( - ) The rule of interpretation "against the strong party" (see, for example, Civil Appeal 191/85 State of Israel v. Neve Shuster Company, IsrSC 42(1) 573, 580-581 (1988); Civil Appeal 4651/95 Hamuda v. Araba Local Council, IsrSC 50(5) 81 (1997); Civil Appeal 650/98 United Mizrahi Bank in Tax Appeal v. The Official Receiver, IsrSC 35(4) 433 (1999); Civil Appeal 9609/01 Mul Hayam (1978) in Tax Appeal v. Adv. Segev, IsrSC 58(4) 106, 134-137 (2004); Civil Appeal 8729/07 Aeronametal in Tax Appeal v. The Jewish National Fund (November 12, 2009)).
( - ) The rule of interpretation "against the insurer" - see, for example, Civil Appeal 779/89 Shalev v. Sela Insurance Company Ltd., IsrSC 48(1) 221, 240-241 (1993); Civil Appeal 631/83 "HaMagen" Tax Appeal Trust Company v. "Children's State" Ltd., IsrSC 39(4) 561, 570-572 (1985)). This rule of interpretation is perceived as a rule of decision, a rule of "end of the road" where the scales are tilted (Civil Appeal 453/11 M.S. Aluminum Products in a Tax Appeal v. Arie Insurance Company Ltd., paras. 28 and 40 (August 21, 2013) (hereinafter: the Aluminum case)).
( - ) Insurance contracts, as a rule, are uniform contracts, and the above rules are even more effective where it is a standard contract (see, for example, Civil Appeal 83/83 State of Israel v. Avidan IsrSC 39(1) 211 (1985); Civil Appeal Authority 1185/97 Heirs and Executors of the Estate of the Late Milgrom Hinde v. Mishan Center, IsrSC 52(4) 145, 158-159 (1998)).
To these rules of interpretation, an additional contractual rule of interpretation may be added, according to which an interpretation that fulfills the agreement should be preferred. This rule of interpretation is set forth in section 25(b) of the Contracts Law, which states that "a contract that is given to different interpretations, an interpretation that fulfills it is preferable to an interpretation according to which it is void" (see, for example, the opinion of the Honorable Justice Ben-Porat, Other Municipality Applications 391/80 Sarson v. Shikun Ovdim Ltd., IsrSC 38(2) 237 (1984)). As my colleague noted (paragraph 59 of his judgment), the insurer argued that the term "authorized manager" that appears in the exception in clause 4.14.3 of the policy should be interpreted according to its meaning in four pieces of legislation, which are not at all relevant to the purpose of the policy before us (such as the Right to Alternative Civil Burial Law, 5756-1996; National Health Insurance Law, 5754-1994). This interpretation effectively empties the policy of meaninglessness, and it is not for nothing that the insurer's counsel did not repeat the argument that the term "authorized manager" should be interpreted in accordance with these pieces of legislation.