This argument is rejected, for the reasons detailed in the trial judgment. The tender that is the subject of the petition does not create a change in the existing state of affairs according to the management tender from 2016. The provisions that the appellant sought to attack in his petition are nothing more than the provisions Complementarity to the provisions set in this regard in the management tender (and in particular clause 6.5). Therefore, there is no reason to indirectly attack the provisions of the management tender in this matter, about six years after their publication, within the scope of the petition that is the subject of the appeal in question.
It is also on the merits of the matter that there is no substance to the claim of an inherent conflict of interest. In the circumstances at hand, the respondent clarified in its response to the petition, and also in the proceeding before us, that the provisions in the management tender that allow the transfer of files to the handling of the lending firm and/or the management company, are intended for those cases that are not suitable for the handling of the suppliers. Thus it was argued in the response to the appeal:
"The provisions regarding the transfer of the handling of cases in the management tender are intended for cases that are not suitable for transfer to the attorney by virtue of the suppliers' tender, such as negligible handling that requires, for example, sending only a letter, or for cases in which the charge imposed (and therefore the expected fees) is very low. In such cases, it is not profitable for the ministries in the suppliers' tender to handle it, as opposed to the accompanying law firm that receives wages according to working hours. In addition, even though the main tender obligates the suppliers to handle every case that is transferred to them, in cases where there was no supplier capable of handling it (due to overload, conflict of interest, refusal, etc.), the case is transferred to the accompanying firm, in order to prevent the charges from becoming conclusive while harming the state's ability to exhaust its rights with respect to them" (paragraph 45 of the respondent's response to the appeal).