Caselaw

Family Case (Ashed) 37081-08-24 M.M.G. v. B.M. z”l - part 3

November 5, 2026
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However, in 2023, a dispute arose between the daughter and the common-law spouse, which led to the legal proceeding before me.  The common-law spouse commented to the daughter regarding the clinic's working days, which led to a highly charged argument between her and the daughter, which escalated into a harsh exchange on the part of the daughter towards the common-law partner, to the point that the latter forbade the daughter from coming to visit the father at home, even though the daughter sent a letter of apology for her remarks.  This dispute was the motive for drafting a prenuptial agreement between the father and the common-law spouse in 2024 (testimony of the common-law spouse, pp.  47,19-21).  Following the prenuptial agreement, which stipulated that at the time of the rupture between the father and the common-law spouse, the latter would be entitled to half of the company's shares - the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in this case.

  1. It is not superfluous to note that the evidence presented shows that before and after the filing of the lawsuit, the father made efforts to reach agreements with the daughter, when he examined the possibility of acquiring the (alleged) half of the common-law rights in the property, and legally regulating the relationship with the daughter, as appears from transcripts of conversations held between the father and the daughter in August 2024 (P/3 of the plaintiffs' exhibits). The father even contacted the realtor who assisted him in the transaction to purchase the property, and asked him to assess the value of the property today (testimony of the realtor, minutes of the hearing of February 15,2026, p. 52, paras.  36-39).  Unfortunately, these efforts did not bear fruit.
  2. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that it would be just and proper to end the proceeding by way of a compromise, whether by referring the parties to mediation or by means of a compromise outline proposed by the court, at various stages of the proceeding, in the spirit of the attempts that preceded the legal proceeding. Needless to say, the plaintiffs consistently expressed a willingness to compromise, but the defendants did not agree to seek mediation and/or a settlement of any kind.  Taking into account the father's own attempts to formulate an agreement shortly before the start of the legal proceedings, the defendants' objection to trying to negotiate for the purpose of formulating a compromise does not fade.  It is difficult to get rid of the impression that the fact that the father did not appear (with permission) for most of the court hearings (due to his complex personal situation) constituted a real obstacle to advancing a compromise between the parties.  In any event, in these circumstances, there is therefore no alternative to deciding the claim on the merits of the matter.
  3. After examining the arguments of the parties and their appendices, and hearing the evidence, I have reached the conclusion that the claim should be accepted in part. I am not persuaded that the obligatory rights in the real estate property were granted to the daughter as a gift in 2004, by virtue of the establishment of the clinic on the property and the use of the property by the plaintiffs over the years, when the plaintiffs were unable to bear the burden of proving that the property was granted to them as a complete gift that was completed only by the very operation of the clinic from the property, and/or that this was the father's intention at the time of the purchase of the rights in the property in 2004.  The same applies to the equipment used by the clinic, and to the vehicles owned by the company, I did not find that the plaintiffs' mere use of them for the purpose of operating the clinic was sufficient to determine that they were given by the father as a completed gift.  On the other hand, as to the claim regarding the right of irrevocable use of the property, I found that it was proven that the father, through the company, granted the daughter the right of irrevocable use of the property, and in view of the principle of good faith and considerations of justice, it should be determined that the company is entitled to revoke the permission subject to the plaintiffs' compensation, which will be determined after the main arguments are submitted on behalf of the parties in the matter. 
    • 2. The Questions Needed to Decide
  4. Throughout the entire proceeding, the parties argued with some confusion and ambiguity regarding the legal content of the term "veterinary clinic" and the rights of any of the parties therein. Therefore, before I turn to define the questions in dispute, I have found it necessary to clarify the content of the term "veterinary clinic" or "clinic" while clarifying the legal distinction between the various aspects included in the term "veterinary clinic" that is the subject of the dispute.  One aspect relates to the real estate property in which the clinic operates, which is the property as defined above, which is at the heart of the dispute in the present proceeding.  According to the plaintiffs, the obligatory rights in the property were granted to the daughter as a gift by the father, through the company he owns.  The second aspect inherent in the term "veterinary clinic" relates to the equipment and contents of the clinic, including the animal care beds, equipment used by the plaintiffs in their work (for example, an ultrasound device for animals), medications in the clinic and other medical equipment.  This equipment was purchased by the company, and according to the plaintiffs, was given to them as a complete gift by the father, through the company, at the time it was purchased.  A third aspect concerns the business platform used to operate the clinic and to manage its income and expenses, including the customer portfolio and reputation.  As stated above, there is no dispute that from the date of the clinic's establishment, in 2004, the father and daughter agreed that the veterinary clinic would be operated by the company.  Similarly, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs are entitled to terminate the management of the clinic through the company.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs abandoned the declaratory relief requested in this matter (the minutes of the hearing of December 22,2025 and the court's decision from that date).  It is not superfluous to note that the defendants admitted that the reputation of the clinic belongs to the plaintiffs, and that they can continue the clinic's activity elsewhere (transcript of the hearing of January 15,2025, p. 3, para.  18).  In these circumstances, I am not required to rule on the question of the plaintiffs' formal and/or substantive status in the company, even though the parties unnecessarily expanded on this issue.
  5. If so, the main dispute in the present proceeding involves the question of whether the rights to the property and the equipment used by the clinic were granted to the plaintiffs as a gift by the father, through the company. Another question that must be discussed is whether it has been proven that the plaintiffs were granted a license to use the property permanently and without consideration.  Below I will discuss these questions in their order. 
    • 3. Were the obligatory rights in the property and the equipment in the clinic given to the daughter as a completed gift?
  6. According to Section 1(a) of the Gift Law, "a gift is the acquisition of an asset without consideration" where the "gift thing" can be real estate, movables, and/or rights (section 1(b) of the Gift Law). As is well known, in a gift contract, as in any contract, it is required that there be a meeting of wills between the giver of the gift and the recipient of the gift - the gift is perfected when the two elements necessary for the existence of a contract are met, i.e., finality and certain (Civil Appeal 495/80 Berkowitz v. Klimer, 36(4) 057 (1982)).  Although the opinion of the parties is examined both in relation to the recipient of the gift and in relation to the giver of the gift, the examination of the intentions of the giver of the gift is more rigorous, because the recipient of the gift does not give in return, and his interest in reliance is less than the need to protect the free and conscious will of the giver.  In accordance with the law, the examination of the intentions of the parties is an external objective examination, which studies the entirety of the circumstances, including the content of the document, the conduct of the parties and their words before and after the conclusion of the agreement (Civil Appeal 3354/18 Anonymous v. Anonymous (published in the Databases, March 23,2020); Civil Appeal 3601/96 in Barashi v. Estate of the late Barashi, 52(2) 582 (1998)).
  7. In order for the gift to end, in addition to the meeting of the wishes between the parties, it is also necessary to give the gift to the recipient. Thus, according to section 2 of the Gift Law, the gift transaction ends with the gift being given from the giver of the gift to the recipient of the gift, with an agreement between them that the gift is given as a gift.  The methods of giving are set out in section 6 of the Gift Law, according to which "ownership of the gift passes to the recipient upon the delivery of the thing to him, or by the delivery of a document to him that entitles him to receive it, and if the matter was in the possession of the recipient, in the notice of the giver to the recipient of the gift; and all this when there are no special provisions in any other law in this regard." The Gift Law therefore prescribes three ways to create a finished gift: (1) the delivery of the property; (2) the delivery of a document entitles the recipient to receive the property; (3) a notice from the giver of the gift to the recipient where the gift is in the possession of the recipient.  However, where the law prescribes special methods of purchase, the gift will be completed when the relevant specific law is met.  Thus, for example, with regard to the acquisition of a real estate property, the specific law set forth in section 7 of the Real Estate Law, 5729-1969, applies, according to which a real estate transaction requires registration.  Accordingly, where the 'gift thing' is a right in real estate, and the registration in the name of the recipient has not yet been completed, a gift agreement will be considered an "undertaking to give a gift", which is conditional on writing in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the Gift Law.
  8. Further to the aforesaid, and in the context of the dispute that is the subject of the proceeding before me, it will be further stated that in case law the distinction between an obligatory right in a real estate asset and a right in real estate is recognized. Other Municipal Applications 1284/92 Rotem v. Rotem, 49(5) 257 (1996) It was held that the characterization of the right in accordance with one of these two categories has an impact on the classification of the transaction - that is, if we are dealing with obligatory rights in a real estate asset, then it is sufficient to grant the rights to the recipient of the gift, in accordance with one of the ways set forth in section 6 of the Gift Law, in order to determine that the gift has been completed.  On the other hand, if we are dealing with the transfer of a right in real estate, then, as long as the registration is not completed, the agreement will be classified as an undertaking to give a gift.  It is not superfluous to note that in a later case law it was determined that it is not sufficient to classify the right as a right in real estate or as an obligatory right in relation to the land, and it is necessary to examine the intention of the parties - that is, whether there was an intention to assign the obligatory rights in the possession of the holder of the right immediately, in which case the gift is obligatory rights in relation to the land, and it is a gift that has been completed; or whether the owner of the right intended to undertake to grant the right in his possession at a later date, In that case, we are dealing with an undertaking to give a gift (Civil Appeal 2643/97 Ganz v. British and Colonial Company Ltd., IsrSC 57(2) 385 (2003); Civil Appeal 6439/99 Tefahot Israel Mortgage Bank Ltd.   Perach, IsrSC 58(2) 106,118 (2003); Civil Appeal 4593/09 Sa'id v. the heirs of the late Sa'id (published in the databases, November 15,2011); Civil Appeal 879/14 Nachshon v. Nachshon (published in the databases, May 5,2016)).  In accordance with the normative framework established above, I will examine the plaintiffs' arguments that the obligatory rights in the property from which the clinic operates and that the equipment used by the clinic were given as a gift to the plaintiffs by the father, through the company.
  9. The rights in the property - There is no dispute between the parties that in 2004 the company purchased the obligatory rights in the property from which the clinic operates, in accordance with the purchase agreement (P/2 of the plaintiffs' exhibits). According to the aforementioned purchase agreement, the company signed a lease contract with the Israel Lands Administration (now the Israel Land Authority), when it was declared in the agreement that capitalized lease fees had been paid until March 21,2042 (clause 3.2 of the purchase agreement).  It should be noted that, although according to the purchase agreement, the contractual rights in the property were supposed to be registered with the ILA in the name of the company, the plaintiffs did not present an up-to-date certificate of rights from the Israel Land Authority, and made do with submitting an updated registration document from the Land Registry Office for the month of February 2025, which indicates, as aforesaid, that the land in question is owned by the State of Israel.
  10. As stated above, in the amended statement of claim, the plaintiffs abandoned their claim as it appeared in the original statement of claim, according to which we are dealing with an undertaking to give a gift of real estate, and claimed that the obligatory rights that the father acquired (through the company) in the property in 2004 were granted to the daughter as a complete gift, while the gift was completed by the fact that possession of the property was handed over to the daughter in 2004, for the purpose of operating the clinic. The defendants, on the other hand, consistently argued that this was not a completed gift and/or an undertaking to give a gift, since all that was given to the plaintiffs was a place of work in favorable and better conditions than usual, due to the family relationship between the father and the daughter and the father's desire to provide the daughter with a permanent and stable place of work.  Although I am unable to accept the defendants' argument that the entire relationship between the parties is summarized in the "employee-employer" relationship, and I am of the opinion that this is a simplistic and even bad faith presentation of the agreements that were formulated between the parties and according to which they were conducted, I have not found that the plaintiffs have been able to prove their claim that the rights in the property were indeed granted to them as early as 2004.  Therefore, the plaintiffs' argument in this matter should be rejected.  I will explain my reasons for this determination below.
  11. The father's lack of discretion - the daughter was unable to prove that the father had decided to grant her the rights he had acquired in the property, through the company, in 2004. The father did confirm in his testimony that he had bought the clinic for the daughter, saying, "I bought it for her so that she would have a normal place of work" (the father's testimony, February 15,2026, p. 64, lines 8-18).  And later on, "I said unequivocally that I purchased the clinic so that M. could make a living from it, " and yes, "I bought the clinic in order to give it a certain livelihood" (Father's Testimony, Pro.  of February 15,2026, p. 96, line 34 to p. 97, lines 10,25).
  12. 00The father's statements are consistent with the testimony of the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs - the father's sister, the daughter's aunt, confirmed in her testimony that the father was very proud of the daughter, and that upon completing her studies he decided that he wanted to open a clinic for the daughter, when she (the aunt) helped the father choose the location of the clinic in City A, and in her words, "I don't know that he didn't prescribe, he said he was buying M. the clinic. You don't understand what pride B. had.   was an insurance agent, he was later...  He didn't have any personal successes of his, his success was all the time with M., my daughter is a veterinarian, my daughter I bought her a clinic, my daughter...  You don't understand what a pride it was for him because this is his adopted daughter with his second daughter, he ate shit all his life, and M. was the one who saved me, she would have admired the person, not only her, but all of us.  (Testimony of the father's sister (p.  60, lines 1-8.  See also on p. 61, lines 34-36; p. 57, paras.  29-35).  Similar statements were made by the daughter's close friend, and the insurance agent, the son of the father's partner, who were present at the opening ceremony of the clinic.
  13. However, taking into account the conduct of the parties during the 20 years that passed from the date of the opening of the clinic until the outbreak of the dispute, I do not believe that the father's declarations on the festive occasion of the opening of the clinic are sufficient to prove his intention to grant the daughter the rights in the property as a gift that has been completed, on the contrary, while throughout the years the father has retained in his hands, at least legally, the rights in the property.
  14. Thus, the purchase of the rights in the property by the company in the first place indicates that the father intended in 2004 to retain control of the rights purchased in the property by the company he owns. It was not claimed, and in any case it was not proven, that there was any impediment to the daughter's direct engagement in the purchase agreement directly with the seller of the rights, with the assistance of the father for the purpose of financing the purchase.  This fact testifies, in my opinion, to the father's intention in real time, not to grant the rights in the property as a complete gift to the daughter.  This conclusion is strengthened in light of the daughter's own words in her testimony, which testified in her own words that the father "is not a person who is in a hurry to do things.  Especially not to give" (testimony of the daughter, p. 21, para.  12).  Moreover, it was proven that the father's initial intention was to rent a property for the purpose of establishing the clinic, but only after it became clear that the owner of the property did not agree that the property should be renovated - the father purchased the rights to the property through the company, as confirmed by the daughter in her testimony (testimony of the father, p. 83, paras.  3-8; testimony of the daughter, pp.  30, s. 30).  I am of the opinion that the fact that the rights in the property were purchased in the first place by the company and not by the daughter (by financing the transaction from the father's sources); the words of the daughter herself, who testified about the father as a person who was in no hurry to give; as well as the father's initial intention not to buy the property but only to rent it - testify to the father's intention not to grant the daughter the rights in the property as a gift at the time of their purchase.
  15. As to the sources of financing for the property, the daughter claimed, on the basis of the father's declarations in the 2021 will (in particular, sections 25-26 of the 2021 will), that the sources of financing for the property were from the sale of a joint penthouse for the late father and mother. However, it was not claimed, and in any case it was not proven, that these were indeed funds that the daughter had any right to receive.  It should be noted that the father responded in his cross-examination on the issue of the sources of financing in a confused and inconsistent manner, when he claimed, on the one hand, that the property was purchased from funds that he had in his possession in the company (the father's testimony, p. 77, paras.  15-19; p. 78, s. 15), and on the other hand, he claimed that he had taken out a mortgage for the purpose of purchasing the property; asked his lawyer about the matter during the interrogation; and even asked to go out - during his testimony - to ask the common-law spouse whether he had taken out a mortgage for the purpose of purchasing the property, or not (the father's testimony, p. 79, para.  22).  In these circumstances, even if I assume that the property was purchased from funds that were owned by the father, which are not shared by him and the common-law spouse, I do not believe that this proves the father's intention to give the daughter the property as a gift, in particular, as stated, it has not been proven that the daughter had any right to the father's money.
  16. Moreover; The failure to register the rights in the daughter's name in the years that have passed since the purchase agreement was drawn up strengthens the conclusion that the father did not intend to give the daughter the obligatory rights in the property as a gift at the time of their purchase. It would have been expected that if the father had intended to grant the daughter the obligatory rights in the property as a gift, he would have acted to register the rights with the ILA in a different appeal from the daughter, including by sending a notice to the seller of the assignment of the rights (according to section 10 of the purchase agreement).  The fact that the father did not act in one of the aforementioned ways strengthens the conclusion that he had no intention of gifting the rights in the property to the daughter at the time of their purchase, in 2004.
  17. The 2021 will, in which the father bequeathed the company's shares to the daughter, as well as the videotaped conversation between the father and the daughter in 2023 - in which the father confirmed his intentions to transfer the company's shares to the daughter only after his longevity - reinforce the conclusion that the father did not intend to grant the daughter the rights in the property at the time of their purchase. The father explicitly stated in the 2023 videotaped conversation, which was documented by the daughter, that he made an orderly will, in which he divided his assets into two parts - the company he bequeathed to the daughter, while the additional capital he owned was divided between the common-law spouse and his additional daughter and her children.  The father revealed his opinion in that conversation that this was his will, and that the will was drawn up after in-depth thought, and according to him, by a "very serious lawyer" (pp.  50-52 of the plaintiffs' exhibits).  The very fact that the father included the property in his will (through the company that owns the rights in it) and considered it to be an asset that belonged to him, which was included in the scope of his assets that would be granted to the daughter only after her longevity and years, and did not mention that it was an asset that was purchased and belonged to the daughter from the time it was purchased, negates, shares, and her, the daughter's claim regarding the granting of the rights in the property back in 2004.
  18. In the pre-trial hearing held on January 15,2025, the father was asked by the court whether he had given the property as a gift to the daughter, and in response, he stated the following:

"I'm in court, I'm here in a completely stupid act.  She claims that I gave her a gift.  I never told her that I was giving it to her as a gift, I never said that.  We had an argument, she came up with the idea that we might transfer the property to her, and I considered it.  We talked, and it was all in my hands.  Maybe not, but very quickly the penny dropped and I said to myself, for some good reasons not to make the deal in any way, as long as I'm alive.  I make a living from it, I don't have a livelihood today.  My investment house hasn't been functioning for two years.  I'm trying to pick it up now, that's my income now from the clinic.  If I give it to her alive, why shouldn't I give it to the second daughter alive? The second daughter is in an inferior state than the plaintiff.  It's out of the question, because I made a will.  After my death, I divide the property, I have no problem with that.  As long as I'm alive, it's out of the question" (transcript of the hearing of January 15,2025, p. 4, paras.  6-15).

  1. Later in his remarks, the father confirmed that he had told the daughter that "one day" the property would be hers, but added that as long as he was alive, he did not intend to divide the property, because it was his source of income (transcript of the hearing of January 15,2025, p. 4, lines 24-25). Moreover, from the father's words, it appears that the daughter's request to him to transfer the rights in the property to her was made shortly before the lawsuit was filed, and he refused to do so - and this too strengthens the assertion that the rights were not granted to the daughter from the time they were purchased.
  2. This version of the father is consistent with the transcripts of the conversation submitted by the plaintiffs, which took place in 2023 and 2024, after a dispute arose between the daughter and the common-law spouse. The recordings of the aforementioned conversations show that the father told the daughter that he was trying to purchase the common-law partner's share in the property, so that in the future, after his long life, the father would be able to transfer to the daughter the full rights in the property.  Thus, the father told the daughter in a conversation that took place between them on August 18,2024, that "even when I buy the property, I do not transfer it to you.  Only when I die does it pass to you.  You will have an orderly agreement.  You will have an orderly agreement and a will that when I die, everything goes to you" (P/3 of the plaintiffs' exhibits, p. 30, s. 32.  Emphases added, H.A.G.).
  3. It is not superfluous to note that in that conversation the daughter told the father that he had promised her the rights to the property, saying, "Everything is mine. This is what you promised..  You promised me the clinic" (P/3 of the plaintiffs' exhibits, p. 27, p. 32, emphases added, H.A.G.).  The daughter's choice of words, which expresses a future expectation (promise) of a certain action, indicates that the daughter knew that the gift was not actually given to her, contrary to her claim in the proceedingthat preceded it.  It should be noted that it is puzzling to me that the daughter's claim that she was not aware over the years of the manner in which the rights in the property were registered (paragraph 12 of the summaries).  As stated, the daughter managed the clinic through the company all these years, and she never directly bore any obligations, including municipal taxes and/or taxes, in connection with the property.  It is also clear that the daughter knew that she did not sign the rights purchase agreement at all, and even for this reason her claim appears to be naïve.  In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the daughter's claim in her testimony that she did not know all these years about the registered status of the property.
  4. In this context, I found it necessary to add that, indeed, as the defendants claimed, there is a difficulty in the contradictory factual arguments raised by the plaintiffs in the original statement of claim, in which it was claimed that the father undertook to give the daughter the rights in the property as a gift, as opposed to the amended statement of claim, in which it was claimed that the obligatory rights in the property were given as a completed gift to the daughter. The plaintiffs argued that the change stemmed from the fact that they did not know the facts at the time the original claim was filed, since they did not have the purchase agreement, and it was attached only to the statement of defense.  However, I did not find that this explanation was sufficient to resolve the contradiction between the factual claims as detailed above.  It is not clear why the purchase agreement was intended to substantially change the factual claims that were raised, in such a way that the plaintiffs changed the factual basis underlying the claim, from an argument of an undertaking to give a gift, to a claim of a completed gift.  I am of the opinion that this is consistent with the assertion that the father intended to grant the daughter the rights in the property (through the company) only after his long life, and that this was the authentic agreement between the parties, as was also known to the plaintiffs themselves.  The aforesaid was therefore also supported by the daughter's own statements in a conversation with the father in August 2024, shortly after the filing of the claim, as detailed above.
  5. In summary, it has not been proven that the father's intention was to grant the daughter the obligatory rights in the property as a gift at the time of their purchase in 2004, as emerges from the various indications detailed above, the opposite is true, since it has been proven that the father's intention and desire was to grant the daughter the rights in the property only after his longevity and years, in the framework of his will. It also emerges that the daughter knew that this was the father's promise to her, in a manner that is inconsistent with her claim that it was a completed gift.  In circumstances in which it was not proven that the father's intention to give the obligatory rights in the property as a gift to the daughter was not proven, it is not possible to determine that the gift contract between the parties was perfected. 
  6. Although the aforesaid was sufficient to reject the daughter's claim that the obligatory rights in the property were granted to her as a gift, and for the sake of the entirety of the hearing, I will address the plaintiffs' claim that the obligatory rights in the property were granted as a complete gift that was completed in the hands of the plaintiffs, by the very handing over of possession of the property to them for the purpose of operating the clinic. As is stated in the chapter on the presentation of the normative framework above, the methods of granting are set forth in section 6 of the Gift Law.  In our case, there is no dispute that the 'gift thing' is obligatory rights in relation to real estate, but I have not found that the mere use made by the plaintiffs of the property for the purpose of operating the veterinary clinic is sufficient to determine that the obligatory rights in the property were granted as a complete gift to the daughter.
  7. First, if the rights were indeed granted to the daughter as a gift by way of assignment of rights, then according to clause 10 of the purchase agreement, the company should have notified the transfer of the rights to the seller, and the daughter should have signed a document according to which she accepts all of the company's obligations under the sale agreement. Similarly, the daughter was required to be registered as the owner of the rights with the ILA.  However, the fact that no actual transfer of the obligatory rights in the property was made, and in any case no report, notice, or request to assign the rights from the company to the daughter weakens the plaintiffs' claim that the obligatory rights in the property were granted to the daughter as a complete gift.  On the contrary, when the permission of the obligatory rights in the name of the company over the years attests to the fact that the father has maintained control of the property in his hands, through the company, as he wished and intended from the outset.
  8. Needless to say, in all the judgments to which the plaintiffs referred, some written document was prepared that may attest to the transfer of the obligatory rights to the recipient of the gift: Other Municipality Applications 1284/92 Aryeh Rotem v. Menachem Rotem, 49(5) 257 (1996) Betterment Tax Reports were submitted by the owner of the right; Other Municipality Applications 6439/99 "Tefahot" Israel Mortgage Bank Ltd. Farah, IsrSC 58(2) 106,118 (2003) A written gift agreement was drafted; Other Municipality Applications 4593/09 Majid Yosef Said v. Heirs of the late Ayoub Muhanna Said z" l (published in the databases, November 15,2011) The deceased prepared gift affidavits (and in any case, it was determined that in the circumstances of the case it was an undertaking to give a gift); Other Municipality Applications 879/14 Amos Nachshon v. Yehuda Nachshon (published in the databases, 05.05.2016) An agreement was drawn up with respect to rights in the land whose registration was not completed.  However, in the circumstances of the aforementioned case, no affidavits of gift were prepared; the seller was not informed of the assignment of rights; no application was made to the Israel Lands Authority for the purpose of registering the rights in the daughter's name; and no written document was prepared attesting to the acquisition of the rights in the property as claimed by the daughter.
  9. Second, the mere use made by the plaintiffs of the property for the purpose of operating the clinic is not sufficient to determine that possession of the property was given to them absolutely, in a manner that expresses the granting of a completed gift. There is no dispute that over the years the company bore all the expenses involved in its ownership of the obligatory rights in the property (to the extent that they existed), including the payment of expenses and taxes.  This is in a manner that strengthens the determination that the father intended to retain control of the property in his hands, through the company he owns.  The daughter's argument that the company's expenses in connection with the holding of the property were paid from the clinic's income, which are the result of the plaintiffs' work in the clinic.  However, as stated above, I am of the opinion that the plaintiffs also enjoyed the advantages of managing the clinic through the company, rather than its direct management by them as independent business owners.  Therefore, the fact that the plaintiffs made use of the property for the purpose of operating the clinic does not in itself attest to the granting of the obligatory rights therein as a complete gift to the plaintiffs.
  10. Third, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs made use of the property for the purpose of operating the clinic from the time possession of the property was received, and that for this purpose the property was purchased in the first place. In other words, this is not a change that occurred after the purchase of the rights, and it was clear and agreed that the property would be used to operate the clinic by the daughter from the time it was purchased.  Granting such a right of use does not mean granting the rights in the property as a gift, and I am not persuaded that this was the case before me.
  11. Thus, it has not been proven that the obligatory rights in the property were granted to the daughter in one of the ways of acquisition prescribed in the Gift for the Creation of a Finished Gift Law: (1) The property was indeed used for the purpose of operating the clinic, but in practice the rights in it were not "delivered" to the daughter and remained under the control of the company; (2) The daughter did not receive a document entitleing her to receive the rights, other than the 2021 will, which there is no dispute that the father was entitled to change at any time; (3) The father did not inform the daughter that he was granting her the rights to the property, and his declarations at the time of the opening of the clinic are not sufficient, taking into account the additional evidence presented and the daughter's own statement that this was a future promise. In any event, as stated, the use of the property for the purpose of operating the clinic is not sufficient to determine that the obligatory rights in the property are in the possession of the daughter.  In the absence of the father's discretion regarding the granting of the rights as a gift, and since it is not possible to determine that the gift was given to the daughter in the completed purchase - I found it necessary to reject the plaintiffs' claim that the obligatory rights in the property were granted to the daughter as a gift completed by the father. 
  12. The equipment in the clinic - as to the equipment currently in the clinic and the vehicles used by the plaintiffs, in respect of which the plaintiffs also claimed that it was a gift that was completed by the very delivery of possession of the vehicles and movables for the use and operation of the clinic - this claim is also not acceptable to me.

First, the force of the evidence presented above - which testifies to the fact that the father's intention to grant the daughter the rights in the property to the daughter as a complete gift - is also valid with regard to the equipment used by the clinic.  The equipment was purchased over the years by the company for the purpose of operating the clinic, as part of the business platform for managing the clinic, which was agreed upon between the parties.  In circumstances where, even according to the plaintiffs, the equipment was purchased from the clinic's income as a result of the plaintiffs' occupation as veterinarians, it is difficult to accept the plaintiffs' claim that the father intended to purchase the equipment in the clinic to the daughter and give it to her as a gift that was completed during his lifetime.  This determination is consistent with the 2021 will, in which the father explicitly wrote that he bequeathed to the daughter the company's shares, as well as the company's bank account, the rights to the property, and all the movables and equipment in the clinic (section 6.1 of the 2021 will).  It should be noted that although the equipment is owned by the company, so that on the face of it, the father could not bequeath it to the daughter in the framework of the 2021 will, what is stated in the will constitutes a statement of opinion regarding the father's desire to grant the daughter the property and all its contents only after his long life and years, and not immediately, as the daughter claims.

  1. It is not superfluous to note that there is a certain difficulty in the daughter's claim that the equipment was given to her as a gift by the father (through the company), and her version that in practice all the expenses of the clinic, including the equipment, were purchased and paid from the clinic's income as a result of the plaintiffs' occupation. These arguments are not mutually exclusive, since the meaning of giving a gift is the granting of the property (and in our case, the equipment) without consideration, whereas the daughter's claim appears as if she was the one who purchased the equipment (through the company).
  2. Second, the plaintiffs did not specify in the pleadings what equipment was given to them, according to them, as a gift, by the father through the company, and the lack of detail should be attributed to their obligation. Thus, for example, the plaintiffs did not specify exactly what movables were given to them as a gift; whether they were connected to the property or not; when each item was purchased and when it was given to the plaintiffs as a gift (according to them); what vehicles were given to them as a gift.  In the absence of detail, it is not possible to determine that there is a certain element that constitutes a necessary element for the existence of any contract, including a gift contract.
  3. In view of the aforesaid, I found that the daughter was not able to prove that the foundations of conclusiveness and specificity were met for the purpose of formulating the conclusion that the equipment was given to the daughter as a gift by the father through the company, when it emerges from the totality of the evidence that the father did not intend to give the equipment to the daughter during his lifetime, and in any event, the plaintiffs did not present a specific sufficient detail of the movables given to them as a gift, according to their claim. In circumstances in which it was found that it was not proven that the obligatory rights in the property and/or the movables were granted as a completed gift to the daughter, I am not required to accept the daughter's claim regarding the "lifting of the veil" between the father and the company, in accordance with the provision of section 6(b) of the Companies Law, 5759-1999.
  4. In the margins of this chapter, while the parties elaborated on the pleadings, testimonies, and summaries regarding the circumstances of the preparation of the prenuptial agreement between the father and the common-law spouse (who was also a party to the proceeding until it was deleted at the beginning of the evidence hearing stage), and even though these are not necessary for the purpose of deciding the claim before me, I found it necessary to comment, with the necessary caution, that on the face of it, question marks arise as to the circumstances of the drafting of the prenuptial agreement, and there is concern about a relationship of dependency.

Thus, it is not clear what caused the father to agree in 2024, after many years of marriage, to draw up a prenuptial agreement, which stipulates sharing of all his assets, despite his explicit declarations in the 2021 will that he and the common-law spouse lived in a complete separation of property between them, as follows: "I would like to clarify hereby that despite the fact that there is no prenuptial agreement between me and V. during the years in which we were a couple, each of us managed his property separately and without any partnership between us" (paragraph 25 of the 2021 will - P/4 of the plaintiffs' exhibits);

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