Moreover. As may be recalled, the plaintiffs claimed that if they had known about the restitution clause, they would not have entered into contracts with defendant 4 (see, for example, paragraph 12 of Mr. Horowitz's affidavit; paragraph 21 of the affidavit of the transfer of the venue of the Junger hearing). In other words, all the plaintiffs claimed that it was sufficient that they knew about clause 15 of the lease contract with the manager, in order to cause them not to enter into contracts with defendant 4, "for what reasonable person purchases land for the purpose of the settlement in order for it to be returned to the manager?" (paragraph 21 of the affidavit of the transfer of the place of the Junger hearing). This means that they did not argue and believed that the defendants should have examined the Administration's policy with respect to the rezoning stipulation, and that their mere knowledge of the stipulation was sufficient to cause them not to enter into a contractual contract.
In general, since the transfer of the venue of the Goren hearing gave to the transfer of the venue of the meeting place of the concealed meeting, and even informed him specifically about clause 15, I am of the opinion that the transfer of the place of discussion Goren was entitled to assume that the transfer of the venue of the meeting would inform his clients of this, as he was their representative. In fact, from the date on which plaintiffs 3-7 were presented by the transfer of a concealed hearing place, it is doubtful whether Goren was entitled to speak with them - as opposed to with their counsel - in order to inform them at the same time about section 15 or about another relevant detail.
This is the case with regard to the transfer of the Goren hearing place.
- Whether the transfer of the place of hearing was made by Mualem, as the counsel for plaintiffs 3-7, informed them about the lease contract, and in particular regarding clause 15 of the lease contract
There is no dispute that after the transfer of the venue, Mualem served as counsel for plaintiffs 3-7 in the transactions that are the subject of the lawsuit, and even generated invoices for fees for payments he received from them. The rule before us is that a lawyer owes a duty of fiduciary duty and a duty of care towards his clients, and he is required to defend their interests and act for them skillfully, professionally and faithfully (Civil Appeal 2625/02 Silvio Nahum, Adv. Rachel Dornbaum, 58(3) 385 (2004). hereinafter: "The Dornbaum Case"). This breach of duty establishes liability by virtue of the tort of negligence in the Torts Ordinance [New Version], and it may also create a basis for contractual liability. In the Dornbaum case, it was held that an additional source of a lawyer's duty of loyalty towards his client is found in the Courier Law, 5725-1965. This obligation is based on the power of attorney entrusted by the client to the lawyer. The required standard of conduct is in accordance with the level of skill and caution required of a professional towards whom he is indebted, along with the rules of ethics that determine the appropriate norms of behavior for a lawyer. In the meantime, when a lawyer prepares a contract, he must ensure the rights of his clients on the most beneficial side (Bar Association Appeal 2/80 Anonymous v. District Committee of the Israel Bar Association, Tel Aviv-Yafo, 34(4) 707 (1980); hereinafter: "The Certain Case").