Indeed. The question before us is whether there is an obligation on the transfer of the Goren hearing place to examine the ILA's policy and the practice of enforcing the restitution clause in the event of a change of designation, as the seller of the land plots and not as an attorney (in the matter of counsel, we will discuss below in relation to plaintiffs 1-2), and to update the transfer of the venue of the hearing to the plaintiffs' counsel. As far as can be understood, the plaintiffs did not explicitly claim this. More than necessary, I will note that I am of the opinion that there is a difference between the seller's obligation to disclose to the purchasers the very existence of the restitution clause in the event of a change of designation (compare: Civil Appeal 8068/11 Uri Eini v. Chen Shefries (February 11, 2014)) and an examination of the Authority's policy and the practice of enforcing the restitution clause in the event of a change of designation. The discovery of a fact that is within the seller's knowledge, even constructive knowledge in the sense, is part of his inherent duty as a person with excess knowledge in relation to the sale. This is different with regard to a fact in respect of which the examination of the policy requires in-depth consideration that is not the property of a given seller.
In my opinion, it is correct to say that when the seller has access to the information or the purchaser has an inherent inferiority with regard to obtaining the information, the failure to disclose relevant facts in relation to the sale may establish grounds for cancellation of the contract (see, for example, Civil Appeal 9019/99 Kinstlinger v. Elia, IsrSC 55(3) 542 (2001)); Civil Appeal 2469/06 Ronen Suissa v. Zaga Company in Block 5027 Plot 1 in Tax Appeal (August 14, 2008)). This is also the case when the information may have a real impact on the buyer's decision whether to enter into a transaction, and this information is known to the seller, whether by force or in practice. However, when it comes to information about which the seller has no excess access, even if this may be related to the fundamental nature of the sale, and on the face of it, any person is entitled to examine the information, I do not believe that the seller is obligated to investigate in depth and examine the policy of the public authority with regard to the possibilities of realizing the sale in his possession one day. In our case, it was not proven that the transfer of the place of the Goren hearing, as a seller, knew that the Administrator's policy at the time determined that upon a change in the designation of agricultural land, the lease agreement would necessarily be terminated and the land would be returned to the Administrator, subject to the granting of a right of compensation to the lessee. Indeed, the case law held that even when the lease contract did not explicitly stipulate a restitution clause, it should be read into the contract (Civil Case 8325/12 State of Israel Israel Lands Administration v. Mehadrin in Tax Appeal (June 5, 2014); see also: Civil Appeal 465/12 Development Authority Israel Lands Administration v. Hadari HaCoastal Company No. 63 in Tax Appeal (August 21, 2014); High Court of Justice 7620/19 Tamir Lerer v. Israel Land Authority (July 3, 2022)). However, this ruling is later than the date of the signing of the contracts that are the subject of this proceeding, and in any event, I do not believe that an ordinary person who sells from an acquaintance should be attributed a constructive knowledge of all the legal precedents in practice, which has a possible impact on the characteristics of the sale in his possession.