Severing the legal relationship between the child and his biological parents... is one of the main pillars of the adoption process. This is a very significant component for the establishment of a parenting relationship by way of adoption, which is regulated by a strict and clear set of instructions. It is not appropriate to casually sever a legal biological or genetic connection by creating a 'jurisprudential' order, while ignoring the legislature's mandate and the clear set of rules it established in this context" (ibid., at paragraphs 25-26 of Justice Mintz's judgment).
The clear words are also relevant in this case.
- Beyond that, an examination of the circumstances of the matter Consensual Parenting It shows the clear difference between it and our case. First, in the matter of Consensual Parenting A judgment was given in the state of Oregon in the United States, which ruled that the woman is the sole parent of the minors and deprived the mother of parental rights. In contrast, in our case, there is no official document on behalf of the authorities in Northern Cyprus that indicates the severance of the mother's relationship with the minors (and not even a document that was predicted to be such a document). Interestingly different. Consensual Parenting, in this case, we are dealing with a territory with which the State of Israel does not have diplomatic or consular relations, so it is not possible to trace local law, and in any case - Even if such a document existed - It is doubtful whether full weight could be attributed to him. Second, in the matter of Consensual Parenting No allegations were raised regarding the exploitation or violation of the rights of the parties involved. ThirdFrom a procedural point of view, that proceeding dealt mainly with the issue of principle only, since the Attorney General did not strive for a result whereby no recognition would be given to the woman's parenthood. Fourth, the judges of the panel all clarified that it was not possible to apply the provisions of the Adoption Law in that case (see: paragraphs 35-36 of the judge's judgment Mintz, paragraph 5 of the judge's judgment A. Baron; Paragraph 7 of the judge's judgment v. Solberg. It is not superfluous to mention that the latter even emphasized in paragraph 11 that "The result we reached, Deeply planted in a stubble"A: The facts of the individual case brought before us, in its specific circumstances, and stems mainly from the manner in which the state's arguments were presented at the appeal stage; Do not dispose of it in other cases").
- If so, we return to the starting point: the signing of the mother giving birth to the letter of consent as drafted in the Adoption Regulations is the mandate of the legislature. Should the circumstances of the case at hand be regarded as an exception to this rule? I do not think so. In my opinion, a substantive examination of the two documents side by side - The letter of consent set forth in the Adoption Regulations and the affidavits of waiver that were actually signed show that they are not identical in essence and that the requirement to sign the letter of consent in this case is not purely formal.
- An in-depth examination of the waiver affidavits (see paragraph 30 above) shows that there are essentially two issues regulated in them. The first - The declaration of the birth mother that she agreed to serve as a surrogate for the embryo created from the sperm of the relevant respondent and that she had no genetic connection to the newborn. The second - Irrevocably waiving her rights with respect to the minor and transferring them in full to the relevant respondent, who is, as stated in paragraph 5 of the affidavit, the minor's father. It should be noted that the results of the genetic tests (which confirmed the genetic connection between each of the minors and his father) were submitted to the Family Court only about two weeks after the waiver affidavits were signed. Therefore, a difficulty arises from the fact that in the said affidavits it was noted as a matter of fact that the respondents are the genetic ancestors of the minors - Something that has not yet been formally decided at that stage.
- In any event, as can be understood from the description above, the waiver affidavits are missing a number of aspects that appear in the letter of consent set out in the regulations, including: presenting the parent's possibility of leaving a souvenir or a letter that will be kept in the adoption file (section 7 of the letter of consent); denying the right to receive information regarding the child and clarifying that the adoption does not terminate the child's rights as the heir of his parents (section 8 of the letter of consent); presenting the child's right, when he reaches the age of 18, to review the adoption register and receive information about the parent (section 11 of the letter of consent); the possibility of the parent to consult with any party before signing and to be accompanied by another person in this capacity (section 12 of the letter of consent). As I emphasized, each of these aspects is of great importance in the circumstances of adoption, and therefore this was explicitly expressed in the Adoption Law.
- The waiver affidavits are missing another important aspect - The ability of the parent to withdraw his consent to adoption in certain circumstances. In this context, special mention should be made of section 10 of the letter of consent, which qualifies the principle according to which the adoption is final in determining that the court will allow the parent to retract it in the following circumstances:
"The court will be entitled to permit me, upon my request, to withdraw this consent for special reasons that will be recorded, provided that on the date of submission of the application, 60 days have not yet passed from the date of the child's delivery to the person who agreed to take him home with the intention of adopting him, or from the date of my signing of this letter of consent, whichever is later, and provided that an adoption order has not yet been issued.