Second, and regarding the claims regarding the lack of distinction between fees and reimbursement of expenses (Article 85 Law and Section 44 Rules of Ethics) - The court ruled that the format of the tender creates a clear separation between the fees to be paid to the winner, and reimbursement for his expenses, which will be paid separately and subject to prior approval. In this regard, the District Court relied on clause 45 of the tender, which deals with the payment of consideration to the winner; and in particular, the court referred to sub-clause 45.1: "Each requirement in the tender will be interpreted in accordance with the law and in accordance with the rules of ethics and restrictions that apply by law to lawyers, and in any case of a contradiction between what is stated in the ethics laws and what is stated in the tender - What is stated in the laws of ethics will prevail." In addition, the trial court relied on the answers to the clarification questions (and in particular questions 24,27 and 45), where it was clarified that the winners of the tender would be entitled to reimbursement of expenses for all the external professional services they would assist, as long as this was given prior approval by the Director-General; and referred to the determinations detailed in this context in the matter Rifand (in paragraphs 35-38 of the judgment).
- In the trial judgment, additional arguments by the appellant regarding the unreasonableness of a long list of tender terms (as detailed in paragraphs 33-34) were rejected; since it was found that there was no room to interfere with the authority's discretion.
- Therefore, the appellant's petition was rejected, and expenses were awarded in favor of the respondents in the sum of ILS 40,000.
Hence the appeal before us.
The Appellant's Arguments
- First, the appellant argues that his procedural rights were violated in the preliminary proceeding, first and foremost the right to a plea, because he was not given the opportunity to argue in an orderly manner, whether by way of oral argument or by way of submitting arguments or summaries. With regard to the hearing held on June 30,2022, the appellant argues that this was in fact a preliminary hearing, which was held only four days after the filing of the reply on behalf of the respondent, and therefore this cannot be viewed as a realization of the right to a plea. In addition, the appellant argues that prior to the issuance of the judgment, no decision was made in his request of October 6,2022 to add the additional bidders in the tender as respondents to the petition.
According to the appellant, the following injuries"30 in his procedural rights caused him to pervert the law and in themselves justify the annulment of the trial judgment.
- At the same time, the appellant claims that there was no delay in filing the petition. In this regard, the appellant emphasizes that his petition was filed on May 26,2022, only 9 days after receiving a response from the tenders committee, which rejected his objections (the response was received on May 17,2022).
- On the merits, the appellant reiterated his three main arguments in the lower court (as detailed above in paragraph 12): the argument that the tender suffers from defects in the conflict of interest that justifies its cancellation; the argument that the quantitative criterion is not relevant to the tender and that the weight given to it is unreasonable; the argument that the provisions of the tender violate the laws of ethics - both with regard to the uniqueness of the profession and with regard to the duty to distinguish between the payment of legal fees and reimbursement of expenses.
- The appellant also directs his appeal against the interim decision of the trial court of August 19,2022, regarding the request to amend the minutes; and against the interim decision of January 1,2023, in which his request to provide additional details was denied.
In addition, the appellant argues against the expenses awarded to him in the sum of ILS 40,000"VIII.