So yes. What emerges from the compilation so far, and thus I am persuaded, that the transfer of the Goren hearing venue did not serve as counsel for plaintiffs 3-7 in relation to the transactions that are the subject of the lawsuit, but rather that he was the owner of defendant 4, between whom and these plaintiffs the agreements were concluded. The person who represented plaintiffs 3-7 in those transactions would have transferred the place of the hearing from Muala alone.
- B. Did Goren give the place of discussion to the transfer of the place of discussion is concealed of the lease contracts signed with the manager, and whether he informed him about clause 15 of the lease contract
When we have reached the aforesaid conclusion, I will note, as will be explained below, that since the transfer of the place of the Goren hearing and the transfer of the place of the hearing of Mualem are unanimous in their version, which is faithful to me, that the transfer of the place of the hearing of Goren gave to the transfer of the place of the hearing of Mualem the lease contracts signed with the manager, which include clause 15 of the lease contract and discussed this clause with him , in any case since the transfer of the place of hearing from Mualem served as counsel for plaintiffs 3-7, It is not clear the plaintiffs' grievances regarding the transfer of the Goren hearing venue.
From the moment Goren handed over the lease contracts to Mualem and spoke with him about clause 15 of the contracts, as far as he was concerned, the knowledge of the mualem venue in the matter should be identified with the knowledge of plaintiffs 3-7, as he was their representative. Section 2 of the Courier Law, 5725-1965, states that "the agent of a person like him, and the act of the emissary, including his knowledge and intention, binds and entitles, as the case may be, the sender." In these circumstances, plaintiffs 3-7 (the sender) are attributed the knowledge of the transferee of the venue of the Mu'alem (the emissary) regarding the restitution clause (with regard to the attribution of the lawyer's knowledge to the senders, see more: Civil Appeal 767/11 Jahansheh Higgi v. Yitzhak Azuri, paragraph 20 of the judgment of the Honorable Justice A. Hayut (August 27, 2013); Opening Motion (Haifa District) 77/01 Dr. Lev Avivi v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel Ltd., para. 25 (February 28, 2002)). Even if Goren's relocation created a barrier between him and potential buyers, with the intention of removing the allegation that he had behaved improperly against him, from the moment he informed plaintiffs' counsel 3-7 about the restitution clause, it cannot be expected that he would be obligated to have a separate duty to update each of these plaintiffs. Goren could and should have assumed that the relocation of a hearing venue would act as his obligation to inform each of his clients about clause 15 of the lease contract.