Criminal Case (Jerusalem) 54589-02-17 State of Israel v. Oshri Sharon - part 116

The second evidence (Appendix 2 to the application) – The second evidence concerns correspondence in connection with the purchase of computer equipment manufactured by IBM whose production was to be completed (in contrast to the state of affairs in most of the charges, except for a certain resemblance to the fifth charge: the Anemone Unit).  The entire correspondence took place on the dates following the last indictment in the indictment and after the Competition Authority's investigation became public.  As stated, no testimonies were heard in relation to the correspondence in question.  From the correspondence itself, it appears that Wii dealt with the matter with the project at Elta and with IBM, and tried to obtain a commitment to order the equipment from the project, to which the project received an insufficiently clear response (see emails dated September 26, 2012 and September 29, 2012).  Later, after a correspondence between Peretz from Maiman and Connecticut Malta on the matter, Peretz complained to Leshem about the connection between the project and Levi and that "everything was closed" even before the matter came to Maman's attention (email message dated October 24, 2012, p. 3; Peretz recommends that the invitation be issued from Elta and asks to release him from signing it).  Leshem replied that Maman could not be released from procurement on the scope under discussion and that he should participate in the procurement committee and demand that there be a competition or engineering reasoning for the selection of the supplier (email message dated October 24, 2012, p. 3).  In response, Peretz reiterated his grievances regarding the procurement procedures, referring to the fact that there was no framework agreement with Wei, and announced that he intended to participate in the procurement committee and recommend the conduct of a competition (email message dated October 24, 2012, p. 2).  After Peretz was not summoned to the procurement committee, he wrote to Shem that a new committee should be demanded, and Peretz again complained that "it is highly doubtful whether it is possible to compete between the suppliers" in the circumstances of the matter (emails dated October 25, 2012, pp. 1-2).  Although the picture of the facts with respect to the procurement in question in the correspondence was not clarified, on the face of it, it seems that the matter fits in with Peretz's testimony and his assessment that where the procurement entered the picture, but at a later stage, the possibility of pricing is more limited and the pricing is less effective (see paragraph 614 above).  They do not instruct, even remotely, that pricing, if any, will be for the sake of appearance and for the purpose of receiving fictitious or coordinated offers, or that this is what was said to the suppliers.  As stated above, this is not what emerged from Peretz's testimony and from all the evidence.  On the contrary, and as we saw above also with regard to the fifth charge, in the Anemone Unit, even where the project sought to "reserve" the contents of equipment and issued a single supplier's reasoning, this did not prevent the procurement bodies from examining – by way of conducting real pricing and requesting quotes – other alternatives to engagement and procurement at the optimal price.  Such a proceeding does not amount to pricing on the face and it seeks to receive genuine offers (see paragraphs 372-385 above).  And let us mention again: Peretz himself wrote in the correspondence that the subject of additional evidence under discussion would recommend the holding of a competition.