Civil Appeal Authority 6176/21 Israel Levy v. Michael Klein (published in Nevo, September 14,2021) held:
"The rule is that even if the parties exempt the arbitrators from conducting the arbitration in accordance with the rules of procedure, they are not entitled to exclude the arbitration from the rules of natural justice (see: Civil Appeal Authority 8692/14 Yitzchakov v. Gilkarov, para. 14 (March 8,2015); Civil Appeal Authority 1531/14 Abu Daof v. Abu Da'of, para. 15 (July 14,2014)). Therefore, the arbitration law was to be annulled in accordance with section 24(4) of the Arbitration Law because of the impairment of the respondent's ability to raise his claims and bring his evidence."
And in arbitration claims (Azori Hay) 57801-02-19 Hapoel Bnei Mosmus - Burhan Mahagna (published in Nevo, February 10,2020) it was held as follows:
"36. The rule is that the court does not position itself as an appellate court against arbitral awards, when the grounds for its intervention are characterized by an examination of the basic correctness of the arbitration proceeding and not a substantive examination of its results. It was also determined that the court will interpret the grounds for annulment set forth in section 24 of the Law in a narrow and precise manner, in order to give effect to the arbitration award and not to annul it. In the Gamlieli case[1], it was held: "Judicial intervention in the arbitrator's award is narrow and limited to defined grounds. These grounds are applied carefully and by way of strict interpretation in order to give effect to the award and not to annul it. The court examining the award does not hear it as an appellate court, and it is not supposed to examine whether the arbitrator was right or wrong in his rulings according to the law, since the cause of annulment for an error on the face of the award is not one of the grounds for annulment. All the more so it does not examine these questions where the arbitrator is free from the substantive law and even from the rules of law and evidence, as in the case at hand. The court is also not entitled to put the award to the test of its own criticism - whether it is right or unjust in accordance with its own perception. He must put the arbitrator's award to the test on fundamental questions that are mainly concerned with examining the basic propriety of the arbitration proceeding, i.e., the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the appointment of an arbitrator lawfully, rulings within the boundaries of authority, the preservation of the rules of natural justice, compliance with the standards of public policy, and a host of other matters. The spillover of judicial review of the arbitrator's award beyond the narrow grounds of review violates the proper balance between the independence and freedom of action that the legislature sought to grant to the arbitral institution and the public's interest in maintaining only narrow judicial supervision over the integrity of the arbitration proceedings (616G-617C)."
- Despite the fact that the Applicants did not support their claims in the response or in the affidavit, at the end of the hearing the impression was formed that there was no substantive dispute as to the manner in which the arbitration proceeding was actually conducted. There is no dispute, for example, that the respondent requested witnesses to testify at the first hearing, when according to him, it was not possible for the witnesses to testify on the spot, due to the late hour (towards midnight). In this regard, the applicants argued in the hearing that the tribunal allowed the respondent to testify witnesses over the telephone. There is also no dispute that the respondent sought to argue disqualification with respect to the panel, but he was not allowed to do so before arguments on the merits of the matter were heard. There is also no dispute that between the first and second judgments there was no further hearing in the presence of the respondent.
- I have also found room to comment that the application in this case deals with the three judgments that were brought before me. According to the applicants, there is an additional judgment that was given even before the commencement of the accommodation, in which it was determined by the court that the accommodation agreement was valid and existed, and that following this judgment the accommodation actually began.
The claim before me does not deal with this judgment and even the judgment does not deal with this judgment to the extent possible. In any event, if it was determined in a previous judgment that the agreement was valid and existed, then it would appear that the dispute on which the arbitration revolved relates to the financial dispute and not to the question of the validity of the agreement.
- After considering the arguments of the parties, I have reached the conclusion that the law of the motion to annul the arbitrator's awards is to be accepted, and in any event, the law of the motions for confirmation of the arbitrator's award is denied.
I am of the opinion that the respondent has borne the burden of proving that In conducting the arbitration proceeding, there was a violation of the natural rules of justice and that he was deprived of the right to a plea.
- First and foremost, I accept the respondent's argument that the tribunal should have heard first and foremost the argument of disqualification, before the tribunal would address the arguments of the parties.
The rule set forth in the provisions of section 77 A (b) of the Courts Law, 5744-1984, according to which the court will rule on a claim of disqualification before rendering any other decision, is a rule that derives from the rules of the natural side, and even if it is not written, it is self-evident and should certainly be applied to proceedings conducted in arbitration as well.