In essence of this matter, I am factually convinced that the transferee of the place of hearing Mu'alem detailed to plaintiffs 3-7 the existence of clause 15 of the lease contract, and that he explained to them the risks involved in executing the transaction against the background of the possibility that the land would be taken from them (paragraph 6.7 of his affidavit, which is stated therein to me). Despite the aforesaid, plaintiffs 3-7 consciously chose to ignore the general policy of the Civil Administration on the matter, inter alia, relying on the deputy mayor's letter and the fact that a Knesset member they knew had purchased a plot of land in the area. Plaintiff No. 4, the relocation of the hearing venue of Ariel Cohen, led the conduct of these plaintiffs and even consulted with other attorneys while he was in the office of the concealed venue transferee, while convincing the other plaintiffs in this group to sign the contracts after explaining to them "the risks of the transaction", and then "they all agreed to sign and take the chance that the manager would not renew the lease agreement or ask for the land back without compensation" (paragraph 9 of the affidavit of the concealed venue transfer; See also, ibid., section 8).
Did plaintiffs 1-2 know about clause 15 prior to the signing of the contracts?
After I have found to determine factually that the transfer of the place of hearing Goren informed the transfer of the place of hearing of Mualem the lease contracts signed with the manager, which include the aforementioned clause 15, and that upon the transfer of the place of hearing Mualem informed his clients, plaintiffs 3-7, about the lease contracts and in particular with regard to clause 15 of the contracts, it is necessary to examine whether even plaintiffs 1-2, who were not represented by the transfer of the place of hearing from Mualem, Know about the lease contract, and in particular about clause 15 of the lease contract.
As may be recalled, in his affidavit, plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Netanel Attias, claimed that after many inquiries he made, he decided to purchase, together with his mother-in-law, plaintiff No. 2, lands from the Goren hearing place. According to him, although Goren stated to him that he "does not intend to take any responsibility for the results, and that this could be a speculative transaction" (paragraph 50 of his affidavit), according to him, Goren further claimed that there are positive trends and tremendous momentum in the city of Ashkelon, and that there is a considerable probability that the land will be thawed for construction and its value will increase. Mr. Attias further argued that the transfer of the venue of the Goren hearing did not bother to inform him that a lease contract had been signed between defendant 4 and the manager (ibid., section 51), and did not clarify that the manager was entitled to return the land in the event of a change of designation.