The examiner's cross-examination ended without the defense's success in obtaining approval of the feasibility of the alternative accident scenario, as presented by the defendant's counsel in his cross-examination.
We'll see, then., that the defense's attempt to present a possible alternative scenario for the occurrence of the accident and to determine other culpability in the present case is devoid of any evidentiary basis.
It should be noted, that this possible scenario of the defense was raised only in the cross-examination of the examiner Maayan by the defendant's counsel, and that the defendant did not raise this scenario at all in any of his interrogations with the police.
During his interrogation with the police, the defendant stated that he had not seen the vehicle involved at all before and that he had seen lights in front of him and then, as he said "Boom." (P/43, paras. 48-52).
It should be noted, because an alternative scenario is required to be anchored in the evidence. (See Criminal Appeal 511/21 Anonymous v. State of Israel, given on February 22,2022)
IICriminal Appeal 8030/21, Muhammad Abu Zeinab vs. the State of Israel, given on December 25,2022, the following was stated in this regard:
"The alternative scenario is required to have a hold on the evidentiary material, in such a way that its reasonableness will stand the test of reality. The thesis proposed by the defense must therefore establish a real and substantial doubt, which will be consistent with the evidentiary fabric and will raise reasonable doubt about the incriminating conclusion. A theoretical or pressing possibility is not enough."
Also relevant to this matter are the things that were determined inCriminal Appeal 261/83David Ben Siman Tov Levy v. State of Israel, given on February 19,1984:
"It should be emphasized that there is no reasonable doubt with the existence of a remote possibility that something extraordinary has occurred, which negates the guilt of the defendant, in whole or in part, and that there is no mention of this possibility in the evidence that was brought before the court.
This rule found instructive expression in court rulings, both here and in England.
The judge's following remarks Silberg BCriminal Appeal 38/49 [2], at p. 832, as if they were specifically adapted to the case before us:
"There is also no doubt that the court may also convict the defendant, if the prosecution's version is the only logical interpretation of the facts that have been proven - even if it is not a real certainty."
IICriminal Case (Tel Aviv Department) 40330/02, Central District Attorney's Office v. Masrava A-Hakim, given on September 1,2003, the following was stated:
"The term 'reasonable doubt' indicates the existence of a real possibility that has a hold on the evidentiary material, as opposed to a hypothesis that has no evidentiary basis or is absorbed from the air. Moreover, in the face of the evidence collected against the defendant, he must present a realistic, plausible line of defense, which is not merely a product of imagination. The expression "reasonable doubt" lies the filtering between matters that have a logical basis in reality and speculation without a realistic basis; doubt alone is not sufficient to acquit him of guilt, but only a doubt with a reasonable hold on the evidence material.
...
From the above, I have reached an unequivocal conclusion that there was no "slippery substance" such as mud or oil in the defendant's lane that caused his vehicle to slide involuntarily into the opposite lane.
....
It is certainly possible that the defendant's car did indeed reach a state of losing traction with the road and perhaps even slippingHowever, this situation does not stem from a mechanical failure in the vehicle or the presence of a "slippery substance on the road", and therefore the last option that necessarily remains is the way in which the defendant chose to drive his vehicle in the difficult road conditions in which he drove. (Hence also derives the presumption of negligence by virtue of the "rule of way")."