Caselaw

Family Case (Ashed) 37081-08-24 M.M.G. v. B.M. z”l - part 5

November 5, 2026
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Later on, he said:

"I told M. that I bought you the clinic so that you could work there.  I bought you the clinic so that you could work in it like a human being.  Here there is a real veterinary practice, much bigger than with God, much bigger, much more beautiful, and here you can be a real veterinarian." (Testimony of the father, p. 72, paras.  6-9).

 

He also added:

"Certainly, she would like to do things properly, to have a normal clinic to work in, so she chose the furniture, she chose the medicines, she chose all the equipment that was, she chose and I paid" (Father's Testimony, p. 81, paras.  1-4).

  1. Further to the father's promise to establish a real clinic for the daughter, as he put it, the father purchased, through the company, the rights to the property, for the purpose of establishing the clinic, and for this purpose only. The father renovated the property, in accordance with the daughter's requests, as confirmed in his testimony (as appears from his words quoted above), and gave her the right and permission to use it for the purpose of operating the veterinary clinic from the date of the acquisition of the rights in the property, in 2004 onwards.  Even during periods when the clinic was loss-making, and at the very least, did not generate profits, it did not occur to the father to terminate the license to use the property that he had granted to the daughter, and/or to inform her that it was not profitable for him to operate the clinic from the property (through the company), and therefore he asked it to evict it.  The father testified in this matter that if the daughter had voluntarily resigned, he would have "brought someone else, " but he was unable to "fire" her (the father's testimony, p. 72, paras.  12-17).  In addition, in a conversation between the father and the daughter after the lawsuit was filed, the father told the daughter that the common-law spouse "wanted to close the clinic" (P/3 of the plaintiffs' exhibits, p. 28, para.  14), but this was not done, and the plaintiffs continued to operate the clinic from the property.  In practice, taking into account the relationship, the father's promises, and the parties' agreements, the father's statements regarding the promise he made to the daughter, and the fact that he did not act at any stage over the years and/or after the filing of the lawsuit to remove the plaintiffs from the property and close the clinic operated from the property - should be interpreted as a lack of ability - morally, morally, and legally - to revoke the personal permission that the father granted his daughter in 2004 to operate the clinic from the property, as long as the daughter wishes to do so.
  2. Relying on the permission to use the property, the plaintiffs established their veterinary clinic on the property, and they have been operating it from it since 2004, for more than 20 years, when significant reliance on the part of the plaintiffs was proven. First, even though the daughter did not grow up in city A, but rather in the central area, the plaintiffs built their lives as a couple and as a family in the city, due to the location of the property.  I was impressed by the authenticity of the daughter's testimony on this matter when she testified, "We did not find a place from A, we looked for a place, I entered the clinic, I worked for 20 years as my clinic, knowing full well that my clinic, I put my husband to work with me...  There is no more heart here than this" (Daughter's Testimony, p. 9, paras.  15-17).  Second, relying on the license to use the property, the plaintiffs invested all their time and energy in establishing and establishing the clinic and its reputation, while plaintiff 2 waived over the years business opportunities and job offers that were offered to him, knowing that the parties had the right to use the property for the purpose of operating the clinic they owned (plaintiff 2's testimony, at p. 49, paras.  34-39).  Thus, this is a significant reliance on the plaintiffs' non-exclusionary use license given to the daughter in the property for the purpose of operating the clinic.
  3. With regard to investments in the property, in the circumstances of the case, the father and daughter made investments and renovations in the property in accordance with the needs of the clinic, in cooperation and coordination between them, out of the clinic's income, which were received as a result of the plaintiffs' occupation as veterinarians. I am of the opinion that, in practice, this is a financial investment and an investment of additional resources (time, etc.) that the plaintiffs invested in the improvement of the property through their occupation as veterinarians, while relying on the fact that they will continue to use the property for the purpose of their activity as veterinarians.  In this context, there is no dispute that at the time of the purchase of the property, the father renovated it and adapted it to the needs of the clinic according to the daughter's requests, as the father himself testified (the father's testimony, p. 81).
  4. In addition, the daughter held the company's credit card for the purchase of the equipment needed for the business, although expenses over ILS 100,000 were made in coordination with the father, and signed by him. The daughter testified in this context that "the property itself that needs to be renovated B doesn't decide who renovates or doesn't renovate, I decide what needs to be done, I fix it, we pay for it through the company but that's all, OK.  We have everything related to advertising, we've already talked about advertising, we've talked about operating hours, we decide what the hours of operation are, which employee decides on his hours of operation? I decide when I work, what day I am on vacation, when I go on vacation, I don't inform anyone, I don't declare to anyone, and I will never declare because it's my business" (daughter's testimony, p. 22, paras.  16-23).  The aforesaid testifies to the intention of the parties and the free hand that the father gave to the daughter in managing the clinic from the property as part of the license to use it.
  5. Moreover, the father also benefited from the license that he granted to the daughter to use the property for the purpose of operating the clinic, when the evidence presented shows that, for at least the past two years, the father made a living from the clinic's revenues and relied substantially and exclusively on the monthly salaries he withdrew from the company from the revenues, and it is possible that he even made additional investments in favor of his income from the clinic's activities (the father's statements at the hearing of January 15,2025, p. 4, paras. 11-12; P/3 of the plaintiffs' exhibits, p. 29).  In this sense, the father's claim that the plaintiffs are only "employees" of the company, and that he did not dismiss them over the years only because of the family relationship, is contrary to the principle of good faith and the administration of justice.  And to be precise.  As stated, there is no dispute that there was no impediment to the plaintiffs moving their business and establishing a clinic elsewhere at any stage.  However, if the plaintiffs had indeed acted in this manner, the company would have had no income from the veterinary services, except for the possibility of renting the property and receiving rent, which, apparently, would have been infinitely lower than the clinic's income as a result of the plaintiffs' occupation.
  6. From the above grouping, it therefore emerges that this is an exceptional and exceptional case, in which the father gave explicit permission to the daughter to use the property for the purpose of operating the clinic, as long as she wished to do so, while against the background of the father's promise "that one day this clinic will be hers, I do not deny that I told her this, I meant that one day I would die, that the property would pass in her name. This is what I meant" (the father's words in the hearing of January 15,2025, p. 4, paras.  24-25).    In practice, the father did not act to revoke the permission granted to the daughter's irrevocable use of the property even after the outbreak of the dispute between the daughter and the common-law spouse, and/or after the daughter filed the lawsuit, and at no stage did he demand that she vacate the property, in a manner that supports the conclusion that this is an irrevocable use authority.
  7. Thus, the father's promise that the property would pass to the daughter upon his death is not sufficient to determine that the rights in the property were given to the daughter as a gift, and/or to determine that it is an enforceable undertaking (and in any event, the daughter abandoned her claim to the undertaking to give a gift). However, I am of the opinion that the father's promise, along with the granting of permission to the daughter to use the property for the purpose of operating the clinic for more than twenty years, even during periods when this was contrary to the economic interest of the father and/or the company; as well as the plaintiffs' significant and legitimate reliance on the permission given to use the property for the purpose of managing the clinic - are sufficient to substantiate the determination that by virtue of the principles of justice and good faith, the daughter was granted permission to use the property permanently.  The right of use that was granted also includes the right to use the veterinary equipment used to operate the clinic. 
  8. Where it is determined that an irrevocable use permit has been granted, as in our case, the court may, for considerations of justice, prevent the revocation of the permission or condition the cancellation on the payment of compensation to the licensee for the investments he made or for the damage caused to him, while balancing the interests of the right holder and the licensee (Civil Appeal 87/62 Badihi v. Badichi, IsrSC 16 2901 (1962); Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv) 3356/00 House on Allenby Street in Tel Aviv Ltd. Varba Bella (published in the databases, January 1,2004); Family Appeal (Center) 9507-10-21 G. S.  v. H.S. (published in the databases, May 1,2022)).  Scholar Nina Salzman, in her article on this issue, clarifies that where the right has been formulated as an irrevocable license, the recipient of the license enjoys immunity from the unilateral and arbitrary revocation of the license, while the court has broad discretion to examine the appropriate remedy, as she says:

"The court has discretion in this matter, and it is entitled to choose from a variety of remedies the remedy that it thinks appropriate to grant to a certain person in the circumstances of the case, from imposing a financial obligation on the landowner to obligating him to grant a certain person a right in the land...  The guiding idea in granting the relief is also based on considerations of justice, namely that the relief must be proportional to the suffering caused to a certain person as a result of his reliance on the promise or representation of the landowner in a manner that will provide the minimum degree necessary for the administration of justice, and no more" (Nina Salzman, "Free Permission" in Real Estate as "Lending of Land" - The Classification Approach and the Rules of the "Real Estate License", Iyunei Mishpat 35 (2012) 265,271).

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