In our case, the commencement date of the order is on the date on which it is given. On this date, the matter of its issuance must also be published in the register (section 64H(c)). Still, the beginning is separate and applicable. In accordance with the provisions of the Law, the application of the order will be at the end of the period of the basic patent, as aforesaid. This is similar to a piece of legislation whose commencement date is at the time of its publication in the Gazette after its enactment, but its date of application may change in accordance with what is stated therein.
- And when the extension order was created, and it came into being, its validity can expire even if its effective date has not begun to run its course.
Therefore, when section 64J(3) of the Law states that the validity of the extension order will expire, inter alia, to the extent that the order to extend the reference patent abroad is revoked, it must have immediate effect. It applies to the extension order in Israel, which has already been established. And the expiration result does not wait for the future to come. The legislature expressly determined that the expiration will occur "no later than the first date on which, in one of the recognized countries in which a marketing permit was granted, an order to extend a reference patent expires or any reference patent is revoked." Hence, the expiration date may be retroactive, before the date of declaration by the Registrar of Patents, and in accordance with the relevant dates for events abroad.
- The appellant's argument that in the event of the cancellation of the extension order, the notice by virtue of Section 64E(e)(1) Can't stand:
- a) It ignores the fact that the said notice is nothing more than a stop on the road, leading to the issuance of an extension order in accordance with the request, or to the postponement of the extension order to the extent that the conditions for its issuance have not been met. As explained above, when the extension order was granted, the notice that preceded its issuance is no longer relevant.
The appellant relies on the fact that the canceling clause, section 64J(3), relates to other notices - those given under section 64E(c) or 64E(e)(3) and not to a notice under section 64E(e)(1). From this she tries to learn that this notice will continue to stand on its own feet even after the revocation of the extension order abroad. However, this argument ignores the common denominator of the notices to which the legislature referred.