Caselaw

Civil Appeal 47526-05-26Leave Jazel Weinrot v. Moshe Gartner

November 17, 2026
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In the Supreme Court sitting as a civil appeals court

Civil Appeal Permission    47526-05-26

 Civil Appeal Permission 55664-05-26

Civil Appeal Permission 19977-06-26

 

Before: The Honor of the    Judge    David Mintz

Honorable Judge Yael Wilner

Honorable Judge Alex Stein

 

The Ra’   Requesting a

47526-05-26 and Civil Appeal 55664-05-26 and the respondents Civil Appeal 19977-06-26:

   1 .     Jesel Weinrot

2 .     Yechiel     Weinrot

3 .     bear     Weinrot

4 .     wolf     Weinrot

5 .     Shmuel     Weinrot

6 .     Esther Atzmon

7 .     Hannah Tzipora Lev

 

Against

 

The   Respondents     B    Civil Appeal Permission
47526-05-26 and    Civil Appeal Permission     55664-05-26 VM    Requests     B    Civil Appeal Permission  19977-06-26:
   1 .     Moshe Gartner

2 .     Mandy Gartner

3 .     The     Mendi    Gertner  Trust

4 .     The Moises     Gertner     Trust

 

Two requests for leave to appeal the  judgment of the Jerusalem District Court (Judge D. Ziller) in civil case 71355-05-25 and civil case 41172-07-25 dated 26.2.2026; and a request for leave to appeal his decision dated 12.5.2026

In the name of the Lord Bara   Requesting ‘a

47526-05-26 and Civil Appeal 55664-05-26 and the respondents Civil Appeal 19977-06-26:

 

 

Attorney Eyal Rozovsky; Attorney Eli Borshtin;

Adv. Lior Reichert; Adv. Liron Sapir

The   Respondents     B    Civil Appeal Permission
47526-05-26 and    Civil Appeal Permission     55664-05-26 VM    Requests     B    Civil Appeal Permission  19977-06-26:
 

Attorney;   Uriel    Prinz  Attorney Marina Roizer;

Attorney Ilan Gold; Attorney Elad Moshe; Noa Hadadi

 

 

Judgment

 

 

E:   Judge    David Mintz

Three requests for leave to appeal against the judgment and decision of the Jerusalem District Court (Judge D. Ziller) in civil case 71355-05-25 and civil case 41172-07-25: two requests for leave to appeal the judgment dated 26.2.2026, in which an arbitration award given in the proceedings between the parties was partially approved and the other part was returned for hearing before the arbitrator (hereinafter: The ruling); and a request for leave to appeal his decision dated 12.5.2026, in which he ordered the enforcement of a security deposited to secure the fulfillment of the arbitration award (hereinafter: The decision regarding the guarantee).

Background to the requests

  1. The applicants in Civil Appeal Leave 47526-05-26 (who are also the respondents in Civil Appeal 19977-06-26 and the applicants in Civil Appeal Leave 55664-05-26; hereinafter: the heirs) are the heirs of the deceased, the late Adv. Yaakov Weinrot (hereinafter: the deceased). The applicants in  Civil Appeal Leave 19977-06-26 (who are also the respondents in Civil Appeal  Leave 47526-05-26 and Civil Appeal Leave 55664-05-26; hereinafter: Gartner) are former clients of the deceased, who were represented by him in arbitration proceedings conducted against a third party (hereinafter: parallel arbitration). Following disputes that arose between Gartner and the deceased regarding the management of the parallel arbitration, mutual claims were filed by them, which were mutually referred to arbitration before the same arbitrator who heard the parallel arbitration (hereinafter:  the arbitration process and the arbitrator).
  2. During the arbitration process, the deceased passed away. As a result, Gartner approached the arbitrator requesting that the heirs be appointed as parties in the proceeding in the deceased's place. In their response, the heirs noted that in order to allow the continuation of the arbitration process, they would continue to conduct it in the deceased's place, but clarified that they would not take their place in matters beyond the arbitration management. In the arbitrator's decision dated 22.12.2019, it was determined that the heirs would indeed be the parties in place of the deceased.
  3. At the end of the arbitration process, on May 12, 2025, an arbitration award was issued in which the arbitrator determined that the deceased had refrained from returning to Gartner funds totaling 37,500,000 US dollars transferred to him in trust, and therefore the deceased and the heirs must pay Gartner this amount "jointly and severally" (hereinafter: the arbitration award or award). Gartner filed a request with the District Court to approve the arbitration award (hereinafter: the approval request), while the heirs submitted a request to annul it (hereinafter: the cancellation request).
  4. The cancellation request was based on two main arguments. First, that the heirs became parties to the arbitration proceeding only to allow its continued conduct, and the arbitrator had no authority to adjudicate their personal liability for the deceased's estate debts (hereinafter also: the estate). It was argued in this context that according to the provisions of the Inheritance Law, 1965 (hereinafter:  the Inheritance Law), a condition for imposing personal liability on heirs for estate debts is that the estate is divided; And when it is found that there is reason to obligate an heir personally, the amount of the obligation is influenced by the value of the estate and by whether the testator's creditors were summoned to notify their claims. These are therefore factual questions that go beyond the original dispute before the arbitrator, whose need for clarification arose after the deceased's death, and therefore even if the heirs succeeded him in the proceeding, this does not grant the arbitrator jurisdiction to hear them within the arbitration process. The second argument  raised by the heirs in the annulment request was that the arbitration award contradicts the arbitrator's factual findings in the parallel arbitration regarding funds Gartner transferred to the deceased, which would have established estoppel. Among other things, it was argued that while the arbitration award in the parallel arbitration determined that the deceased transferred part of the funds to the party with whom Gartner conducted the proceedings; in this arbitration, it was determined that the deceased did not transfer the funds to the opposing party and must return them to Gartner.
  5. Shortly after submitting the certification and cancellation requests, Gartner filed a request to require the heirs to deposit a security to ensure compliance with the arbitration award, and to impose liens on various assets belonging to them and the deceased. On May 29, 2025, temporary liens were imposed ex parte on the said assets, and on October 22, 2025, the heirs were required to deposit a security of 7,000,000 ILS.

The District Court's ruling

  1. In its judgment dated 26.2.2026, the District Court upheld the arbitration award regarding the obligation of the deceased and partially accepted the cancellation request concerning the obligation of the heirs, while returning the matter to the arbitrator.
  2. Regarding the  heirs' first claim, concerning their personal liability – the court ruled that according to the provisions of Section 4 of the Arbitration Law, 1968 (hereinafter: the Arbitration Law), which states that "an arbitration agreement and the authority of an arbitrator under which their power is valid also regarding the parties' substitutes to the agreement [...]", the force of an arbitration agreement also applies to the parties' alternatives, and in this case, the heirs are indeed the deceased's substitutes regarding the financial disputes between him and Gartner. However, it is unclear whether Section 4 of the Arbitration Law alone is sufficient to grant the arbitrator authority to hear the heirs' liability personally. On the one hand, there is reason to believe that where heirs become parties to arbitration proceedings by virtue of being substitutes, they should be regarded as entering it "to terminate it," in a way that also addresses their personal responsibility without the need to initiate additional and independent proceedings against them to determine this liability. This conclusion aligns with the purpose of Section 4 of the Arbitration Law to ensure the efficiency of the process—a purpose that will be thwarted if, whenever an estate proceeding is involved, a complete and final resolution of the dispute cannot be brought and an additional proceeding will be required against the heirs to determine their personal liability. This conclusion also aligns with the fact that an estate is not a legal entity, and therefore where a litigant has passed away, their heir takes their place as a party whether the estate is divided or not.  On the other hand, one cannot ignore the difficulty in providing a sweeping interpretation of Section 4 of the Arbitration Law, according to which an heir will be subject to arbitration proceedings also regarding their personal responsibility for the estate's debts, even if they did not agree to the arbitration terms and were not part of shaping its terms.
  3. Despite the above, the court held that under the circumstances there is no need to decide on the question, since in this case the arbitrator indeed acquired jurisdiction to consider the heirs' personal liability. This is because the arbitration agreement between the deceased and Gartner was broadly drafted and may also include a personal obligation for the heirs; The heirs did not object in real time to the decision to join them in the proceeding, even though it was given after the arbitrator was presented with the question of his authority to bind them personally; and according to established case law, parties who are not signatories to the arbitration agreement may also be joined to arbitration if it is found that they agreed to it substantively (the "third extension circle"), and this was the case in our case in light of representations made by the heirs in other proceedings. Against this background, it was ruled that a claim from the heirs that the proceedings should be conducted in "two stages" should not be accepted. Nevertheless, the court found that the heirs' personal obligation in the arbitration award was made without Gartner raising a claim on the matter or seeking to amend their pleadings after joining the heirs, and without conducting the factual inquiry involved. Therefore, it was determined that the ground for annulment set forth in Section 24(4) of the Arbitration Law arises, concerning the failure to provide a proper opportunity to present arguments or present evidence, since since no clear argument was raised by Gartner on the matter, no response was given by the heirs; The ground for annulment set forth in Section 24(6), which concerns the lack of reasoning for the arbitration award, when the arbitrator did not justify his decision to hold the heirs personally liable; and the ground for annulment set forth in Section 24(9), concerning an arbitration award contrary to public policy, since the heirs were ordered to pay an amount higher than the share of the estate they inherited. Alongside this, it was noted that the existence of these grounds does not justify annulling the arbitration award, and given the arbitrator's fundamental authority to hear the matter, the proper course of action is to return the matter to the court.
  4. Regarding the heirs' second claim , concerning the existing relationship between the arbitration award under discussion and the arbitration award in the parallel arbitration, it was determined that although there are conflicting findings between the arbitrator's decision in the arbitration proceeding and his decision in the parallel arbitration, these are separate arbitrations based on different questions and evidence, which explains the aforementioned contradiction. Furthermore, the decision on the relevant factual questions in the parallel arbitration was not required for the purpose of the final ruling, and therefore, contrary to the heirs' claim, no estoppel was created. In addition, the heirs did not request to delay the arbitration process until the conclusion of the parallel arbitration proceedings and did not claim a contradiction between the two arbitration awards shortly after the arbitration award was issued in the parallel arbitration, and for this reason as well, the claim of estoppel should be rejected.
  5. In conclusion, the court ordered the approval of the arbitration award regarding the deceased's estate and returned the hearing to the arbitrator to decide on the heirs' personal liability for the estate's debts.

The decision regarding the guarantee

  1. Following the issuance of the judgment, Gartner approached the District Court requesting to transfer to them the security deposit deposited by the heirs following the cancellation request; to enforce the liens imposed on the estate's assets; and to leave the liens imposed on the heirs' assets until a decision is made in the supplementary arbitrator's ruling regarding their personal liability. The heirs opposed the request, arguing that they deposited the security to ensure the enforcement of an arbitration award issued against them, and it should not be enforced when their personal obligation on the deceased's debts was canceled and returned to the arbitrator; that they were assisted in depositing it with third parties; that an estate is not a legal entity and therefore its obligation is impractical as long as it is not possible to bind its heirs; and that the liens imposed on the heirs' personal assets expired on the day the judgment was given with the cancellation of their personal obligation.
  2. On 12.5.2026, the court granted the request regarding the guarantee and rejected it concerning attachments. Regarding the guarantee, it was determined that the cancellation request was submitted by the heirs both on behalf of the estate regarding its obligation and on their own behalf and regarding their personal obligation, and it was intended to ensure the enforcement of the arbitration award against any of them if the cancellation request is rejected. Therefore, the heirs' arguments on this matter are not accepted. Moreover, the heirs are restrained from arguing that the arbitration award should not be seen as relating to the estate itself, as they argued throughout the annulment motion. Therefore, since the cancellation request was denied regarding the estate's debts, there is room to transfer the guarantee to Gartner, and the claim that the collateral originated from third parties does not change this conclusion. Regarding liens imposed on the heirs' own assets, it was determined that once their personal liability was canceled, the grounds for imposing the lienses against them expired. Regarding liens imposed on the estate's assets, it was determined that the proper way to carry out a temporary lien is not through the court but through an enforcement procedure; and that there is uncertainty regarding how the judgment can be enforced against the estate's assets, since it is unknown whether the estate was divided and who is responsible for its debts. Therefore, it is necessary to wait for a decision regarding the heirs' personal liability before operational enforcement procedures can be taken.
  3. Hence, the requests before us, two of which, as mentioned, are directed against the judgment, and one of them is directed at the decision regarding the guarantee. The parties' arguments in the three aforementioned requests focus on three main components: the personal liability of the heirs; the relationship between the arbitration award in question and the arbitration award in parallel arbitration; and the transfer of the guarantee deposited by the heirs to Gartner. In order for the reader to be drawn to read the judgment, I will first detail the parties' arguments regarding the heirs' personal liability, then address their arguments regarding the relationship between the arbitration awards, and finally detail their arguments regarding the guarantee.

The parties' claims - the personal liability of the heirs

  1. According to the heirs, the District Court rightly ruled that a personal obligation of heirs requires a factual investigation regarding the fulfillment of various conditions such as the actual distribution of the estate, the value of its assets, and more—conditions that were neither claimed nor proven by Gartner. However, the court erred in ruling that the arbitrator has jurisdiction to discuss the fulfillment of these conditions and to reinstate the proceedings before him.
  2. First, it was argued that there was no reason to refrain from deciding whether Section 4 of the Arbitration Law could grant the arbitrator jurisdiction to hear personal liability of heirs. This is a fundamental issue with broad implications, and a decision on it would have led to a different outcome than that reached by the court in its judgment. It was argued in this context that Section 4 of the Arbitration Law is intended to prevent the frustration of the original dispute, while the question of the personal liability of heirs towards a creditor is a different, later dispute distinct from the original dispute that arose between the creditor and the deceased; subject to later factual conditions of the arbitration agreement and the grounds originating in the Inheritance Law; and which is not absorbed in clarifying the original dispute between the deceased and the creditor. This is especially true when the heirs never agreed to resolve it in arbitration. Therefore, the determination that the heirs are the successors of the deceased under the aforementioned section can at most require clarifying the deceased's liability, but not their personal liability.
  3. It was also argued that the court erred in ruling that under the circumstances the arbitrator had jurisdiction to hear the heirs' personal liability. In this regard, it was argued, among other things, that the heirs never agreed to be parties to the agreement and that the broad wording of the arbitration agreement does not change this; that according to the wording of the arbitration agreement between the deceased and Gartner, it is not possible to learn any agreement to discuss the heirs' personal liability after his death; that the heirs did not dispute their inclusion in the proceedings as substitutes for the deceased and therefore had no reason to appeal the arbitrator's decision on this matter; that the decision to join them did not address the question of their personal liability at all; that the determination that they are excluded from arguing regarding their personal liability does not align with the determination that the question of their liability did not explicitly arise in the proceedings; that even if the arbitrator had ruled that he had jurisdiction, the ground to challenge this decision is within the framework of a request for annulment after the award was given; that the discussion on the question of joining the heirs to the proceedings under the "third expansion circle" is unnecessary given that they are in any case parties to the proceeding by virtue of being substitutes; and that the heirs' statements do not establish estoppel against them at all.
  4. The heirs further argued that even if the arbitrator had the authority to adjudicate their personal liability, it was exhausted in the proceeding before him. Therefore, Gartner should not be allowed to make a "step of improvement" and now raise claims he did not make before him at the first opportunity, in order to hold the heirs personally liable for the deceased's debts under inheritance law. Furthermore, the hearing should not be returned to the arbitrator who issued an arbitration award contrary to public policy.
  5. Gartner, for their part, relied on the court's determination that the arbitrator had acquired jurisdiction to hear the heirs' personal liability, but believed he erred in canceling their personal liability and returning the matter to the arbitrator.
  6. Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, it was argued that the court's decision was based on the specific circumstances of the case and there is no reason to intervene. The wording of the agreement is broad and supports the interpretation that the arbitrator had the authority to discuss their personal liability, and contrary to what was claimed, the heirs' personal liability is not a later dispute or external to the dispute between the deceased and Gartner. Furthermore, the heirs' various representations do indeed justify including them in the arbitration process. In any case, since the heirs refrained from claiming that the arbitrator's authority is limited throughout the arbitration process, they are now restrained from raising arguments on the matter.
  7. Regarding the cancellation of the heirs' personal liability and the return of the hearing to the arbitrator, it was argued that the judgment expands the grounds for annulment under the Arbitration Law, thereby causing significant harm to the institution of arbitration and prolonged legal hardship. Without exhaustion, it was argued that the arbitrator's decision that the heirs would be parties in place of the deceased was explicit and clear; that the heirs had the right to submit additional pleadings after joining the proceedings and argue that they should not be held personally liable, but that they deliberately chose not to do so in order to maintain ambiguity regarding the value of the estate; that Gartner explicitly stated throughout the proceedings that they intended to request the heirs' personal liability; and that claims limiting the heirs' personal liability are clear defenses that should not be allowed to be raised only after the conclusion of the proceedings. In light of all the above, there was no basis to say that there was material harm to the heirs' right to argument or to the rules of natural justice. Moreover, there was no reason to determine that there was a defect in the reasoning of the arbitration award, since the heirs' personal obligation is a direct legal result of stepping into the deceased's shoes and therefore no reasoning is required. In any case, at most, the court should have returned the award to the arbitrator to complete his reasoning. In addition to the above, there was also no basis to determine that the arbitration award contradicts public policy, since this is a ground for annulment reserved for exceptional cases and deals with the content of the award and not the conduct of the proceedings.
  8. Finally, Gartner argued that the heirs' claim that Gartner's cause of action against them had already been exhausted in the arbitration proceeding should be rejected, as it contradicts their claims that they were denied the right to argue regarding their personal liability.

The parties' arguments - the relationship between the arbitration awards

  1. According to the heirs, the court erred in determining that the arbitration process and the parallel arbitration proceeding are separate proceedings, as they are related and involve the same dispute and the same foundation. Furthermore, contrary to the court's ruling, the factual decisions were essential to the arbitration award in the parallel arbitration, and therefore they establish a defensive estoppel in their favor. According to the heirs, the contradiction between the arbitration awards creates a severe result contrary to public policy, and the court's reasoning does not resolve the contradiction. The court also erred in attributing to the heirs the fact that they did not raise claims in court practice before the arbitrator in real time, since the summaries in this arbitration were submitted before the arbitration award in the parallel arbitration was given.
  2. In contrast to Gartner's approach, the court's findings regarding contradictions between the arbitration awards are based on factual findings and an examination of the two arbitration awards, and therefore should not be interfered with. The heirs' claims are also appealable in nature and do not justify granting leave to appeal. Even on the merits, they must be rejected, since it was determined that the outcome of the parallel arbitration was not affected by the factual findings claimed to contradict the arbitrator's factual findings in the arbitration process, and therefore the conditions for estoppel dispute are not met.

The parties' claims - transferring the guarantee to Gartner

  1. According to the heirs, the court's findings regarding the transfer of the guarantee to Gartner contradict each other: on the one hand, it was determined that the estate is not a legal entity and that there is no debt owed by the heirs to Gartner, and on the other hand, it was determined that the estate owes Gartner and therefore the security deposited by the heirs should be transferred to them. It was argued in this context that the heirs' consent to the existence of a debt of the deceased to Gartner does not resolve the aforementioned contradiction; that the estate is not a "party" against whom the arbitration award was issued, and the security deposited under the Arbitration Law was not intended to ensure the enforcement of the award against it; and that at this time, according to inheritance law, there is effectively no legal entity liable under the arbitration award against Gartner, so there was no basis to transfer the guarantee to them. Additionally, the court's decision contains internal contradictions regarding whether the estate was indeed divided or not.
  2. Gartner, for their part, relied on the District Court's decision. Among other things, it was argued that the decision is based on the law regarding the deposit of security and relies on factual findings, including that the cancellation request did not only concern their personal liability but also the estate's obligation. Furthermore, contrary to the heirs' claims, the arbitration award is enforceable regarding the estate's assets, and there is no dispute that the heirs must pay Gartner at least a debt equal to the estate's value. In this regard, it cannot be argued on the one hand that the estate is not a legal entity and has no debts, and on the other hand, that the heirs owe nothing either. There is also bad faith in the heirs' claims since they did not appeal the decision that ordered them to deposit the security as a condition for reviewing the cancellation request, but once their request was denied, they argued that the funds they deposited could not be used. Finally, and contrary to the heirs' claim, the court did not attribute debts to the estate nor treated it as a legal entity. An estate is the mass of rights and debts left by the deceased upon their passing, and therefore a creditor may act to collect the estate's debts by initiating proceedings against the estate assets held by the heirs.

Discussion and ruling

  1. After reviewing the judgment, the decision regarding the surety, the requests for leave to appeal, and their responses, I have reached the general conclusion that leave to appeal should be granted on one of the three issues raised in the requests—the issue of the arbitrator's authority to consider the personal liability of heirs who succeed the deceased as substitutes under Section 4 of the Arbitration Law. In this regard, I have decided to exercise the authority granted to me under Regulation 149(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 2018, to grant leave to appeal and to hear it as if an appeal was filed under the permission granted.
  2. Leave to appeal in arbitration matters is reserved for exceptional cases where a fundamental or public legal question arises that exceeds the interests of the parties or when intervention is required for reasons of justice or to prevent a miscarriage of justice (see, for example: Civil Appeal Authority 66369-02-25 Tai Investment and Trade Ltd. v. Fishman, paragraph 9 (2.7.2025) (hereinafter: Tai Investment Cells case); Civil Appeal 4146/23 Palacio Properties Ltd. v. Pedlon Building and Investments (R&A) 1982 Ltd., paragraph 10 of my opinion (13.6.2024)). In our case, the aforementioned issue indeed raises a fundamental legal question, and therefore this case falls within those exceptional cases justifying granting leave to appeal. On the other hand, the other claims of the heirs in their requests do not meet these standards. Both the claims of contradictions between the arbitration award and the parallel arbitration award, and the claims regarding the enforcement of the guarantee, are essentially appellate claims that do not establish grounds for granting leave to appeal (see, for example, recently:  Civil Appeal 39387-07-26 Natan Raskin Law Firm v. Sharon Nahav Agricultural Incomes Ltd. (9.8.2026);  Civil Appeal Permission 24621-07-26 Zrua Moshav Ovdim for Cooperative Agricultural Settlement Ltd. v. Elbaz (30.7.2026)).
  3. I will therefore turn to the fundamental question at the heart of our matter, concerning the limits of an arbitrator's authority towards an alternate heir of a party to an arbitration agreement, and in particular his authority to hold the heir personally liable for the estate's debts.
  4. Fundamental principles are that arbitration derives its power from the parties' agreement to resolve disputes between them before an arbitrator. The element of consent is the foundational element of arbitration and what gives it vitality (see among many: The Investment Cells case, paragraph 10; Civil Appeal 18749-09-24 Safrin v. Volk, paragraph 13 (13.1.2025)). Two important principles arise from the establishment of agreement: first, that the arbitrator's authority is valid only towards the parties to the arbitration agreement (Investment Cells case, ibid.;  Civil  Appeal Authority 1950/20 Yafe v. Diamant, para. 14 (10.5.2020)); and second, that the arbitrator's authority extends solely to the issues submitted for decision by the parties (Civil Appeal Authority 8930/22 Achim Petashi Construction Company Ltd. v. M.R.R.G. Entrepreneurship Ltd., para. 9 (24.4.2023);  Civil Appeal Authority 4095/12 Magnazi Infrastructure B.G.M Ltd. v. Sikik Earthworks and Development Ltd., paragraphs 16-19 (13.11.2012); Civil Appeal Authority 2638/18 Anonymous Company v. Anonymous Partnership, paragraph 14 (6.5.2018) (hereinafter: Anonymous Company case)).
  5. To the first principle regarding the applicability of arbitration only to the parties to the arbitration agreement, there are several exceptions (for more details see: Investment Cells case; Civil Appeal Authority 3925/12 Ronen v. Cohen (17.6.2013) (hereinafter: the Ronen case); See also, for example: Civil Appeal Authority 1030/15 Dadon v. Hadad, paragraph 9 (18.8.2015);  Civil Appeal Authority 6574/13 Amram v. Regev, paragraph 10 (3.12.2013)). One of those exceptions is anchored in Section 4 of the Arbitration Law (part of which was quoted above), which states that:

An arbitration agreement and the authority of an arbitrator according to which their power is valid also regarding the parties' alternatives to the agreement, and the authority of an arbitrator under an arbitration agreement is also granted to a substitute arbitrator, all provided no other intention is implied by the agreement.

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