Estate Case (Nazareth) 55176-03-22 Anonymous v. Anonymous

How will the court act after it finds, at the end of a factual examination, that the testator did not know how to discern the nature of a will at the time of making it, while its content reflects his true will as it can be identified over the course of time?

Is he permitted to prefer the presumed will of the mitzva over the substantive requirement of kashrut? Perhaps the lack of kashrut essentially negates the possibility of ascribing legal validity  to the will of the mitzva?

Background

1. The deceased was born in Argentina in Year X, grew up, married and later had a son and a daughter (they are the defendants). Later, she immigrated to Israel with her family, and here her youngest son (who is the plaintiff) was born.  The father of the parties died in Year X, the deceased was left to live alone in her home in X, and in the late 1990s she granted the plaintiff the right to build a residence on the lot where her house stood, adjacent to it.  The plaintiff built his house with his personal resources and has lived there ever since with his family.
2. At that time (August 20, 1999), the deceased made a will (hereinafter – the preliminary will) in which she made a distinction between her residence, which she bequeathed in equal parts to the defendants, and the residence built by the plaintiff for which she bequeathed it. The deceased ordered that the lot on which the two houses were built should be divided between the plaintiff and the defendants as equally, as far as possible, and that she bequeathed the rest of her property equally among her three children.
3. Eventually, the deceased's health began to deteriorate and she became increasingly dependent on her environment. The family relationship, which had already been tense since the deceased granted  the plaintiff the right to build his house next to her home, became more and more strained, and mutual claims arose between the parties regarding her economic exploitation, the manner in which she was treated, the degree of devotion to her and her needs, the gifts or money she chose to give to any of her children or grandchildren, and the contribution of each party to her alienation from the other.
4. In February 2017, the defendants petitioned to be appointed guardians for their mother (Guardianship 30045-02-17 (hereinafter – the Guardianship File)).  A welfare report was submitted, as is customary, as was the response of the family appellant's counsel, and a hearing was held, during which the deceased was heard in court.  At the end of the proceeding (judgment of July 20, 2017), the court found (by the Honorable Judge Jamila Jabareen-Khalifa) not to appoint a guardian for the deceased and made do with appointing a power of attorney in the account to assist her in managing her financial affairs.  The court appointed the plaintiff as the power of attorney, restricted the deceased's use of the account, created a mechanism to monitor its management, and determined that any transfer of any rights (in consideration or not) by the deceased would require the approval of the court.
5. A short time later, on September 2, 2017, the deceased made a will before a notary public (hereinafter – the late will), in which she bequeathed her residence to her three children in equal parts and the house that the plaintiff had built for him in full. In this will, the deceased revoked any other prior will and does not contain any provision relating to the lot, the building rights therein or any reference to the rest of her property.
6. So far, I have discussed the early and late wills, around which the parties chose to conduct their legal battle, but over the years other wills have been drafted that cannot be ignored. I will elaborate.
   1. On November 18, 2001, an "Appendix Agreement to the Will" was added, signed by the deceased and all the parties.  Essentially, the granting of all the unused building rights in the lot to the defendants in equal parts (hereinafter – the appendix to the preliminary will);
   2. On August 19, 2003, the deceased made a new will, in which she revoked every previous order and will. The principle of division between the houses remains the same, i.e., the house she bequeathed in equal parts to the defendants and the house that the plaintiff built bequeathed to him.  In contrast to the appendix to the earlier will, the division of the remaining building percentages was made in equal parts between the plaintiff and the defendants (hereinafter – the 2003 will).  This will was made in a very detailed manner and included a sketch of division;

• On July 15, 2012, the deceased made a third will (which was delivered to the Registrar of Inheritance Affairs on November 17, 2020, by the lawyer who drafted it). In this will, the principle of division was changed for the first time.  The deceased bequeathed her residence to her three children in equal parts.  The rest of the details of the will remain identical to the 2003 will (hereinafter – the 2012 will);

1. On June 28, 2017 (about three weeks after the hearing of the guardianship case), the deceased signed a fourth will. There is no reference to the house that the plaintiff built and in which he lives, but only to her own home and an instruction that it be divided equally among her three children (hereinafter – the 2017 will).

7. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916The Significance of Wills in the Overall Fabric of Evidence, I will discuss below.
8. 12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D. 51 (2)On X day , the deceased died.  A few months later (November 24, 2020), an  application was submitted to the Registrar of Inheritance Affairs to execute the prior will.  Since the will was not originally attached, the application was received only on October 7, 2021, with the submission of a request to prove it in a copy; on November 26, 2020, an objection was filed on the grounds that the late will should be upheld.  The objection was also received on October 7, 2021.  In the absence of an original will, the Registrar of Inheritance Affairs ordered that the application and the objection be transferred to the court.  On January 2, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion to execute the late will, which was transferred to the court, and within the framework of the court proceeding, the defendants' objection to the application was filed.
9. If I summarize the proceedings before me now, we are dealing with the defendants' request to execute the early will – and the plaintiff's objection on the grounds of the existence of the late will; In addition, the plaintiff's request to execute the late will – and in contrast to the defendants' objection to the arguments that mainly relate to the deceased's legal capacity that expires the validity of the late will.

The Controversy

10. There are three points of disagreement between the parties.
11. The first is about the deceased's competence to make the late will. The defendants claim that the deceased had suffered from dementia and Alzheimer's disease since 2010, in a manner that negates her fitness to serve on the team.  They rely, inter alia, on the expert opinion of the court.  The plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that the deceased was lucid and valid, and that her true and free will was expressed in the later will.
12. In this context, the defendants also raised an argument that the late will did not meet the requirements of the law, since it was made before a notary, but that contrary to Regulation 4(e) of the Notary Regulations, 5737-1977 (hereinafter – the Notary Regulations), no request was made and in any case no appropriate medical certificate was presented, in a manner that urges it to be revoked.
13. The second is whether the deceased was subjected to unfair influence on the part of the plaintiff or anyone on his behalf. The defendants claim that the plaintiff took advantage of the deceased's weakness, dependence and medical condition to get her to sign the late will.  The plaintiff rejects these claims and claims that he acted out of concern and love for his mother, and that the late will reflects her free will.
14. The third is summarized in the question of the validity of the late will against the background of the judgment in the guardianship case. Does the need for court approval for any act of transfer of rights imply a restriction on the freedom of the will as well, or is the act of making a will exempt from it?

Discussion and Decision

15. Quoted from NevoAfter reviewing all the files, examining the evidence, considering the parties' summaries and discussing their various arguments throughout the proceeding, I found that none of the parties before me hold a valid will.
16. The process taught me that out of a need to feel "right" and not to accept "less" in relation to another, the three children acted during their mother's lifetime (in fact two decades before she went to school) to secure their personal interests, regardless of her personal aspirations in this matter (it is enough if I refer to the appendix to the early will and the way it was worded).  In fact, an unfortunate picture emerges that since the deceased granted the plaintiff the right to build his house next to her home, tension has been created that characterized the relationship between the parties in a way that disturbed the deceased's peace and clouded her routine.
17. The deceased, in her great wisdom in the midst of the family chaos, left a will whose provisions are fully integrated with the rest of the evidence in the file. A will that is more detailed than the two wills that the parties chose to focus on, is defined in a way that saves additional legal battles, and the main thing is that it reflects in detail her free will as she consistently expressed it years later.  The parties were so eager for the early and late wills, out of the perception that it served the defendants' position and the plaintiff's position, that they argued in relation to the 2012 will in weak language, as if they wanted to "conceal" its existence.  Well, it is here, it was duly deposited, and the significance of this, in view of the result, I will discuss later.
18. First, the prior will can be removed from the chapter. There is no dispute that the deceased made a later will, the 2003 will, which the defendants themselves attached to the summaries on their behalf.  There is no claim on the part of the defendants regarding the deceased's competence at that time.  The will annulled every previous will according to its provisions.  This is sufficient so that we will no longer discuss the early will or the question of proving it by copy.
19. I will now turn to examine the validity of the late will in terms of the restrictive provision in the guardianship file; the question of the existence of unfair influence on the part of the plaintiff; and the deceased's competence to make the will at the time of making the will.

The question of limitation from the guardianship file

20. As for the provisions of the judgment in the guardianship case, the matter has already been discussed and decided in this case (the Honorable Judge Jamila Jabareen-Khalifa) on April 2, 2023, as follows: "The laws that apply to wills are different from those that apply to matters of guardianship.  In the guardianship case, the court instructed the parties that the mother's signature on the transfer of rights would require the permission of the court, but it cannot be said that this prohibition expropriates the mother's right to sign a will.  The will is a personal act of the deceased, in order to revoke a will, it is necessary to clarify the deceased's wishes, her qualifications to sign the will, and whether she has been unfairly influenced.  These things require factual clarification and hearing of evidence...".  It therefore follows that the court, from the panel that heard the guardianship case and determined the restrictive provision, rejected this argument in a decision that no one objected to, ruling that the will should be examined like any other will.

The question of unfair influence

21. As to the question of the existence of unfair influence on the part of the plaintiff,  section 30(a) of the Inheritance Law, 5725-1965 (hereinafter – the Law) is intended to ensure the principle of freedom of the will, and states that a will made (inter alia) due to unfair influence is void.  As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of unfair influence is on the opponents of the will (in this case, the defendants), but where there is a comprehensive and fundamental dependence of the testator on the beneficiary, a factual presumption arises as to the existence of unfair influence.  In such a situation, the burden of proof (as opposed to the burden of persuasion that remains on the shoulders of those who object to the execution of the will) shifts to the applicant for probate of the will (in this case, the plaintiff) to prove its absence.
22. In another civil hearing 1516/95 Marom v. Attorney General [Nevo] (1998), the Supreme Court formulated four auxiliary tests that help determine the existence of the testator's dependence on the beneficiary: the testator's independence, the scope of the assistance he received from the beneficiary, the extent of his relations with others, and the circumstances in which the will was drafted.  Alongside them, having passed the burden of proof, the Supreme Court proposed practical tests to contradict the presumption of unfair influence, including: the test of emotional closeness, the test of dispossession, the test of abuse of dependence, the test of permissible influence, and the test of the logic of a will.
23. In this context, it is important to add that not every effect will be considered invalid. It is only natural for a person to be influenced by those around him and by the connections in his life.  Only an exceptional effect, one that directs the will of the testator in his place, will be considered invalid (Civil Appeal 4377/04 Holtzberg v. Mirez [Nevo] (2004)).  In this context, improper influence in itself does not negate the validity of the will in its own right.  A causal connection between the effect and the provisions of the will is required (Civil Appeal 1729/06 Adamsky v. Adamsky [Nevo] (August 2, 2007)).
24. In the case before me, I was of the opinion that the use of the auxiliary tests does establish a presumption of fact as to an unfair influence, but in the totality of the circumstances, as the presumption was established, it was contradicted.
25. The evidence presented indicates that the deceased had great difficulty mobility, suffered from a variety of illnesses (including neurological diseases), recurrent falls, and required nursing assistance (see the expert opinion of Dr. Naon). It also emerges that the scope of the assistance she received from the plaintiff and his wife was broad and included accompaniment and assistance in health, financial matters and the management of the household, or in the plaintiff's own words , "from lace to shoestring" (paragraph 5 of the plaintiff's main witness affidavit).  As to the deceased's relations with others, and in particular the defendants, it clearly appears that the ties were tense and meagre.  The defendants attribute this to the alienation of the deceased towards them by the plaintiff, while he attributes this to their behavior towards the deceased, which was expressed in lack of care, exploitation and indifference towards her.  As to the circumstances of the drafting of the will, here, too, the plaintiff's involvement in the proceeding stands alongside the circumstances that establish the presumption.  It is sufficient for me to refer in this matter to the testimony of the plaintiff that he drove the deceased to the attorney's office in favor of the 2017 will ( 66 of the transcript, line 24), as well as his testimony that his attorney in the proceedings before me, was present at the office of the notary public at the time of the deceased's signature on the late will (p. 64 of the transcript, lines 3-6).
26. However, as I have already noted, the establishment of a presumption in the case before me does not lead to the conclusion that improper pressure was exerted on the deceased on the part of the plaintiff. First, the plaintiff is the deceased's youngest son.  He established his adult life near her and took care of her together with his wife.  In other words, there is a close emotional closeness that justifies her choice; Second, at  the end of the day, we are not dealing with the dispossession of the defendants, at most the provisions of the late will can be viewed as an unequal division between the three natural heirs, and this too is doubtful since these provisions did not come in a vacuum, but are still rooted in the choices that the deceased made during her lifetime, at the height of her power, when she granted the plaintiff the right to build a residence on her land; Third, the very fact that the deceased did not sweepingly grant the plaintiff her property, but rather anchored in her will the right that she had granted him during her lifetime, and divided her own house equally among her three children, teaches that the plaintiff did not abuse the dependency, otherwise, presumably, it would have influenced her to completely dispossess the defendants and bequeath all her property to him; Fourth, the  test of the logic of a will also strengthens the assessment that the will reflects the will of the deceased.  Again, the will served as a legal instrument to anchor the right granted by the deceased to the plaintiff during her life (the construction of his house) and her daughter bequeathed equal parts to her three children.  This is not an inexplicable deviation or a glaring and illogical imbalance.  This is said in particular against the background of the fact that the deceased knew the plaintiff well for the treatment and treatment of her and expressed displeasure with the defendants (see the deceased's statements in court in the minutes of the hearing of July 20, 2017 in the guardianship file); Fifth, and most importantly, the manner in which the deceased bequeathed her property in the late will reflected a consistent and long-standing position that began at least in the 2012 will and culminated on July 20, 2017, when she remained in the courtroom without the presence of the parties, and in a clear, coherent, reasoned and unequivocal manner expressed her will – reflecting the provisions of the late will.
27. In fact, her words caused the court, in the guardianship case, to refrain from appointing a guardian for her despite the material before it, and not only that, but also to appoint the plaintiff as a proxy in her bank account. The court was under the impression that "this is not a woman who is not clear in her mind or is incapable of managing her affairs at all" (p. 7 of the transcript in the guardianship file, lines 23-24).  The appellant's counsel also noted at the same time, after hearing the deceased, that she "understands the matter, can decide for herself" (p. 7 of the transcript in the guardianship file, lines 20-23) and that she understood from the social worker that there is no fear of financial exploitation on the part of the plaintiff or his wife, and therefore her freedom should not be restricted.  Similarly, the social worker noted that the plaintiff's wife is transparent to the audit in the management of the funds at any moment.  She was impressed by their good intentions, and the deceased knew how to say otherwise as well, and in her own words , "when she doesn't love someone, she knows how to express herself very well" (p. 7 of the transcript in the guardianship file, lines 25-28).
28. In summary of this part, the defendants have not been able to prove that the plaintiff unfairly influenced the deceased, all the more so that this influence directed the deceased's will in her place in a manner that establishes unfair influence, i.e., that the provisions of the will do not express her true will.

The Question of Legal Capacity

29. At this point, it remains to discuss the question of the deceased's fitness to make a will at the time of drafting the late will. This matter is regulated in section 26 of the Law, which states that a will made when the testator did not know how to discern its nature is void.  The Supreme Court noted that "in this context, it is possible to take into account the testator's awareness of the fact that he is making a will, his knowledge of the extent of his property and his heirs, and his awareness of the consequences of making the will on his heirs" (Civil Appeal 851/79 Bandel v. Bandel [Nevo] (1981)).  Elsewhere it was held that the expression – he did not know how to discern the nature of a will – is "a general guideline, the purpose of which is to examine whether the testator was aware of the nature of his actions and their consequences.  Indeed, it was held that in this context it is possible to take into account the testator's awareness that he made a will, his knowledge of the extent of his property and his heirs, and his awareness of the consequences of making the will vis-à-vis his heirs" (in Tax Appeal 3539/17 Anonymous v. Anonymous [Nevo] (June 11, 2017)).
30. Ordinarily, the burden of proving that he is not fit to testify falls on those who oppose the will, but in the case before me, the late will is a notarized will. As such, the notary public had to insist on presenting a medical certificate in accordance with Regulation 4(e) of the Notaries Regulations.  Such a requirement must be made, inter alia, where the testator is confined to his bed.  Although the deceased physically arrived at the notary's office, she was accompanied by a nursing caregiver and she was 84 years old.  This combination of circumstances created the need to present a medical certificate, if only out of caution.
31. In this context, I will add that the courts have given an expansive interpretation to the box "confined to his bed" as one that also includes cases in which the testator is limited in mobility or is an elderly person who has difficulty leaving his home due to his age or illness (see: Family Appeal (Jerusalem) 13612-12-12 Darwish v. Darwish [Nevo] (July 15, 2013); as well as Estate Case 23328-11-09 A. v. Y.A.[Nevo] (September 30, 2014) and the references therein).  To complete the picture, I will add that the defect in not requiring a medical certificate does not in itself lead to the annulment of the will, but rather to the transfer of the burden of proving the deceased's discretion at the time she signed the will to the applicant to rely on it (see: Civil Appeal 1395/02 Levy v. Custodian General [Nevo] (2005)).
32. Ostensibly, since the court determined, less than two months before the date of the drafting of the late will, that the deceased did not need a guardian; the court ruled (by way of negation) that it could not be said that the deceased was not lucid or incapable of managing her affairs; and the main thing was that the deceased participated in the proceeding, stood firm and expressed her clear and reasoned will in court, in a manner free of pressure, it is permissible to assume with a great degree of confidence that the deceased was competent to bequeath her property according to her free will – but this is not the case. I'll explain.
33. The evidence shows that until 2012, the deceased tried to balance the choices she made in her lifetime, with the instructions she left after her death, because of the negative effects of her choices on the relationships within the family.  This is clearly evident from the provisions of the prior will, and especially from the wording of the appendix thereto.  In the 2003 will, a movement towards a different division began.  At first, partially around the building percentages, and later, in the 2012 will, in full, which grants all of her remaining property (beyond the plaintiff's house) in an equal manner to her three children.  Since then, this principle has remained consistent and constant.  But what? At the same time, the deceased gradually became weaker.  So did her opinion and her ability to resist the actions that motivated her children.
34. The climax occurred when it became known that the deceased's son-in-law (X, the defendant's husband) had taken her on his own initiative and signed her on a will that disappeared only to prove that she was not valid.  This was explicitly expressed in the social worker's report in  the guardianship file: "X explained that...  It can easily be signed on documents.  He admits that he himself signed Nechama's will without the knowledge of all the children (including his wife)" (p. 4 in Appendix 5 to the defendants' summaries; and see also the words of the social worker for the minutes in the guardianship file (p. 2 of Appendix 4 to the defendants' summaries)).  The matter was not concealed by the defendants despite an opportunity to do so during their testimony (see, for example, the defendant's evasive testimony on this matter, p. 41 of the transcript, lines 6-19), and was supported by additional evidence (paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's wife's main witness affidavit, as well as her testimony on page 74 of the transcript, lines 1-18; and paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's main witness affidavit, as well as his testimony on page 53 of the transcript, lines 1-3).
35. In response to the incident, the plaintiff worked to get the deceased to draw up the 2017 will, and later, in view of the partial manner in which it was drafted, he worked for the drafting of the late will, and in his words , "after we learned that the husband... My sister's took her...  Whenever she was there she came back to us crying...  He signed her something she didn't know what.  That is why we have reached a situation where she makes another will" (p. 56 of the transcript, lines 20-24).  This sequence of events has a real implication for the question of the deceased's kashrut.
36. This is the place to dedicate attention to the will of the deceased. Consistently and clearly, since the deceased chose to grant the plaintiff, while still alive, the right to build his house on her land, she expressed a clear desire for the plaintiff to inherit the house he built.  This is one aspect of the principle of division that she has adhered to since the early will.  It has never changed (although it was omitted from the 2017 will).  The other side of the principle of division dealt with the residence of the deceased.  whereas in the early will and in the 2003 will she determined that her house would be divided only between the defendants; In her 2012 will, and since then, continuously and consistently, on various occasions, with various parties, she insisted that her home be divided among her three children in equal parts.  In other words, from the evidence before me, it is clear what the will of the deceased is andit is reflected (albeit in a deficient manner) in the later will.
37. The question arises, if the late will reflects the free will of the deceased as it arises from the evidence, how can it be determined that it was not valid? Well, unlike the question of free will, the requirement of understanding is not binary. A person may have the ability to fully understand the guiding principle, the justice of the allocation, or the purpose underlying the way of distribution that he has chosen, precisely because it is a simple and clear idea or principle that he has held with complete confidence over the years; But at the very same time, to be incapable of understanding the details essential to the realization of the idea of order, which include, but not limited to, the identity of the parties concerned, the extent of the property, and the expectations of the beneficiaries and the excluded.
38. In other words, a person may experience a gap between his ability to understand the principle of division and his ability to understand how the principle is realized in the world of action. Such a gap, between the perception of the general idea and the ability to understand the matter, is liable to cross the line of legal competence for the team.  As in the case before me.
39. If I apply this here, the necessary conclusion is that the deceased enjoyed a general understanding, because it is possible to determine what is the principle of division that expresses her free will, as she expressed it well (also) in court in the guardianship case only a short time before the late will (in which it was reflected). However, as  far as the substantive understanding is concerned  , it was not for her, for rest, at the time of making the late will.  First, this is learned from the lackluster, almost urgent manner in which the later will was drafted, which includes only the idea of ordering without any additional details (her own home for her three children, the house that the plaintiff built for him) and there is no reference to the rest of the property.  There is no reference to the lot on which the houses are built.  There is no reference to the building rights on the lot.  There is no reference to the use of the common parts of the two houses on the field, all details that have been expressed in the past more than once.  Moreover, the fact is that even though the principles of division of the 2003 will and the 2012 will were different from each other, the two wills were still accompanied by details that carry the free will of the deceased (at each time), unlike the later will.  Second, the sequence of events as described in paragraphs 34-35 above, and which was well supported by the evidence of both parties, also testifies to the decline in the deceased's ability to understand.  In this context, I will also refer to the plaintiff's words.  When he was asked in his interrogation how the deceased was taken by her son-in-law to sign a will, does she not have an opinion? He replied, "Probably not."  Later, to the question of whether anyone can come and sign it, he replied, "Right, X, it's written here...".  Third, this conclusion is also supported by the opinion of the expert, Dr. Naon, who was not invited by the plaintiff to be questioned about her opinion, despite her determination that there is "a probability of more than 50% that the deceased, due to the cognitive and mental impairment, was not fit to edit, sign, understand the contents of the will and to consenting to it of her own free will"; Fourth, and most  significant, we should mention that the deceased was transported by the plaintiff (p. 66 of the transcript line 24) for the purpose of making a new will, which is the 2017 will.  The fact of the existence of another will was not brought to the attention of the court by the plaintiff, and was discovered for the first time only in his cross-examination (p. 65 of the transcript, lines 7-23).  The fact that the 2017 will included only reference to the deceased's home and ignoring the house built by the plaintiff, in a manner that subsequently led to the drafting of the late will, also  supports the conclusion that her understanding and grasp of the details decreased, and joins the rest of the evidence in this regard.
40. And here is the difficulty, how can it be determined that the deceased was not fit to testify when the provisions of the later will reflect hertrue and free will? After all, if the will corresponds to a will, how can it be determined that she was not fit to formulate it? Well, the difficulty is only logical and not normative. I'll explain.
41. Legal capacity is a condition for entering a track that examines the will of the deceased, and therefore even if the content of a will is consistent with the consistent will patterns that preceded it, it is not sufficient to legitimize a legal act that was done without legal capacity. In other words, human will cannot replace legal will.  You said otherwise and you undermined the foundations of inheritance law, whose purpose, beyond the fulfillment of  the deceased's command, is also to ensure certainty, finality, stability, and increased precautionary norms when the deceased  can no longer  protect his will.  I will add, giving validity to a will made in the absence of kashrut because its content is consistent with a known will, creates a practical anomaly.  After all, if another will that was made in the same cognitive state is discovered, how can it be possible to justify the existence of one and the disqualification of the other?
42. I will not deny that the disqualification of a will that reflects the will of the deceased, for the reason that it was made in the absence of legal capacity, may lead to difficult consequences in the manner in which the estate is divided (whether by granting an inheritance order or by granting a probate order for another will), but this does not deviate the court from the rule, since softening it will increase the risk of retroactive interpretation, erode stability and undermine the foundations of the system.

The Result

43. Since I have determined that there is no hope for the early will and that the deceased was not fit to make the late will, the practical question arises. The 2012 will was delivered to the Registrar of Inheritance Affairs by the lawyer who drafted it and was one of the two witnesses.  The Registrar of Inheritance Affairs noted this in the framework of the proceedings before him and asked the defendants here to announce whether, despite its existence, they insist on their request to execute the prior will (later the proceeding was transferred to the court).  In practice, no one applied for it.
44. The parties focused on the early and late wills and hardly delayed the 2012 will process, although it was mentioned. The plaintiff argued in favor of the late will and adhered to it, while the defendants argued against it and adhered to the earlier will and only to it (see paragraphs 57-58 of the defendants' summaries).
45. From the procedural side, a request for probate of the 2012 will was never placed before me. It is common to believe that in the absence of an application for probate of a will, the Registrar of Inheritance Affairs or the court is not authorized to initiate the issuance of an order for its probate.  The reason for this lies in the purpose of protecting the interests of all those concerned.  However, based on the principle that "the living are commanded to fulfill the words and wishes of the deceased" (Civil Appeal 4660/94 Family Appeal v. Lischitzky [Nevo] (1999)), the scope of judicial intervention and initiative expands.  This is not "a regular hearing in which the court decides the disputes that the parties choose to bring before it..." For the court is committed "to the will of the deceased, on whose fulfillment – and not on the fulfillment of the wishes of the parties – it is entrusted.  It is therefore clear that he is not wholly bound, as in a "regular" civil procedure, to the arguments and remedies sought by the parties (in Tax Appeal 852/07 Anonymous v. Anonymous [Nevo] (2007)).  In another place, it was held that "when a concern arose with the court about the existence of a late will...  He should have sought the parties' attention and allowed them to argue in this matter.  There is no impediment – and there is even an obligation – for the court to raise a claim of this kind on its own initiative, but it must allow the parties...  to argue in her case (Civil Appeal 11324/04 Rivka Menashe v. Elisha Marcus [Nevo] (June 4, 2007)).
46. Therefore, the court may declare a will that has been delivered to the Registrar of Inheritances (which it believes is the most recent will in respect of which it has not yet been determined to be valid) as to be executed, while giving the parties concerned an opportunity to argue in relation to it. That's what I intend to do here.
47. Since I have determined that both the early and the late will are null and void, in view of the delivery of the 2012 will to the Registrar of Inheritances, I will allow the parties – who have nothing to do with the matter, being the natural heirs of the deceased on the one hand and beneficiaries according to the 2012 will on the other – to argue in relation to the 2012 will until December 3, 2025. In the absence of an argument, I will issue an order to probate the 2012 will and the case will be closed without an order for costs, given that the claims of both parties were rejected.
48. The file will be brought to my attention on December 4, 2025.

Given today, November 03, 2025, in the absence of the parties.