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Civil Appeal 47526-05-26Leave Jazel Weinrot v. Moshe Gartner - part 4

November 17, 2026
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Liability for the entire estate

  1. (a) If the estate is distributed without summoning the creditors and without the debts known at the time of distribution being settled, each heir is liable for debts that were not settled up to the value of the entire estate at the time of distribution; However, if he proves he was unaware of a certain debt at the time of distribution, he shall be liable only for the value of what he received from the estate.

(b) Proof of the value of the estate or of what the heir received from the estate - on the heir.

From these provisions, it appears that where a deceased person left debts behind, these do not necessarily pass to the heirs in the sense that they themselves are required to bear them, certainly not fully and not automatically. Whenever the estate has not yet been distributed, all debt of the estate will be paid only from the estate's assets, not from the personal assets of the heirs; and even after the estate is divided, the attribution of the deceased's debts to the heirs by deducting their personal assets is limited and can—under various conditions—reach at most the estate's value at the time of division (See also: Civil Appeal 125/89 CPA Ovadia Bales - Liquidator of Kopel Tours Ltd. v. Estate of the late Rosa Rosenberg, PD 46(4) 441,452 (1992); Civil Appeal 8265/03 Aberman v. Real Estate Capital Gains Tax Manager, P.D. 59(4) 180,191 (2005) (hereinafter: the matter Averman); Civil Appeal 810/77 Darwish v. Lusthaus, PD 33(3) 355,359-358 (1979); Civil Appeal 865/76 Lopez v. Shoshani, PD 31(3) 748,754-753 (1977) (hereinafter: Case) Lopez); Civil Appeal 110/89The Official Receiver as liquidator of Bank North America Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Gilboa, P.D. 46(3) 638,641 (1992) (hereinafter: the matter Gilboa)).

  1. Therefore, when an arbitration award is given establishing liability of the testator that arose prior to their death, it creates   a valid debt of the estate—for which  the heir is responsible for disposing  of it  (see also: Sections 82 and 123-124 of the Inheritance Law); but they are not necessarily obligated to bear it personally. Although under certain circumstances the heir may be liable, it depends on a wide range of variables—including the actual distribution of the estate, its value, the heir's share in the estate, and the appointment of the testator's creditors.
  2. Naturally, the fact that the personal responsibility of the successor-heir to bear the estate's debts determined in the arbitration award is not self-evident and depends on a variety of factual questions, may provide fertile ground for disputes between the parties, the heir on one side and the creditor on the other. Indeed, this issue is not unique to cases involving arbitration proceedings, and it may also arise regarding the enforcement of judgments given by a court (see, for example: the Lopez case, pp. 753-754). However, unlike court proceedings, where there is generally no objection to examining such issues within the dispute itself or in an additional claim filed with the same court, arbitration can only be done if consent has been given by the heir-surrogate. The reason for this lies in the fact that resolving disputes regarding  the heir's personal  liability for the debt revolves around    the heir's own actions and actions and involves him not as a substitute but  as an independent party. As such, it cannot be handed over to an arbitrator within an arbitration agreement to which the heir is not a party. The heir's consent is a constituent condition to grant the arbitrator the authority to decide on personal liability, and the fact that he entered the proceeding as a substitute does not circumvent the need for this consent. The consent can be explicit or even implied (see the case of "expansion circles" recognized in case law: Investment Cells case, paragraph 10; Ronen case). However, in the absence of agreement, even if the original arbitration clause between the testator and the opposing party explicitly included  a provision stating that issues related  to imposing personal liability on the testator's heirs would also be resolved in arbitration, the arbitrator's authority ends with the decision on the very question of the deceased party's obligation. It is obvious that as long as the scope of the heir's responsibility for the estate's debts under the Inheritance Law is clear and undisputed between the parties, then the arbitration award will bind the heir personally (subject to, of course, the provisions and limitations of the Inheritance Law).
  3. Indeed, this means that sometimes the arbitration award will not be the final word for the creditor, and they will have to conduct an additional separate proceeding with the heir in order to obligate them personally to bear the estate's debts (see and compare: Civil Appeal 8602/12 Menachem v. Golan, paragraph 7 (16.1.2013); Civil Appeal 4923/09 Arafat v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd., paragraph 5 and references therein (12.10.2010) (hereinafter: the Arafat case); the Gilboa case). However, as mentioned, such a scenario exists even when the dispute was initially resolved before a court. In any case, this consideration does not overcome the difficulty inherent in a situation where an arbitrator appointed with the consent of the testator and creditor decides issues concerning the liability of heirs who were not parties to the said agreement (see and compare: Investment Cells case, paragraph 28).
  4. To all the above, it should be added that where the arbitration award has been approved by a court, there are various legal ways that, under certain circumstances, allow for its execution or at least to advance the matter (see, for example: Section 78 of the Execution Law, 1967 (hereinafter: the Execution Law) and Regulation 10a of the Execution Regulations, 1979, which recognize the possibility of taking enforcement proceedings against a deceased debtor; Section 78a of the Execution Law and Section E1 of the Inheritance Law, which anchor special tracks for collection from a deceased debtor's bank account up to an amount of 20,000 ILS; and Section 78 of the Inheritance Law, which allows the creditor to act to appoint an estate administrator to advance the settlement of their debt. For further details, see also: David Bar-Ofir, Enforcement - Procedures and Rules 1 202-204 (7th edition, 2025). Indeed, sometimes the creditor may encounter difficulties that require taking additional legal action, as mentioned above, but this is not necessary in every case.
  5. The claimant will argue that the difficulty inherent in conducting arbitration proceedings against an heir can be resolved by placing the estate itself as a substitute. However, as has been established more than once, an estate is not a legal entity but serves merely as a term for all assets, rights, and obligations left by a person after their passing, which pass to their legal heirs (see, for example: Civil Appeal 148/53 Penz v. Feldman, PD 9 1711, 1719 (1955) (hereinafter: Penz case);  Civil Appeal 395/70 State of Israel v. Arabi, PD 25(2) 20, 24 (1971); Averman case, p. 189; for more see also: Shaul Shochat, Nahum Feinberg, and Yehezkel Plumin, Inheritance and Estate Law 6-11 (2014)). Therefore, just as an asset cannot serve as a "party" in a legal proceeding, so too can an estate not serve as such (see over the years: Pentz case, pp. 1719-1720; Civil Appeal 181/67 Greenshpan v. Sharabi, PD 21(2) 630,639 (1967);  Civil  Appeal Authority 6590/10  Estate of the late Fuad Ashtiyeh v. State of Israel - Ministry of Defense, paragraphs 5-7 (28.5.2012); Civil Appeal Authority 5059/10 Alum Gold Ltd. v. Dor, para. 10 (10.8.2010); See also: Uri Goren, Civil Procedure Issues 1285 (13th edition, 2020)). Indeed, in practical life, the estate is often used as a "litigant" in various pleadings (including in proceedings before a court). However, this practice is inconsistent with the provisions of the law (see: Civil Appeal 7717/20 State of Israel - Israel Land Authority v. Estate of the late Ismail Muhammad Ismail Ahmad, of  blessed memory (20.3.2025); see also: Regulations 36 and 38 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 1984; Nadik case, paragraph 17; Kasum case, paragraph 4; and court registrar case law: Arafat case, paragraphs 3-5).
  6. Let's summarize so far:

(-) Section 4 of the Arbitration Law is an exception to the rule according to which the arbitrator's authority applies only to the parties to the arbitration agreement, and by virtue of it, arbitration proceedings can also be conducted against a substitute party to the agreement. Substitution may exist in circumstances where a right or liability has been transferred from one party to another, provided that the cause of action against the original party to the agreement has not changed with the assignment.

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