Administrative Appeal Request 3222-05-25 Attorney General v. Anonymous - part 12

In addition, I am aware that the court will be entitled to revoke my consent to the delivery of my child for adoption if it finds that it was received by improper means, provided that on the date of submitting the application, 60 days have not yet passed from the date of the child's delivery to the person who agreed to take him home with the intention of adopting him, or from the date I signed this letter of consent, whichever is later, and provided that an adoption order has not yet been issued."

It should be noted that this section is based on the wording of Section 10 to the Adoption Law itself.  It seems that there is no need to elaborate on the importance of allowing a parent to withdraw his consent to give his child up for adoption under certain circumstances, especially one given shortly after the birth (see, for example: Civil Appeal 5225/94, at pp.  832-833).  The problem is that the remembrance of the matter does not appear at all in the affidavits of the waiver.

94. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the signing of the waiver affidavits is equivalent to the signing of the letter of consent.  In contrast to the waiver affidavits signed by the mothers, which were mainly intended to settle the obligations that apply to them, the consent letter includes comprehensive information on material details and also enshrines within it the rights granted to them as those who give consent to the delivery of a child for adoption.  It can therefore be said that the waiver affidavits omitted the rights that would have been granted to the mothers of the mothers had they been signed in the Regulations.  Against this background, they cannot be regarded as sufficient consent given in good faith (see and compare: P"m 1118/14 Anonymous' Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, paragraph 19 of the judge Handel and paragraph 4 of the President's judgment From' Enlightened [Nevo] ‏(‏1.4.2015‏))‏‏.
95. Counsel for the respondents argued throughout the proceeding that there are aspects in the letter of consent that there is no justification for including in the affidavits of waiver of rights in this case, so it is not necessary to go into detail about all their details. Thus, for example, it was argued that in the absence of a genetic connection of the mother giving birth to the minor, there is no reason for the mother to leave him a letter or a souvenir.  I am of the opinion that this argument is ridiculous.  There is no room for an instrumental reference to someone who has a deep involvement - on both the physical and emotional level - in the process of bringing the children into the world.  The defined framework of the surrogacy process and the absence of a genetic connection between the surrogate mother and the newborn do not cancel out the human connection that may be created between them, in a way that can also be expressed in her desire to leave him something of her at the end of the process.  There is therefore no justification for ruling out this possibility in advance.  Even from the formal aspect, the respondents made a decision to initiate an adoption proceeding, a choice that indicates that they saw this proceeding as a suitable option for establishing parenthood in the circumstances of the case.  Given that they saw fit to take this path, there is difficulty in their decision to skip some of the milestones of the process.  In this sense, their conduct can be seen as holding the rope at both ends: relying on the adoption laws as the only possible way to recognize parenthood on the one hand, and deviating from them on the grounds that they do not correspond to the concrete circumstances on the other.  This is unacceptable.
96. In this context, I will add that the judgment of the District Court held Because even if there is a doubt as to the intention of the mothers giving birth to their children for adoption, it fades as time passes. The District Court further explained that since about two years have passed without any of them raising any claims regarding her parental rights, the conclusion that their consent was given with knowledge is strengthened.  This position is not without difficulties.  The entire proceeding revolves around the concern that the rights of these women will be violated to the point of trafficking them and real question marks that arise in relation to the legality of surrogacy procedures in Northern Cyprus.  The District Court itself also gave extensive expression to this in its judgment without appealing it (in paragraphs 54 and 61).
97. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the passage of time in and of itself, without the mothers turning to the respondents in relation to the minors, indicates the nature of the consent that was given in the first place.  In the background of this is the concern that the mothers will be exploited in a manner that may amount to human trafficking.  In this situation, it is possible to reflect on the practical ability of the mothers who give birth - whose socioeconomic status may be among the lowest in the population and who raises a concern that their autonomy will be denied in the framework of the process - to appear, without being called, and to present legal arguments regarding their parental rights.  This is all the more valid in view of the fact that the possibility of reversing the decision was not brought to the mothers of the birth at all in the framework of the waiver affidavits, as well as in view of the restrictions imposed on them in the agreements with regard to contacting the respondents, as detailed below.
98. Indeed, the fact that the respondents began the surrogacy proceedings before the travel warning was issued works in their favor, but this does not create anything out of nothing. "Exemption" complying with the requirements of the law.  In addition, it is impossible to ignore the fact that already in 2018 a travel warning was issued that clarified that "Before applying for surrogacy procedures in any country abroad"30, It is necessary to ensure the full legal framework that applies to the conduct of surrogacy in that country with all its legal implications".  The respondents did not claim before us that they took any steps to clarify the issue prior to the conduct of the surrogacy proceedings.

Second question: In what way should we act to locate the mothers who are giving birth?

99. Now that we have reached the conclusion that the informed consent of the mothers was not obtained and that the waiver affidavits are not sufficient for this purpose, it is now necessary to examine what actions must be taken in order to try to obtain such consent.
100. Throughout the litigation, the respondents refused to take any step, even minimal, in an attempt to locate the mothers who gave birth and have them sign the letter of consent. They reiterated that this entailed high costs for them, referring to the fact that the previous courts accepted this argument and were of the opinion that the demand to have the mothers sign the letter of consent would impose a heavy and unreasonable burden on the respondents.  I cannot accept this approach.  An exemption without anything is impossible.
101. It should also be remembered that without taking lightly the costs claimed from the perspective of the intended parents, the rights of the mothers who give birth are at stake, in circumstances in which there are serious concerns about exploitation bordering on human trafficking. The content of the waiver affidavits cannot be separated from the circumstances of the entire surrogacy process.  From the picture that has been presented to us, it appears that the process raises significant difficulties with regard to ensuring the rights of the mothers who give birth (as detailed in paragraph 25 above), including: the arrival of the mothers who give birth to Cyprus for the purpose of surrogacy only, the drafting of the agreements in English without any indication of their knowledge of the language, their signing of the agreements at the time of the absorption of the embryos even though they include stipulations regarding earlier stages of the process, significant sanctions that can be applied against them in a variety of situations, their involvement in making decisions regarding the termination of pregnancy if necessary, their commitment to agree in advance (before birth) to relinquish parenthood and hand over the newborn, denying them the right of access to the courts regarding the risks to their lives and health, and obliging them to return a copy of the agreement in their possession at the end of the process.  In addition, weight should also be attributed to doubts regarding the legality of surrogacy procedures in Northern Cyprus according to the local law prevailing there, doubts for which no severance of ties was carried out in the formal format accepted in other countries around the world.
102. Against the background of these grave circumstances, there is also no reason to accept the argument that has been raised merely that locating the mothers who give birth for the purpose of signing the letter of consent, as required by law, entails considerable expenses. Such costs, insofar as they exist, cannot justify waiving compliance with the provisions of the law - and especially given the circumstances surrounding the surrogacy process.  Accepting this argument without reservation is tantamount to legitimizing a process that has serious flaws, and may even create an incentive to conduct problematic proceedings of this kind.
103. I will add that no basis was presented for the respondents' claim that Contacting the mothers of the birth contradicts the obligations of the parties in the agreements. The opposite is true.  An examination of the surrogacy agreements shows that there is no provision in them that prohibits the respondents from contacting the mothers.  On the other hand, there are provisions that limit the possibility of the mothers giving birth to contact the respondents in various contexts, and in particular section 4.7.21, which states that "The surrogate mother agrees and undertakes that after the birth of the child/children she will not request a meeting with the child and the intended parent and will not contact them by any means and for any reason, unless otherwise agreed between the parties".  There is no similar provision in the agreements in relation to the respondents.
104. Moreover, clause 4.7.31 of the surrogacy agreements explicitly states, inter alia, that "Does the surrogate undertake to appear before any authority in the Embassy of Northern Cyprus and the State of Israel for the purpose of implementing this Agreement". A similar provision also appears in the waiver affidavits of which section 9 included the obligation of the mothers giving birth "To appear before any judicial instance, physically or via video call...  If the need arises in the future".  If so, the mothers undertook to appear before the relevant Israeli representation in order to complete the process, if necessary, and even before the courts - so that the argument that contacting them in this context is a breach of contractual obligation on the part of the respondents should not be relevant.
105. The conclusion required from all of the above is that the respondents are required to take practical steps in order to locate the mothers who are giving birth and have them sign the letter of consent before a diplomatic or consular representative of the State of Israel. The Attorney General enumerated various actions that they are able to take, including: contacting the brokerage agency and the clinic that were involved in the surrogacy procedures; contacting the authorities in the mothers' country of origin; traveling independently to that country or using a courier for this purpose; assisting local authorities in the search efforts; or even searching the social networks.  These are only examples, which are not binding but indicate the main point: the respondents must devote sincere efforts to locating the mothers.  To the extent that the respondents' actions bear fruit - And this is the most positive scenario - They will be able to take up an adoption process once again in the Family Court.  At the same time, there is also the possibility that the passage of time will ultimately make it difficult for the respondents to meet the task successfully.  They may not be able to locate the mothers who give birth or obtain their consent to cooperate at this time.  This difficulty does not exempt the respondents from engaging in the task in advance, nor does it allow them to make do with a minimal effort in the form of "Fulfilling an obligation".  At the same time, to the extent that the attempts fail, it is clarified that the Attorney General will have to give weight to the efforts made up to that time, and that to the extent that she believes that additional actions will be required of the respondents, she will have to point to concrete steps that have practical and legal feasibility, as opposed to sending them to a dead end.

Question 3: Is it possible to declare minors adopted?

106. The truth can be told: in the background is Article 13 to the Adoption Law, according to which in the absence of consent to the delivery of a child for adoption by a parent, the court may declare the minors adoptable under certain circumstances, at the request of the Attorney General. In particular, this can be done when "There is no reasonable possibility of identifying, finding or clarifying the parent's opinion", according to the aforesaid In section 13(a)(1) to the law.
107. For the sake of completeness of the picture, it should be clarified that in the usual case, the said section deals with the duty imposed on State Authorities act to locate a parent whose identity is unknown, when the other parent wishes to give up his child for adoption. Such circumstances were at the basis of the matter Baby Fighter described above, following which Amendment No. 8 to the Adoption Law was enacted, which included a detailed arrangement in this context.  Even after the amendment of the Law, a similar case was discussed inP"m 9447/16 Anonymous v.  Attorney General - Ministry of Social Affairs [Nevo] (February 28,2017) (hereinafter: P"m 9447/16)).  As explained in the same matter, the arrangement that was determined seeks to strike a balance between the desire to prevent a situation in which the court declares a minor already adopted by a parent who is not aware of the proceeding, in violation of his right to parenthood, and the protection of the privacy of the parent who wishes to give up his child for adoption without providing details about the identity of the other parent.  In this context Section 13(a)(1) enumerates actions after which a presumption arises that there is no reasonable possibility of identifying the parent.  InP"m 9447/16 [Nevo] was determined by a majority opinion that this is a closed list of actions, the completion of which establishes a conclusive presumption on the matter.
108. The circumstances before us, as is well known, are fundamentally different. This is a case in which the respondents - That they are the ones who wish to adopt the minors - bear the burden of convincing the Attorney General that there is no reasonable possibility of locating the mothers who are giving birth.  Therefore, the normative decision inP"m 9447/16, as well as the rationales underlying the determinations in that proceeding, do not apply directly in the present case, at least at this stage.  To this it should be added that in the circumstances of the case, the specific actions listed In sections 13(a)(1)(a)-(c) The Adoption Law as conditions that must be met in order to establish the conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility of finding the mothers giving birth do not exhaust what is required of the respondents at this time.
109. It should be noted that from the very beginning of the proceeding, the Attorney General reiterated that on the procedural level, Article 13 The Adoption Law explicitly states that a minor can only be declared an adoption. "At the request of the Attorney General or his representative".  In the present case, such an application was not filed at all on behalf of the Attorney General.  On the contrary, the respondents also did not file a motion to declare the minors adopted, and in any case they did not indicate that the fixed cause In section 13(a) According to them, the Adoption Law exists in the circumstances of the case.  More specifically, and on the merits of the matter, since no practical attempt was made to find the mothers who are giving birth, it is clear that at this time it is not possible to determine that there is no reasonable possibility of doing so (in accordance with the established grounds In section 13(a)(1) to the law).
110. It is reasonable to assume that in circumstances in which efforts to locate the mothers of birth fail, this would be the most appropriate alternative that would be worth examining. In her supplementary statements, the Attorney General declined to clarify the situations that might allow the filing of a request under Section 13(a)(1) and to present guidelines for examining additional cases.  All that has been noted on the practical level is that "To the extent that there is a change in circumstances of one kind or another and the respondents present a solid factual basis to support it, the position of the Attorney General will be re-examined" (paragraph 26 of the supplementary notice of April 16,2026).  This is true, but requires qualification: indeed, the time is not yet ripe to consider submitting such an application.  The decision on the matter will be placed at the door of the Attorney General if necessary, and it is difficult to give clear indications in advance.  At the same time, it can already be said that there is a connection between the total steps that the respondents will take as part of the efforts to locate the mothers who are giving birth and the question of whether or not there is a reasonable possibility of locating them.  On the one hand, in this situation, the respondents will be required to present to the Attorney General a factual basis that will establish the conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility of locating the mothers; On the other hand, to the extent that the Attorney General believes that they have not been able to prove the existence of the cause, she will have to clearly specify why and what she wants to be done more (and the rights are reserved to validate this decision, if necessary).
111. It may be added that throughout the litigation, the respondents repeatedly raised concerns that the mothers who gave birth might condition their signature on the letter of consent on fulfilling various demands, including financial demands. At this stage, these are speculations and assessments that should not be riveted, nor is it possible to know whether they will be anchored in the law or in the contractual system between the parties.  In any event, even if it is more than necessary and without taking a position, it is sufficient to mention that in accordance with the Section 13(a)(8) According to the Adoption Law, the Attorney General may submit a request to declare a minor already adopted.  "The refusal to give consent is motivated by an immoral motive or for an illegal purpose".

Not finished

112. The case before us sharpens the difficulties that arise from surrogacy procedures"to those who are managed without sufficient state supervision. These are first and foremost at the doorstep of those who promote these proceedings, but it must be admitted that the conduct of the Israeli authorities in this context was also not optimal.
113. FirstIt is important to point out the difficulty that arises from the provision of diplomatic or consular services, which may, along the way, create legal problems. This was the case when the mothers of the birth signed the affidavits of waiver before a representative of the State of Israel - A document that in retrospect turned out to be irrelevant to the adoption proceedings taken in the circumstances of the case.  It is possible that at this time, following the publication of the decisive travel warning and the update notice clarifying that No further consent will be given for the establishment of parenthood of the spouse of the genetic parent following surrogacy procedures in Northern Cyprus that began after June 21,2023, mishaps of this kind are not expected to recur.  However, it would have been better if the mothers had signed the letter of consent required by law in the first place.  The parties before us disagreed on the question of whether the respondents were willing to take this path in real time.  I will only note that to the extent that it was difficult to act in this way before the minors were recognized as Israeli children - There was room for the state authorities to explain this and direct the parties to appear before the Israeli delegation again afterwards.
114. Second, in the course of the litigation, the Attorney General raised arguments of extreme severity regarding the circumstances surrounding the surrogacy proceedings in this case - even though no accusing finger was directly pointed at certain parties, and in particular no allegations in this regard were directed at the respondents personally. There is no doubt that the picture that has emerged in relation to the contractual system and the surrogacy process as a whole is disturbing, and it seems that there is prima facie basis for the concerns that have arisen.  At the same time, no information was provided about the proceedings taken in this context, on the criminal, disciplinary level, or other levels.  Time and again, the concern of committing some of the most serious criminal offenses in the statute book was mentioned, and in respect of which Israel also has obligations at the international level.  However, - No details were provided about actions taken (e.g., without taking a position - the opening of an investigation, a preliminary examination or relevant disciplinary proceedings).  This issue is not before us in the present proceeding, but there is no choice but to note with the necessary caution that to the extent that there is a basis for the allegations, it is possible to expect more decisive action on the matter.  This is all the more reinforced in view of the significant legal ramifications of the surrogacy proceedings described in the realm of family law and adoption.  It can be construed that most of the activity in this context was intended to harden the conditions that the intended parents are required to fulfill, rather than taking firm measures against other parties involved in the process.
115. Third, it should be noted that The litigation in this case continued for a long time, even against the background of the fact that the Attorney General was supposed to collect relevant information from the state authorities. It is worth emphasizing - As complex as the picture is from the perspective of the legal advisors to the government, this is even more true with respect to ordinary citizens.  Even in the framework of the current proceeding, we have noted more than once the need to draw guidelines in such situations, but these have not been presented to us.  Alongside the concern that "Institutionalization" or "Training" of undesirable effects, it is important to remember that Clear and concrete guidelines can help all parties involved, improve the handling of such cases, and prevent unnecessary litigation (see and compare: P"m 1533/24 Attorney General v.  Anonymous, paragraphs 32-33 [Nevo] (May 7,2024)).  We are not required to have the desired content of such guidelines, but it is reasonable to assume that you can benefit from them.
116. This is all the more reinforcing in light of the accumulated experience with regard to surrogacy procedures that take place in Northern Cyprus.  Without exhaustion, it should be noted that the difficulty involved in this has also been recognized in legal proceedings that take place in other countries.  This is what emerges, for example, from the rulings of the family courts in England.  I will begin by addressing the matter Re Z (Unlawful Foreign Surrogacy: Adoption) [2025] EWHC 339 (Fam) In which the adoption process of two minors born to a couple of women was discussed as part of surrogacy procedures that took place in Northern Cyprus.  In the circumstances of the case, the surrogacy procedures were carried out without any of the intended mothers having a genetic connection to the fetuses.  The mothers who gave birth were Ukrainian women who had arrived in Northern Cyprus for this purpose, with only their first names known, without being able to locate their identities.  After the birth, the two minors were stateless and even brought to England was delayed for several years.  In the difficult circumstances that arose, and after a careful examination of the case, in the absence of any possibility of locating the mothers, the Family Court issued an adoption order in the case of the minors.  In that case, the government ultimately decided not to object to the issuance of the adoption order, subject to clarification that it reserves the right to object to it in future cases.  Another case discussed in the same year - Re W (Foreign Surrogacy: Consent and Welfare) [2025] EWFC 85 - It also revolved around a surrogacy procedure that was carried out under suspicious conditions in Northern Cyprus, in the same case, using the sperm of the intended father.  The surrogate was a Kyrgyzstan citizen who traveled to Northern Cyprus for this purpose.  The procedure revolved around the issuance of a parenting order for the genetic parent, and this matter was delayed, inter alia, due to the need to obtain effective consent from the birth mother.  And about this, it can therefore be said: The Daraa workshop is sharp.

Conclusion

117. The litigation in this case has led us a long way. Unfortunately, its end is not in sight and it is not yet possible to welcome the finished.  It should not be forgotten that the focus of the matter is complex and sensitive issues: the family life of the respondents, the welfare of the minors and the rights of the mothers who give birth.  It can be assumed that a great deal of pain would have been spared from all the parties involved if the respondents had refrained from walking a bumpy road full of question marks in the first place.  What has been done cannot be answered, but it seems that it is still possible to correct it.
118. The discussion before us is also complex due to the clear tension in this case between the"מלכתחילה" and the"In retrospect".  In retrospect - At the stage where we are - There is no dispute that it is in the clear interest of the minors to arrange the status of the two parents who raise them fully.  However, from the outset - A situation of neglect and violation of women's rights in surrogacy proceedings should not be validated, while waiving the requirements of the law and relying on the assumption that when the children come into the world "It'll be okay", in the sense that it will be possible to quickly regulate their legal status.  There is no room for the conduct of the marcher in"Eyes open" to create a difficult situation that will in effect force the authorities to find a solution.  A lenient and permissive approach that retroactively legalizes surrogacy procedures under abusive conditions may lead to repeated violations of rights and even incentivize their creation.  Therefore, at the current stage, it is of particular importance to ensure that the process is properly maintained.
119. The human yearning for parenthood is one of the deepest foundations of existence, but it must not come at the expense of women who are exposed to exploitation. The goal does not sanctify any means.  The desire of the intended parents cannot justify harming women who serve as surrogates.  It requires careful protection of their rights and the existence of a fair, beneficial, and proper process.  Alongside state institutions, the responsibility for ensuring this lies with those who initiate and manage such proceedings, as well as the professional bodies that accompany the process from the legal, economic, and medical aspects.
120. Finally: I would suggest to my colleagues that the appeal be accepted as detailed in paragraphs 73-74 above. Also, in the circumstances of the case, and taking into account the possibility of further litigation between the parties, I am of the opinion

Because an order for expenses should not be made.