Later on, we will find a reference to alternatives (1) and (2) in the disputed section, where with regard to the second alternative relevant to our case – an expression of consent to join an organization in front of a person who is a member of the organization or someone who is expected to be an agent on its behalf – it was noted: "As opposed to a casual declaration regarding a willingness to join a terrorist organization – which was made against 'Kuli Alma,' and in circumstances in which it does not appear that there is any substance to it," and this, even without proving that he was actively involved in the activity."
Explanatory notes, which include reference to the manner in which consent to join a terrorist organization, in the sense that a casual declaration of willingness to join a terrorist organization in circumstances in which it does not appear to be substantial, is the giver. The explanatory notes emphasize the legislature's intention to define a "member" broadly and beyond formal membership.
The legislature is not satisfied with a formal-organizational affiliation, but has also expanded the incrimination network to declarative and functional affiliations, provided that these are genuine.
It is not for nothing that in order to prevent and thwart terrorist offenses committed by organizations and individuals, the legislature found that the potential risk inherent in membership in a terrorist organization is sufficient to justify the incrimination of membership in a terrorist organization.
In other words, when making a statement is an acceptable way to join a terrorist organization, and when the person making the statement considers himself (after his declaration) to belong to the organization, then it is a statement that changes status and moves him from the status of an "observer" to the status of a "member."
- From the aforesaid, it was found that the defense's argument that "A member of a terrorist organization, a person who belongs to a terrorist organization" is a vague basic definition that does not include a definition of who is a member of a terrorist organization - ignores the special structure of Section 2 (a) to the Counter-Terrorism Law. In fact, the defense seeks to read the law as a "closed list" of technical actions, while the legislature constructed the clause as a substantive-functional definition.
The claim that there is no definition of the term "friend" violates the purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Law and its linguistic structure. The term 'member', which appears at the preamble of section 2, constitutes a broad substantive definition intended to capture the affinity of belonging to the organization, beyond its formal forms. While the Haganah tries to reduce the offense to a list of physical or virtual rituals, in an era of decentralized terrorism, the significance required by virtue of the principle of legality is crystallized by the interface between the expression of will (expression) and the adoption of the organization's operative tools (slang and combat doctrine). A person who defines himself as a member by means of an oath and acts in accordance with the organizational codes creates the required criminal certainty with his own hands. The definition in the law is clear enough to make it clear to such a person that by doing so, he is crossing the line between "sympathetic" and "belonging to a people," and thus the principle of legality is fully fulfilled.