The legislature has taken into account various situations that stand on its feet. A situation in which an extension order was issued in Israel, and situations in which extension orders were issued abroad that allow the publication of the notices in accordance with section 64E(c) or 64E(e)(3). In such a situation, there is relevance to the expiration of the orders there. This relevance does not exist in relation to a notice under section 64E(e)(1), which is given before the conditions of the two countries have been fully met, and before the orders are issued abroad in a manner that allows the granting of an extension order here.
- b) From this it is clear thatAcceptance of the Claim of the appellant will lead to an absurd result. Take the case where it shouldn't have been done Rule Use ofThe mechanism of theSplit message, SinceIt was possible to proceed straight to the message according to Section 64E(c) and Section 64E(e)(3) to the law, Because the conditions for granting the extension order were met, and it was indeed granted. In such a case, no use of the notice under Section 64E(e)(1). The appellant is correct in her argument that these cases are rare, but they still exist.
In such a case, if the extension order is revoked abroad, the extension order will be closed in Israel, since it is certainlynot possible to return to the stage of the initial notice under section 64E(e)(1), since it was not possible to do so in the first place.
But then the question arises, why should the situation of someone who met the conditions of the two states be deteriorated at the outset? Why shouldthe extension order in his case be revoked, while someone who was required to resort to the mechanism of splitting will be saved, and will be able to find refuge in the notice in section 64E(e)(1)? Is it precisely someone who was in an improved state of affairs at the beginning who will be harmed? This is indeed an incomprehensible distinction, as noted by the State's counsel.
Moreover; The Manufacturers Association is correct in pointing out that the legislature did not regulate an updated notification mechanism under section 64E(e)(1). If, in such a situation, the wheel returns to the initial notice, it was expected that the opponents would be given an opportunity to relate to the new state of affairs. To explain the implications of the cancellation of the order abroad on the duration of the protection in Israel, etc. None of this is mentioned in the statutory arrangement.