Before the letters converge in the expanse of our journey in order to answer these questions, it is necessary that we first review the normative aspect that governs our matter, since its main points will hover above the accompanying casuist analysis in accordance with the chapters listed above. It should be emphasized. This normative legal aspect constitutes the beginning, if not the end, of the analysis of the legal issues that are necessary for our case, and the Mishkan is at the top of writing as the case may be.
Before entering the lounge, we will remove the defendants' claim regarding the statute of limitations.
Discussion and Decision
Statute of limitations
The defendants argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed due to its statute of limitations. According to the claim, the contracts were entered into with the plaintiffs during the month of August 2011, while the claim was filed on September 5, 2018, more than seven years after the contracts were drawn.
This argument deserves to be rejected.
Section 10(c) of the Interpretation Law, 5741-1981, states: "In the count of days of a period, days of rest, recess or sabbatical according to legislation shall also be included, except if they are the last days of the period." The case law held that when the statute of limitations for filing a claim during the recess of the courts expires, by virtue of section 10(c) of the Interpretation Law, the limitation period is postponed until the first weekday after the recess (Civil Appeal 3141/99 Migdal Insurance Company in Tax Appeal v. Pondminsky, IsrSC 55(5) 817 (2001)). In our case, the contracts signed by the plaintiffs were concluded between August 28, 2011 and August 10, 2011. Therefore, in accordance with the provision of section 10(c) of the Interpretation Law, the limitation period is postponed until September 6, 2018, the first day of the week following the recess. Since the claim was filed on September 5, 2018, in any event, there was no statute of limitations on its filing (in paragraph 16 of the summaries of defendants 1 and 4 they no longer discussed their claim in this matter, but only argued for a delay that, as a rule, does not constitute grounds for expropriation of the right to sue, and in any event, the conditions for the application of the exception according to case law have not been proven).