceeding to the BLM was intended for the purpose of pricing the truth that coordinating bids in relation to him and behind the client's back was intended to eliminate the uncertainty, to thwart the competition, and it is invalid (and I do not need to say that part of the concern expressed by Peretz in the correspondence also stems from the coordination of the proposals itself, which he learned of following the open investigation).