According to the defense attorneys, it appears from the above that the court itself understood the difficulties arising from the conduct and failures of the investigative unit, i.e., the violation of the basic rights of a suspect with no criminal record who is not familiar with the legal world, and it impairs his ability to manage his defense in an optimal manner, even more so when it comes to the offense of murder. According to the claim, it is clear that if the defendant had consulted with a lawyer, the defendant would have understood the importance of his first interrogation and the importance of the version he gave to the police.
As is well known, the right to consult with a lawyer is a basic right intended to ensure that a detainee is aware of all his rights, including the right to confidentiality from self-incrimination and the right to remain silent, and in addition, information about the right to counsel ensures the fairness and proper conduct of interrogation proceedings, and prevents abuse of the powers built between the detainee and his interrogators (see Criminal Appeal 2868/13 Issacharov v. State of Israel).
At the same time, an examination of the defendant's first interrogation with the police, dated July 15, 2019, P/9, shows that in the said interrogation, the defendant answered almost all the questions, while lying mainly about a number of key details. The defendant lied by stating that his relationship with Muhammad was one of "goodbye" (Q. 13) and that he had met Muhammad only two or three weeks earlier. The defendant lied in saying that he had only heard about defendant 3 (Q. 32). The defendant also lied by stating that his trip south was to the Dead Sea, but in the Beersheba area the strap in the jeep was torn and he was forced to return home (Q. 69). In addition, he lied by saying that Muhammad and Defendant 1 did not travel in his car (Q. 102, 103). The defendant also lied about the purpose of his trip to the Occupied Territories.
Indeed, in his first interrogation, the defendant was not told that he was accused of murder, and as noted above, this may have been done because at the said stage, the investigative unit did not yet believe that the defendant was actually involved in the murder. The problem is that, as noted above, already in the second interrogation of the defendant, which took place the day after his first interrogation, the defendant was explicitly told that he was suspected of murder. A review of the defendant's second interrogation (P/10B) shows that at the beginning of the interrogation, after it was explained to the defendant that he was suspected of murdering the deceased, the interrogator made sure with the defendant that he had spoken with his lawyer, Adv. Shemesh, and when he replied that he had not, the interrogator called Adv. Shemesh, but the defendant told him that he was not interested in speaking with him. Moreover, an examination of all the statements of defendant 2 in his second interrogation shows that in that interrogation the defendant continued his line of answers from the first interrogation and he did not appear to be particularly affected by the fact that at that stage he was already presented by a lawyer with whom he had contacted him.