Caselaw

Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 9884-06-23 Tal Ohev Zion v. Ronen Ohev Zion - part 6

October 21, 2026
Print

When will the court order a forced purchase - the rule

  1. As mentioned, Section 191 of the Law enshrines the court's broad authority to order remedies to remove oppression. Once oppression is proven, one of the remedies explicitly mentioned in Section 191 of the Companies Law is forced acquisition.  As part of implementing this remedy, the court is authorized under Section 191(a) of the Companies Law to order the purchase of a shareholder's shares according to their value, whether by another shareholder or by the company itself.  This remedy is part of the range of remedies "that bring the relationship between shareholders to an end" (Eran Spindel and Yael Zchut, Shareholders' Struggle: The Cause of Discrimination in Private and Public Companies, p. 323 (2017) (hereinafter: Spindel and Zchut).
  2. The importance of this remedy was emphasized by the Supreme Court in other municipal requests 5804/19 B. Real Estate Management Ltd. v. Tinhav Construction and Development Company (1990) Ltd., published in Nevo, on 3.10.2021, in paragraph 46 (hereinafter: the Tinhav case): "The remedy of forced sale has been recognized in case law as the main remedy for removing oppression and loss of trust, due to its advantages as a simple mechanism and as a remedy that allows determining which party will be the controlling owner after the forced purchase.  (...) It was further noted that this remedy is a "royal road" in classic cases of minority discrimination, where the court was convinced that the way to remove the discrimination is through separation between the opponents."
  3. When it comes to private companies, the court will make broader use of its authority to order the purchase of shares of a shareholder (Shpindel and Zchut, p. 350), in order to prevent a situation where the shareholder is in a "trap": "This authority of the court is applied even more strongly when it comes to private companies whose shares do not enjoy high liquidity: the minority shareholder may find themselves "trapped" in the company, without the ability to realize his property, when he falls into a situation of exploitation or deprivation" (Civil Case (Tel Aviv-Jaffa District) 1720/04 Etting Yonatan v. Spector Avner, published in Nevo, given on 6.5.08, section 33).
  4. On the unique characteristics of this remedy, its advantages and disadvantages, the Supreme Court addressed in the Adler case, in Section 85: "The advantage of this remedy is twofold: first, it is a mechanism that is simple to implement, and second, the remedy allows pre-determining which party will be the controlling shareholder after the separation of powers. It should be noted that in cases where this remedy is applied as a remedy to remove oppression, usually it is the oppressed party who is obligated to buy the shares of the oppressed party, but there may be cases where it may be appropriate to require the oppressed party to purchase the shares of the oppressed party (...).  Alongside the advantages of the remedy is also its main disadvantage-the need to obtain an objective valuation, which can be expensive and reflect a value that deviates to some extent from the value the parties themselves attribute to the company."
  5. However, while forced purchase is the "royal way" in a classic minority oppression situation, its granting is not automatic. Case law has established that the remedy of compelling share purchase should be used proportionally, as this remedy may harm the proprietary rights of shareholders and interfere with the company's internal affairs (see Pindel and Zchut, pp.  351-352).  In light of these limitations and the potential harm to the shareholder's property, it is important to distinguish between oppression and mere dispute.  Thus, it was ruled that loss of trust between the parties or a strained relationship, by themselves, does not constitute sufficient grounds justifying coercion to purchase (see Civil Case (Economic) 11439-05-19 Lilach Tal v. Orly Guy, paragraph 139 of Judge Sharvit's ruling, published in Nevo, dated 21.1.2024, hereinafter: the Tal case).  However, it was determined there: "Once the existence of ongoing oppression has been proven, which in itself justifies granting a coercive purchase relief, the strained relationship between the parties strengthens the justification for granting this remedy."
  6. The question of the weight of loss of trust as a justification for separation of powers takes on unique significance when the company is not a regular private company but operates as a "kind of partnership." In such companies, when the parties' relationship breaks down, shareholders may feel a "dead end." Against this background, case law has given Section 191 of the Companies Law an interpretation of "open tapestry, " which does not list a closed list of remedies. The Supreme Court explicitly ruled that in the case of a "quasi-partnership" company, the broad and flexible authority of the section can be used to provide a just solution even in cases of loss of trust or "deadlock, " which by themselves justify the separation of powers in the company, without proof of any oppression at all (see the Magnazi case in paragraph 15).
  7. When the court comes to "separate forces" in a company that is quasi-partnership, it faces several alternatives. Case law has determined that in cases of pure loss of trust (without oppression), the "proper way" will be to conduct internal bidding between the shareholders (such as the envelope method, ibid., paragraph 17).  However, in the Magnazi case, it was clarified that the bidding remedy "is not without defects, " and it was ruled that bidding is an inappropriate tool when there are significant power imbalances between the parties (ibid., paragraph 17).  In these cases, there is a real concern that the economically strong side might make an offer that would give it an unfair advantage and push the weaker party aside (see also Adler case, paragraph 87).
  8. Therefore, where there are significant power imbalances between the parties, or where either party has a close and special connection to the company and its activities, the court must abandon the bidding method and adopt the forced purchase remedy, based on an external and objective valuation. This is to ensure the severance of the connection in a fair manner, "by manually tailoring each case according to its circumstances" (Magnazi case, paragraph 15).

From the general to the specific

  1. In our case, I have reached the general conclusion that regarding the period preceding Eli's passing, Yoram and Ronen had equal rights to him, and the relationship between the brothers was based, alongside the formal corporate structure, also on trust and partnership. See Ronen's testimony on page 54, lines 22-27: "From the age of 17 until the day of his death - I worked with him hand in hand, with great love, full trust...  Eli was the eldest; when I spoke to him - I spoke to him with my head down, that's how we were raised, after Dad it's Eli, Eli and Eli and Eli."
  2. Alas, the situation changed after Eli's passing. While the plaintiffs, his heirs, did not seek to fill his shoes regarding the management of the companies, the defendants took Eli's place in managing the companies (see the defense, section 15; Tal's affidavit, section 8, it should be noted that the plaintiffs do not claim that by virtue of their inheritance they have the right to manage the companies or that the defendants are not entitled to continue managing them).  In fact, since the death, the plaintiffs were not involved in managing the companies and, according to them, have no intention of being involved: "I want to receive what is due to me and my younger brothers and to separate, I no longer want any connection to these things, I want to receive what I am entitled to and continue our lives" (Tal, p. 37, lines 13-15).
  3. Tal was asked if during Eli's life "you made a living from all these friends, " and she replied: "I don't know, but we lived at a high standard of living, and it's as if it just stopped since he passed away" (p. 37, lines 29-32).  Her testimony also shows, and by the very existence of additional pending proceedings in the Family Court, that there is a severe crisis of trust between the parties: "All the interaction I had with my uncles was only in the courts where they often made statements against me and my brothers, towards my father.  Once during the hearing, it was said by Yoram that before the hearing, he went and urinated on my father's grave before he arrived" (p.  32, lines 8-11); "We were told they would take revenge on us" (p.  32, line 13); "Ronen told my sister that if he needed to-he would also sue us.  In one of the discussions with the estate administrator, it was said that suddenly we had a secret brother.  Throughout the entire time since my father passed away, the interaction with us was very unpleasant, very blunt, insulting, with threats of doing things to us, making our lives miserable, leaving us nothing, and therefore I never approached direct interaction except through a lawyer" (p.  32, lines 15-20).
  4. I will note that during the meetings, Tal and her sister, not even during Tal's testimony, broke down in tears, and it was clear that the whole situation was difficult and stressful for them, especially when things were said against their mother: "This has nothing to do with my mother at all, this lawsuit is about me and my younger brothers not receiving a single shekel from the moment my father passed away, not a single shekel for anything, the three of us have no connection to friendship, The three of us are in the army, I am in permanent service, Ron is in permanent service, Amir is in regular service, I have no connection to friendships, the only thing I want is to receive what I am entitled to and end the relationship with them, because it simply does not allow us to move forward in life, neither personally nor mentally" (p. 32, lines 22-28).  I was impressed that this is indeed the case.
  5. Therefore, and in accordance with the precedents reviewed and mentioned above, I have reached the general conclusion that this is a private and family company operating as a "quasi-partnership"; I was impressed that there are strained relations between the parties, as evidenced by the additional legal proceedings ongoing and will continue to be conducted in the past, including regarding the plaintiffs' residence; I have come to the conclusion that indeed there is a deep trust crisis; see Tal's words on p. 34, line 32 to p. 35, line 3: "But you yourselves claim there is a lack of trust, because Yoram is suing my deceased father for being an untrustworthy person and embezzling money, so you can't say there is no crisis of trust if you yourselves sue my deceased father for being an untrustworthy person and a fraud, so how, and you disgrace his name after he died, so don't come and say there are good trust relations when in another lawsuit you say not."
  6. Not only that. I was impressed that the acts of discrimination have continued for years, since Eli's death in 2017, and this is not a isolated case; I was impressed that there are power imbalances between the parties - the older and experienced uncles, the founders of the company, versus the younger nephews who are not involved at all in management; I was impressed that it is not possible to sell the shares to any third party under the existing constellation; I have reached the conclusion that there is no more moderate remedy that can be granted to the plaintiffs - such as appointing a director or distributing dividends, since this is not the essence of the lawsuit; I have concluded that the plaintiffs are neither interested nor able to manage Ohev Zion Investments, and therefore a bidding is not on the table.  In the present case, it is justified to order a mechanism of forced purchase in the manner described below, even if in other companies the plaintiffs retain shareholders.
  7. Regarding the date for valuing the shares, I refer to the words of Judge Sharvit in the Tal case in Chapter D.3 (Sections 150-172) of the judgment, where it was stated: "Thereis no absolute rule regarding the date by which a company's value should be assessed for the relief of compulsory purchase, when the court has broad discretion in this matter, mainly for reasons of justice in the specific case before it. It seems that in most cases, the valuation date will be the date the claim is filed (as the default according to English case law) or the date of the oppression or some date in between.  Personally, I tend to prefer by default the date of the valuation to the date of filing the claim for forced purchase relief, since this is the date when the plaintiff expresses his desire for separation, while maintaining broad discretion for the court to set a different date for reasons of justice." At this stage, I adopt this position.
  8. In light of the above and the details, I hereby order as follows:
  9. The plaintiffs' shares in defendants 3-4 will be purchased by the defendants according to the ratio of their holdings in the companies, in exchange for equal payments, as will be determined below.
  10. The parties shall notify the court, within 14 days from the date of the judgment, of an agreed identity for the expert to determine the value of the shares as of the date of filing the claim. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the court shall appoint a valuation expert on its behalf.  The expert shall provide the court with the required declaration of the absence of a conflict of interest.
  • The expert will be entitled to request from the parties any document, data, or information required to perform his work, and the parties will provide him with all the required knowledge and documents, taking into account that control and management of the companies are in the hands of the defendants. Any document the expert receives from one party will be reviewed by the other party.
  1. The expert will submit his opinion within 90 days from the date of appointment. In the opinion, the expert will also address the relevant dispute regarding the amount of the owners' loans in defendants 3-4, all at his professional discretion.  If the expert finds this dispute relevant, he will detail the possible tracks for calculation.
  2. His salary will be paid at this stage by the companies, and a settlement will be made upon the issuance of a final judgment.
  3. The expert's opinion will serve as the basis for determining the compensation to be paid to the plaintiffs, the parties will be entitled to submit substantive comments regarding the expert opinion within 14 days from the date of receipt, and the expert may, at their professional discretion, amend or complete their opinion within an additional 14 days.
  • After receiving the expert's opinion (after its amendment, if requested), it must be submitted to the court, and after the parties' positions are requested, instructions will be given to conclude the proceedings and issue a final judgment. In the final judgment, I will also address the issue of costs.
  • The file will be brought before me for an internal reminder on 14.3.27.

Given today, 10 Cheshvan 5787, October 21,2026, in the absence of the parties. 

Previous part1...56
7Next part
Skip to content