In another context of the Real Estate Market Regulation, it was stated that "Moreover, it is possible to justify the imposition of a requirement to examine the basic transaction, even without necessarily being required to apply an objective standard of examination to the circumstances, by means of the duty imposed on the buyer, within the framework of subjective good faith, not to close his eyes to the warning lights that come his way: "As soon as a 'red light' is lit in the buyer's head due to the circumstances of the matter or various details that he discovers during his examination, He will not be considered good faith without a proper examination of the seller's status of rights. As the volume of the alarm bell rings, so is the intensity of the test required... A "red light" is not in heaven, and its examination does not require the wisdom of Solomon or the genius of Albert Einstein..." (Section M.A. to the judgment of the Honorable Justice A. Rubinstein, Other Municipality Motions 624/13 Esther Mordechayov v. Shlomo Mintz (August 4, 2014) (emphases added).
Indeed. In his testimony, Mualem noted that he was aware that clause 15 of the lease contract with the manager was a significant stipulation. In these circumstances, as I noted above, it could have been expected that he would not suffice with updating the plaintiffs orally about clause 15, but that this clause would find explicit and prominent expression in the contracts entered into with the plaintiffs, and at the very least, that he would act to attach the lease contract as an appendix to those agreements. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, beyond what I have detailed, which is based on the fact that I was trusted with the version of Mu'alem that he informed the plaintiffs at the time of their signing of the contracts regarding clause 15, I am convinced that in the circumstances of the case they did not take his heart to his words. The plaintiffs were motivated and wanted to sign the contracts with all their might, even though they were aware of the risks involved in the realization of the transactions, especially after they heard that a member of Knesset they knew had signed a similar contract and no less after they had witnessed the letter of the deputy mayor regarding the potential for improvement of the land in the area (see more: p. 2 of defendant 2's summaries). The plaintiffs hoped that these risks would not materialize.