Class Action (Jerusalem) 42026-05-20 The Israeli Consumer Council v. Lotont Friends Club Ltd. - part 16

Later, Mr. Shiri was asked about the use of game data from recent decades, which was made in the framework of the use of the Respondent's software, in accordance with the engagement agreement with it:

"Q. You know how important game data from the last few decades is

1. In my personal opinion, there are statisticians who believe in statistics and there are people who have their own opinion. In my opinion, it's a game of chance. Some people will say that the combination of 1-6 is so zero that it's not worth sending the column, so this column can be subtracted. It's not my area of expertise, so I can't answer on this issue. I can estimate that at the time, 20 years ago, Alfasi sat down with professionals, I appreciate, and brought me the forms after sitting with them.
2. I understand that your personal position regarding the selection of numbers is not important to the lottery data from the past decades.
3. This is my personal opinion."
4. As for the use of game data from recent decades in favor of the software presented as statistical, as appears from the professional opinions of both sides, statistically, the use of this data may not help increase the chances of winning, since every combination of numbers has an equal chance of winning the lottery. In fact, Mr. Shiri himself admitted that in his personal opinion, it is not important to use the lottery data from recent decades for the purpose of choosing the numbers, so this is an apparent misrepresentation of the situation.
5. Admittedly, in clause 6 of the agreement, the Respondent clarifies that "the Member declares that he is aware that the Company does not undertake as to the chances of the Member winning the prize and/or in any amount whatsoever, and the Member will not be entitled to raise any claim in the matter against the Company or anyone on its behalf". However, here too, this clause does not negate the representation that this Respondent creates in publications as stated above.
6. It emerges from the aggregate that the Respondent's boasting that it uses "advanced statistical software", the content of which is a "trade secret", while the contribution of that software is the use of lottery data from the past, which does not make any statistical contribution to improving the chances of winning, the expectation of winning or the expectation of profit, is prima facie a misleading representation.
7. The Respondent's customers may get the impression that the same advanced statistical software may improve their chances, when this is not the case. The experts on both sides, as well as Mr. Shiri himself, agree that these data do not have the power to improve the chances of winning the lottery. Mr. Shiri did not claim that the software uses additional techniques, and the Respondent did not testify against Mr. Ofer Alfasi, about whom it was claimed that he was the entity in the company who dealt with the software matters in the past, in order to shed light on the matter, and what this entails. Here, too, there is a reasonable chance of a finding against this Respondent with regard to a misrepresentation in all matters.

Respondent 7 - Smart Winners

184. Respondent No. 7 presents in its bylaws that it has developed mathematical methods according to which "the chances of winning, as well as the sums to win, are significantly higher than those that can be won by other means of participation in lotteries that currently take place in the market. The mathematical methods in question allow for a significant reduction in the number of active number  combinations in the regular lottery and chance lottery, and therefore the chances of  winning significantly increase [...] The website further states that "we have invited mathematicians to develop the exclusive Smart Play system. With the click of a button, Smart Play automatically  selects the number combinations with the highest odds of winning for you." The headline "How does the SMART PLAY statistical model work?" reads: "We can't reveal too many details. They are a well-kept secret. Even if a little information leaks out, these statistics will no longer be relevant. So to give you a chance to win, we need to keep our lips sealed [...] The algorithms used by Smart Play can  significantly increase your chances of winning the big prize! Take advantage of the opportunity that Smart Play gives  you, and your numbers will be automatically selected for you based on the latest statistics we have" Under the heading "Why Number Combinations Are So Important" it says: "The chances of certain numbers being drawn as winners are quite low. For example, it won't be easy to pick the numbers, so they all come out odd or, conversely, they're all even. They just don't pop up often enough to bet on them and risk your money. Our statistical calculations show that the most successful number combinations should be in a ratio of 2/4: 2 even balls, 4 odd balls, 4/2: 4 even balls, 2 odd balls, and 3/3: 3 even balls and 3 odd balls." A similar principle is described in relation to the combination of high numbers, middle numbers, and low numbers. The paragraph ends with the sentence "This is why using Smart Play is a good bet for you. Smart Play will always choose the combination of numbers with the highest chances for the next lottery." (Emphasis added - H.M.).
185. Respondent 7 did not attach an affidavit and did not summon witnesses in order to try to substantiate these representations, which do not appear to be in line with the experts' view. The representations in themselves indicate that respondent 7 is allegedly misleading her clients. The respondent undertakes to significantly increase the chances of winning and the winning amounts, inter alia by choosing certain combinations of numbers that have a higher chance of winning the lottery, such as number combinations that combine even, odd, low, middle and high numbers. As stated, the experts on both sides agree that there are no combinations of numbers that have a better chance of winning the lottery. Therefore, this is a misleading representation.
186. It has not escaped my notice that on the website of respondent No. 7 there is attached a document allegedly signed by Prof. Zvi Gilula, in which the "method of reductions" described by Dr. Regev in her opinion is attached. Indeed, according to the opinion, the use of this method increases the chances of winning the prize in the amount of NIS 10, but does not change the expectation of winning. However, the fact that the website also mentions a method recognized in Dr. Regev's opinion does not negate the fact that the rest of the respondent's representations deal with "statistical" methods that have no basis. On the contrary, the presentation of his method and the use of Prof. Gilula's name on the Respondent's website, together with the presentation of "statistical" methods that have no basis, are liable to create the impression that Prof. Gilula relies on those unfounded methods as well, and reinforce the deception effect. In this context, it should be noted that the link on the Respondent's website, which leads to the document written by Dr. Gilula in relation to the reduction method, bears the title "Prof. Gilula's Explanatory Document on Smart's Statistical Method". The client may mistakenly conclude that Prof. Gilula is behind all the statistical explanations that appear on the Respondent's website, even those that have no basis in the research. Hence, the Respondent's representations are liable to mislead its customers regarding a material matter to the transaction.
187. Admittedly, Respondent 7, like other respondents, also included clauses in its bylaws aimed at limiting its liability, such as: "The Smart Club hereby declares that it is not obligated to its customers as to the chances of winning the participants and with respect to any prize(s) or amount(s). The Subscriber hereby declares that he or anyone on his behalf hereby waives any right to claim a claim on this matter against the Smart Club, his representative, or anyone on his behalf"; "The probability of the Client winning this or that prize in such lotteries, which the Smart Method includes, is in accordance with the probability of a customer winning such lotteries." However, even these sections do not exempt the Respondent from liability for its misleading representations. On the contrary, the statement that the probability does not exceed the probability in lotteries of this type supports the prima facie conclusion that this is a misrepresentation.
188. It therefore appears that even with respect to respondent 7, there is a reasonable chance that in the main proceeding, a finding will be determined in accordance with respect to a false situation regarding the use of statistical methods and an increase in the chances of winning, which is liable to mislead the customers regarding a material interest in the transaction.

Respondent 8 - New Sport and Marketing

189. Respondent 8 offers its customers group participation in lotteries, which increases the chances of winning. Respondent 8's website states that "the group subscription operates on the basis of simple mathematics: a single person can purchase hundreds of tickets in each lottery, but it is expensive and not worthwhile. Instead, we gather hundreds of people into one group who play together and in this way significantly increase the chances of winning, with everyone participating in all the"
190. In a video posted on the respondent's website, it was said: "There is really no safe method to win the lottery. But there is a sure way to increase the chance. And the truth? You don't have to be an Einstein to understand it. You just have to send more forms. So you can send a full amount of forms in each lottery, or you can send with friends. That's why we founded "Equal Equal" - the only team lottery club where you choose your lucky numbers, which are sent regularly along with the numbers of the other members of the group [...] The larger the group, the greater the chances of the group. In a group of 100 people, the chance increases 100 times. A group of 200 - 200 times the chance, and so on." [Emphasis added - the undersigned].
191. The experts on both sides agreed that participation in a multi-participant lottery increases the chances of winning any amount. The more forms are sent, the greater the chance of winning. The Respondent clarifies in its presentations that all the members of the group are "partners in all the forms", so it is clear that just as the submission of the forms is shared, so too does the distribution of prizes among the group members. In contrast to other Respondents, who boast of the use of sophisticated statistical methods developed by experts, Respondent 8 presents its clients with the simple logic of the way it operates – sending multiple forms increases the chances of winning the prize. These representations in themselves are indeed not misleading.
192. In this context, it should be noted that although in the application for certification the Applicant referred the claim of deception in relation to the chances of winning to Respondent 8 as well, it appears that in the course of the Applicant abandoned this claim. Mr. Shmuel Levy, the witness on behalf of the Applicant, was not asked in his cross-examination about alleged deception in relation to the chances of winning, and the Applicant did not address this claim in her summaries. The motion to certify a class action against Respondent 8 for the claim of deception regarding the chances of winning is rejected.
193. To summarize this chapter: There is a reasonable possibility that it will be decided that Respondents 1. 2. 5.  6. Seven that published that they use "statistical methods" developed by "experts" and that can improve the chances of winning, presented representations that could mislead consumers regarding a material interest in the transaction. The experts on both sides agreed that there is no way to improve the chances of winning a single column. Admittedly, there is a way to increase the chances of winning in a group by using the "reduction method" described by Dr. Regev, but it has not been proven that this method is used, especially since it has not been proven that it is a method with real advantages.
194. However, the group participation in itself increases the chances of winning, since each participant participates in all the lottery tickets submitted on behalf of the team. However, creating the impression that sophisticated statistical methods developed by experts in the field, when the benefit of those methods derives from the very participation of the group, is misleading.

Funding of the proceeding by an investment fund

195. Towards the end of the hearing of the parties before me, and after the Applicant's counsel was asked to produce the powers of attorney by virtue of which they are acting on behalf of the Applicant, it became clear that the power of attorney also authorized the Applicant's counsel to enter into an agreement to finance the proceeding with the private investment fund "Biactive" (hereinafter – the agreement or the financing agreement and the investment fund, respectively). It also became clear that an agreement was indeed signed between the Applicant and the Investment Fund, but this was not presented on behalf of the Applicant throughout the proceeding, but rather following the Respondents' attorney's request to review the power of attorney, from which the matter was learned.
196. As part of the agreement, the investment fund undertook to provide the applicant with financing for the legal proceeding in the amount of up to NIS 250,000 , in exchange for a portion of the remuneration awarded to the applicant as a class plaintiff, should it be awarded. The funding is intended to cover legal expenses, court fees, investigators, expert fees and other expenses in the legal proceeding.
197. According to the testimony of the declarant on behalf of the Applicant, Adv. Yael Cohen-Shawat, the fund raised the funding from the public through a crowdfunding platform specifically designated for the proceeding at hand, and the Applicant does not hold a list of investors in the project (p. 142 of the transcript). According to the Applicant's counsel, the financing for the claim was obtained by recruiting investors for a cluster of class actions, one of which is the claim in question, and not specifically and exclusively for the present claim (p. 186 of the minutes).
198. As part of the agreement, the investment fund was given the right to receive information about the proceeding and to advise the applicant on matters relating to the proceeding, but it was clarified that "the decisions regarding the conduct of the proceeding, the acceptance of a compromise, the taking of actions or the non-taking of them will ultimately be made by the plaintiff alone and in accordance with his professional position and taking into account the position of the representative counsel." The investment fund is also entitled to cancel the agreement in the event of a breach by the representative plaintiff, and to receive the return of the financing funds, together with linkage and interest, and a share of the remuneration to the plaintiff, if the remuneration is stopped.
199. Upon learning of the existence of the agreement, the respondents sought to postpone the proceeding out of hand, because in their opinion, the very existence of the financing agreement and the lack of disclosure about it to the court and to the parties to the proceeding constitutes a defect that goes to the root of the proceeding for which the claim should be dismissed in limine.
200. This position is based on the Respondents' argument that the Applicant, as a non-profit government company, was prevented from entering into such a financing agreement with a private investment fund. This is because it was not authorized to do so by law, because it was prohibited from acting according to business considerations and distributing profits, because the engagement in the agreement is likely to create a conflict of interest, since it is not clear who are the investors in financing the claim and whether they are business competitors of the Respondents. It was further argued that the engagement in the agreement raises the "representative problem" with extreme severity, since there is another party involved in the proceeding, which the court cannot supervise.
201. The Respondents further argue that in view of these concerns regarding the involvement of an investment fund in the proceeding, the Applicant should have brought to light the existence of the financing agreement on her own initiative at the beginning of the proceeding. It is argued that the fact that the Applicant did not disclose this shows that the Applicant herself is of the opinion that the engagement in the agreement is invalid. In this context, the Respondents also rely on clause 8.6 of the financing agreement, which instructs that the plaintiff and his counsel "shall act with caution and professionalism, which undertakes to inform the court regarding the existence of external financing in the case in order to prevent harm to the chances of the claim as a result." According to the respondents, this provision in the financing agreement reveals that the investment fund's approach was also required to disclose the existence of the agreement to the court, and the argument of the applicant and her counsel that they believed that there was no need to inform the court of the existence of the agreement is a difficult one.
202. The Applicant, on the other hand, is of the opinion that there is nothing wrong with entering into such a financing agreement for the purpose of managing the claim. According to her, this is an accepted and legitimate practice that assists the plaintiffs in conducting class actions. The Applicant, like any class plaintiff, is also entitled to enter into a financing agreement. The fact that the Applicant is a government company and as such the rules of administrative law apply to it does not exclude it from the possibility of entering into a financing agreement. According to her, it is a matter of using a private entity for the purpose of exercising the authority, which is permitted by case law, and not a dissolution of discretion and the transfer of authority to a private entity. On the contrary, the engagement in the financing agreement helps the Applicant to realize the public purposes for which it was established and to protect consumers. Although the investment fund is entitled to receive information about what is going on in the proceeding and to advise the applicant and her attorneys, it cannot intervene in the decision-making regarding the conduct of the proceeding, and therefore the receipt of the funding does not impair the independence of the applicant's discretion.
203. The Applicant also claims that the financing agreement was also concluded by virtue of the Council's auxiliary powers, which may include finding external sources of funding, provided that this is done with the approval of the authorized institutions prescribed by law. The financing agreement was approved by the Council's Director-General, who, according to the Applicant, is the authorized entity to approve the receipt of funding, as in our case.
204. With regard to the Respondents' argument that the financing agreement embodies a "distribution of profits" that is prohibited by the Company's Articles of Association, the Applicant is of the opinion that the division of the remuneration with the Fund, in the event of winning the claim, is not a "distribution of profits" of the Company to its shareholders in the sense that it is prohibited by the Company's Articles of Association, and this is not relevant to the matter.
205. With regard to the Respondents' argument that the engagement in the financing agreement places the Council in a prohibited conflict of interest, the Applicant argues that it is not clear what the conflict of interest is that was created in such a situation, and since there is no conflict of interest, there is no defect in the engagement in the agreement.
206. With regard to the issue of the disclosure of the agreement, the Applicant initially argued that since she was entitled to enter into the agreement and that it was not an illegal agreement, it was not required to disclose it. The Applicant also argued that a class plaintiff was not required to explain from where he obtained the funding for the proceeding, and as long as the financing party is not given a foothold in the proceeding, this issue has no relevance. For this reason, too, the Applicant was of the opinion that there was no obligation to disclose the receipt of the funding.
207. In the hearing before me, counsel for the Applicant and the witness on her behalf agreed that in retrospect there was room to inform the court about the external funding, but at earlier stages of the proceeding they believed in good faith that there was no obligation to disclose the existence of the agreement and therefore did not do so.

Discussion regarding the engagement with the fund

208. The Class Actions Law does not include special provisions in connection with agreements such as the one in question, and the issue has not yet been discussed and decided in the Supreme Court's rulings. We will therefore examine the issue in accordance with the purpose and purposes of the law. As will be explained, in light of this, it appears that there is no room for a sweeping prohibition of entering into agreements of this type for the conduct of a class proceeding, and such an engagement in itself is not supposed to lead, in itself, to the rejection of a request for approval.
209. The purpose of the Class Actions Law, which is clarified in section 1 of the Law, is to regulate the manner in which the class action device is used for the purpose of exercising the right of access to the court, enforcing the law and deterring it from violating it, providing appropriate relief to victims of the violation of the law, and efficient, fair and exhaustive management of claims. The law is therefore intended to realize the right of access to the courts and to clarify justified claims if it were not for the class action instrument, there is little chance that they would have been clarified.
210. The interpretation of the law as prohibiting the receipt of funding from an external entity for the conduct of the proceeding, even though such a prohibition is not interpreted in the language of the law, is inappropriate because it undermines the purpose of the law that is explicitly mentioned therein.
211. Financing the proceeding, including in the format discussed here, enables the conduct of more expensive and complex proceedings in a proper and serious manner within the framework of a class proceeding, in which many class plaintiffs will find it difficult to finance the expenses required to place them in a proper format by means of the assistance of an expert and the submission of professional opinions, etc.
212. Accordingly, a sweeping prohibition on a financing agreement means a barrier to the submission of proper proceedings that require serious clarification and proper investment of resources, due to the personal financial limitations of the person who identified the tort and requested to become a public representative in the matter.
213. It seems that the silence of the law on this issue does not mean a sweeping prohibition on taking funding from a private entity with economic interests for the purpose of managing the claim, but rather a permit in principle to do so.
214. The case law recognizes the economic incentive of the plaintiff and his counsel as a legitimate motive in filing a class action and finds nothing wrong with it (see, for example, Civil Appeal 1834/07 Haim Keren v. Assessor Gush Dan, para. 19, 636(3) 636 (2012); Civil Appeal Authority 3698/11 Shlomo Transportation (2007) Ltd. v. S.A.M.G.R. Enforcement Services Ltd., para. 44, (September 6, 2017)). The rationale for this lies in the unique nature of the class action, a proceeding that is intended, as stated, to enable the clarification of justified claims of public and economic importance, which without the class tool would not have been possible to manage them individually due to the inputs required to conduct an individual proceeding on the one hand, and the limited scope of damage to each individual on the other. The economic incentive therefore plays an important role in the class proceeding, and is even found at the foundation of class proceedings, in terms of the engine and incentive for their existence: it encourages the filing of proper lawsuits and enables private enforcement of the law.
215. Indeed, the use of the class action device for purely economic motives raises concerns about the abuse of the class action mechanism. The concern is about the phenomenon of the "class action industry", in which lawyers and professional plaintiffs file lawsuits in order to derive personal profit, when the public interest or the best interest of the class does not receive their due weight. There is also a concern that the class action mechanism will be exploited in order to harm a business competitor or to pressure the defendant to agree to a settlement, when the defendant is willing to do so in order to avoid exhausting and expensive litigation, even if the lawsuit is hopeless. Abuse of the class action mechanism may harm both the defendants and the members of the injured class.
216. Against this background, the Class Actions Law establishes a number of control and supervision mechanisms for the management of the class proceeding. Thus, the law establishes prerequisites for approval to conduct a class action or for approving a settlement arrangement between the representative plaintiff and the defendant, and also establishes supervisory mechanisms for the representative plaintiff and his representative. These control mechanisms are intended to reduce the possibility of abuse of the class proceeding by the representative plaintiff or his representative.
217. Similarly, in light of the potential advantages of an external financing agreement, there is no room for a sweeping prohibition on claims filed with the assistance of external funding. Rather, it must be required to be transparent and disclosure already at the stage of initiating the proceeding, so that it will be possible to ensure that the class proceeding is not abused in a manner that is inconsistent with its purpose. This is in the framework of the clarification required to determine that the condition according to the court is met in light of the fact that the case of the class members will be represented and managed in an appropriate manner and in good faith. Such an inquiry conducted by the court makes it possible to prevent abuse of the class proceeding by various parties, including a financing entity.
218. The purpose of the control and supervision mechanisms is, therefore, to create a balance between the need to encourage the filing of proper class actions and the concern of abuse of the proceeding. Through meticulous judicial supervision of the approval of the claim, the conduct of the proceeding, and the settlement arrangements, it is possible to ensure that only well-founded claims with real public value will be clarified, while claims filed for extraneous motives or bad faith will be filtered. Within the framework of this balance, there is room to recognize the possibility of external funding, as long as there is full transparency regarding the agreements with the financing entity and the funding does not impair the independence of the conduct of the proceeding or create a material conflict of interest.
219. The court will examine, in each case, on its own merits, the engagement agreement between the financing entity and the plaintiff and his counsel and ensure that it is not an abuse of the proceeding and that the agreement allows the financing entity, who will normally not be subject to ongoing supervision during the proceeding, to take part in the management of the proceeding in a manner that may harm the best interests of the group or create a fear of a conflict of interest. It is also necessary to ensure that the identity of the financing entity does not cast aspersions on the good faith of the applicant or his representative, as may happen, for example, in a case where the financing entity is a business competitor of the defendant (and cf. Civil Appeals Authority 4556/94 Rami Tzetz v. Avraham Zilbershatz, 49(5) 774 (1996), para. 12). Here no indication was presented that the fund in question is a business competitor of the respondents, and it was presented that its business is in the financing of class proceedings. Indeed, I do not have data on the identity of the "investors", but in the circumstances of the case this is not significant, since it does not appear that they have any influence on the manner in which the proceeding was conducted, nor is there any indication that they initiated it. Admittedly, the Fund may announce the termination of the funding of the legal proceeding in the event of a breach of the agreement by the plaintiff (clause 9.2 of the agreement) or "in the event that a material fact is discovered that changes the plaintiff's chances of winning the legal proceeding" (clause 9.5 of the agreement). However, it does not appear that this right gives the fund influence that creates the potential for abuse of the proceeding against the respondents.
220. On the aforementioned issue, a different position was indeed recently expressed in a class action (Central District) 28974-10-20 Ofer Peart v. Monsanto Company [Nevo] (August 7, 2025), where a claim was dismissed in limine due to an external financing agreement. It was held that the fact that the Class Actions Law does not include an arrangement of the issue of financing the class proceeding by a private company operating for profit, constitutes a negative arrangement that attests to the legislature's desire to prohibit this practice, and the silence of the law does not indicate that this is permitted.
221. However, as stated, I am of the opinion that if the legislature wishes to prohibit such a practice, it requires a direct provision. Financing that does not involve abuse and bad faith is not prohibited, and what is not prohibited is permitted. Indeed, the legislature established in the law state frameworks for the financing of a class proceeding. However, this does not indicate the exclusivity of the institutional track. On the contrary, the establishment of a statutory fund for the financing of class actions indicates that the legislature recognizes the difficulty of financing complex class proceedings. The Class Actions Law provided an institutional response to this difficulty, but the law does not hint that private solutions to it have been ruled out.
222. As to the obligation to bring to light the fact that there is an agreement, I am of the opinion that in order for the court to be able to examine the matter in its entirety before making a decision on the motion to certify the class action, the applicant is required to become a representative plaintiff, or his representative, who entered into a financing agreement with an external party in order to bring to the attention of the court the existence of the agreement and its contents. This is in order to enable the opposing party to examine the matter and to enable the court to ensure that this is not an abuse of the class action mechanism by unknown parties.
223. In our case, the existence of the agreement was not brought to the attention of the Court at the Applicant's initiative. This is despite questions addressed to the witness on behalf of the Applicant regarding the budgeting of the proceeding by the Council (p. 44 of the minutes). This was discovered only after the Respondents' counsel demanded to receive the power of attorney by virtue of which the Applicant's counsel acted, and the power of attorney learned that the Applicant's counsel was also authorized to enter into an agreement with an investment fund to external finance the claim (see the Respondents' request of March 20, 2024). Only after the Applicant was asked to notify whether or not she entered into a financing agreement did her counsel notify her of the existence of the agreement and forward a copy of it to the parties and to the court (see the Applicant's response of March 25, 2024).
224. This is misplaced conduct. The Applicant and her counsel should have notified the existence of the agreement upon filing the motion to certify the class action, or at least when the question of funding the proceeding was raised in the framework of a cross-examination. However, in view of the fact that at that time this issue was a matter that had not yet been discussed, there is no basis for a determination of bad faith in this regard.
225. In the margins, it should be noted that in view of the conclusion I reached, in the next chapter, regarding the replacement of the Council as a representative plaintiff, I am not required to rule on the Respondents' argument that the Council, as an administrative body, was not entitled to enter into the financing agreement.
226. To summarize this chapter: the fact that the proceeding is financed by a private investment fund does not dismiss the application for approval in limine, in the circumstances of our case. As to the discovery of the agreement, it would have been better if the Applicant and her counsel had notified the existence of the financing agreement in advance, but in view of the ambiguity that prevailed at the time regarding the law applicable to this issue, I do not believe that this is a matter of bad faith at the level that justifies preventing the approval of the application.

The Applicant's Suitability to Serve as a Class Prosecutor

227. As revealed in the proceeding, in recent years the Israeli Consumer Council has suffered from managerial instability. The witness on behalf of the Applicant confirmed that in recent years a number of senior officials have been replaced in short periods. Thus, the position of CEO of the Consumer Council has been transferred from a significant number of people: Josh Goldschmidt served as CEO for only one year (p. 46 of the minutes). Subsequently, Mr. Ofer Marom served as Acting CEO for the period between March 2019 and August 2020. (p. 46 of the minutes). Adv. Ofer Feinstein served as CEO from April 1, 2022 until the end of June 2023 (p. 62 of the minutes), since July 2023 there has been no CEO of the Consumer Council (p. 163 of the minutes). Adv. Sharon Meir served as the acting CEO of the Council until she ended her position in August 2024 (p. 165 of the minutes). Since August 2024, there has been no CEO and no Acting Director General (as of the date of the witness's interrogation, October 8, 2024).
228. It is not only CEOs who have changed frequently in recent years. According to the witness, the position of legal advisor to the council has also not been filled permanently in recent years. Adv. Mizrahi served as acting legal advisor to the council in 2019, but resigned after only two months (p. 61 of the minutes). Adv. Sharon Meir served as the legal advisor to the council until she was appointed acting director-general, and since January 2024, Adv. Yael Cohen Shawat has served as acting legal advisor to the council, in addition to her regular role as director of enforcement and strategy (p. 41, p. 62 of the minutes).
229. Moreover, in July 2023, with the resignation of the CEO, Adv. Ofer Feinstein, a number of other senior members of the council resigned: the council's spokesperson, the director of public inquiries, the director of external relations, and the council's financial manager (p. 163 of the minutes). According to the witness, this mass resignation stemmed from the fact that in June 2023, the quorum of the board of directors was completed and the process of dismissing CEO Feinstein began, with a day or two before the date of the hearing, the CEO submitted a resignation notice together with those other senior officials (p. 163 of the minutes).
230. The witness was asked about the manpower and decision-making capacity in the council and answered as follows (pp. 164-165 of the transcript):

"S.C.H., Madam, who today has the ability to make decisions in the council?

1. So that's how I don't make decisions on my own, every decision, for example, whether to compromise, some kind of compromise and so on, I bring it to the board of directors, I don't want to, I'm just acting legal advisor. Okay, I don't make managerial decisions.

S.K.H. Is there anyone else besides you who brings decisions to the board of directors?

1. No"

And later on.