Caselaw

Family Case (Ashed) 37081-08-24 M.M.G. v. B.M. z”l - part 4

November 5, 2026
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In addition, the woman's counsel was present at the confirmation hearing, but not the man's counsel (as appears from the minutes of the agreement approval hearing - P/6 of the plaintiffs' exhibits).  In this context, the daughter claimed that the father consulted with the lawyer of the investment company he owns and not with a lawyer specializing in family law.  In the first pre-trial hearing, when the court asked the father, the father replied that the woman's lawyer had drawn up the agreement, and that he had let his lawyer read it, and that he had been told that "according to the law" the common-law spouse was entitled to 50%, and in his words, "In any case, she would have deserved 50%, it was not what I wanted to give her or not" (the father's remarks in the minutes of the hearing of January 15,2025, p. 5, paras.  1-11);

In a conversation that took place between the father and the daughter after the filing of the lawsuit, the father told the daughter, "I had no choice." Therefore, I am buying back" (P/3, p. 32, emphasis added.  H.A.G.), when I got the impression that the common-law spouse had casually denied in her testimony the plaintiffs' claim that the prenuptial agreement was drawn up under an ultimatum, even though she admitted that the agreement was drawn up because "Mrs. M. [the daughter] began to harass" her (testimony of the common-law spouse, p. 47, para.  19).  This, in a manner that ostensibly raises questions regarding the father's freedom of will in drafting the prenuptial agreement.  It should be noted that since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the father's personal and medical condition has deteriorated, and according to him, only the common-law spouse actually treated him (the father's remarks in the minutes of the hearing of January 15,2025, p. 5, paras.  4-5) in a manner that may attest to a relationship of dependence;

It is not superfluous to note that in the father's cross-examination it was evident that the father was physically and perhaps even mentally weak, when he answered the questions in a confused and incoherent manner, while often mentioning the common-law spouse, and even asking, during the testimony, to stand up and ask her what the answer is in relation to some of the questions he was asked (see, for example, the father's testimony, pp.  79-80, paras.  34-39; p. 81, paras.  25-36).  Although there is no dispute as to the father's cognitive competence, the aforesaid raises questions regarding the circumstances of drafting the prenuptial agreement against the background of the father's weakening and the dependence that may have been created on the common-law partner.

  • 4. A license to permanently use the property and equipment for the purpose of operating the clinic
  1. With the rejection of the declaratory relief regarding the granting of the rights to the property and the equipment as a gift, not Segi, since the plaintiffs' claim that the daughter was granted a license to use the property permanently should be addressed.

In this context, the plaintiffs claimed that the father granted the daughter, through the company, an irrevocable license to use the property, while in the original statement of claim it was claimed that it was a license to use the property until the completion of the undertaking to grant the gift, while in the amended statement of claim it was claimed that it was a license to use the property permanently and without consideration, until the registration of the obligatory rights in the property in the daughter's name was completed.  On the other hand, the defendants reiterated their claim that all the plaintiffs in general, and the daughter in particular, received was a place of work under favorable conditions, when, according to them, the claim of an irrevocable use license, which is granted in exceptional and exceptional cases, was not proven at all.  Indeed, as the defendants claimed, the remedy regarding a use license was requested as a secondary remedy, accompanying the gift claim, when the plaintiffs focused on the gift claim.  However, and even though the claim that the rights were granted as a gift was rejected, I found that the remedy regarding a permanent non-revocable license is a remedy that stands on its own, and should be discussed as such, in order to do justice in the circumstances of the concrete case (see and compare: Civil Appeal 483/16 Yehudai v. Halamish (published in the databases, October 3,2017); Family Appeal (Tel Aviv) 73405-11-25 Anonymous v. Anonymous (published in the databases, August 24,2026)).

  1. A real estate license is a permit that a person obtains, holds, or uses from the owner of the property. It is a personal right, which is not conditional on an explicit agreement, and can be learned about it from the behavior of the landowner, which indicates his consent that someone else will use his property.  A distinction must be made between an authorization given in consideration, which can be revoked subject to the provisions of the General Contracts Law and the provisions of section 31 of the Rent and Loan Law, 5731-1971, and an authorization without consideration, which is granted, for the most part, for immediate revocation, upon the licensee's expression that he is not interested in continuing to grant the permission (Civil Appeal 304/72 Bialer v. Bialer, IsrSC 27(1) 553 (1973); Civil Appeal 517/70 Gross v. Club N.Z. Ltd.  et al.  IsrSC 26(1) 175 (1971); Civil Case (Be'er Sheva) 51484-03-21 Tnuva Cooperative Center for Marketing Agricultural Produce in Israel Ltd.   Maya Chemicals Ltd.  (published in the databases, February 15,2026)).
  2. A determination that a real estate license cannot be revoked, i.e., that it is a permanent irrevocable authorization, has serious implications, since it denies the rights holder of the rights to exercise his proprietary rights in the property. For this reason, case law recognized the existence of an irrevocable license in exceptional and rare cases, where the principles of justice and good faith require it, if it is proven that explicit consent was given by the landowner, and it is also proven that the circumstances created a logical and legitimate reliance that the permission was granted permanently (Civil Appeal 515/76 Yitzhak, Rachel and Ruth Levy v. Haim Weiman et al., 31(2) 127 (1977); Family Appeal (Center) 49135-04-26 M. v.  B.M. (published in the databases, June 9,2026)).
  3. The considerations that must be examined are, inter alia, the duration of the use of the land; the intention of the parties; the terms of the license; the expectation created by the licensee and the degree of his reliance on the license; investments made by the licensee in the property, their scope, and whether they were made in cooperation with the right holder (Civil Appeal Authority 4936/20 Estate of the late Muhammad Mahmoud Sumarin v. Himanuta Ltd. (published in the databases, April 3,2023); Civil Appeal 588/81 Aryeh Zizik v. Deborah Horowitz, M(1) 321 (1986)).  It should also be noted that in circumstances in which it is determined that there is an irrevocable right, the right also applies to a third party - a creditor, heir, or purchaser - to whom the rights in the property have been transferred, with the exception of a purchaser of real estate in consideration and in good faith, who did not know of the existence of the right of use, by virtue of the laws of proprietary estoppel and the principle of good faith (Civil Appeal 7139/99 Aloni v. Arad, IsrSC 58(4) 27,35 (2004)).
  4. After I have discussed the case law, I will move on to its application in the circumstances of the present case. In my opinion, and as explained below, against the background of the special characteristics of the family and business relationship that was created between the father and the daughter; and in light of the plaintiffs' reliance on the father's promises regarding the clinic, there is a solid basis to determine that the father granted the daughter a license to use the property permanently.  Below, I will explain the reasons for my decision.
  5. We are dealing with a property that was purchased in the first place for the purpose of operating the clinic by the daughter, and for this purpose only. The father reiterated in his testimony that he established the clinic for the daughter, so that she could make a decent living and operate a "real" clinic on the property, as he put it.  He testified as follows:

"I said that this clinic, it was on the day of the opening, there was a big celebration and in the midst of the celebration I was very happy that I had finally built a clinic for M., so I said that I bought the clinic for M. so that she could work and make a living there.  She would have an abnormal clinic to work in, why with Dr.  H. the conditions were horrible, horrible, it was not a clinic at all" (Testimony of the Father, p. 70, paras.  35-39).

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