Civil Claim in Rapid Hearing (B.Y.) 26342-10-24 A.M. Tiger Ltd. v. Assaf Hochman

Judgment

I have before me a monetary claim, filed by the plaintiff, A.M.  Tiger Ltd., against the defendant, Mr. Assaf Hochman, for his obligation to pay an alleged balance of debt, which stems from the plaintiff's claim for the early termination of an agreement for the provision of business consulting services that was entered into between the parties, before the completion of its full term.

Summary of the factual background

1. The plaintiff, A.M. Tiger in Tax Appeal ("Tiger"), is a company engaged in the provision of business consulting services.  The defendant, Mr. Assaf Hochman, is an overseas travel insurance agent ("Hochman").
2. On July 6, 2017, a previous agreement was signed between the parties for the provision of business consulting services to Hochman (the "2017 Consulting Agreement"), which was terminated after about two months, at Hochman's request.
3. On July 22, 2018, the parties signed a new agreement for the provision of business consulting services (the "2018 Consulting Agreement") (Appendix 1 to the amended statement of claim).
4. It should be noted that the agreement is signed by Success, but the registered company number is Tiger's, and according to Tiger, Success is only a "commercial" name and not of a registered company.
5. On April 1, 2019, Hochman informed Tiger that he was interested in terminating the engagement in the 2018 consulting agreement.
6. In response to the termination notice, Tiger sent Hochman a letter of termination of account demanding additional payments from him in addition to the amount paid by him until the date of termination of the engagement (Appendix "H" to the amended statement of defense).
7. Hochman refused to pay the required amount, and as a result, Tiger filed a monetary claim (Civil Suit at Speedy Hearing 49290-04-21), which was deleted due to the failure of a representative of Tiger to appear for the hearing (the "First Claim").
8. After the first claim was deleted, a statement of claim was filed in the present proceeding, in which a debt in the sum of ILS 22,253 was claimed (the "original statement of claim"). At a later stage, Tiger amended its statement of claim, and inter alia the relief sought under it, to the sum of ILS 23,938 (the "Amended Statement of Claim").

Summary of Tiger's claims

9. According to Tiger, according to the 2018 consulting agreement, Hochman undertook to receive consulting services from her for a period of 12 months in exchange for a sum of ILS 2,900 plus a tax appeal per month (paragraph 11 of the amended statement of claim and paragraph 2 of the Tiger summaries).
10. Since until the termination of the engagement on April 1, 2019, Hochman paid Tiger a cumulative sum of ILS 14,513 plus a tax appeal (paragraph 17 of the amended statement of claim and paragraph 4 of the Tiger summaries), he remained indebted to Tiger the balance amount in the sum of ILS 20,287 plus a tax appeal (paragraph 18 of the amended statement of claim and paragraph 5 of the Tiger summaries).
11. It was also claimed that the sum paid by Hochman until the date of his termination of the engagement was paid as part of a "cash flow relief" that Tiger gave to Hochman, which allowed him to pay a small sum with a promise that he would supplement the balance in the future. Tiger noted that the summary of the "cash flow relief" was given orally and not documented, but clarified that it had not waived the amount of the contractual payment (paragraph 4 of the Tiger summaries).
12. Tiger further clarified that contrary to what is now claimed by Hochman, in real time Hochman confirmed that the termination of the engagement by him was due to a lack of budget and not to a lack of satisfaction (Appendix 2 to the amended statement of claim; paragraph 14 of the amended statement of claim and paragraphs 6-7 of the Tiger summaries).
13. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916 Tiger also claimed that, contrary to Hochman's claims, he received all the services required of her, and that the reference to the benefits listed in Clauses 1.3.5-1.3.7 of the 2018 Counseling Agreement, including 2 personal courses at Hubbard College; tickets to workshops held by Success each month, and 2 subscriptions for the entire period of the Success University Course, is one of "acceptance" and "entitlement" and not of obligation. According to it, this is a kind of supplement that can be chosen by Tiger's customers, free of charge, despite the prices stated in these sections, and Tiger cannot force customers to receive and consume these benefits (paragraph 12 of Tiger's summaries).

12-34-56-78 Chekhov v.  State of Israel, P.D.  51 (2)Summary of Hochman's arguments

14. Hochman argued that Tiger could not change the price of the contractual consideration as it wished, or charge him for the entire period. According to him, it should not be allowed to determine the terms of withdrawal from the agreement signed by the parties, without informing Hochman in advance and without the matter being clearly regulated by the text (paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Hochman summaries).
15. In this regard, Hochman noted that Tiger changed its position several times with regard to the amount of the claim and the way it was calculated: Thus, in a "final account" letter sent to Hochman (Appendix "H" to the amended statement of defense), Tiger claimed that Hochman had chosen a "master package" that included a discount in exchange for his commitment to receive an accompaniment for a year. It was argued that if the engagement is terminated before the end of the year, the discount is canceled and therefore Hochman is charged the full prices for the services (clause 10.1 of the Hochman summaries).
16. Following the letter of completion of the account, a request was filed for the execution of a claim for a fixed sum in accordance with section 81A(1) of the Writ of Execution Law, 5727-1967 (Appendix "I" to the amended statement of defense). In this framework, Tiger demanded from Hochman the sum of ILS 16,417 (paragraph 29 of the statement of defense and paragraph 10.2 of the Hochman summaries).  The amount in Appendix "I" to the amended statement of defense is stated in addition to VAT).
17. Subsequently, the first lawsuit was filed (Civil Suit in Rapid Hearing 49290-04-21) [Nevo], in which Tiger demanded payment for the relative portion of the months that Hochman consumed, at a monthly rate of ILS 3,616 plus a tax appeal and a total of ILS 14,417 plus VAT.
18. In the original statement of claim in this proceeding, Tiger reiterated the claim that the consideration in the 2018 consulting agreement reflected a discount from the value of the services, and claimed that when Hochman requested to terminate the engagement before the end of its term, he must pay for the services he consumed (paragraphs 5 and 6 of the original statement of claim).
19. In contrast, in the amended statement of claim, Hochman was required to pay in accordance with the amount of the monthly charge in the engagement agreement from 2018 over a period of 12 months, even though he had asked to terminate the engagement earlier. In other words, instead of arguing about a discount that was allegedly given, in the amended statement of claim, Tiger demanded the monthly rate multiplied by 12 months, minus the amount paid until Hochman's notice (paragraph 32 of the statement of defense).
20. To the pleadings in this proceeding, Tiger did not attach the final account document, and the claim regarding a "master package" was omitted from them (paragraph 10.4 of the Hochman summaries).
21. Hochman argued that this was a different way of calculating the amounts, and that the difference between the methods of calculation was not properly clarified.
22. In addition, Hochman claimed that Tiger did not claim "cash flow relief" prior to its conclusions, and therefore raising the claim constitutes an expansion of a prohibited front. Moreover, even if the argument regarding the expansion of the façade is not accepted, it is a discriminatory condition in a standard contract (clause 7.1 of the Hochman Summaries).
23. It was also claimed that Tiger did not meet the burden of proving the elements of the lawsuit, and according to Hochman, Tiger was the one who breached the agreement by not providing him with the services it undertook. Thus, it was claimed that no business plan was provided; No strategic plan was provided and no two courses were provided at the plaintiff's college, as Hochman was disqualified from taking the courses due to the use of antidepressants, in accordance with Scientology values (paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Hochman Summaries; paragraphs 46-54 of the statement of defense).
24. It was also alleged that in the cross-examination of Mrs. Iris Perlman (" Perlman"), an instructor at Hubbard College at the relevant time, as well as in the Hochman investigation, Tiger made the claim that eligibility for two courses mentioned in the 2018 counseling agreement was transferable. Hochman argued that this claim had not been made before and that Tiger was prevented from raising it (paragraph 7.2 of the Hochman summaries).
25. In addition, Hochman claimed that during his cross-examination and during Ms. Perlman's interrogation, an argument was raised that there was no obligation to provide the benefits, but only entitlement. Hochman argued that this claim constitutes an expansion of a prohibited front.  Moreover, it was argued that even if it is determined that this is not an expansion of the façade, it is an interpretive question that should be interpreted to the detriment of the formulator (Tiger) (paragraph 7.3 of the Hochman summaries).
26. It was further argued that the agreement between the parties is a uniform contract, because its stipulations deprive the consumer (paragraphs 12-13 of the Hochman summaries). Hochman claimed that he had been misled by the use of the terms "college," "university," and "Hubbard College" (paragraphs 18.1-18.3 of the Hochman Summaries).  It is also alleged that the connection to Scientology doctrine has been concealed (paragraphs 18.5-18.8 of the Hochman Summaries).

Discussion and Decision

27. Since the defendant raised an argument regarding a discriminatory clause in a contract entered into under a standard contract, on January 12, 2026, the position of the Attorney General was requested, in accordance with section 20 of the Uniform Contracts Law, 5743-1982 (the "Uniform Contracts Law").
28. On June 22, 2026, the state announced that the professional bodies in the Ministry of Justice were of the opinion that there was no reason to give a position in this proceeding, without expressing a position on the merits of the matter, including not with regard to the plaintiff's proper conduct.
29. In addition, to complete the picture, the state added that it had received a request from the professional bodies in the Ministry of Justice, which indicated that many inquiries had been received from clients against the plaintiff's activity, mainly on issues relating to the termination of the contract, and that the plaintiff manages hundreds of lawsuits against her clients.
30. After accepting the state's position and after reviewing the pleadings and summaries; hearing the parties' witnesses and examining the evidence presented, I reached the conclusion that the claim should be dismissed, for the reasons that will be detailed below:
31. Interpretation of the 2018 Consultative Agreement
32. It should be clarified that despite the signature of "Success" on the agreement, the registered company number is Tiger's, and in the absence of a concrete claim on the part of the defendant regarding the identity of the contractual parties, Tiger is a party to the agreement and this claim.
33. In clause 2 of the 2018 consulting agreement, under the heading "The Consideration", it is stated that the price of the package is ILS 2,900 plus a tax appeal per month, with the plan lasting 12 months. It was also stated that the payment options are: seven equal payments per month that will be delivered at the time of signing, the first payment in cash by check/standing order, or 8-18 payments by credit card.
34. Clause 2.1.2 of the Agreement states that the above tariff constitutes a condition for receiving the services and/or advice and is not refundable under any circumstances. Section 2.1.3 refers to a payment of 10% of the improvement in the monthly turnover.
35. According to Tiger, under the heading "consideration" in the aforementioned clause 2, there is also an undertaking to consume the services in a total amount of 12 months multiplied by ILS 2,900, not as a monthly payment but as a total amount to be paid whether the agreement lasts for one month or 12 months.
36. In this regard, Mr. Hadar was asked by Adv. Kolb: "No problem. If you can show me in the agreement where it is written in the commitment for a full year?".  Hadar replied: "If you look at the section itself, it says...  It says it's for 12 months...  The plan is the package" (page 6, line 38 to page 7, line 5).
37. Apparently, Mr. Hadar relied on the words in clause 2.1.1 of the 2018 consulting agreement: "When the program lasts 12 months."
38. After reviewing it, I do not believe that a reasonable contractor in the 2018 consultancy agreement could have understood that the intention of clause 2 was to create a contractual obligation for 12 months, without the possibility of terminating the period of the agreement earlier. Thus, the 2018 consultancy agreement does not have a separate title regarding the term of the agreement and does not include a clear statement that the agreement period is for 12 months and that the agreement cannot be terminated earlier, unless the client pays the full contractual consideration.
39. The wording "when the program lasts for 12 months" and the wording "non-refundable in any case" are absorbed in the context of reference to consideration and receipt of services, and do not create a clear and unequivocal contractual obligation on the part of the client for a contractual period of 12 months without the possibility of release.
40. This is a very substantial stipulation, which has significant financial implications for the client, and the plaintiff should have formulated it clearly and separately.
41. The court cannot complete for the drafter a substantive stipulation of the client's undertaking for the period, in the absence of an explicit provision in the matter in accordance with the principle of "the one who takes out the evidence from his friend", the burden of proving this condition is on the plaintiff.
42. Moreover, even if I had assumed that the words "when the program lasts 12 months" or "non-revocable in any case" would have created ambiguity in the language of the agreement, my conclusion would not have changed.
43. In such a situation, the court is required to trace the subjective intentions of the parties by means of external circumstances that surround the contractual relationship, including: the conduct of the parties after the conclusion of the contract, the conduct of the parties in the framework of other contracts, and the like. In order to be able to use external circumstances, a solid evidentiary basis is required that indicates that this was the actual intention of the parties (Civil Appeal 2308/20 Paz Oil Company in Tax Appeal v.  Eliyahu Maman , para.  64 [Nevo] (August 28, 2022)).
44. This is an evidentiary hurdle that cannot be easily overcome, and concrete evidence must be presented to support it (Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 43884-04-14 Bynet K.H.M. in Tax Appeal v.  Meuhedet Health Fund, at paragraph 10 [Nevo] (March 30, 2015)).
45. One of the pieces of evidence that may be used as external circumstances is Tiger's claim that the contractual undertaking for the term of the agreement was given orally. This is what Mr. Hadar was asked by Adv. Kolb: "How am I supposed to know that this is what will cost me to withdraw from the agreement? Hadar replied: "This is explained in a one-on-one meeting, and it is also written next to each section if you look" (page 7, lines 18-19 of the minutes of the hearing).  Attorney Kolb added: "Is he supposed to understand all this on his own?", and was answered by Mr. Hadar: "No, I explained it to him one on one at the meeting, it was in a written agreement" (page 7, lines 32-33 of the minutes of the hearing).  Adv. Kolb asked: "It is not written in the agreement," to which Mr. Hadar replied: "Sir, if that's the case, the agreement was 7 pages" (page 7, lines 34-35 of the minutes of the hearing).
46. However, Tiger did not meet the burden of proving that there were oral agreements according to which it was explained to Hochman that he was bound by the agreement for 12 months, and that the amount written in the consideration clause is a total amount that will be collected even if the period of consumption of the services is for a shorter period. Therefore, Tiger did not meet the burden of proof on the claimant of the existence of an oral agreement, especially when it comes to oral agreements that change material terms of a written agreement.
47. In these circumstances, I cannot accept Tiger's argument that a material undertaking regarding the possibility of termination of the agreement was given orally in order to avoid full detail in the written agreement.
48. Another evidence that may serve as an external circumstance is the conduct of the parties in the framework of contracts signed between them in the past. Hadar explained in his testimony that in the 2017 consulting agreement, Hochman was allowed to be released from the agreement before the end of the period because he was taken into account, and that it was his right to decide who he took into account and who he did not (page 3, line 30 of the minutes of the hearing).  On the other hand, Hochman testified that at the time of entering into the 2018 consulting agreement, he understood that he could terminate the engagement at any time, as he had done in the previous agreement (page 38, lines 14-22 and line 28 of the minutes of the hearing).
49. In the absence of any explicit clarification from Tiger that the conduct in the past was a one-time exception, it appears that Hochman's claim that he relied on Tiger's conduct that allowed him to be released from the 2017 consulting agreement without any penalty was reasonable. This behavior strengthened Hochman's perception that he could terminate the engagement at any time, as he had done in the past.
50. Moreover, the agreement drafted by Tiger does not clearly specify the mechanism for "dismantling the package" or recalculating the consideration at a higher rate due to early termination. The terms of the cancellation are also hidden between the lines, according to Tiger's approach, and are only known to Tiger.  This indicates a lack of good faith, or an attempt to mislead the consumer, since this essential condition is not clearly and clearly detailed.
51. In circumstances in which there is a dispute between the parties regarding the interpretation of a contract, an interpretation against its drafter is preferable to an interpretation in his favor, in accordance with section 25(b1) of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, according to which: "A contract that is given to different interpretations and one of the parties to the contract has priority in shaping its terms, an interpretation against it is preferable to an interpretation in its favor."
52. In our case, there is no dispute that the 2018 consulting agreement was drafted by Tiger. As stated, the opinion of the witness on her behalf, Mr. Hadar, was also necessary to provide a detailed oral explanation to the client regarding the nature of the commitment for the period and its monetary significance in the event of an early termination (page 7, lines 29-35 of the minutes of the hearing).  The need for an oral explanation of such a material detail, which does not arise clearly and explicitly from the language of the agreement, constitutes a fundamental lack of clarity that justifies the application of the rule of interpretation to the detriment of the drafter.  Therefore, the agreement should be interpreted to the detriment of Tiger (the drafter).
53. Moreover, the amended statement of claim did not say anything about the claim that there were additional details that were agreed upon between the parties in their meeting. This claim was first made during Mr. Hadar's interrogation.  These are details that are at the heart of the lawsuit, and there is significant weight in the fact that they were not previously raised in the pleadings and constitute an expansion of a prohibited front.
54. The interpretation proposed by the plaintiff, according to which clause 2.13 of the 2018 consultancy agreement is an indication of a 12-month undertaking, is also rejected. This section refers to the method of calculating an additional payment, but does not state or clarify that a commitment is for an irrevocable period.  On the contrary, section 2.13 states that the menstrual cycle improvement test will be done during the consultation period and up to three months after the end of the consultation.  In other words, the reference is to the period of the consultation and three months after the end of the consultation, and not to the absence of counseling.
55. In light of the above, I determine that the interpretation given by the plaintiff to the provision of clause 2.1.2 of the 2018 consultancy agreement, according to which in the event of early termination of the engagement, Hochman must pay the payment amounts at full rate for 12 months, is inconsistent with the language of the clause and its reasonable interpretation, and it is rejected.
56. Tiger changed its version regarding the amount of Hochman's debt and the way it was calculated
57. This is compounded by the fact that during the course of her dealings with Hochman, Tiger changed her claims regarding the amount he must pay her for the termination of the engagement and the way it was calculated.
58. The method of calculating the amount requested in the amended statement of claim was not clearly explained, nor was the difference between this amount and the original claim amount, or the amount in the termination letter, explained, and this may detract from the credibility of Tiger's claims (Avishai Adad, Inconsistent Argument: Finality, Prevention, and Estoppel 103 (2021)). It should be emphasized that in the amended statement of claim, it was claimed under the chapter "Claim that was deleted" without numbering a clause, that the amounts of the claim differed due to an incorrect calculation of the debt in the previous claims, but no explanation was given beyond that.
59. Initially, Tiger claimed that the rates paid by Hochman were rates that included a discount, which was canceled if the engagement ended before the end of the period. Thus, following Hochman's announcement of the termination of the engagement, Mrs. Adva Fuchs, a consultant in charge of Tiger, sent Hochman a letter of termination of account (Appendix "H" to the amended statement of defense) (page 24, lines 1-2 of the minutes of the hearing).
60. In the final letter of the account, it was claimed that the package is based on the fact that in a year of accompaniment, the sum of ILS 2,900 is paid in addition to the tax appeal per month, spread over 7 installments and 10% of the increase generated. However, when the customer decides not to continue for a whole year, "as soon as the package is dismantled.  The prices vary and are charged according to their full prices as detailed in the contract" (Appendix H to the amended statement of defense).
61. The statement also explained that ILS 15,000 plus VAT must be paid for the first quarter; in respect of the second quarter of consulting in the amount of ILS 9,000 plus VAT; A month from the third quarter worth ILS 1,500 plus a tax appeal and a monthly subscription to the University of Saxes worth ILS 3,430 plus VAT. A total of ILS 28,930 plus VAT.  and that since the sum of ILS 14,513 plus VAT had been paid until the date of writing the letter, Hochman must complete a balance of ILS 14,417 plus VAT.
62. Subsequently, on August 13, 2020, Tiger filed a motion to file a claim for a fixed sum in the Execution Office in the sum of ILS 14,513 plus the appellant's taxes (Appendix "I" to the amended statement of defense, page 46) and filed the first claim that was deleted as stated above.
63. Subsequently, upon the filing of the statement of claim that opened the present proceeding, contrary to the letter of completion of the account and the request to file a claim for a fixed sum at the Execution Office, Tiger claimed that Hochman owed her for 8 months of business consulting services. It was claimed that the cost of the business consulting services received by Hochman amounted to ILS 27,000 (paragraph 21 of the original statement of claim); that in accordance with clause 1.3.7 of the 2018 consultancy agreement for the value of two subscriptions he received to the "University of Success" website for 8 months, Hochman was liable in the sum of ILS 6,533 (paragraph 22 of the original statement of claim) and the total amount, including additional VAT, is ILS 39,233 (paragraph 23 of the original statement of claim).  During the engagement period, Hochman paid Tiger a total of ILS 16,980.  Therefore, the alleged debt remaining to Hochman is estimated at ILS 22,253 (paragraph 23 of the original statement of claim).
64. As part of the amended statement of claim, Tiger changed the amount of the requested relief and the way it was calculated. Tiger claimed in the amended statement of claim that for the period of the engagement, Hochman was required to pay her the sum of ILS 34,800 plus VAT, which is a total of ILS 40,716, of which Hochman paid a sum of ILS 16,980.  Therefore, the remaining alleged debt to Hochman is estimated at ILS 23,938 (paragraphs 17-18 of the amended statement of claim).
65. This means that Tiger has changed the way the debt is calculated, and today its claim is not that the discount is canceled in the event of termination of the engagement before the end of the period, or that the subscription to the "University of Sex" website must be paid, but rather that the full 12 months of the engagement period must be paid.
66. During his testimony in this proceeding, Mr. Hadar was asked about changing these versions. Hadar testified that the name "Master Package", to which Adva referred in "The End of the Account", is an internal name of Tiger (page 6, line 31 of the minutes of the hearing).  When asked why it was decided to waive the reference to the "end of the account" in the amended statement of claim, Mr. Hadar did not know how to answer the question and referred to his attorney, Adv. Granovsky (page 8, lines 7-11 of the minutes of the hearing).
67. Later in his testimony, Mr. Hadar explained that: "First of all, even at the end of the bill, it is written how much he paid and what his balance for payment is, and in fact it depends very much on what agreement the person chooses. Assaf chose the track with the lowest base and percentage of growth with a 12-month commitment that protects us since we invest a lot of money in order for it to grow.  The very amount of the transaction is even stated in the agreement, so everything has its value next to it so that if he wants to break up the package, he will know what he has to pay as explained to him in the meeting" (page 11, lines 24 to 30 of the minutes of the hearing).
68. Later, Mr. Hadar testified that: "I am aware that it is possible to end the final calculation in two different ways, and it is possible to come to the customer once and be considerate as we did last time. For the most part, we go according to the lowest of them" (page 13, lines 9-11 of the minutes of the hearing).
69. 00These version changes are particularly significant in light of the fact that each version presented different calculations, and included different calculation mechanisms, from "Master Package" to "Proportional Portion" to "Full 12 Months".
70. I do not accept Tiger's argument that it is possible to terminate the account in a number of ways, since the way of termination of the engagement must be clear, predetermined, and derive consistently and unequivocally from the provisions of the agreement between the parties, in order to enable the client to finance his steps. The very fact that Tiger changed its position frequently and substantially regarding the manner of calculating the termination of the engagement shines a strong spotlight on the fundamental and substantial ambiguity in the agreement between the parties in this matter, and casts a heavy shadow on the consistency and reliability of its claims throughout the proceeding.
71. In this context, as part of its summaries, Tiger reiterated that Hochman paid reduced payments during the engagement as part of a "cash flow relief" (paragraph 4 of its summaries). However, this claim was not proven and was not mentioned in the amended statement of claim or even in the original statement of claim, it is a new factual claim in the proceeding, which constitutes a fundamental change in the basis of the alleged charge, which was not claimed at any previous stage in the pleadings.  Therefore, and in accordance with the law, this is an expansion of a prohibited front.
72. A party may not deviate from the scope of the dispute as set out in the pleadings, unless the court grants his request to amend his pleadings or if the opposing party has given his express or implicit consent to this (Civil Appeal 6799/02 Yulzari v. United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., IsrSC 58(2) 145, paragraph 6 of the judgment) ("Meshulam Matter").  In the present case, no such amendment was requested and no consent was given.  Therefore, it is not possible to raise a claim regarding "cash flow relief" at the summary stage and I do not give it weight.

• Lack of proof of actual service delivery

71. In addition to the above, I am of the opinion that the services provided to Hochman during the period of the agreement for the provision of consulting services from 2018 have not been proven.
72. In clause 1 of the 2018 agreement for the provision of consulting services, Tiger undertook that the service would include consulting in a number of areas (to the extent that these areas would need to be addressed): marketing, personnel, financial planning, organizational structure, advertising materials, and personal coaching.
73. Section 1 also states that "the consultation will include, among other things: copywriting; editing marketing content; Accompanying marketing campaigns and their ongoing management; supervising and managing the website upgrade; Facebook; personality tests for new and existing personnel; Defining and managing marketing budgets; managing financial budgets; Building a Procedure Book; Defining a policy for the company; Building a salary plan and goals and a strategy for managing and operating a customer club."
74. In clause 1.3 of the agreement, Tiger undertook that the consultation would include: an extensive business investigation, at the end of which a strategic plan would be written in accordance with the client's needs and in relation to the set goals; that if during the consultation there was a need to deal with issues not specified in the business plan, the treatment would be carried out and then the work format would return to the series; that the time for building the strategic plan would be done by a senior consultant; that the accompaniment would be for a period of 12 months, during which success would be guaranteed. Two counseling sessions per month during the first quarter, one consultation meeting per month in the second quarter, each meeting will be about two hours long, as well as ongoing consultation via email and telephone support.  For the next six months, the accompaniment will include ongoing support via email and telephone support.
75. Tiger also pledged that a personality test would be conducted, according to which a personalized program for empowerment would be tailored through personal courses at Hubbard College. The client will be entitled to two courses as part of the consultation package; The client or any of his employees will be entitled to take part in the workshops that Tiger conducts every two weeks as part of the consultation package; The customer is entitled to 9 tickets for workshops of his choice; The client will receive 2 subscriptions for the entire period of the Success University Mentorship; Success undertakes that during the accompaniment program, follow-up will be carried out by a "case supervisor" who is a senior consultant who supervises the entire consultation process and reviews the client's consulting file once a week.  Next to most of the above clauses there is also a price tag for performing the actions listed therein.
76. Despite the above, Tiger did not prove the service given to Hochman. First, Tiger did not summon to testify the advisors who, according to the claim, provided services to Hochman (first "Liran" and then "Yam"), who were its employees and under its control, witnesses who could shed light on the service given to Hochman (page 13, lines 22-23 and later lines 33-39; page 14, lines 35-38, page 41, lines 32-33, page 43, lines 31-39, and page 44, lines 1-3 of the minutes of the hearing).  Similarly, the person in charge of the consultants, Mrs. Adva Fuchs (page 24, lines 1-2 of the minutes of the hearing), who sent the letter of determination of account to Hochman, was also not summoned to testify.
77. In place of these essential witnesses, the testimony of Mr. Hadar was brought, who testified that he did not provide services to Hochman and even referred the person who provided services to receive a response regarding the service provided (page 14, lines 35-38 of the minutes of the hearing).
78. The rule is that there is an evidentiary presumption that a party will not withhold evidence from the court in his favor, including the presentation of testimony, and if he refrains from bringing relevant evidence that is within his reach, without giving a reasonable explanation for this, it can be concluded that if the evidence had been brought, it would have acted against him. The more significant the evidence, the more extreme the court may draw more extreme conclusions than a party's refusal to bring it (Civil Case (Maritime District) 2538/00 Irena Norzitz-Litvak v.  Palestinian Authority, at paragraph 61 [Nevo] (July 8, 2019)).  This matter is even more valid when we are dealing with material witnesses to the proceeding, as in our case (Civil Appeal 7300/21 Asraf v.  Bublil, at paragraph 36 [Nevo] (March 12, 2024)).
79. In light of Tiger's refusal to bring to testify the witnesses who gave business advice to Hochman, who in the circumstances of the case would have been asked to summon, Hochman's argument is strengthened and Tiger's argument is weakened.
80. The failure to summon these substantive witnesses to testify undermines Tiger's claims that Hochman received the full service he needed, and on the other hand, strengthens Hochman's claim that he was not provided with the service that Tiger undertook in the 2018 agreement to provide consulting services.
81. Second, no specific services were provided to Hochman. At the beginning of his interrogation, Mr. Hadar explained that "everything that is written in the agreement we give.  Of course, according to the client's needs, each one has what he needs" (page 2, lines 25-26 of the minutes of the hearing).
82. However, Mr. Hadar could not point to a service given to Hochman. When asked if Hochman had a business plan, Mr. Hadar replied: "I say again, you should ask Liran, but according to what I look at in the final account he received, I don't see that he was charged even though the agreement says that the plan is 12,000 shekels, and I also don't see that he was charged for a business plan according to the final account.  Not every client is obligated to write a plan" (page 14, lines 35-38 of the minutes of the hearing).
83. After being asked how a business plan was not prepared, Mr. Hadar replied that "...A plan can be a joint worksheet. Since customers come to us sometimes need something that is an emergency, say marketing help or financial help.  And if we were to write a business plan now, it could take a month, a month and a half, because our business plan is self-respecting and is dozens of pages, and if a client like Assaf comes in who is now financially stressed and he was financially stressed in the first place, then we immediately take action...(page 15, lines 28 to 33 of the minutes of the hearing).
84. Hadar later claimed "...I don't see that a business plan has been made. It is possible that a strategic plan has been executed.  It cannot be, it is certain that a strategic plan has been executed" (page 16, lines 6 and 7 of the minutes of the hearing).  When asked where the plan is, he replied, "A strategic plan should not be presented to the client.  This is material between the consultant and the person in charge of the consultants.  It's an internal document with our business information.  We do not share it" (page 16, lines 9-10 of the minutes of the hearing).
85. When asked about this matter explicitly, he replied: " For Assaf, this agreement is from 2018, 7 years have passed, and I am not the consultant.  I can tell you that we don't record since it's conversations between a client and a consultant.  Sometimes people come to us for coaching.  It is possible that he was in a very shaky mental state and we helped him with this, we did not record all the conversations" (page 17, lines 2-5 of the minutes of the hearing).  Later, Mr. Hadar testified that "he received counseling, counseling is something that is done between two people.  The consultation is done orally.  Fortunately, today in 2025 we can already document it with artificial intelligence and issue a summary that didn't exist in those years, so we didn't record all the conversations.  It's not recorded orally.  It's done between two people and they schedule a meeting again, just like a conversation with a psychologist, and it's not documented anywhere" (page 24, lines 17-22 of the transcript of the hearing).
86. I cannot accept this argument either.
87. First, even if there is no documentation of the service provided, as appears from Mr. Hadar's words, Tiger should have presented direct and individual testimony regarding the service provided, and it is not enough to speculate about it.  A business company that provides consulting services is reasonably required to document its activity, especially when it demands payment for these services, and in light of the extensive detail of the services in the agreement itself.  Hadar's claim that "this is not being documented" is inconsistent with this expectation, and is even unreasonable given the business and commercial nature of the agreement and the alleged services.  In the absence of any documentation, or concrete testimony of any consultant, it is not possible to accept the plaintiff's claim that the services were actually provided.
88. Second, even if some of the meetings were not recorded, it is impossible to accept a situation in which there is no indication of a business consulting service that can be provided to Hochman. In this regard, Hochman testified that the only service he received was one meeting a month with the business consultant, a one-hour meeting in which he claimed he received nothing (page 41, lines 32-33 of the minutes of the hearing).  Hochman's testimony was not contradicted by Tiger.  The defendant's reliable and consistent testimony, which stood the test of cross-examination, is further strengthened by the absence of any contradictory evidence on the part of the plaintiff, who had the tools to refute it.
89. Third, it should also be noted that Tiger conditioned the receipt of the benefits and courses promised in the agreement on requirements relating to the defendant's lifestyle and privacy. The testimony of Ms. Perlman and Mr. Litvak indicated that the defendant was required to fill out a questionnaire on a Performia.com website allegedly linked to the doctrine of Scientology, and that he was required to change his habits and stop taking psychiatric medications as a condition of receiving services (page 32, lines 21-28 of the minutes of the hearing).  This demand strengthens the claim that Tiger was the one who did not comply with its part of the agreement by preventing the defendant from consuming the services due to these conditions.
90. To summarize this point, in the circumstances detailed above, Tiger failed to prove its claim that it provided Hochman with the full services it undertook. The burden of proof that the services were actually provided rests on Tiger's shoulders, which did not present documentation of the consultation sessions.  Hochman's consistent claims that he did not receive any real consideration and that Tiger did not meet its material obligations were not contradicted.
91. Tiger's omission in this matter violates the core of the agreement and constitutes a breach of the duty of good faith set forth in section 39 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, with regard to the fulfillment of its obligations deriving from the 2018 agreement for the provision of consulting services. Hence, she should be attributed a part in the failure to realize the engagement (Civil Suit in Rapid Hearing (Bat Yam) 28164-11-24 M.  Tiger in Tax Appeal v.  Levy [Nevo] (June 22, 2025) at paragraph 11 of the judgment).  In this situation, a demand to pay the full consideration for 12 months at the time of termination of the engagement earlier, does not hold water.
92. Are the "benefits" part of the services that Tiger is obligated to provide?
93. As stated, Tiger argued that the benefits detailed in paragraphs 1.3.5-1.3.7 are not mandatory, but rather entitlement "a kind of extra given to the plaintiff's customers, without consideration, despite their price stated in these agreements and the full choice of the customers" (paragraph 12 of Tiger's summaries).
94. This claim by Tiger did not appear in the original statement of claim nor in the amended statement of claim. Therefore, this argument constitutes an expansion of a prohibited front (Meshulam case, paragraph 6 of the judgment).
95. More than necessary, and even if it were not an expansion of a prohibited front, I am of the opinion that Tiger did not meet the evidentiary burden required to prove that the reason Hochman did not receive the benefits was his unwillingness to consume them.
96. Thus, Mrs. Perlman's testimony indicated that she had taught classes at Hubbard College; that the college courses were part of Tiger's services (page 26, lines 28-29 of the minutes of the hearing); that she met with each client; that some of the services were the courses at the college (page 26, lines 35-38 of the minutes of the hearing), and that after Hochman shared with her about the situation he was in, he said, "And then what I suggested to him was simply that there was a possibility where he would go to college. That he should simply study the same content with a consultant.  He can actually get one-on-one" (page 27, lines 38-39 and page 28, lines 1-2 of the minutes of the hearing).
97. In response to Adv. Kolb's question about whether Hochman received the aforementioned personal service, Ms. Perlman replied: "I don't know. I wasn't responsible for the service, to give, to take care of the customer at this level if he receives this or that service.  But I did convey what I said to Assaf, I did transfer it to the head of consultants, and the decision is made at this level.  I didn't have the authority to decide what the client would get or what wouldn't.  Because that's also what the client wants, so in the end it goes to the consultant supervisor.  In this case, yes" (page 28, lines 5-10 of the minutes of the hearing).
98. Although Ms. Perlman's testimony does not clearly indicate that the service was not provided to Hochman as a result of taking the medication, it is clear from her testimony that the service stated in the contract agreement with him does not correspond to his lifestyle and characteristics, and that it did not allow him to study within the framework of the college (page 29, lines 5-9 of the minutes of the hearing).
99. This was supported by the testimony of Mr. Sergei Litvak, who was Tiger's financial officer at the time of the contractual engagement with Hochman (" Litvak"), when in his response to Adv. Kolb's question whether he remembered what Hochman was told in the meeting with Mrs. Perlman, he replied: "In the meeting with Iris it turned out that in order for him to receive service he had to change his habits, the things he does. the way of life he had until then...  From what I understand, he would have been under medication, and under the service he had to take the medication in order to receive service so that he could actually enjoy the service itself" (page 32, lines 21-28 of the minutes of the hearing).
100. This means that, contrary to Mr. Hadar's testimony that he cannot force a client to take the courses and services provided within the framework of the benefits (page 20, lines 23-26 of the minutes of the hearing), the testimony of Mrs. Perlman and Mr. Litvak indicates that at least as far as the college studies are concerned, the service was not provided for reasons related to Tiger and that he was not offered an alternative service.
101. The reason for the termination of the contractual engagement
102. On the one hand, Tiger presented the WhatsApp correspondence sent by Hochman to Mr. Elad Hadar, according to which Hochman explained that he was not interested in terminating the engagement due to dissatisfaction but due to lack of budget, and that he wanted to remain in good taste so that he could use Tiger's services in the future as well (Appendix "2" to the amended statement of claim).
103. On the other hand, Hochman testified that: "I did not consume any service, I did not receive anything, and as evidence, you cannot even show proof of the product that was given to me. I try to avoid confrontations.  I don't like it" (page 39, lines 3-6 of the minutes of the hearing).  Hochman later added, "Your client doesn't answer my phone.  I'm trying to show you all the correspondence that you're presenting, some of them in a tendentious way? I have them all on my phone.  I can show you time and time again.  'Elad, I want to meet', 'What is it about?', 'Elad, I need to talk to you', 'I'm busy until 9:30 p.m.', from 7 a.m.  to 9:30 p.m., a paying customer doesn't have a single minute.  'Let's meet on Friday,' does my lord want me to show him the correspondence he uses in a tendentious manner? I have all the correspondence in full" (page 39, lines 8-14 of the minutes of the hearing).
104. In these circumstances, I have not found that decisive weight should be given to the WhatsApp message as the only and decisive evidence for terminating the engagement for budgetary reasons only. in balancing this statement against the other evidence, in particular the fact that Tiger failed to prove the actual provision of the services, as well as the inconsistency in its versions; and Hochman's credible and consistent testimony, according to which the termination of the engagement stemmed from dissatisfaction with the quality of the service provided and not solely for budgetary reasons, I saw that more weight should be given to the other evidence.
105. The WhatsApp message could have stemmed from a desire to end the engagement in a pleasant way and put the matter behind it, as Hochman testified, and did not necessarily reflect satisfaction with the quality of the services he received.
106. Discriminatory Clause in a Uniform Contract
107. In addition, even if I assume that Tiger's interpretation of the provisions of the 2018 consultancy agreement holds water and that service was provided to Hochman (and as stated, I do not believe so), it is a standard contract and the demand for payment for the full period of the alleged agreement (12 months) even in a situation where the termination of the agreement is requested earlier, amounts to a discriminatory condition in a uniform contract and therefore is subject to cancellation.
108. Applicability of the Uniform Contracts Law - Section 23(1) of the Uniform Contracts Law, 5743-1982 (the "Uniform Contracts Law"), negates the applicability of the law to a condition that determines the monetary consideration that the customer will pay for the subject matter of the transaction. In the present case, the condition that restricts the defendant's right to terminate the engagement, and even requires him to pay full payment for a period when he did not receive service, is not a condition that determines the basic monetary consideration for the service (the monthly consideration).  Instead, it is an arrangement relating to the termination of the agreement within the period of the engagement, and its financial implications in the event of an early exit.  Such terms are not covered by the exception in section 23(1) of the Uniform Contracts Law, since they do not determine the price of the product or service itself, but rather the conditions accompanying the termination of the engagement (Class Action (Center) 53033-12-12 Levy v.  Zap Group in Tax Appeal [Nevo] (May 11, 2014), paragraphs 32-34 ("the Zap Case").
109. In addition, and as detailed in detail above, the clause is not formulated in simple and clear language, contrary to what is required by section 23(1) of the Standard Contracts Law, and thus the restriction to the applicability of the law is omitted.
110. Is it a standard contract - According to section 2 of the Standard Contracts Law, a standard contract is: "a version of a contract whose terms, in whole or in part, were predetermined by one party in order to serve as conditions for many contracts between him and persons who are not specified in number or identity."
111. The burden of proving that a contract is uniform is on the claimant (usually the client). However, the test for the fulfillment of a uniform contract is formal.  All the client needs to prove is the existence of the elements of the definition of a "standard contract" in section 2 of the Standard Contracts Law.  He is not required to prove that he was not given the opportunity to negotiate a change in the terms of the contract (Civil Appeal 4602/97 Radal (Ashdod 88 in Tax Appeal v.  Bank Leumi Le-Israel Ltd., IsrSC 55(2) 577, at paragraph 18 of the judgment).
112. An examination of the consulting agreement from 2018 shows that it is a uniform contract, as it was drafted by Tiger, which defined its terms in advance so that it would be used for many contracts with clients who are not specified in their number or identity.
113. It can be seen that Hochman's details were filled in by hand, and that it was written that the service would include consultation in a list of areas, with it written "to the extent that these areas will need treatment." In other words, each client will be examined and treated, but the agreement relates to all possible services, since it is general, and this is what Mr. Hadar even testified (page 2, lines 25-26 of the minutes of the hearing).
114. It was argued by Mr. Hadar that if a change in the contract is requested, it can be changed (page 2, lines 35-38 of the minutes of the hearing), but no evidence of this was presented. In practice, the wording that was prepared in advance was also not changed.  In other words, the evidence presented shows that the agreement is a standard contract and that the substantive terms therein are not subject to negotiation.
115. Is the condition regarding the inability to be released prior to the termination of the agreement a discriminatory condition - a discriminatory condition is defined in section 3 of the Uniform Contracts Law, as a condition that, taking into account the entirety of the terms of the contract and other circumstances, constitutes discrimination of customers, or an unfair advantage to the supplier that may lead to the deprivation of a customer.
116. Section 4 of the Uniform Contracts Law establishes presumption of discrimination. Among other things, subsection 5 states that a condition "that unreasonably obliges the customer to rely on a supplier or another person, or that otherwise restricts the customer's freedom to engage with or not to engage with another person" establishes a presumption of discrimination.  In addition, section 4(6) establishes a presumption of deprivation for a condition "that denies or restricts a right or remedy available to the customer by law, or unreasonably qualifies a right or remedy available to him by virtue of the contract...".
117. The clause in question, which requires full payment for services that were not actually provided due to the early termination of the contract, in effect negates the customer's right to be released from the contract without payment for consideration that he did not receive, and thus meets the presumption of discrimination in sections 4(5) and 4(6) of the Law.
118. The main criterion for examining discrimination is the "fairness and reasonableness test." A condition will be considered a disadvantage if it is intended to protect the interest of the supplier beyond the proper and legitimate extent in this type of engagement, while taking advantage of the supplier's preferential power to dictate terms in a contract in which the customer has no real ability to negotiate in this matter the burden shifts to the supplier to show that the condition is reasonable and justified in the circumstances of the case (Civil Appeal 1770/21 Amir Hetzroni v. Facebook Ireland Limited at paragraph 47 [Nevo] (December 14, 2022)).
119. The Honorable Justice Grosskopf referred to this matter in the Zap case, paragraphs 46-47: "The reasonable length of time for an engagement without the possibility of exit is a matter that depends on the nature of the service in question, and the totality of the circumstances of the matter... In order to show that an arrangement that prevents the customer from any possibility of terminating the engagement is reasonable and non-discriminatory, it is not enough to point to a legitimate business interest, but there is also room to convince that there are no less extreme ways (in terms of harming the customer's freedoms) to promote it."
120. After examining the terms of the agreement and its circumstances, I am of the opinion that Tiger has not met the burden imposed on it to show that the condition preventing the termination of the engagement is reasonable and just in the circumstances of the case.
121. Although this is a non-essential product, and it can be assumed that there is some competition in the market (although the matter was not presented), taking into account the entirety of the terms of the agreement and other circumstances, the condition constitutes giving an unfair advantage to Tiger in a manner that may lead to discrimination (section 3 of the Uniform Contracts Law).
122. Thus, it was not presented that Hochman was given the option to choose between different contractual periods, and it was not proven that the lack of the possibility of being released from the agreement was clear to Hochman. There are power and information gaps between the parties, and the unclear language of the agreement does not contribute to narrowing this gap.  The fact that the conditions of the restraint are vague reinforces the imbalance and the weight that must be given to the fact that this is a discriminatory condition.
123. Similarly, I do not accept Tiger's argument that since part of the consideration is in the form of 10 percent of the improvement in the menstrual cycle, there is a basis for her demand (page 10, lines 22-25 of the minutes of the hearing, and page 11, lines 24-30 of the minutes of the hearing).
124. This is an argument that was made in general, without presenting evidence that this component did indeed create a reasonable economic balance for the conditions of the alleged discrimination. Thus, it was claimed that a large sum of money was invested in order for Hochman's business to grow, and therefore there is reasonableness in the condition, but no evidence was presented in this regard.  The plaintiff failed to prove a concrete investment, and therefore her claim regarding 'commercial logic' remained unchecked.
125. In addition, this is a condition that is not necessarily met, and there is no certainty of improvement at the time the agreement was signed, and therefore deviates from the required balance between the parties. In other words, as happened in the present case when Hochman was charged full payment even without receiving full service or without any service at all and without any alleged improvement in his profits.
126. In these circumstances, the condition protects Tiger's interest beyond the proper and legitimate extent, and creates an imbalance between the parties. Especially when it comes to a standard contract in which the customer has no real ability to negotiate these terms.
127. A similar determination regarding the discriminatory nature of similar conditions in a standard contract was given in a civil lawsuit in a quick hearing (Hadera Peace) 12729-11-20 M. Tiger v.  Tsibulsky [Nevo] (November 28, 2022).  In the same matter, it was held that a condition that restricts and qualifies the right of cancellation in an agreement was unreasonably worded and constitutes a discriminatory condition by virtue of section 4(6) of the One Contracts Law.
128. The fact that pricing is based in part on success rates does not contradict the presumption in section 4(5) and section 4(6) of the Uniform Contracts Law, as it unreasonably restricts the customer's freedom to be released from a contract or enter into a contract with another supplier. In order to justify a blocking restraint clause it is not enough to point to the existence of an interest of the doubter, but it must prove that there are no less extreme ways.  That is, when the legitimate interest of the supplier can be protected by means less harmful than total restraint (such as conditioning release on a relative fee even after release instead of a complete denial of the right to exit).  Total restraint without a proportional exit alternative exceeds what is required and constitutes unfair over-protection.
129. To summarize this point, Tiger's argument regarding "commercial logic" behind a full charge during the period of the engagement, even in the case of early termination, is insufficient, as it has not demonstrated that there are no less harmful ways to protect this interest and how it balances the information gaps and potential genetic biases in its customers (the Zap case, para. 47).
130. Therefore, for this reason as well, the claim against Hochman should not be accepted.

• A note before finishing

128. I have referred above to the arguments that I have deemed to have weight in my judgment. It should be noted that additional arguments were made which I did not see fit to address due to their lack of weight in my decision, inter alia, the claim of deception of Hochman due to the use of the terms "college"; "University" and so on.  There is merit in the argument that these terms cannot be used without the approval of the Council for Higher Education, but I do not believe that the use of these terms had a decisive weight in Hochman's engagement in the agreement for the provision of consulting services from 2018, or in the termination of the engagement.  Although the claim regarding the use of misleading terms may have public weight, in the circumstances of the case in which the claim was dismissed on the basis of material reasons relating to the interpretation of the agreement, the failure to provide services and the fact that the conditions are discriminatory, there is no need to rule on this argument for the purpose of this judgment.
129. The same is true of the alleged concealment of a connection to Scientology. However, in this matter as well, I did not see that a decision in it required a judgment.  It has not been proven that he was in such a relationship in order to influence Hochman in his engagement or termination of his engagement with Tiger.  More than necessary, I will note that no provision of the law prohibiting the existence or activity of the Scientology movement has been presented.

• Conclusion

130. In light of the aforesaid, the claim is dismissed. Tiger will pay Hochman's expenses at the rate of ILS 7,500.  The said amount will be paid within 30 days, otherwise it will bear arrears interest in accordance with the law.
131. The Secretariat will provide the judgment to the parties.

Given today, June 24, 2026, in the absence of the parties.