Mr. Dahari certainly wanted to have the transactions signed in order for him to receive his share in brokering the transaction. However, he never prevented these plaintiffs from conducting further inquiries and learning about the risks involved in executing the transactions in the administration's offices or among other professionals. In any event, I have already determined that plaintiffs 3-7 knew about clause 15 of the lease contract, so it cannot be said that their engagement in the contracts was made when they mistakenly believed that the factual representation placed before them distorted the picture of expectations, or the risks and commercial considerations that they had in mind prior to the contractual engagement. Plaintiffs 3-7 knew that clause 15 of the lease contract was intrinsically connected to a substantial and significant feature of the sale, but they preferred to take a risk, despite what was said, which they believed was the potential return on his side.
In the summaries of defendants 1 and 4, it was claimed that Mr. Dahari's testimony was riddled with inaccuracies. Thus, Mr. Dahari claimed in his testimony that all the plaintiffs gave the money directly to the transfer of the Goren hearing place, while "in my case I never counted money and did not touch the funds and I did not transfer money" (p. 2698 Q. 2-4; See also: ibid., p. 2831, paras. 3-4). Mr. Dahari also claimed that the plaintiffs had sent text messages to the Goren hearing venue with their details (p. 2699, paras. 8-10), and that they had called for the transfer of the Goren hearing venue (p. 2700, paras. 17-18; see also: chapter 18 of the summaries of defendants 1 and 4, some of which includes contradictions in Mr. Dahari's testimony and part of which is full of insights and conclusions that are not obligatory). Indeed, in his interrogation, Mr. Dahari found it difficult to adhere to the truth in its entirety. It is beyond any doubt that Mr. Dahari informed plaintiffs 3-7 that they must obtain cash; that he told them on the day the contracts were signed that lower sums would be recorded in the contracts than those they had actually paid (see, for example, the testimony of Cohen at p. 316, paras. 17-24); for he had counted with them the money they had brought; Because plaintiffs 7-3 did not contact the transfer of the Goren hearing venue in any way. In this sense, Mr. Dahari's attempt to distance himself from the factual events that are the subject of the lawsuit broke through the barrier of factual reality as it is. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid, this false testimony does not relate to substantive matters that go to the root of his defense, and in particular to the core of the claim. Therefore, I do not believe that Mr. Dahari's misguided conduct leads to the conclusion that he should be obligated to pay compensation in favor of the plaintiffs.