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Civil Case (Herzliya) 45864-06-23 Sasson Rahamim v. Lidor Alkobi - part 4

October 28, 2026
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See also Civil Appeal 18/91 Ohana v. Bat Yam Municipality, para.  5 (Nevo, November 19,1996):

"The appellant argues, against the charge of use fees, that the respondent did not prove, even prima facie, that it had a right in the area.  This is a puzzling argument, at this stage, after the appellant signed the agreement with the respondent.  In any event, the respondent's cause of action is based on the contract with the appellant, and the appellant, from the moment he signed this contract, is prevented from denying the respondent's right to the field."

  1. Second, even if it is said that the defendant is entitled to deny the plaintiff's right to receive a proportionate portion of the agreed rent, this does not mean that the defendant is entitled to keep this proportional share for himself. If the plaintiff is not entitled to payment, then the representative of the house is entitled to receive it. The defendant is not entitled to put himself in the shoes of the representative of the house and claim that the plaintiff owes him - to the defendant - sums that the plaintiff is supposed to pay to the representative office.
  2. It should be noted in this context:
  3. In a letter dated June 19,2023 (hereinafter: the "Management Company's letter"), the management company does indeed address the demand for payment of rent for the outdoor dining area to the plaintiff, and not to the defendant.
  4. From the transcriptof the conversations that were submitted, it appears that the plaintiff expressly undertook to the defendant to bear any demand for payment that would be made by the representative of the condominium in respect of the outdoor dining area (p. 35 of the plaintiff's exhibits, paras.  102-131).
  5. Third, section 53(a) of the Contracts Law allows for the offset of unspecified financial obligations when they derive from the same transaction and the date of their existence has arrived. However, the mere possibility of offsetting an indefinite charge does not mean that an estimated or general offset amount can be raised. The person claiming the offset must prove the debt itself, its rate and its connection to the transaction from which the mutual charges derive.
  6. However, the defendant did not do any of the following, and in particular he refrained from submitting an expert opinion for a proper valuation of theuse of the outdoor dining area, or for the quantification of the alleged damage. The court does not usually award compensation or approve offset by way of estimate where a party could have brought accurate evidence and did not do so.
  7. I therefore do not accept the defendant's arguments regarding his right to reduce the rent that has not yet been paid, or to deduct rent that was allegedly overpaid. The defendant is therefore obligated to pay the rent for the months in which he used the leased property and did not pay rent, in the total sum of ILS 46,46,10.

Debts for Current Expenses

  1. The plaintiff claims that in addition to the rent debt, the defendant accumulated additional debts due to non-payment of current expenses (municipal taxes, electricity, water and management fees).
  2. Clause 10.a. of the lease agreement states that "the tenant undertakes to pay throughout the lease period all expenses, of any kind and kind, arising from the use of and/or possession of the leased property" (hereinafter: "current expenses").
  3. In paragraph 5 of the statement of claim, entitled "The Requested Relief", the plaintiff asks the court "to obligate the defendant to pay his debt for non-payment of the store's rent [...] and also to oblige the defendant to pay the plaintiff legal expenses [...] ". To be precise, this section does not refer in any way to current expenses.
  4. In paragraph 10 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff states that the defendant undertook to:

"To pay ongoing expenses such as: electricity, water, municipal payments, expenses of management fees, business tax and sign fees to the Herzliya Municipality (clause 10 of the agreement).  The defendant accumulated debts in current expenses totaling ILS 2,0, 00 with respect to municipal taxes only from January 1,2022 to August 17,2022 [...] ".

  1. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that in the framework of a warning letter dated May 15,2023, sent by the plaintiff's attorney to the defendant (Appendix 1 of the file Exhibits Claim - hereinafter: "the warning letter"), the plaintiff's attorney claims the existence of debts in respect of ongoing expenses (municipal taxes, water, electricity and management fees) in the cumulative sum of ILS 6,3, 9,30, of which a debt is claimed in the sum of ILS 4,5, 6,85." 8, for municipal tax payments.
  2. It therefore follows that out of all the debts claimed for current expenses, the only amount that the plaintiff mentions in the statement of claim is the sum of ILS 2,0, 000 in respect of municipal tax payments. The result is that debts for other current expenses (to the extent that they exist) were not included in the statement of claim and in any case the defendant cannot be obligated to pay them.
  3. As to the alleged arnona debt: apart from that single statement, that there is an arnona debt in the sum of ILS 20,000, there is no reference whatsoever to this debt in the statement of claim. Moreover, even in the framework of the evidence of the claim, there is no reference from which it is possible to learn about the existence of the alleged arnona debt. In particular, the evidence of the claim does not include a demand for payment in respect of arnona debts, nor does it include a confirmation by the plaintiff of payment of such debts.  The plaintiff therefore did nothing to prove the alleged debt.
  4. On the other hand, the claim regarding the existence of a municipal tax debt was weakly denied, if at all, in the statement of defense, in which it was argued in this regard as follows (section 46): "With regard to payments to the authorities, most of the payments claimed are not debts for which the defendant is liable, but rather the plaintiff" [sic].
  5. This is a casual denial andevasion, which, taking into account the provision of Regulation 14(b) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, is equivalent to an admission of the claim. Moreover, based on the totality of the evidence before me, I have reached the conclusion that the defendant - both in his conduct and in his contacts with the plaintiff - did not deny the existence of the municipal tax debt and even paid its share. Support for this can be found in the following facts:
  6. A transcript of a conversation that took place between the plaintiff and Mordechai (Appendix 4 to the prosecution's evidence, pp. 29-46, at p. 37, lines 141-150)) indicates that Mordechai does not deny the municipal tax debt and claims that the defendant is working with the authorities for the purpose of formulating an arrangement.
  7. In paragraph 49 of the statement of defense, the defendant claims: "In addition, the defendant is currently in contact with the relevant authorities in order to settle the debt with them, to the extent that there is one."
  • Between the amount of the debt for municipal property tax payments, as claimed in the warning letter (ILS 85,5, 6,4), and the amount of the debt for property tax payments, the existence of which was claimed in the statement of claim (ILS 2,0, 0,00), there is a considerable discrepancy that presumably attests to the payment of part of the debt.
  1. Although this was not explicitly stated by the defendant, it is clear to me that the basis for the defendant's claim that part of the property tax debt should apply to the plaintiff and not to him, is the same basis by virtue of which he argues that some of the rent payments should not apply to him - that is, the claim that the catering area is not owned by the plaintiff. This argument has already been rejected above, in the context of the rent, and I do not accept it in the present context as well.
  2. Thus, even though the plaintiff refrained from attaching positive evidence to prove the amount of the debt, in view of the combination of the two - i.e.: the absence of an explicit denial as required by law; the defendant's admission in real time and in his pleadings of the very existence of a debt vis-à-vis the local authority; and the rejection of his claim for exemption due to the scope of ownership of the leased property - the defendant should be regarded as admitting to the existence of an unpaid municipal tax debt in the sum of ILS 20,000 .
  3. As to the omission of the relief from the chapter "Requested Relief" (paragraph 5 of the statement of claim): since the debt is explicitly detailed in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim, and since the defendant has been given a full opportunity to defend himself against the demand for payment (an opportunity that was actually taken advantage of by him), this wording failure should not be regarded as a barrier preventing his ruling. The defendant's obligation to pay the property tax derives directly from the facts that were placed before me and decided, andtherefore the wording failure did not cause a distortion of law.
  4. I therefore found that the defendant is obligated to pay the municipal tax debt in the sum of ILS 20,000.

Replacing locks as a consideration in an expense ruling

  1. When I came to examine the issue of charging costs, I came to the conclusion that the circumstances of the matter justify making use of my authority and ordering that each party bear its own costs, in view of the plaintiff's impaired procedural conduct prior to the filing of the claim. As is well known, the purpose of the unique proceeding for eviction of a tenant is to provide a quick and effective remedy to the landlord who wishes to regain possession of the property by the usual legal means. In our case, when it was determined in the framework of the eviction claim that the disputes that need to be decided deviate from the scope of this special proceeding and require clarification in the framework of a regular action, the court ordered the dismissal of the claim.
  2. However, instead of turning to the competent courts and exhausting the legal proceedings in accordance with the law, the plaintiff chose to take the law into his own hands, and shortly after the eviction claim was dismissed, he took a forceful self-remedy and replaced the tenant's locks. The approach that the existence of a financial debt provides the landlord with a justification for circumventing the law enforcement mechanisms and trampling on the tenant's procedural rights by way of taking unilateral steps. Although the plaintiff's improper conduct does not negate his substantive right to receive the rent that has been proven, it carries decisive special weight in the matter of awarding costs.
  3. A litigant who petitions for relief from the court is required to follow the king's path and come with clean hands. When the plaintiff chooses to deviate from this path and take unilateral and forceful steps outside the court, he is not entitled to benefit from an award of expenses in his favor, despite the fact that most of his financial claim was accepted on its merits.
  4. Conclusion
  5. The defendant will pay the plaintiff within 30 days the sum of 122,146 ILS, which constitutes the rent debt (104,646), plus the debt for current expenses (municipal tax) (20,000 NIS), and deducting 2,500 ILS, which were awarded in favor of the defendant as expenses in the eviction suit, but have not yet been paid.
  6. Linkage differentials and interest will be added to the payment as required by law from the date of filing the statement of claim until the date of the actual full payment.
  7. There is no order for costs.

Granted today, October 28,2026, in the absence of the parties.

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